LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
i^. mppn0 !f n. 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



THE 



Civil Polity ofthe United States 



CONSIDERED IN 



Its Theory and Practice. 





BY A MEMBER OF THE NEW YOEK BAR. 






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CHICAGO: 


CUSHTNG, 


Thomas & Co , Printers and Publishers. 






1883. 



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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by 

MEEDS TUTHILL, .' ' <j Ut | V 
In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



V 



CONTENTS. 



Chapter I. — Origin and Growth of the United States 1 

Chapter II. — Sketch of Civil Politj^ in General 8 

I. — The Power to Design, as General Ground 

II. — Relation of State to Citizens, as Ground of Reci- 
procal Development 

III.— The Religious Ground ;— Faith in Truth and in 

Persons 

IV. — Greek and Roman States. — Deficient Views of Law 
and Lawmakers _ 

Chapter III. — Distribution of Powers in the Nation 42 

Chapter IV.— The Two Parties, and their Use of Power .54 

What Written Constitutions Signify in General. — 
The U. S. Constitution.— Necessity of Two Parties 
for General Judgment. — Their Use of the Con- 
stitution and of the Powers it Distributes 

Chapter V. — Methods of Government 65 

Legislative: Executive: Judicial: — each a trinity of 
Powers ; the three a moral Self-government. — 
Relation of the Two Parties in each Sphere 

Chapter VI. — Methods of Civil Service - 79 

I. — Suffrage designed as Choice of Persons.— The 

Electoral College, etc 

II. — Qualifications for the Suffragan and other Officials. 
Citizens and Foreigners. — Woman-Suffrage. — 
Election Laws.— Difference of Parties in Use of 
the Suffrage. — Effect of the Party- system upon 
Suffrage and Office-holding in General: requires an 
organized choice of either men or measures. — Abuse 
of Party-methods by one party and neglect by the 
other *. 



II CONTENTS. 

III. — Methods of Appointment, auu of Removal from 
Ofl&ce. — The Civil Service Reform. — The Tenure of 
Office Act. — The Method of Impeachment. — Party 
Relation to these subjects^ 

Chapter VII.— Methods of Taxation, of Finance, and of Com- 
mercial and Industrial Development 104 

I. — National and State Taxation. — Foreign Relations 
and Methods. — Protection and Free-trade. — The 
Power and Duty to Discriminate — A "Tariff for 
Revenue Only." — True Criterion for Development 
of Commerce and Industry. — Attitudes of Parties 

on Questions of Taxation and Finance 

II. — Financial Methods. — Hamilton and his Successors. 
— The Legal Tender Act and its Consequences 

Chapter VIII. — Business Methods. — Property and Personal 

Rights 130 

False Views of Government, — by force, not of 
force. — Self-government, and its Mutuality. — The 
Basis and Origin of Property. — English Theory and 
Practice. — Laws Regarding Property. — Personal 
Nature of both Liberty and Property. — Criminal 
and Civil Remedies. — Abuses of Liberty and Prop- 
erty. — False Views of Self-interest. — Conflict Be- 
tween Capital and Labor. — Strikes and Monopol- 
ies. — Communism the Logical Outgrowth of Feu- 
dal Relation between Capital and Labor, and the 
Completion of Natural Theories of Property . 

Chapter IX. — Business Methods: — Private and Public Trusts; — 

Patent Rights; — Corporations 159 

I. — The law of trust essential to both personal liberty 
and property. The right of all to good inven- 
tions, Capital most fruitful as accumulated know- 
ledge 

II. — Patent-rights and Copyrights 

III. — The Nature of Corporate Trusts. Their use in 



CONTENTS. Ill 

England; their abuse in this country. Labor 
Organizations. True interest of Capital and 

Labor. Reform of Business Methods 

Chapter X. — Theory and Practice of Education in the Nation. . . 177 

I. — Ethical Theories of Education and Evolution 

IL — Practical Education in Schools, etc 

III. — Literature 

IV.— The Press 

Chapter XI.— Morality 307 

I. — Spheres and Modes of Moral Suasion 

II. — National and State laws of Morality. Liquor-sel- 
ling and liquor-drinking. False views of per- 
sonal liberty. Right and duty to regulate the 

Uquor- traffic 

III.— Moral Use of Evils 

Chapter XII. — Religion; its relation to the Nation and to Indi- 
viduals 336 

I. — Prevalent Theories of Religion. Spencer, Comte, 
Voltaire, etc. Nullity of abstract, necessity of 

personal views of Religion 

II. — The Nation protecting, and protected by Religion, 
The criterion for National judgment of a Relig- 
ion. The Christian Religion. Irreligion and its 
rights. Buddhists. Mahommedans. Mormons.. 
III. — Religious Education of the Individual; by State 

and Church, by Science, Art and Philosophy 

IV. — Agnosticism and Modern Society 

Chapter XIIL— The Future of the Nation 358 

I. — Dependent on the character and conduct of Parties. 

II. — Relation to foreign nations, etc 

III. — The Moral intent. A future of moral persons, or 
one of feudal things. 



Civil Polity of the United States. 



CHAPTER I. 

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The facts respecting the origin and growth of our Nation have been 
and may be easily poetized, eulogized and speculated upon, as to what 
they contain beyond what lies upon the surface. But this carries them 
out of the scope of ordinary observation. Every fact, however simple 
or commonplace, contains such immeasurable things. Even the fall 
of a stone has that in it for which the explanation "gravity" is mere 
name, and does not tell us what makes the stone fall. Much more in 
the rise and fortunes of a State, is there a boundles<5 exuberance of this 
"we-know-not-what," within the facts, though it be not essentially 
any more unexplainable than is that simpler "what is it" that makes 
the stone fall. It does not come within the purpose of this sketch, 
either to surmise or attempt to state what lies within or beyond the 
simple facts respecting the origin and growth of the United States. 
Let each one rather think for himself what wealth of glory, or what 
weight of shame may come from a purposeful development of the facts. 
For though all facts have their own logical sequences, yet for Man, as 
a living purpose in this world, they are also material to be worked 
upon. They may be moulded more or less into his likeness, by being 
wrested from their mechanical tendencies. They may be attuned to 
such harmonies with his spirit as those by which the walls of Thebes 
were typically fabled to have been moved into their mathematic adjust- 
ment to the sound of the Orphean lyre. 

The "simple" fact respecting the origin of the States that compose 
our Union is, that it was heterogeneous. Both in the public and pri- 
vate motives which prompted the discovery and settling of these 
States, there was a mixture of all the motives, good, bad and indif- 
ferent, which can be described or imagined. In this respect, the truth 
is that the whole world came here, just as it was, just as it always is, 
in its entirety, as the world of Man's hopes and strivings. Nations 
were prompted by lust of power, ambition for predominance, greed 



3 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

for gold, desire to get' rid of the turbulent; all these motives seem 
still to inspire nations. As to individuals, their objects were not less 
heterogeneous; they rounaed up the full measure of private motives. 
Necessity, chance, choice, devotion, fear, hope, all had their word to 
say in the matter. Every imaginable motive was there. And why 
should the truth be less than this? This alone is what fills our land 
with the full life of humanity, and gives us as a nation the heart-throb 
of the world entire. 

It is common to point to the fact that desire for religious freedom 
peopled part of our shores, as though this gave a sacred tinge to our 
destiny. But this is only part of the fact; and the whole fact speaks 
more loudly and completely to the purpose. Whoever has the religion 
of the world must therein bear the burdens of the world. It is these 
burdens, which man makes for himself, in his endless striving to be a 
power in the world, through failure or success, through suffering or 
joy, that make of religion a necessity for him — nay, which reveal it as 
his inmost prompting through evil as well as good. Religion is his 
"gravity." 

This heterogeneous origin rests ultimately, on something "homo- 
geneous," but by no means simple; on the contrary, as in the whole, 
so in each individual, it begins with an intense activity vastly differen- 
tiated, clearly a world of thoughts in full poise and swing. Such an 
origin, so pregnant and fully ripe with capacities for immediately diver- 
sified good and evil, doubtless no other nation ever had. But this is 
only an incident of the progress of the world in general. Postponed 
until this present time, and with the auxiliaries of human will devel- 
oped as now, the conquest and settlement of this continent would have 
exhibited a seething overflow of energy that must at least have crowded 
two or more centuries into one. With time, Man rises above time, 
more and more; so that in space his projects get an accelerated frui- 
tion. This is a palpable fact, whatever may be inferred from it, as to 
all that is within it. This ''fall of man" is another "acceleration," 
over whose laws the statesmen may or may not ponder, but the future 
of which he can at least foresee and should care for. This ever 
pent-up, ever entire and unexpended energy of the race, is becoming 
terrific for those who look back; it is dynamitical for those who will 
not look ahead. Woe to those who merely obstruct its way ! blessings 
for those who can prepare its way, that all its paths may be paths of 
peace. 

The growth of this country, then, was marvellous only for those 
who lived before it. Every age has its growth according to what is in 
it. Superficially it may be said that the bringing here of both slavery 
and freedom as yokefellows for a commonweal was a chance. But 
among the heterogeneous mass of impulses which made our origin. 



OKIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 6 

these two only struck out in full relief that contrast of good and evil 
in the whole as a whole, and which alone made it a whole — a complete 
exhibition of the pioblem of human destiny. It marked the fact that 
among' the things Man has to do is to rule Man himself as well as the 
external world. That is what the State is for, to rule over Man, if 
necessary by force; but the State may be made to present itself to him 
only as a law, a law which he can see to be right; a law also which, if 
intelligent enough, he can make for himself. Thus the education of 
the State leads directly to the true solution, namely, that the man who 
has tobe ruled is just the Man who also rules; in other words, that real 
freedom is possible for all only when every man rules himself as he 
would a slave, in respect to what he deems wrong. 

But if the principle is laid down that the slave is what is possibly 
permanent in a man, and that some men have only that relation to 
other men, this extreme view only serves to drive others' views to the 
contrary extreme, and to pit the issue once for all in its naked sim- 
plicity: — whether mankind itself can be divided in this way as half 
free and half-slave, and whether this is the solution of the question as 
to what that moral intensity is which seethes in Man, and calls 
itself Religion. Without slavery to thus pose the question, it may well 
be doubted whether this Nation would have yet gone deep enough into 
its own common thoughts to know what it is that makes it a nation, or 
to feel what is the necessity laid upon it if it would fulfill completely 
its destiny as a nation. In a peculiar way, as we have noted, it has 
been from the first our fortune, to be compendious as to our content, 
and lacking nothing that is in Man, whether for evil or for good. 
This completeness of the problem has been laid upon us, and it can- 
not be put off with partial solutions. 

This is the situation, and this explains what has been, what is, and 
probably also what will be the civil polity of this JSTation. Its compro- 
mises in the past, vain attempts to escape from a certainty, its vacilla- 
tions in the present, due partly to terrible shocks, partly to paralysis of 
all statesmanship by a general absorption in greed for wealth, partly to 
the old habit of mere makeshifts, and of putting off all political action 
till a crisis demands it; all these and an undue confidence in a let-alone 
policy for the future, are but the outgrowth, and show the earmarks of 
the same heterogeneous mixture of good, bad and indifferent with which 
the childhood of the Nation began. For it has only just attained to 
manhood; it can scarcely be called matured. It has settled only with 
the past, but has no policy of a definite sort for the future; does not 
realize that any is needed, has not thought of the future, but drifts 
into it. 

This failure to have any really definite policy is what indeed must 
always characterize all governments which look anxiously for their 



4 THE CIvrL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

justification and support to the opinion of the many. Precisely what 
this many have not got is this " public opinion " looked for. Ready- 
made opinion on all questions under the sun cannot be found with any 
one safely, even the most intelligent; hence least of all with the many 
who have not even the means for forming such an opinion. What is 
the public opinion ? is a question which must needs be unsettled on 
most points, and of course in respect to new affairs. Such a criterion 
for either executive or legislative guidance must therefore be an uncer- 
tain one. It is easy to see how it seems to leave more latitude to the 
evil than to the good. Practically the rule amounts to this: that noth- 
ing can be condemned except after trial; it must first enter into and be 
rejected by the public experience. This gives to the society as a whole 
the air of a merely animal judgment, and to it-s progress the degener- 
ate character of a merely material growth. Since it has no opinion, it 
merely touches what is met with, and if too much resistance is felt, 
takes another route; "the easiest way is the best" where there is so 
much free choice of an easier. And where public opinion seems fully 
made up only on one point, namely, that the main point is to get a 
living, the other points will not receive much discussion. Hence in 
the history of this country there has been little or no invention ex- 
cept of machines. In respect to civil government the old forms of 
organization have been accepted, and twisted into adaptation. 

Thus the Colonial form was turned into State form and "persists'' 
in the "Territorj^" also. The league form was first at hand as a 
means for unitj^ in the revolt of the Colonies; and it was not conven- 
ient to settle what public opinion then was as to whether the "Union" 
was a mere federal compact of States or a Nation. Nor was this ques- 
tion settled until it was posed in its naked contrast as a question 
whether it should be a Nation or not. This is a question as to whether 
all men, or only part, shall constitute public opinion as to what is to 
rule. For every nation, whether ostensibly or not, depends upon its 
public opinion, and its forms of government depend only upon the 
state of it as more or less expressed and thus rendered definite to the 
general consciousness as to what it is, 

De Tocqueville misstates a mere fact for a capacity, when he says 
that a democratic government cannot rise above the average intelli- 
gence of its members. That it will not, may or may not be the case, 
and very likely it will illustrate that possibility of falling below even 
its "average intelligence," which the keen critic leaves open for it but 
politely only intimates. But it is equally true of every form of gov- 
ernment that it will not rise above the average intelligence so far as 
that is an opinion merely as to form. An aristocratic government falls 
lowest of all in this respect, because it takes advantage of the general 
■ignorance as to what a State should be, to enslave the whole in a stupid 



ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 5 

admiration of what it is merely as a force. So long as the national 
spirit is worshipful of force, it will get force in some form for its ruler. 
The worship of wealth will make wealth the ruler. The god is always 
what is worshipped, and reveals himself accordingly. 

De Tocqueville, Frenchmanlike, looks mainly at the matter of or- 
ganization. The ability to organize perfectly evinces and demands 
intelligence. And far more admirable than the wisdom shown in even 
vital organism, is that which can so organize a State as to give perfect 
expression, or means of immediate expression, as if by a look or a voice, 
to all that is as yet really definite and asks for expression, in the senti- 
ments and opinions of the people. But there is a danger in this sup- 
posed perfection of the machinery of a State which the French, in 
their admiration for perfect organism, do not appreciate. Hence, in- 
spired though they be instinctively by a love of order, yet most of all 
nations have they been troubled with disorder. The difficulty is that 
merely mechanical order is not in the nature of a State. It can 
neither express what, as intelligence, is ever varying, nor can it adapt 
itself to this variability; anew machine is necessary for every change 
of opinion. Or, just as sense organs limit the intelligence itself so 
-long as it looks merely through them, so also with the organized forms 
of the State ; the tendency is, if these are regarded as already perfect, 
to think no more, as in China; or else, as in England, to regard new 
ideas as at least suspicious and prima facie immoral, simply because 
they are new, and hence are not expressed or calculated upon in the ex- 
isting forms of the State. 

Now the origin and crowth of this Nation, have been such as to 
defeat any intention, had there been any, to fix a special organic form 
loi all time as a model government of the mechanical sort, which must 
rather form Ihe people than they it. So also the sweep of events has 
lifted us high and "fancy free " above the safe anchorage principle of 
the English ship of state. We rather flatter ourselves that we have, 
hy some happy chance or other, got an adaptable system, something 
that will fit all changes whether of opinion, circumstances or events in 
the future. 

Under this illusion, we fail to observe, what did not escape De 
Tocqueville' s keen perception, that we have really evinced little or no 
political invention. We prefer to follow precedents, and adopt tem- 
porary expedients, and test by trial, rather than venture upon any 
theoretical thought. In this way the typical "statesman" becomes 
modelled upon the average intelligence and prides himself upon not 
rising above that. Why should he? Does he not depend upon that, 
both for his election and his confirmation in the political church? If 
he falls below it, in a new matter, who is to blame him, since it is not 
jet expressed? He will conform to it when exiDressed; but meanwhile 



b THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

it is perhaps quite as safe to fall below as to go above it; especially 
when majorities are narrow, or can be made narrow. In such a state 
of things, where public opinion merely floats and waits for an occasion 
to decide, it is evident that many occasions must pass without the' de- 
cision, and that in general only a crisis where things have gone to ex- 
tremes decides anything, and then only for one extreme rather than 
the other. Hence theory, which unites extremes and moderates them 
into the " middle way," is really needed. If the people are only to be 
called upon to choose between extremes, then the legislatures should 
really avoid these extremes; and the duty of courts is to decide, not so 
much by precedent what has been, as what is to be and ought to be. 
Where public opinion remains pretty much absorbed in the matter of 
private business, and quite aloof from public questions, it is easy for 
such important questions, for example, as those relating to corpora- 
tions, to be decided pro tempore in legislatures, and even in courts, by 
such means and in such a way as to bring about eventually one of 
those crises under which nations quake and all parties concerned are 
injured. 

The diflBculty here is that the public opinion which is to be the 
eventual judge of all in a free State, is not really given to questions of 
public policy; or even so far as it is so given, must remain more or less 
unknown. It is in fact, in a State just what a man's own capacity for 
judging is until it is called into actual exercise. Seeing that all is 
made to depend upon this mere latency of it, in this country, De. 
Tocqueville affirms rightly enough that for executive purposes, such an 
agency is inefficient. But just for this reason it is for moral purposes 
the most efficient. In a State where all opinions are free, and efficient 
when expressed, there is a possibility of more good being effected than 
in any other State. For when it comes to a clash of opinions there is 
a question of truth and not merely of private interests. Just because 
all opinions are there, the tmth alone can survive the conflict and be 
eliminated, as that alone in which all men are unquestionably in a com- 
mon possession and a common right, as something autlioritative over 
all. In such a Nation, public opinion and its efficiency both can and 
must rise above the average intelligence. In any other nation it both 
will not and cannot; simply because not the truth, but only clashing 
interests are brought in question. This is DeTocqueville's mistake 
with reference to the nature of our government, in taking its actual 
waiting upon a latent public opinion for an incapacity of that public 
opinion itself. It is equally error, however, to go to the other extreme, 
and deify the "vox populi.''^ It can be right if it will, but only if it 
will. It can decide the truth, but not unless it decides it as truth, and 
hence by rising above the average intelligence as to what has been ex- 
perienced, into the broad Heaven's light of theoretical truth, as to what- 
ought to be enacted. 



ORIGIN" AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES. 7 

Public opinion in this nation is not insensible to the inefficiency 
which results from its lack of expression in time to be efficient. Hence 
the power of the public press. Half unawares, those who use it feel 
they have a duty to utter the voice which cannot utter itself. 
Many do this doubtless with a keen sense that they ought to rise far 
above the average intelligence. Others may ask whether it "will pay" 
to do this, and so subside into expediency as "politic," or take for 
criterion of what they shall say, whatever seems to be current, count- 
ing that to be the "best for the hour." Others make it into a theory 
of true journalism, to be a mere echo of the present, and a mirror for 
the public to behold itself in; or further still, hold it to be the "duty" 
of the press merely to express what the average public opinion is, and 
not what it ought to be, or would be if clarified. Still others, aware 
of the unconscious way in which most people identify themselves with 
what they read, use the press as one of the means of advancing their 
own interests. Thus the press itself is but a mixture of voices, a con- 
fusion of tongues; and its Babel only demonstrates again the fact that 
that public opinion upon which the State must rest for its safety, that 
inmost vitality which can endure all and renew its youth in everlast- 
ing springs, — must be an opinion as to the truth. 

It will be well therefore to introduce this sketch of what is actually 
the policy of the nation, by at least a brief account of Civil Polity in 
general. This cannot be done here in a fully phi-losophical way, 
showing the connections of State, Church, Family and Natural life, as 
diflEerent spheres of Man's spiritual endeavor; nor can it be traced even 
in its successive phases as a historical development. We can only 
hope to give some general view of what is necessary to a State which 
will at least suffice to carry suggestion with it as to what must be left 
unsaid. 



CHAPTER II. 

CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 

1. — The Power to Design as General Ground. 
II. — Relation op State to Citizens, as Ground op Reciprocal. 

Development. 
III. — The Religious Ground:— Faith in Truth and in Persons. 
IV. — Greek and Roman States — Depicient Views op Law and 

Lawmaker. 

It may be said that the intent of a civil polity is to promote har- 
mony and prevent discord in the human family. But this implies that 
grounds exist for both the harmony and the discord. No theory of a 
polity would be rationalized, therefore, until these grounds were clearly 
discerned and put to use for the purpose. Before this clear perception 
of the means to be used, there would be no civil polity properly so 
called, no designed adaptation of means to ends. There would be a 
state of society, but not of civil polity. There would be a family 
state; for the human race, like every other genus of animals, is by Na- 
ture a family; but there would be no organized relation of men, such 
as we call a civil State, resting upon principles which, while they in- 
clude the Natural relation, do so only by resting upon what is within 
and beyond or above it. 

I. It is easy to see that what harmonizes men is what they are will- 
ing to have in common, and that what occasions separation and discord 
is what they are not willing to have in common. But these vary with 
their situation as natural beings and their development as thinking 
beings. And only at an advanced stage of self-consciousness do Taen 
clearly perceive that the former is idea, and the latter what they call 
" life, liberty and property." 

Neglecting to note this difference between the partial and full self- 
consciousness of mankind, some writers confuse Natural Society with 
civil society, and try to derive a State from merely animal relations. 
But as no man fully knows himself as man, until he is conscious of 
having in idea something he can form and reform at his will, so no so- 
ciety comes to a capacity for organizing a State till it is conscious of 
ideas which all have in common, and all want to erect into a law for 
common action. For with this consciousness of thought as a design- 
ing power apart from and above Nature, comes also for man the con- 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. if 

sciousness that he has various powers; a power to thiak, in which he 
is substantially in an absolute unity at bottom with all his fellow -men ; 
a power to design or express his thoughts, in which he may differ in 
excellence but need not come in conflict with anj''; but also a power 
over Nature, in the exercise of which he must more or less be subject 
to competition, rivalry and collision with all others. This power 
which Man has over Nature, then, is the ground of conflict, his power' 
to think is the ground of unity, and his power to design and will the 
execution of his design is the ground both for harmony and for discord 
with his fellow-men. The very business of a State is to organize the 
relation of these three powers of which men have become conscious. 

Now in this process of organizing a State as a mutual relating, in 
harmonious exercise, these three powers of mankind, the inventive 
power is itself the mediator, the finder of means to harmonize wills, 
just as it is also the stimulus of wills into their opposition to each other. 
It both creates and remedies the difficulty. In this respect it is anal- 
ogous to gravity, which, being attractive as law and repulsive as form, 
is a maker of solar systems. But to look upon this forming of States 
by Man's own invention as a merely mechanical affair, and identical 
with the action of force, is to deny all freedom to Man's inventive 
power and to make of force itself the reason and the maker of right. 
On the contrary, force is only one of the powers which Man uses; and 
the business of the State is to coordinate it with his other and higher 
powers, and in subjection to them, as only a means of expression. 

No doubt mankind have had and still have these powers, and use 
them in an instinctive way, before they attain to an intelligent con- 
sciousness of them, and of how to relate them rationally. Hence the 
phenomena of states of human society more or less above animal so- 
ciety, but far below the character of a well-organized civil State. 
Even high intelligence is not enough if confined to a few. The per- 
fect State does not issue from even a wise control of the few over the 
many, but only from an intelligent concord of the many in the same 
design. The inventive power must be active in all; this is what Mr. 
Seward, with the keen eye of a true statesman, pronounced lacking in 
China. He saw it was "paralyzed" there by an enforced devotion to 
inherited forms of government; as though a Civil Society were, like 
an animal, to accept from its ancestors a certain organism, as a genus 
which it cannot surpass or even change. So also in Hindoostan the 
same statesman observes that the intelligence of the few, unsurpassed 
merely as capacity for intelligence, has never risen to the capacity for 
forming a State, because lost in merely metaphysical views — a sort of 
identification of the operation of the moral world with that of the 
physical world which has disabled even the few from seizing upon the 
true relation of Man's powers, and transferring this in a systematic 



10 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

way to the construction of a State. Always, when only the few do 
the thinking, the mass of men are, in one way or another, made into 
mere material for the civil power. There is a logical consistenc}^ in 
such forms of a State even when despotic, and even a necessity for 
them-, because when the many do not invent, they have really no 
proper power of possession: it is the man's power to create, to invent 
and make, which gives him the right of property. Hence the neces- 
sity for intelligence, not merely as a capacity to think, but also as a 
practical power and will to design and create. When this is exuberant 
in all, there is a necessity for a perfect state which shall itself be an 
invention, and one of the highest and noblest inventions of a common 
ingenuity, seeking to relate all the powers of men in a concord of 
common efforts for common ends. 

These remarks may perhaps suffice to show that a really free State 
is essentially a "morality" — a rational coordination of individual 
men, whereby their necessary separation, as actors in and upon Nature 
is made into a harmonious unitj^ through their conscious possession of 
idea as a common arbiter and authority. This inevitable resolution of 
a true State into a Moral relation, and the consequent fundamental 
dependence of it at last upon a religious relation, is what must strike 
us in every phase of the discussion, as what is the secret, — the behind 
the veil, — the unsayable, of all this process of State-making. This 
;may be further enlarged upon in treating of the policy of this Nation 
in respect to morals and religion. Here we must be content to add in 
an unsystematic and cursory way some merely illustrative suggestions. 

The general problem in the forming of a State, as we have noted, 
is to so relate the three powers which all men possess, and so regulate 
their exercise, as to give the greatest freedom to all consistent with the 
general harmony. But this is precisely the problem which presents 
Itself to every individual man as the problem of his own greatest per- 
sonal freedom as a man. Were it not so, the same problem would not 
be reflected into the State as a question for that, in the guise of a larger 
or collective man. And for the same reason is it that we find 
in some State-solutions of it, those imperfections which spring 
from and reflect the half -conscious, and only tentative way in which 
the citizens themselves go about solving the question as a personal 
matter; each for himself, according to the degree in which he has de- 
veloped and become conscious of his various powers as a man . The 
U. S. Constitution itself, and those of the States, advanced as they 
may be in the political art, over ancient codes, yet hi triy this merely 
half -reflection of the individual, and the consequent adoption of forms 
created by what may be called a mutual estoppel, rather than a mu'ual 
agreement. The individual thought itself had not gone far enough to 
see clearly what man is and wants, and how best to obtain it; but only 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 11 

rather to vaguely feel a repugnance or fear for this or that. Hence 
the "principle " is very fitly called a "balance of power" by those to 
whom such a balance seems static, and not really a Union of several 
into a one complete dynamic activity— a National reality. This tentac- 
ular, fearful mode of proceeding is wise and even necessary where the 
self-consciousness is not complete; for then, feeling rather than thought 
must guide, and prejudice must have its part. But to praise this, as 
some publicists do, as though the necessity for it depended upon some 
mysterious " spirit of a nation," which is conceived of (from the illu- 
sion of a metaphor), as quite parallel in all respects to the "life" which 
forms an animal body, and whose "laws " therefore must be practically 
left to form themselves, — this is one of the superstitions of metaphysi- 
cians. And oddly enough, it is derived from the sphere of mechanics, 
and does not recognize even the unmechanical operation of life, much 
less the mode of thought's development. The necessity in the case 
here depends simply upon an existing stupidity, or inferior develop- 
ment of the general intelligence, which is certainly not to be regarded 
as anything sacred, although it must be considered as a limit or estop- 
pel for the time. Prejudices, although stages in development, are not 
of f^uch divine right to be simply because they are, or even because 
they are precious to the logical evolutionist as "necessary stages," 
that they must needs be let alone till they die out of themselves. They 
are rather weeds, which, if thus let alone and sanctified to boot, will 
live long and propagate lustily. No State can come into the light of 
real freedom, where there is not such a full sense of moral responsi- 
bility in all its members, as to make them get rid as soon as possible of 
stale stages of development, and especially of the notion that they are 
something sacred, and that the "Spirit of the State" is particularly 
resident in and fond of them. However important " evolution " may 
be to the mere theorizer, as a name which describes nothiag, it must 
be for Man at least, as a practical matter, something which he can help 
effectuate; otherwise he would never have known there was such a 
process in reality. 

Since all really turns, then, upon the individual effort, and, on the 
greater or less real freedom of spirit which each brings to it, let us look 
at this moralizing of the relation of Man's three powers, from the in- 
dividual point of view, and see how this comes to require an expres- 
sion in the State and to be reflected in that* And let all its 
imperfections be referred to their true origin, so that the place and 
mode of remedy can be found. 

II Merely by instinct, every man feels that he has a power to 
know, a power to design an outer act, and a power to execute this as 
an act of force. How he exercises these three powers he does not at 
first inquire. When he becomes fully conscious of them, he knows 



12 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

that he has them but can no more explain how he can act upon nat^ 
ural forces, than how he can think or form designs. So long as it seems 
to h'm that all these processes come about by a co-ordination of mutual 
collisions, he carries that notion into the State, and his formings there 
are of the merely tentacular, estoppel sort. Thus he gets the notion of a 
morality which is made for him and not by him, and to that extent he 
loses all sense of moral responsibility for such a "State." Evidently 
he has made of the civil State a mere state of " things," a mechanical 
State. He has made no distinction between the unlimited power he 
has to think, in common with all, and in collision with none, and that 
limited power he has over the form of force. And so long as his think- 
ing is only of designs to be expressed in the form of force, his thinking , 
itself is thereby limited, and not free Neither is his will free in such 
a State of "things " His relation as a designer to others who design, 
is made just the same practically as that of their bodies or physical 
powers. However abstractly they may agree upon a unity of "thoughts 
and things," either as a one law of force, or a one nature of thought, 
yet in fact they, as "persons" are separated; just as much so as 
" spirits" as they are as bodies. No one is "free " All are limited ia 
some fortuitous way, and their intercourse is adjusted only by colli- 
sions. This State of mutual enslavement leads men to deeper reflec- 
tion. 

This reflection is both as to what these three powers are in the man,. 
what their relation to each other should be, and finally, as to the best 
methods of using each. For a man is not fully free even to think till 
he finds the true method of thinking. — the law of true thinking. Nor 
is he perfectly free to design till he is free to think, — then only can he 
determine the best art-method. Nor yet has he his largest freedom in 
exercise of his power over force, till he has learned the law, the meth- 
od of operation in that To all three of his powers therefore the high- 
est freedom comes only from a knowledge of the law of each, — the meth- 
od of each within its own sphere,— of Idea, of Art, or of Nature.— This 
result will recur again and again in various phases; — the only real free- 
dom is in knowing and following law or true method. 

Although the civil State, then, is thus based upon the individual 
"spirit, " (and no other as a ghostly outsider), and though all its phases 
reflect his errors, yet also is the State a necessity to him, to relate him. 
properly to his fellows through a common law, in which alone they 
can be free. He would be non-effective, — not really Man, — merely as 
an isolated individual. Nature is no companion for him. She would, 
make him more mute th m herself. What would her noises signify, or 
even her echoes; where there was no speech of thought? Animals have 
a voice, birds have a song; but it perishes with the uttering. Nature 
has no memory, and no silent monuments of her past throes can stand. 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 13 

as a history. History appeals to a thinking which reconceives it, and 
Man would have no history but for fellow -men, in whose memories the 
past is garnered up. He would have no " development," but for this 
accumulation of a past thinking which he ?'ethinks, takes as "au - 
thority" for the time, but improves upon, and himself developes into 
broader views of the present, as well as of the past. And thus he makes 
it into more and more a foresight of the future, through his finding in 
it a law, — a true mode of thinking which is law for all and overrules 
all past imperfections. In short, Man is so related to his fellows 
that expression to them is a necessity for him as a thinking being; and 
the force- form or '"body" which separates him from them is the very 
means for this expression. As soon as he thinks, he wants to speak, — 
he lives as a Word in the world; — every child shows that. " Man does 
not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of his 
mouth." Without this expression of his thought, there would be no 
" evolution " for him He does not show himself merely as a " force, " 
nor even merely as a "life,'* but as an active form of thought 
uttering itself. 

Now, even as thinking -being alone, Man requires some agreement 
with his fellows as to the mode of expression. Language is a conven- 
tional mode of using force for this purpose, and it is his own invention, 
his designed and elaborated invention. However instinctive his use 
and appropriation of the force form of power may be here, as in every 
other case in which he exercises it, yet he shows himself capable of 
using it as no animal does or can; he subjugates it arbitrarily by mere 
convention into an expression of idea. He needs agreement therefore 
with his fellows upon the form to be used: 1st, as to the language 
itself, its symbols for things and for relations; 2nd, as to the proper 
use of it; Srd^ as to the abuse of ;t. The comprehension of this mode 
of expression must be an affair of pure thinking; it calls upon the inter- 
locutor for a complete reconstruction bj^ him of the idea which is ex- 
pressed. But so also with respect to all expression, Man is related to 
his fellow man as a thinking being; for what they express to each 
other is their Ideas. 

Yet man is also a living being, an animal ; and is related to others 
by need of common regulation in the sphere of his physical wants. 

Between these two extremes of his nature, as thinking and eating, 
man devours all, the physical and the metaphysical. Neither of these 
exists apart for him in his actual intercourse with others, however he 
may separate them for himself. For the physical, or so-called "real," 
must be used for purposes of expression or other action with reference to 
otliers, and yet it must also be judged of and handled by him as a 
thinking being, and hence by some law of idea. The question for. him 
then is, how properly to relate this ideal and this " real," which shall 



14 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

dominate, which shall be subordinate, and what on the whole shall be 
the common rule, law, or mode of action for all in such a necessarily- 
external intercourse with each other. The total relation is one of 
necessity to combine the physical and the metaphysical as they should 
be,— and to do this by design — by a power and law of design. 

Hence the middle and practical world for men in society is and must 
be amoral world, just as it is for each as an individual. It is a world 
of methods, laws, modes, of fashions; — the mode of doing is what 
extends itself into all, as what he is to look to as a law for him because 
it is so for all. Its authority is in the fact that it is a devised mode, — 
not an accident, but proceeding from some act of thought. However 
trivial it may be, or even transient, this origin of it in a thinking im- 
poses it upon thinking-beings as something superior to mere Nature. 
And it is especially worthy of regard if it show itself at all a com. 
mon thought, an agreed-upon or conventional mode of acting ; for that 
renders it, in so far as it is communal or general, agreeable as a moralitj-. 
In this way, the merely animal, or natural is suppressed in society, even 
by fashions; — by the instinctive common-sense that a thinking-being 
cannot remain a merely natural being, for the reason that, having the 
power to design more and beyond what is done in Nature, he has 
also the right and even the duty so to do. Otherwise he would not be 
himself, would not exercise the thinking-power that is in him in that 
independent way to which it impels him by designing. Hence dress is 
not a sign of shame but a token of glory for mankind. It does not in- 
dicate expulsion from his Eden, but impulsion towards it. Nature is 
not his Eden. His angels point him to a spiritual one, even through his 
instinct to elevate himself above Nature by the art of dress. It is only 
the insane that go naked, or worship the nude as a "classic art." The 
spiritual man knows that when he is " clothed " he is " returned and in 
his right mind." 

Thus the inventive, innovating, creative faculty shows itself as what 
is spiritual in mankind, and as what attracts them from their natural 
diflferences into a harmony in idea. They admire only what they recog- 
nize as originating in this spirit of invention, — this creative power 
which seeks to be admired. This impulse to create, which is also the 
desire to be admired, is that essential unity in difference of masculine 
and feminine in all Art, which enables creative power in general to 
unite what it separates, to harmonize what it creates. And so in 
society, it is what enables creative power properly conducted, to not 
only furnish a true basis for " right of property," but to unite all its crea- 
tions in a community of possession, recognized as none the less real 
because it is held by an ideal instead of a physical "tenure," by a" law" 
instead of by hand, and is enjoyed in the thinking rather than in 
the eyes. It is in this way that the rich man's art gallery, for example. 



CIVIL POLITY IK GENERAL. 15 

er his fine house is enjoyed more, and therefore really possessed more by 
others than by himself. A high civilization creates for all, and cannot 
do otherwise ; but it must create most for those who think most and are 
thus able to recreate and enjoy the very process of the designing. 

Man then is, by his very creative nature as a spirit, estopped intui- 
tively from acting in society merely as an animal or Natural being. 
Jlvery Natural tendency must be moralized, modified as to its expression 
by a common-sense of what is appropriate for one who can think, invent, 
and show himself superior to mere Nature. Man is held obligated to 
fashion himself, control himself, and to moralize all his " Natural dispo- 
sitions," by giving them a form of expression which is fitting for one 
who is not bound in them as his " human nature." 

But since this self-forming or creative power is both an impulse to 
create and a love for admiration, it is not a merely individual affair, but 
has relation to others, as judges and authority for what is done. "Taste" 
is not what it is likened to by metaphor,— a physical appetite. That 
which enacts or authorizes fashions or modes or morals of any sort is 
not mere personal sestheticism, but it is essentiallj' a reverence for com- 
munity in judgment. For it is really indifferent to any particular form 
of beauty, or rather overpowers any merely sensible form of it, and sub- 
stitutes for it a higher ideal of beauty, — the harmonious fellowship of 
spirits in a common idea or in a common action. As to particular 
forms of conception. Beauty is thus referred to its true genus, the abso- 
lute idea of Beauty, which can have, and hence seeks, infinitely many 
particular forms in every inventive mind. In respect to sensible forms, 
the expression is modified, as it should be, rather by a common accept- 
ance than by an isolated preference. In short, the social spirit is the 
moralizing power, in respect to actual expression ; the form must make 
its way gradually without rude jars; for it seeks admiration from all. 
and hence must find in them capacity to accord with it. A new fashion 
is like a new play for children ; it asks all to unite in it. Thus children 
will say: "Let us find something we can all play together." They 
know well that otherwise " there will be no fun in it." Mere fashions 
are mere amusements for the creative power, which is always uneasy 
unless it is making something new. But they must amuse ; and if they 
do this, it is quite immaterial if it do so only for the time, and seem 
" shocking bad taste " afterwards, — more comical than beautiful. So of 
a dance; the delight is not merely sensuous, there must be a notion that 
all are pleased in mind. Let there be a disgruntled one, and all are 
"irritated." When the thought festers, all is sore. 

This love of admiration by the creative power seems thus to subject 
it at first to its admirers, as judges or authority for it. But after all, love 
of admiration is a selfish love and needs to be thus judged and modified 
It must eventually find some higher criterion than these meiely particu- 



16 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

lar judgments. Yet they are sufficient judges of it so far as it, also, is 
only particular, in an affair merely of temporary and formal expression. 
No artist can appeal from the public for which he professedly works ; 
the only question is, — for what public does he work ? These conventional 
authorities must always subsist for the individual in the sphere of ex- 
pression. The}^ are the "judgment" in which he lives merely as an 
appeal for admiration,— a selfish love. But he may go beyond this 
merely selfish desire and its peacock display. If he have also a desire 
to give others the pleasure of admiring, it must be because he knows by 
experience that this must be for them a joy of recreating, — the 
power of which does not depend upon him. He can only offer the occa.- 
sion, and hL nee may venture upon presenting something which, while 
it appeals to a present sense, or a particular thought, yet appeals also 
to all thought and all times, by silently and inwardly unfolding itself 
with a deeper and deeper meaning, according lo the capacity of the one 
who views it to penetrate into all it suggests. Such artistry as that, such 
a true itoiy'jdiZ^ gives a glimpse of what may be the calm confidence 
and unselfish joy of a Divine creating; since it needs to create a self, — 
a thinking, in and by which the Creation must be recreated and so en- 
joyed in a spiritual way, — by feeling its own process. This is the essen. 
tial nature of all called "revelation"; it must reveal itself in its own 
operation and according to the mode of it. That which is spoken for all 
men, for all time, can be uttered only by those i7i whom it is revealed as 
an act in the form of idea. 

Nothing but the particular is "revealed" to those who recognize 
only the particular. Those who address themselves only to the par- 
ticular, speak only of the particular and merely for the time. So far 
as it is spoken only for a present purpose, it may be wise, for it may be 
necessary; yet nevertheless it must be transient; it is not one of those 
"words which men will not willingly let die." 

But this speaking and acting merely for the time is required both 
by the necessities of Man as a living being, and also by his imperfec- 
tions as a thinking-being. The community of ideal development ap- 
pealed to is not developed to capacity for perfect judgment. Yet the 
value of it as a community is not to be disregarded, nor the authority 
of its common voice as to mere matters of expression. Hence it ia 
that pure thinking and its needs, does not take the first place in the 
affections and care of any community. Although it is only because 
Man is a thinking-being that he insists upon moralizing all his actions, 
by adjusting them w^ith those of others according to a general opinion, 
yet since the unity and harmony of action is the main thing sought, it 
is found convenient on the whole to allow the opinions to become, hab- 
itual, or accept them as hereditary. Thus a check is placed on merely 
speculative thinking. Such a thinking "out of time and tune" may 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL, 17 

"he tabooed as " licentious;" it is not to be licensed so far as to intrude 
itself into the sphere of customary action. In this way, restraints of 
thought are its first lessons. But they are good masters since they 
•compel it to deeper reflection, — to the sober second thought, and the 
still wiser third thought, which finds the reason for this contradiction. 
The thought, as final judge in any case, should not pevmit itself a 
merely childish running after every successive new fancy in respect 
to serious matters. This matter of present expression is really an affair 
of no great moment; it can only be temporary; and in that, merely as 
particular, the true thought would have to contradict itself, and deny 
its own permanent truth. This prevention of immediate expression, 
Tiowever, since it rebuts the will of the inventive thinker, his impulse 
to express, may be a suffering; especially if his motive is love of admir- 
ation. But this also is a lesson to avoid that pang, by rising to higher 
motive on the wings of a higher thought. Both for the thinking 
and the will, sufferings maybe lessons; as the Greeks expressed it; 

These congregational judgments, which are authorities for the indi- 
vidual through his own desire for confirmed membership in the fash- 
ionable society of his time, take various forms. Regular education is 
one of them; it continues the past into the future as a consecutive 
thinking; it makes of the child the connecting link for this purpose, 
by filling him with the accumulated judgments of the past, as, for him, 
mere prejudices, — capital for him to start upon and add to. These 
received opinions are not his own judgments; yet, as material, he can 
work upon them if he will, and ought to improve upon them if he can. 
But these and all else he hears and sees, is matter of thought for him, 
it all must be re-thought by him to be received, yet he tends to accept 
it all as from authority, because of his desire to find himself in har- 
mony with others. 

Now that a man maj^ be bound up in prejudices is true; but he is 
only contentedly thus bound, and can break these bonds if he will. No 
education can operate upon him except b}' his own thinking act. Prej- 
udices are not judgments; yet they must at least be re-thought to be 
received. If a man is content with them after reflecting upon and judg- 
ing them for himself, then he confirms them, to the best of his knowl. 
c^ge and belief. If he takes them merely on authority of others, then 
he exercises no judgment on them but only as to the goodness of the 
authority. He consents that some other shall judge for him. This 
last may be the best he can do in the case. It is what we all have to do 
in respect to most matters of a particular sort. Esp'eciallj^ in physical 
science is the prevailing opinion an affair of accumulated and received 
opinion. It is this very necessity of the situation, which calls for 
united effort and at the same time division of labor, even in the sphere 



18 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

of knowledge itself, that makes Society a need of Man, and authority 
of others a law for him. When thus combined with others, he can rise 
to a greater height from having a broader basis,— or, to avoid such an 
insufficient mechanical metaphor, — it is because he is in a vast organ- 
ized activity of a common capacity to think, that he can partake of all 
that proceeds from it. 

Yet it is his own only so far as he himself makes it his own by 
thinking it, or adopts it on strength of his faith in others, either as 
faith in the general activity, or as special faith in persons deemed "ex 
perts." But he is not tied up in this process in any mechanical way. 
He can be as ignorant as he pleases for all the world knows. He can 
scarcely be very wise, if he depends only on his own experience. It 
requires great individual effort to get and keep abreast with all that has 
been thought that is worth re-thinking. No man gets that by "inherit- 
ance," nor by "evolution," either in his "physical system" or in his 
metaphysical. 

This being "bound up in prejudice" is after all an enslavement to 
present habit rather than to the " past " as to something mysterious, 
named a "growth," or "inherited tendency," or a "spirit," according to 
the kind of metaphysical spectacles through which it is contemplated. 
For example, were a man to break his leg, if he be loth to invent, 
and prone to think only of what is customary, it might not even occur 
to him that he could do as the dogs do in such an emergency, carry one 
leg and go on three. This would be a true invention in his case; for 
he has quite lost the " disposition; " he has become prejudiced against 
any ancient "tendency" in him to quadrupedal movement. Even a 
capacity for prejudice proves that the mode itself has become the ob- 
ject of choice; and that man judges between and of Urns. 

Now this power which man has over the physical m general, 
whether as his body or his " property," seems to be what the State has 
mainly to do with, and is called upon to regulate and harmonize as be- 
tween the many. A State would gravely mistake its functions, how- 
ever, if it wholly lost sight of any relation between this and the other 
powers of man. That there is such a relation, and an authoritative one, 
these illustrations from the sphere of ordinary social intercourse, con- 
ventional moralities, etc., serve to show. That a similar relation and 
coordination of powers does or should exist in the civic State, if it is 
to represent the free man, seems obvious. The State should be based 
upon the power and the right of intelligence in all men ; and this must 
be its ultimate authority and guide. But as this is ever active in the 
man, so it should be given an organized and inventive activity in the 
State, It can be expressed there only as a law-making intelligence, — 
an inventing of modes of action whereby the physical power which 
the State must also possess, may be properly related to its fundamental 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 19 

fuaction as a representative of the thinking, man-like intelligence pre- 
sumed to be common to all. Hence, to be operative as a triad of pow- 
ers in activity and not merely dormant, it must have judicial resort of 
an organized kind. And upon what can this judging power be based 
except upon the very nature of idea, — upon what all men are bound to 
think because it is true? 

Thus a State properly organized represents a Man, — represents 
every man as he should be, in a definite known relation of his three 
powers, and in an authoritative reference of them all to truth as the 
final judge. It is an enacted and operative morality. A morality, 
even as conventional or transient only, is, as we have noted, essen- 
tialljr a subordination of power as force to power as intelligence; it is 
exercising the former in a mode designed by the latter. And this is the 
case whether the intelligence be good, bad or indifferent in its modes 
of design. So long as these are referred for judgment only to a com- 
mon consent, or tacit general acceptance, the designing power is 
left in the vague as to its rights, and quasi free as to its exercise, just 
because it is vaguely referred. If this vague notion of the relation of 
the three powers is carried into the State, it will make of it either a 
despotism or a democracy; the former if the citizens are ignorant 
enough to accept any mode in which intelligence can control force, or 
if they are too unruly to bear any sway but that of force; — the latter, 
if the citizens prize their freedom of thinking more than their exercise 
of unregulated force, yet have no definite view as to what the design- 
ing power should be, and hence leave it in the vague and subject to 
merely particular decisions. A partially informed community is apt to 
be fond of this latter kind of State, since it takes away all law for 
designing, and seems thus to make of every one by equal right a de- 
signer, — a law-maker. The making of laws, however, cannot properly 
be thus thrown into the void, either as to its authoritative origin, or 
as to what they can depend upon as judge to accept them. If every 
one has equal right to make, then every one must be consulted as to ac- 
ceptance. This is the error in theory which showed itself, in practice, 
a dissolvent of the Greek autonomies. Instead of gaining a larger and 
larger sphere of common design, they kept dividing into smaller ones • 
till only the individual was left — wholly to himself, but by no means free. 
The difficulty with ancient States was obviously dependent upon the 
imperfect consciousness of the individual, as to the true relation of the 
three powers in himself as a Man. The designing power is just as 
vaguely referred in the State as it is in the Man; and there is no truly 
free designing, by either State or Man, till Design finds a moral rule in 
an absolute origin. Beethoven looked beyond the harmony of music, 
and even beyond the harmony of States, to what is absolute necessity 
for any harmony for Man, when he said: "The true secret of Art lies,,- 
rfter all, in the moral." 



20 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

This is no doubt one way of saying that for any work to be truly 
moral or free Art, its intent must be essentially religious; it must be 
referred for judgment to something beyond merely particular forms; to 
a power which is felt in the creation itself, and also will be felt in the 
so-called ''perception," or "reception," since that must needs be it- 
self a re-creation. Such a design apprehended only by what can de- 
sign it, denotes an absolute freedom of the power or capacity, yet only 
as a law of which the operation being in all, all can re-cognize its true 
and perfect forms, albeit all have not equal active capacity to devise 
them or express them. Others may appreciate Beethoven's music and 
recognize its perfection as well as he, without being at all able to utter 
it for others. 

Now when any individual asks himself whence comes this power to 
design in idea which makes him an individual to himself, and whence 
comes that power he has to express himself or act outwardly in a body 
, or other force form, which makes of him a "person" for others, he may. 
not refer either of these to anything more definite than a mere potency 
or capacity in him for so doing. These two powers he can exercise 
whenever he will and in such, mode as he will, except so far as other 
external wills and forces limit his. This is the disseverance from others 
in which he finds himself as a spirit, or thinking individual, who has 
power over force in some way, so that it can affect him as well as he it; 
otherwise he could not reach others through it nor they him. There is 
an involuntary side, then, to his relation to force forms. But in re- 
spect to his power to think, taken merely as general capacity to know, 
he is utterly involuntary^; he is a must know, whether he will or not; 
the question is only how much, or what particularly he shall know. This 
is a very grave question, however, since it depends not merely on cir 
cumstances but also and mostly on his own active seeking to know. 
Although, then, on this side he is in unity with all men, or in indiffer- 
ence from them, in respect to this involuntary knowing, which is mere 
capacity unless developed by his using it, he may be also in a vast dif- 
ference with them in the really practical respect as to how much of a 
knower he actually is; and especially as to how much, as a prac- 
tical thinker, an accomplished artist, he has real freedom in this 
art of design; — or, in general, as to how much he knows of that funda- 
mental law of all thinking which, after all, must be the final judge, — 
from lack of any other in common, if for no other reason. 

But thus far, the Man, in seeking for a relation wherein to find 
authority, has reached only science in general, or knowing, as a 
capacity which may differ in mtn. And as a true method or law of 
knowing, he has found his authority in philosophy inductive or deduc- 
tive, as an Art of thinking truly. But if he go still further an^d ask, — to 
what is to be referred this involuntary capacity to know, which is 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 21 

ground of unity for all men only so far as it is involuntary, and is just 
as much a ground for diflerence among them practically as capacity for 
design so far as it is voluntary, — he will be thrown into the region of Re- 
ligion. And since he agrees with his fellow-men also on the bodily side, 
in their being alike involuntarily affected in their thoughts and wills by 
force in general, yet differs from them in respect to the will as well as 
the ability he has (naturally or acquired) to dominate over or use that 
form of power, he finds no reference also for that capacity in general to 
use force, except to some creative designing in the universe at large. 
Thus he expands the relation he feels in himself of three powefi's, into a 
xelation for the Universe itself; and makes of that a State, in which he 
would fain find some Morality, — some absolute law or method of action 
revealed to him, as a true and authoritative mode of using these three 
powers he has as Man. For all these powers, he finds, are really only 
"delegated" to him. He represents them in a litile Universe of his 
own. The question is whether there is really any moral Universe, 
■except in him, or any possibility of it otherwise. He is elected legisla- 
tor, judge, of the world, whether he ■^rill or not to serve. He is forced 
"by the Universe to take that attitude or else he ruled by it as a law of 
force merely. There is no real Universe, as a definite whole for him, 
except as he recreates it, or makes it definite by conceiving the laws 
which pervade it and unify it. And these laws he seizes upon as his 
rightful property when he finds them merely as laws of force ; both in- 
stinctively and reflectively, he considers such laws as common property 
for all men, and the knowledge of them as something by which every 
man as a designing being may properly extend his dominion over 
l^Tatural things, as he woald over his body if he knew enough of that to 
liave the power of life aud death over it. 

But so far as a man is impelled by his designs only to this domi- 
nancy over Nature, either as over her bodily forms or over her laws in 
■creating bodily possessions, he finds he is exercising only an animal 
power, a power to live temporarily and not eternally, — to live in space 
and not in his thinking nature and its process. And in this attempt to 
extend himself as a Natural power, he comes into conflict with others 
engaged in a similar effort. He finds he is not the only intelligence in 
the world. The creation is not &l\for him, hence not by him. Intelli- 
gence itself is "dispersed," and has no perceivable unity; but only a 
relation to other intelligence through this common disposition and 
capacity of intelligence to possess itself of a Natural form and law of 
power. 

This discovery that intelligence itself is " dispersed " seems at first 
to render the reference of the designing to it utterly vague and indefi- 
nite. The designing itself is limited; the designing gods are various 
and many. And since they operate consciously only upon Nature, and 



22 THE CIVIL POLITF OF THE UNITED STATES. 

this really exceeds tliem all, and limits them by the very forms they 
take in it, as powers to live only more or less freely in it, it follows that 
there is a Natural " Necessity " above and dominant over all these gods. 
Precisely the same vagueness with which intelligence, as found distrib- 
uted in many, has been referred only to an involuntary necessity for it, 
is carried into the forming of States, and the authority in them is re- 
ferred to some particular god, some designing man deified for his 
special art in statecraft, or some tutelary god, growing vaguer in time, 
as the original inspirer of the work. Thus it is that ancient States rest 
upon the religion of intelligence, so soon as intelligence it' elf is con- 
sciously known as a designing ; although from a sense only of its disper- 
sion, there is no absolute religion of intelligence ; and hence a poly- 
theism. In such a state of things, the gods themselves clash, and Force 
alone is the god of Nations, because design has no absolute reference to 
Truth as such, but is really only a designing of a life which shall extend 
itself bodily into the world. 

But in fact this " dispersion " of intelligence is alone what can relate 
it to itself as intelligence, and bring it back from its mere furor for 
" living," into a consciousness of a deeper life and unity in the thmking 
activity. This is the outcome of the conflict of States, because it is also 
that of the oontra-position of individuals as already referred to. Were 
the individual isolated, related only to Nature, then he would have only 
force-forms to design ; and even if he were perfect in his knowledge of 
the laws of Nature, he would reach no consciousness of his thought as 
such, because never using it as pitted against other intelligence. He 
might perhaps find that Nature was already fully designed, at least for 
him ; for what other use for it would he have but to live in it all as a 
mere body for him, — a mere mode of exercising the physical power of 
which he knew the immost law. 

But as related to other intelligences, the man finds a ground, as we 
have seen, for morality of some sort in every thing that he does. What 
he is guided by here, however, is only a particular group of intelli- 
gences ;— and the " customary " is only the god of the hour. Necessarily 
polytheistic still is man, even in modern times, so far as he worships 
an intelligence which can demonstrate itself only in a fashion, or even 
in any other form merely temporal or spatial, such as a power to get 
money or other means of physical life and expansion of the individual. 
M ammon or other god of mere force is still the real god of any modern 
State, so far as it is what is most worshiped by those who compose 
the State ; but that this is any advance upon the gods of ancient States, 
may be questioned, albeit some hold fealty to it with a superstitious 
devoti on. 

Doubtless the individual man takes more kindly to the discipline of 
these particular authorities, and fellowships with his hour, or province,. 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 23 

or time, because lie begins only aa a capacity for intelligence, and is edu. 
cated into submission to his memory, rather than into questioning of his 
own intelligence. But no one can get far along in life in this modern 
world, without having questions of pure intelligence propounded to 
him ; and he has no resource but to try, at least, to solve them for him- 
self. Even the business and commercial relations which characterize 
the modern world have no choice in this respect ; they are not questions 
ot mere force, such as were presented to primitive men and ancient 
States. Commerce cannot be treated as a state of war between men, — 
nor even as a question of craft ; no one can succeed in it who does not 
see that it rests upon probity, and a mutual moral regard of men for 
each other. This "dispersion" of intelligence is then just what nec- 
essarily refers every man's designs back to his own- moral sense for pre- 
judgment, — a judgment which will hold with all others, because it does 
with him, in that form where it is essential and absolute judgment. 
But if a man were to begin in the world with his knowledge of others 
fully developed as it is by experience, — to what else would he then refer 
this capacity and right of absolute judgment but just this same, — what 
he finds in himself as such ? 

But still this is so far, only a subjective result, a personal affair. 
The man has resolved the relation of his own powers into a morality, 
an authoritative intent for, and judgment of, his designs. But if he 
only judges of others by himself, and makes of this ''self" by which 
he judges, an affair of his own particular views, wishes and likings, of 
how he would /eeil in such a case, or about such a matter, he has evi- 
dently reached no universal criterion. What he would do or like may 
depend very much on his habits; and no one can make a god of his 
habits; rather the contrary, even for himself. 

Thus the morality of Confucius^ so much pointed to as quite iden- 
tical with the Christian, is in fact only the Chinese side of morality. 
It points to the fact that common habits and common wants make com- 
mon thoughts and common designs, and thuij a sort of criterion by 
which we can judge for others by ourselves. But the Chinese moralist 
regards the prevalent as the moral, the habit as the god, the hereditarj^ 
and the customary as an invariable criterion for all. He has none of 
that tender charity of the Christian rule, which suggests that we should 
rather judge for others by tlieiv habits than by ours, should enter into 
their circumstances, their views, and ask ourselves how we should feel 
there. Here is a comparison to make, which puts hrbit in its proper 
place, as an occasion for charity but not aground for true judgment, a 
reason for yielding assent in matters of indifference or even for accord- 
ing it as a matter of necessity; but also of preference for suffering 
wrong rather than even seeming to do it. 

The conflicts of States bring out the same necessity for higher de- 



24 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

signs than those of mere Natural growth or material expansion, and 
for referring all designs to a higher tribunal than that of force. States 
represent successively the gods which men worship, according to the 
nature of the designs they admire most. As the individual does not 
find his three powers properly related, so long as he judges only by 
his private self, his habitual views and desires, so with a State. Some- 
thing more than the private interests of individuals must be repre- 
sented in the State, or else it will be a mere conflict of such interests 
without a criterion by which to judge. If a State is considered as a 
merely commercial affair, in the sense of a correlation of the merely ex- 
ternal intercourse and exchange of material commodities between 
men, it fails to represent Man as Man, and must do him injury in his 
most essential character, that of a thinking being. To represent him 
fully and secure his real freedom, it must represent the relation of the 
three powers as it is in him. But before it can do this, he must him- 
self rise to a full consciousness of the true relation, and not leave in 
the vague what it is to which as final arbiter all his designs must be re- 
ferred. For true harmony, there can be but one god of design for all, 
a sacred source of design, reverenced as religious bond between all 
men. It is not the business of the State to define Religion; but a free 
State, like a free Man, must at least define God as a God of Truth, and. 
promote a worship of him in that relation. 

A State, then, is necessarily a formal teacher of morality; but, like' 
every other teacher of it, teaches best by example. On the other hand, 
it is distinctly set up as such an example, as a realized expression of 
the proper relation of the three powers, just as that is understood by 
the people whether vaguely or otherwise. If self-government is not 
really conceived of at all, there will be a despotism, whatever name it 
go under. If morality is conceived of as something special, or only an 
affair agreed upon by such a particular community, the State will re- 
flect this notion of the individual — that he is a sort of exclusive per- 
sonage only, and that collisions and compromises of interests are the 
only guide to morality, and the only way of finding a working unity 
or hypothesis of what this dispersion of self-wills is. If the concep- 
tion of morality is a religious one, yet only occultly so, it may still 
take all forms in the State, from that of an exclusive theocracy like 
the Jewish, to that of a diffusive polytheism, as with the Greeks. The 
Romans recognized any of these special gods as sufficing for particu- 
lar States; but, with a sense of general law as the true notion, named 
their Jupiter " Optiinus Maximus" as the only god to moralize all. 
This Jupiter of the Romans was not the familiar Jove of the Greeks. 
As "Best and Greatest," he was rather an idea of what ought to be. 
From this idea was discarded that Natural "joviality" which can be 
anything yet only as a thing; and the notion, not merely of a law, but 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 25 

of a one law-maker, stood forth again as vaguelj^ foreshadowed by him. 
For the Jews, this "lawmaker" was One, but arbitrary; for the 
Greeks, Natural, but Many; for the Romans, One again but abstract, 
and so it was ready for that "coming of the Lawgiver" Divinely 
born of Thought, a designation of Love as law of good design. 

States thus have various relations to morals and religion. Each is^ 
involved in special forms of these, according to that prevailing notion 
of what Man himself is, to reflect which the State itself is formed. 
This is true also of modern States, and is shown in the necessity they 
may have for " concordats " or other means of relating themselves tO' 
Religion. 

III. If we grasp firmly the fact that a State is meant to express a 
law, but that this implies also a reference to some lawmaker, we can 
see that according as this lawmaker is definitely or indefinitely con- 
ceived, so also will it be referred to. And with such varying concep- 
tions. States will vary. By noting this, we may avoid that vague and 
mystical explanation of ancient States, as mere shadow-dance of a 
metaphysical theologism. We can see that the changes in them are 
quite like the revolutions in modern States because due to quite 
similar modes of thinking, first in the process of reaching the idea of 
law, then in trying to refer this to a law-maker, and then in general- 
izing law itself. Let us briefly consider this process as a necessary^ 
course for progress in thinking, and hence also in. forming States. 

We hear much of law nowadays, both in the scientific and political 
spheres. But so much talk merely about laws, betrays that no one 
law of laws is yet firmly grasped; or, what is the same, that the search 
for an absolute lawmaker is not yet satisfied. Hence the reference to 
that is left vague and indefinite. No total relation, no mode of activity 
which is a law for itself and hence a lawmaker for all the rest, is real- 
ized in the individual as a right relation of all his powers. Hence it 
cannot be expressed in the State. Yet the State is precisely intended 
to express this existence of a one moral law, as itself a lawgiver for 
all. And the perfection of Civil Polity depends upon this finding by 
every man of some moralizing law in himself, which is also in others, 
some lawmaker for all, known by all, by which all can be really self- 
governed. 

Is each man to find this law-maker only as a Many? Or are the 
Many, are all men to find it as a one ? — Where, or rather, how to find 
this absolute law-maker, is the ultimate question for communi- 
ties as well as for individuals. Otherwise the law itself is without defin- 
ite reference, so that there are really only many laws, and no law in 
general. Yet the perception of laws as existing is a first step; and it 
is a step which only intelligence can make. We might infer at once 
from this, that intelligence alone can make the law, since intelli- 



26' THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

gence alone can perceive it as a general mode of operation. Not that 
a man's intelligence makes it, merely by conceiving of it, (as a partial 
metaphysics errs in holding), but that he must re-make it as to its 
method— as a law of operation, in the very act of perceiving it ; otherwise 
he could not know it as a law, — a mode of operation. The more intel- 
ligent and self-conscious a man becomes, the more clearly he becomes 
aware that he really " understands" things only so far as he perceives, 
(and re-enacts in perceiving) a law for th^m, a mode of operation that 
can make them as they are. This is the first step toward making a 
State, — for the Man to recognize, more or less clearly, that nothing can 
be or is made definite except by a law. But he comes to realize even 
this only gradually, just because he does not realize that he can and 
does intelligently perceive things at all, only by a law of his mind, 
which remakes their laws or modes of activity in perceiving them. 
From failure to realize this creative law of intelligence itself, both 
Natural and political science wander without definite reference to a 
law-maker, — the former as to Nature, and the latter as to Man himself. 

Let us see how this comes about. — So long as there is merely a per- 
ception of "things," of isolated and dispersed objects, whether as Nat- 
lu'al things, or as Spiritual persons, it seems impossible to find any way 
of uniting them externally, except arbitrarily and despotically. But 
when we come to refiect upon it, why should any one of these things it- 
self hold together? for that also seems to be made up of smaller things in 
some external way. The diflBculty is just as great for each of them as 
it is for the whole collectively. When we think of law we seem to un- 
derstand the "thing." We seem to have escaped the difficulty of 
making things from qutside, by turning our attention from that mere 
dispersion of them, and by thinking of a law or mode of operation 
common to all. By this "law" every "thing" is made, as it were, 
from the inside. Thus the " law of gravity " unites things of force; 
and it enables us to think not only the dispersion, but also the total 
unity of them as something necessary on account of the law itself, 
since that cannot operate except as both an attraction and a repul- 
sion. In the same way, we can think a law which may unite intelli- 
gences, just because they are also dispersed by it. It can operate in 
diflTerent persons by the very capacity of intelligence to think any- 
thing, to become any kind of a person, any particular form of intelli- 
gence. Just as the law which makes "things" must also separate them, 
so here the law of intelligence can make "persons" only by dispers- 
ing them in external relation to each other. How otherwise could they 
be "persons" to and for each other? The nature of intelligence is such 
that it canrepresent its " selj" to itself, only in a personal relation. 

Now in either of these cases, when we are thinking only of a nec- 
essary law, either for things or persons, we are evidently thinking only 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENEEAL. 27 

of a mode of operation essential to each. We are thinking, on one 
side, of a method or general law by which " things" can be created; 
and on the other, of a method or still deeper law, by which intelligent 
persons can be realized. But when we think these both together, we 
see that the two methods or laws are necessarily related to each other. 
They have something in common, when it comes to be an affair of re- 
lating particular persons; since this is actually done through the 
other process of relating things. Now, since the method of intelligence 
involves this other, it surpasses and includes it; — it is a law for itself in 
3,11. It is the law-maker, because all other laws are necessary for its 
own purposes, as intelligence; — they are modes of act, or laws designed 
by it. 

And so when a man comes to realize that, however painful or pleas- 
ant for him as an individual, may be his relation to mere things, yet 
he has a relative power over them as things, and an indefinite power 
over them, so far as he grasps the law or method of their making; and 
when he sees that this ' 'knowledge itself is power," in being a knowl- 
edge of law, and thus only an affair of intelligence, — he begins to 
grasp the real relation of his own powers. And through the law of 
that relation he can rise to a comprehension of the absolute intelligence 
which is a law for the Universe ; not merely as an abstract law, but as an 
individual law-maker. 

Mr. Seward states this result in an admirable way for ordinary com- 
prehension as f oUows : "The Supreme Power has so far revealed itself in 
Nature, that Man can attain to the knowledge that it is a single Power; 
that there is one God, not many gods; and that this one God requires 
from Man the practice of virtue and desires his happiness. This tiuth 
must be seized upon and become a Spiritual conviction. Until a na- 
tional mind grasps and cherishes this Spiritual conviction, it must ever 
continue to revolve in a condition of uncertainty and doubt about the 
providential appointments of good and evil, which renders it in- 
capable of a firm advance in knowledge and civilization. This 
is only saying in other words, that such a nation becomes be- 
wildered in the subtleties of metaphysics. This bewilderment has 
hitherto been, and yet remains a condition of the people of 
Hindoostan." 

Such views as these explain why Mr. Seward was one of the most 
practical statesman our country has ever had; — because he was the 
most theoretic, the most philosophical. His method of discussion was to 
refer all to the "higher law,"— the moral or creative law of intelligence 
itself. He saw that the true question was always a moral one ; that 
human acts always involve a known relation of the physical and meta- 
physical; and that this was to be found in every Man, as a moral rela- 
tion; and hence as a true and final method of thinking, of moral 



28 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

designing. Only this grasp of the law of design as highest law, fits man? 
to either make, or interpret the law of a nation; for by that law alone 
is he made conscious of a Divine law-maker. 

While in the United States as a republic, the civil polity is profess- 
edly based on this moral individuality of the citizen, yet not all either 
of its statesmen or of its citizens, have seized the relation of powers 
in the Nation in accordance with what this relation is as moral in 
the individual, and ought to be actually exemplified both by him and 
the Nation. This will appear in the examination to follow hereafter. It 
will be well, then, to further note here, in a cursory way, this final ref- 
erence to a final and true method of thinking, which, if there is to be 
real freedom, must be found in some practical form, both by the indi- 
vidual and the State. 

Much is said about the "liberty of the individual." But this is not 
something which can be made for him, he must make it for himself. 
The State does not make it for the citizen; the citizens make it for 
themselves in and by the State. Freedom is a mc^al question, a ques- 
tion of methods, and of true relation of methods in one which is author- 
itative becaiise it is true, — a method of absolute intelligence which 
admits of no denial. 

Now as the liberty of the individual can be absolute only as freedom 
of thought, according to its own laws, these laWs must needs be found 
as basis for fi'eedom of thought itself. But since this absolute law of 
thought, as an actual thinking of truth itself, cannot become a "thing," 
it follows that liberty must be only relative in the sphere of expression, 
whether it be merely expression of ideas or opinions, or expression of 
design and will over external things in any way. Thus external liberty 
is a question of morals as distinguished from Religion. 

Morals, thus considered with reference to external acts, is an affair 
of relative methods, various laws, for such practical acts of design. 
But for this very reason that it considers only laws, it must relate laws 
to each other, and find a unity for them in a one law as religious, 
absolutely moral, sacred against change because it creates the other 
laws. States may differ as to the form in which they represent this 
sacred, creative or religious law. But the development of States tends 
as we have noted, to representing it for purposes of the State as the 
Truth, recognized as something which can be absolutely known — 
known as authoritative, whether for idea or for other modes of action. 
Designing of anything must follow a law of truth. 

The field of Morals is thus a practical sphere; a sphere where there 
is necessarily a combining of all the powers of Man. There is in it,, 
therefore, a designed combining of the two spheres, metaphysical and 
physical; that of pure thought, and that of its various outer expression. 
A unity of these is reached through a relation of the moral or design- 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 29 

ing power to each, whereby they are modified. For the Moral in gen- 
eral relates itself to the thought, by affirming the difference between 
the true and the false, — not (so long as it is onlj^ relative), as to which 
is which, but as to the authority of the true over the false when deter- 
mined by the intelligence. Hence, the oath to speak the true. This is 
already implied tacitly in all speech between men as conscious think- 
ing-beings, since each feels towards the other that instinct of trust in 
his verity, which is the ground of all authority, and of all accumula- 
tion of knowledge through mutual aid. Since wills are thus bent to- 
wards each other by a spiritual confidence, in such a way that each 
takes the other's knowledge for his own, the same mutuality of wills is 
implied in a promise as to the actions; what each says he will do, he 
"agrees" that he will do. This instinctive "unity of Faith" in all in- 
telligence is the first ground of Society, — the ultimate ground, there- 
fore, to be always returned to. The agreement of wills implied in a 
mere say so, as sufficient between intelligent persons (who personate 
Truth), is the second ground for Societ}^ as authority for compacts, 
for contracts; and, in general, as a realized possibility for unity in all 
outer acts, in conformity with that mutual faith which exhibits itself 
as a fundamental inner unity in the nature of intelligence. But here 
the Moral in these diiferent "persons" goes forth into the field of 
expression indefinitely; since the sanctity of the True keeps pace with 
the recognition of the True. The inner 'unity of these "persons" is 
through a same faith in Truth itself. Their outer unity depends upon 
their recognition of each other as "exponents" of this Truth. 

Morals, then, so far as only relative, or agreed upon, are restraint 
upon the actions, as heretofore noted, and need no further be con- 
sidered. But so also are they a restraint upon the freedom of thought 
in so far as they demand an authority for the True, and find this only 
as relative, in a Moral way, or only as arbitrary in a supposed religi- 
ous form. For real freedom, therefore, the True must be found as 
depending upon a law of thought, or rather as being itself the abso- 
lute law-maker, in respect to all that is formal, whether in the knowl- 
edge or elsewhere. This it shows itself to be since it devises, invents, 
and understands all forms of whatever sort. 

Morals in general, then, become finally a question of a true mode of 
thinking, as guide for the doing. In respect to the thinking, there is a 
question of an authoritative method of thinking in which alone the 
absolute freedom of thought can exist, whether with regard to its 
thinking of ideas or of things. So in general as to expression or ac- 
tion of any kind, the Moral is essentially a question of the best 
method. In respect to mode of expression, it is a question of Art, 
useful or beautiful. In respect to thought itself, it is really a religious 
question for Man, since his power to think or know at all, is a dele- 



30 THE CIVIL POLITY OP^ THE UNITED STATES. 

gated power. And thougli the mode of it as true, or as law of truth, 
is a question for Philosophy, yet the question of its source is one for 
a faith which is intuitive, and hence veils itself as Religion — it needs 
no "eyes." So far as there is a question as to means, for external ex- 
pression or use of things, there is call for Science of physical laws, in 
aid of all the arts and even of the rhetoric and logical arts, since they 
also must express themselves, and need the laws of things, rather than 
things, for their symbols. 

In this way, the promotion of Science, Art and Philosophy are of 
the deepest interest to a community. In fact they are what is making 
the State, and making it according to what they are in the community. 
They are not merely aids for the expression which the community 
desires to realize of that absolute moral freedom which is its social 
basis. No community really desires to realize any expression but 
what is already contained in its Science, Art and Philosophy; nor does 
it rise above these such as they are. Their relation to each other is 
analogous to that of the seeking intelligence, the designing will and 
the religious views, of the citizen himself. Hence, in their entirety as 
knowledge, they go into the State and form it for better or worse, and 
this is inevitable. Yet they may be given a sphere apart from the State 
itself, — a sphere of a purely ideal nature, which can be left entirely 
free merely as speculative; or they may be curbed and limited accord- 
ing to prejudices as to what they are or ought to be. This curbing 
them in their phase as thought, however, is in vaiti; for as ideal, it is 
their very nature and necessity to pervade all and form all. They 
naust and will appear in the State, and in the general life and charac- 
ter which forms the State, as their concrete sphere, — a sphere of mixed 
reality, yet necessary for them since expression is of their very nature. 
The insiitance which the actual thought of a people has to express 
itself, just as in case of a man, in the character of the acts, is ample 
explanation for the imperfections of all States, ancient or modern; 
and also of the mythical forms in which States have sought for ex- 
planation of themselves, so long as the people were not fully conscious, 
of their own thoughts and doings. Neither physical nor metaphysical 
explanations alone do more than lead us and leave us in a mist (called 
^'mystery" to explain it); because the plain fact is that the metaphys- 
ical and physical are always united, and neither can be separated from 
the other, in aught that belongs to a Spiritual Universe, where persons 
of intelligence must exist. The physical theory instead of disproving 
spirit, as supposed, proves it, or it disproves itself as no prover. The 
metaphysical which attempts to stand alone, by abolishing the physical, 
also abolishes itself. It stultifies itself by offering a formal expression 
which it claims is identical with the thought; if it nullifies the expres- 
sion so it does the thought. The manifest truth is that there are three 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 31 

modes of power in tlie world, and yet there is only one, — as Power. 
Make as many modes of power as you will, they must all come 
under the mere name of Power. But three suflQces to make a 
difference and a unity of relation in Power as absolutely one, 
and the sufficient is what alone limits the absolute, because it 
completes it. 

Men arrivea at clear self-consciousness sufficient to form a State, 
have always felt, however occultlJ^ their unity in a common intelli- 
gence (as above sketched), and the legitimate consequences of it with 
regard to their actions. The citizen cannot be a citizen — a fellow of 
many in one ideal unity — unless he feels the common tie, the sanctity 
of the true, the binding nature of the promise which refers itself 
through the oath as appealing to an ideal nature which is sacred. This 
is the religious tie, however vaguely it may be felt, however imperfect 
the conception may be as to the character of the Oneness to which it is 
referred. 

Hence Religion is in all ages the name given to what really founds 
societies as States. What else should it be called? What founds States 
is not a mere abstraction, although it may seem only such. Neither is 
it only the individuals, though it may seem'only they. It is something 
personal and also something capable of being regarded abstractly. 
Hence the first impulse is to regard it as a Person — more or less dei- 
fied; the next is to revert to the abstract side, and regard it as a law, 
yet as a law of persons. The former is the Greek, the latter the Ro- 
man step. The next and final step is the Christian one — to refer the 
law-making itself to an absolute Person, and thus to complete the 
thinking of laws also. 

IV. Previous to a conception which at least goes beyond perception 
of things and recognizes persons as law-makers, there are no States. 
Instincts, such as sense of comfort in fellowship, or of mutual appe- 
tital needs, may congregate animals, as common fears may herd sheep. 
But what leads to human fellowship in a civic way cannot be called 
anything short of intuition. It must be a recognition of the True as 
a basis for all further good to intelligent beings. This sacredness of 
the Truth is the real worship, even when the good in general, or the 
"god" remains an object only for vague superstitions. In any case, 
"the Truth (alone) shall make you free." 

Superstitions are made religions only because they are deemed true 
or feared to be true. With growing intelligence they change their 
forms. But while they last, they cannot be otherwise than aggravat- 
ed by opposition, especially if they have taken form in the State; for 
then they are put there to steady the view, and take away that vague 
searching for a final authority which leaves all action at loose ends. 
Safer for a civil polity to oppose a true than a false religion; for the 



32 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

former knows itself to be beyond the civil sphere, whereas the latter 
knows itself only in that and through that as its formal expression of 
what is held sacred as true. 

The sanctity of the true is thus in any case the basis of the State. 
The Greeks as a people could not see the True as an abstraction, nor 
as a law-maker. Hence they sacrificed Socrates to their civil polity, 
because he was undermining it, by asking perpctuallj'' after the " ab- 
solute" of everything, whether as truth, or beauty, or good; and thus 
intimating, as they thought, that there was nothing personal, no patron* 
"god" of a particular sort to which every one could be referred as 
founder of the State and authority for its laws. They must have won- 
dered why the gorgon-shield of Minerva although only a statue on 
the Acropolis, did not turn the sacrilegious man to stone. For they 
were worshippers of Wisdom, bigots though they were as to the form. 

The Romans went beyond this stage of civil polity. They passed 
the Greek thinking of things, even as so beautiful things as persons. — 
spiritual persons, — gods. They reached a conception of law. But 
this requires a higher mode of thinking, — ^a thinking of abstractions. 
There must be abstraction before there can be generalization, — an- 
al5^sis before a larger synthesis. This habit and power of generaliza- 
tion, in which the Romans surpassed the Greeks, made of them the 
law-makers of the political world, and still more of the practical com- 
mercial world, the sphere of judgments, contracts, the reference to the 
True as abstract. The law of totality was the object sought, its mode 
of operation, its self-making as a definite and consistent conception or 
thovght; it was no longer that mere external Art-form w^hich the 
Greeks sought for as a static representation. Hence the Romans Vere 
no Artists, — except of bridges. Thejr only originality in expression 
of thought was as satirists; — from first to last their literature had this 
strain; and the first expression of it by old Lucilius, is even accounted 
by some the best of its genus; at least equal in genius, if not in 
polish, to the satires of Horace. They did not rise to such philosophy, 
such art of thinking theoretically as Plato and Aristotle, but they were 
all moralists. Historians, poets, satirists, orators, — Livy, Tacitus, 
Horace, Lucretius, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, — all are engaged with this 
practical problem, and mainly watching it and trying to see how it 
solves itself in the actual world, the turbid course of events. Tliey 
want to find some "law" for it; some "working-hypothesis" where 
by to seize upon and use it as a mode of action. 

Hence the Romans were superstitious in a different way from that 
of the Greeks; — more intensely, and in a way they could not express 
in mei*ely Natural forms or mythical fictions. They had a notion of a 
more general sort than had the Greeks; — not so much of things or even 
of persons as of laws. Thus their superstition was an intense sense of 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 33 

•what an infinite range of possibility tliere is for the unknown, so long 
as the mind does not find some one all-embracing law by which to 
think all, and so anticipate all, foresee all as made by it, and proceed- 
ing out of it. Such a law would be a law-maker to which all might be 
referred. But the Romans could not attain to this result. They saw 
many laws, but no one law. They made many laws but were not fully 
icon scions of their own act of making. Any nation which has gone so 
far as to see law as law, both in the power of Nature and the power 
•of mind, yet can make only a vague reference of the power to design, 
the power to make law itself, has still this superstitious fear rather than 
the religious sense of what law is. Hence the Romans, from pure fear 
of offending any law, admitted all the "gods," — the designers of 
States, to a Universal Pantheon. Yet, with a secret sense that there 
■could really be only one, they called their Jupiter, ^'Optimus, Maxi- 
mus'\ That the Best is the Greatest, — however small it seem, — this was 
.a great thought seething through the Roman Empire. And it paved the 
way, was the very ground from which upsprang the Christian idea — 
■the possibility of a Christian State, where Religion is known in its ab- 
solute truth, and presents itself in an absolute law-maker both for the 
individual and the JSTation, as also for the universe entire. 

The Romans reached the power of abstracting and hence of gener- 
alization. They were capable of holding abstractions in a way which 
the Greeks discarded. They dedicated altars and temples to abstrac- 
tions; for example at the birth of Nero's daughter, to Fecundity. This 
form of the god, as an abstract good, caught sight of only as a law^ 
may present itself more clearly in later times, especially at the time of 
the Alexandrian philosophy which it echoes. But it was not unknown 
in early Rome. Such a tendency to consider abstractions evinces a power 
to generalize, to contemplate law; for that also is an abstraction. 
Even when the Romans sought to personalize, they put the good in 
the form of a law, a best mode of action for the individual. Thus 
their favorite philosophies were the Stoic, the Epicurean and the Cj^nic; 
all trying to be practical through the individual alone in isolation from 
others. The Stoic said the good was in a contempt for all, the spirit 
■of negation; and denied that there was any pain, if a man would but 
only think so. The Epicurean said the good was in accepting all, the 
spirit of identification, the making all pleasant by thinking it such. 
The Cynic was the critical philosopher, the satirist and the moralist, 
who could only look on and see the facts as they were, finding laws, it , 
is true, but only laws, and hence also a conflict of laws. This was the 
really Roman attitude with respect to the world. 

Hence the Roman polity was essentially only a '* policy "—a selfish 
policy. What was practicable, rather than what was good, was the 
<][uestion, because after all the good was ouly a law, and as law it dis- 



34 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

severea Itself into many laws, good, bad and indifferent. It was pan- 
theistic as law. In such a view of the situation, what is best is what 
is possible for the Roman, without regard to aught but force as only- 
law for all, so far as known. Vae Victis: this motto the Romans 
stoutly recognized as just as much law for themselves as for others. 
Such a view has by no means ceased to be practically entertained and 
practiced by nations in modern times. The ancient Germans deified 
Force, and especially the god of war, so exclusively as to attract the 
comment of Roman historians. Their modern laudation of "blood 
and iron," may be a hereditary tendency to worship heroes and acts of 
force; but it remains to be seen whether they will so bravely accept as 
did the Romans, the reaction of such a law which, like mathematics, 
knows no mercy. 

Looking upon the conflict of laws as it is in the meirely Natural 
sphere, or as a necessity of outer expression in general, the modern 
man may copy the Roman whose science went no further, and make of 
brutal power the only law for his acts. But in this way he will wholly 
lose sight of any moral law whatever. There can be no morality save 
in what is itself a designing power. Now this power uses the law of 
force to express its conceptions. Every such expression, however, 
since it is in a form of force, must yield and perish before a greater 
force. Thus for example, any written expression of the truth can be 
easily blotted out. But the Truth itself can be neither made or un- 
made by a law of force. And, in general, all such expressions exist 
according to their design, to be expressions only, and not to be the de- 
signing power itself. The very fact of their destruction by the law of 
force demonstrates that the designing power itself does not reside in 
that law, but only uses it. 

This designing power, therefore, has relation to a reality of Thought 
which subsists substantially, and unaffected by all this use of the law 
of force for purposes of expression. But the man may not recognize 
that reality; although there is clearly an absolute ne3essity for it, if 
there is to be any designing at all. In that case he will overlook this 
very reality of a triune relation of powers as it exists in himself. He 
will take note only of those external forms of force clashing against 
and destroying each other. If he recognizes in their formation a law 
of design, still this will appear only as a different law in each, and 
merely a conflict of laws as a whole. The total will be mechanical 
and undesigning, because referred to a mere law of force, which is. 
necessarily incomplete in itself — a made law and not a lawmaker. 

This was the misfortune of the Romans; they could see laws, but 
no law-maker; hence mere conflict of laws, where on the whole force 
alone seemed to be supreme arbiter. "Vae victis.''' A terse phrase; 
but how different it sounds to the conqueror and the conquered ! To' 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 35 

one it means slavery; hence to the other it does not mean freedom. 
No such division in the spiritual world will that moral law permit 
which is perpetually devising whU ought to be. The Romans did not 
perceive this ought to be, as a law-maker; because with all their power 
of abstraction the}^ did not pierce to the moral nature of the True. 
When Pilate asked: "What is Truth?" he evinced the Roman sense of 
it as in itself a mere abstraction. 

Truth is taken as an abstraction because supposed to be derived 
from, or made up of, mere perceptions of outer facts. Now since 
there is no completing such data, neither can there be any for Truth 
itself in that way and it remains ragged, mere collection, not a de- 
signing; gets no moral source from without. But this is because no 
moral source, no lawmaker for it, is found within the man. For in 
that case he can conceive no perfect designs, nor will he perceive the 
entire truth any outer fact is designed to express. These two sides of 
his imperfection, the one in perceiving, the other in conceiving, are 
therefore one and the same thing. He is a bad interpreter.^ The 
works of a trae Artist are inconceivable by him in such a state of 
his mind. This depends upon his ignoring afly moral law for Truth 
— a law felt in himself as an active reality, a real maker of designs, 
and prescribing a certain character for good designs. 

Hence this making an abstraction or incompleteness of Truth, 
makes Good also just as abstract and incomplete. It cannot be found, 
either within or without, as a real doer, amoral designer. The man 
does not refer his own active designing power to that One Divine to 
whom its felt moral obligation points. And since he can certainly 
have no better knowledge, nor clearer conviction, of such a power 
than he has of it in himself, it is obvious that he will not find any One 
God for it at all if he does not for his own share in it. If not thus 
moralized in and by him, the Good will be mere abstraction. He will 
not find it as a Divine reality either in himself or in other persons. 

For it is clear that, so long as alt think in this way, the very fact of 
their being designers is just what gives them a ground for treating 
Good also as a mere abstraction. Good cannot be derived by abstrac- 
tion from anything but designed acts. But when none of these per- 
sons recognizes a one law for his own designs, neither can he for those 
cf others. The very object of the State is to remedy in part this diffi- 
culty, by presenting at least a common law for certain designs. But 
the moment the Roman looked beyond this State law, all became 
vague. There was no morality for him but that of the State. This 
fact explains the intensity of his civic devotion as well as of that 
superstition before referred to. 

In respect to the True and the Good, outside of the State, therefore, 
the Roman was all at sea. So with many now-a-days who are all at sea^ 



■36 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

outside of what they call a " verified science,"- a physical science. The 
only thing to do, is to accept the situation,— to " do as the Eomans do." 
In this way, morality becomes mere acquiescence on the part of the in- 
dividual, and it is a matter otherwise either of " providence " or of 
chance, — who can tell? At any rate, the individual is merely a passive 
material for it; and in some mysterious or fortuitous way, it determines 
that moral community of action in which he must acquiesce. "What he 
judges this outside formative agency to be, will depend upon his merely 
speculative views; and in these also, he at least, cannot be moral; for. as 
merely bound to be acquiescent, he can have no responsibility'. Besides, 
of what account are his views ? What is truth but a mere abstraction 
which he and others can handle and relate as they arbitrarily please 
into any sort of views; so that, indeed, opinions are found to clash and 
collide in the field of such designs, as much as do the bodies which are 
formed by Natural laws. In such a state of thinkings, so akin to a state 
of things, one might as well consult the stars as his own foresight. 
Hence Tacitus says, in reference to the fact that an astrologer had been 
tested by Tiberius and found a true prophet : "As for me when I hear 
such things as this my judgment wavers as to whether the affairs of 
mortals are involved in an immutable necessity and fate, or in mere 
chance." 

No choice of a law-maker except between fatality and chance, either 
for thoughts or things, either for the individual or society ! Not for the 
former, because Truth U reached only as an abstraction. Not for the 
latter, because only a conflict of laws is found which force alone can 
■decide; and so the stars themselves as mere weights, as most abstract 
forms of force, may, just as well as thought itself, cast the die of fate for 
man. There is really no moral designing; laws also are a mere "strug- 
gle lor existence," and perhaps are only fantasies of man. 

Such is the sure result of looking to see right or good, not in forms 
of thought, but in forms of force ; they seem mere products of chance- 
Truth, however, in its own nature has nothing to do with chance. It is 
therefore the only proper basis of morality, and hence of the State. A 
civil polity not founded on some truth as a " self-evident truth," has 
nothing to rest upon. It is a ship of State without either compass or 
rudder, star to guide, or harbor to rest in. All civil polities are on a sea 
of change; but this one is on it only to helplessly toss and hopelessly 
founder. 

Such was the " fate " of Rome, — a fate it morally invited. Since it 
put its trust in force it perished by force. Since it found no law- 
maker in truth, but only an abstraction, it fell a torpid victim to the 
most brainless tyrants, and abjectly let armies make its emperors, fear 
make its laws, and slow dissolution undo all its work of force, in ac- 
-cordance with the mere law of force itself 



CIVIL POLITY IN" GENERAL. 37 

Surely this is a lesson for nations that force may be a means, but not 
an end for civil polity. Force merely extends a nation like a body, — 
till it can no further go, but then it stands palpitating over its grave and 
trembling with a sure dissolution already begun. Even for self-defense, 
force must be related to some higher designs than those of mertiy 
material extension in any form ; or else it will prove the tyrant within 
as well as without ; either by standing armies which must crush others 
or those who maintain them ; or by demoralizing the public sentiment 
into military and mechanical notions of a State, which are essentially 
barbarous, and nourish in some form or other all the "relics of 
barbarism." 

The obvious necessity for the use of force in any expression what- 
ever of the power of Man, brings into question what is the proper rela- 
tion of it to his other powers. And with regard to civil polity this is a 
question also for the State, as to the right use and limitation of force; 
and whether in fact the State as such can use any other form of power. 

Now, since a State is itself made by the moral and religious sense of 
its people, such as these actually are, it is not its function to make them, 
it cannot make its own maker. Neither can it reach these in their inner 
nature, either as consoling or confirming them purely as ideal strug- 
gles or convictions, except so far as it exhibits in its own operation an 
example of morally regulated action which they admire and cherish. 
It may teach them by its own harmonious acts, subordinated in all 
things to Reason, how beautiful a thing it is to be thus ruled, as it were, 
by a god, not as some unknown god, or mere abstract Truth, but by 
the same moral law the Man feels in himself as what ought to devise 
and direct, and harmonize all his d-isigns. And so a people may come 
to love their country, as a model for nations because it is also for men. 
This moral unity of a State becomes personal for men, — personates 
something beyond the State, and beyond the man himself. It reveals 
that which Socrates called the "Absolute Beauty," and which to know he 
•claimed would prove the immortality of the soul which knew it. It 
brings forth, that devotion to the State itself which the Roman expressed 
in those immortal words : "■' Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori:'''' 
*' Both blessed and dwe it is, to die for one's country." Duty and joy 
go together, in life or in death, where the State " fits " the Man. 

In this secret and religious way a true State affects its citizen, 
reaches his heart of hearts as something beyond himself. It touches 
that holiness of all really rational moral nature which makes of it 
" spirit," both finite and absolute. 

But when a State comes to act upon its citizen otherwise, it can do 
so only externally ; whatever means it uses must in some way take the 
form of force, and be subject to all the imperfections of that. Even its 
laws must be expressed, written, in an arbitrary form of force, and be 



38 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

liable to misinterpretations. Still more tlie operation of its laws must 
be external and forceful when tbe.^ are not obeyed. No sucb operation. 
of law can be wbolly just, since it must be external onl}^ and takena 
account of the internal differences in men. The innocent and the guilty 
must be treated alike so long as they are suspected or on trial ; thougk 
in such a case the innocent must suffer far more than the guilty. la 
general, the State can only act in a preventive or vindicatory way ; it 
cannot compensate the innocent or even protect them perfectly ; for all 
its "remedies," as external onlj^, may often be. more costly to those who- 
are wronged than for those who wrong. 

Now, when we look merely to the operation of external laws in the 
Universe itself, apart from the moral law of Spirit, the same necessity 
seems to obtain. There is nothing but preventive law, and vindictive 
law; and the claims of the innocent or of absolute justice in any case 
are quite whisked down the wind. Hence whoever looks only on that 
side of things, may feel himself justified in modelling himself or his State 
upon this '-law of Nature." He will tell us cynically "there is no use in 
trying to be better than the law allows, " meaning by the ' law, " that law 
which he alone studies — a merely mechanical law. "He will not deena. 
himself bound to reform the world," he tells us, as though he had struck 
the bed-rock of all Morality, and found it fustian,— mere fiction,— 
mere pretense to lead the ignorant by the nose. 

But what is all civilization but precisely a reforming of Nature? 
What is Man himself, as a perpetual inventor, but a reformer even of 
laws shemselves, and a bending of them all to his own designs? Were 
Nature itself a morality, a sufficient guide by its inflictions, warnings, 
punishments, as to what is right and wrong for Man, what need would 
he have of the State ? But Natural appetites do not even tell us whether 
w^e find food or poison; the delicious may be either. Natural laws, 
acting merely as external, show no sort of consideration for what is 
Spiritual in man. either as to its innocence, or guilt, or as to its moral 
intentions in any form. Houses do not grow, nor do any of the designs- 
peculiar to man get any advancement, but rather perpetual attack and 
eventual overthrow, from the conflict of mechanical laws. Yet it is 
precisely this conflict which he makes use of by setting it against itself.. 
He reforms it. 

Unless a man sees, then, that his function is to be just this subtle 
and constant reformer, and that, when organized with his fellows, he 
is adequate for it in all emergencies, and called to it as a spiritual and' 
hence triple power in the world, and not a mere mechanical thing him- 
self, — he will be perpetually in confusion of mind as to his relation to 
Nature, and his Statecraft wHU show the same lack of moral sense. The 
gods of the State will also be, for him, some merely Natural powers 
which, since they are mechanical, can really know nothing at all, can. 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENERAL. 39 

■neither know nor care for justice. This so-called "justice" is a fiction, 
useful for State purposes, and which somehow has found its way into 
their verbiage, bui which the State itself is utterly unable to realize 
as a fact. 

Tacitus expresses this conclusion respecting the State, and for the 
world in general, which the Roman State was for him. As he looks 
over the moral dissoluteness of his times, and sees in it the reflection of 
some sort of a general mechanical necessity, he sadly says: " Indeed 
never was it certified by more terrible calamities upon the Roman peo- 
ple, or by more decisive indications, that the gods are not concerned 
about the protection of the innocent, but about the punishment of the 
the guilty," 

— But here is a moral intuition that, after all, there is somewhere 
an eternal law of justice. If it be only a Nemesis, which "with woolen 
tread follows the offender," but only eonsiders the offender and not 
the offended, this is due to the fact that the operation of the law can 
be only external, so far as it is punitive. The offense also was exter- 
nal; — the offender's prize was external; — that must be taken away from 
him. So far, at least, both Greeks and Romans got towards the idea of 
an absolute law of justice. But still this leaves the innocent uncared 
for. And superstition, which always makes it£5 god an external power, 
regards the fall of towers of Siloam as evincing some vengeance upon 
guilt; — the sufferers are proved guilty because they suffer. Young 
Goethe gave his childish opinion upon this at the time of the Lisbon 
earthquake, by sajdng that "he supposed God knew that earthquakes 
could not injure immortal souls." Here was a poet's first intuition of 
a spiritual nature which the act of force can neither help nor hinder in 
what is essential to its happiness. So perhaps in the mind of so great 
a lover of truth and justice as Tacitus, there is a subtle consciousness 
that the truly innocent are really no sufferers by merely temporal mis- 
fortunes, but have their inner compensation, whereas the guilty, whose 
life and joy and very substance is only in the outer world, can be 
punished in and by such a world; death is for them a destruction of all 
they live for. 

Only by going thus deeply into the moral nature of Man as some- 
thing sui'passing his present life and needs, can we find any real law- 
maker for him as an individual, or any real ground for a State as some- 
thing needed by him and conformable to his nature. And only by seeing 
that the exercise of force is a necessary means, yet necessarily always 
.an imperfect one for moral purposes, can we understand that a State, 
while by its example it ought to be such as Man would love enough to 
die for, can yet in its regulative operation be only just as imperfect as 
men by their imperfect morality require it to be. Such also is the 
moral government of the Universe ; when challenged merely as a force, 



4:0 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

it can not, merely in that, fulfil the claims of justice. But the State 
has not in its power the law of compensation -which the absolute 
law-maker has for the innocent. It can only punish the guilty while 
"virtue must be accounted its own reward." 

This is both the necessity and the grandeur of the ca^e; the neces- 
sity, since the fact of government at all in this artificial way implies 
that "ofTenses must needs come," while the grandeur of it is that the 
same law which says, "wo to him by whom the oftense cometh," and 
makes of the State an agent for enforcing it in a moral way, also gives 
blessedness which the State can neither give nor take away, to him who 
doth not otiend, — the innocent. 

The very imperfection of the State as punitive or vindicatory, its 
very incapacity to reach or right this inmost Man, or to moralize the 
community except through its example, are therefore just what refer 
both the State and citizen beyond the sphere of mere force, to an abso- 
lute law-maker and his absolute justice for all. No doubt a State may 
devise ways to encourage virtue as well as to discourage vice ; but to 
neither can it give its absolute due. This due of each is not received 
or receivable by either, merely in an external way. To undertake to 
"reward" virtue has somewhat the air of stimulating a vanily inconsis- 
tent with the highest virtue. Just so, to preLend to precisely value vice, 
and punish it "absolutely" by some external means, is an affectation of 
a power no State can possess. The account is not squared in any suck 
way either for virtue or vice. This is the very glory of Man, that 
he is beyond the measure of mere force, whether as saint or sinner. 
That is what makes him ' spirit," and what makes him make a State. 

For what we mean by "spirit," is a moralized and three-fold 
power. Man makes a State to represent his moral sense of the true 
relation of his three powers. A free State cannot therefore be an 
organization merely of force, nor indeed of any one alone of human 
powers. The incapacity just pointed out of any temporal power or 
external means to effect any absolute justice, shows that a State can- 
not enter into the sphere of Religion and administer its absolute rela- 
tions to men. its necessary forms of action are such that, like those 
of Nature's operations, they may offer either food or poison under the 
name of Religion, when they mistake their capacity to reach that 
sphere. Attempts to reward and punish for religion usually contra- 
dict their intention by the eventual result. Martyrs to real truth are 
only relieved for the present, and glorified for the future by their 
"punishment;" while the "reward" of the bigot turns into an eternal 
sLame for him. From the lessons of experience rather than from clear 
philosophic comprehension, the civil polity of the United States has 
followed that of England into a more complete recognition of this 
impossibility for the State to be in itself a religion. It can only be a 



CIVIL POLITY IN GENEKAL. 41 

morality. It can have no "absolute" power over Men as Men, be- 
cause they are its makers, and not it theirs. It can have no ''absolute 
right" to reward and punish in any religious sense of the term; be- 
cause no man, and no number of men, from whom it does or can de- 
rive its powers and the right to organize them morally, have even 
any power whatever, if they would, to enter behind the veil of any 
man's conscience, or control the power of that as a Divine power to 
reward or punish him absolutely in proportion to his intelligence. 

The State, then, is always founded mainly upon the designing 
power as an essentially religious one, — one which finds its origin and^ 
authority, neither in the actuality of the State, nor in the man him- 
self as mere potentiality of design according to his intelligence. To 
make, — to create, — is something absolute which intuitively seeks for a. 
Divine origin. So long, therefore, as Man discerns not his own 
powers, and the method in which they relate themselves to each other 
in a moral unity always three-fold, he has vague notions of this "di- 
vine;" and seeks superstitious, outside relations of his State with it as 
"a god." When arrived at a clear perception of what Religion neces- 
sarily must be, as distinguished from Morality, (as an absolute design- 
ing is distinguished from all particular designs), he sees the folly of 
proposing any "absoluteness" for his State anymore than for himself. 
He cannot have a particular "god" for either, when he realizes that 
the faculty of designing is itself something absolute and a law for all 
else. Then Religion takes its proper place as what is ultimate author- 
ity both for the State and for the Man himself, including both in the 
scope of its designs, and as operative means for their realization. 

This result places Religion within the sphere of absolute freedom 
of conscience, sacred to the individual himself; simply because the 
common sense of what it is, teaches that the State itself is incompe- 
tent to enter that sphere even if it would. It must rather be itself 
silently formed and transformed into a nobler State by what passes 
there, as a higher designing in the spirits of its citizens. For this 
more intelligent conviction as to what Religion is, does not leave 
either the Man or the State based upon a merely abstract Truth, nor 
upon an abstraction as "law," anymore than upon some particular 
"god," as the designer of this State only. It tends to make a "Union 
of States," as well as a brotherhood of men. 

A Civic State, — a Nation, is therefore a means for reaching this re- 
sult. Its Civil Polity is a sign of the stage of progress towards it. 
Its object is to call forth the highest efforts and purest motives of its 
citizens. To best effect this, it must itself be, not a mere force, but an 
organized and operative unity of all the powers of Man in a truly 
moral relation of them. Thus it declares a common intent to be 
ruled by the highest intelligence and virtue. 



CHAPTER III. 

METHODS OF DISTRIBUTING POWER IN THE UNITED 

STATES. 

Sifeyes thought he had hit upon a discriminating principle in his 
scheme for having "authority proceed from above downwards and 
power proceed from below upwards." It was much like Comte's 
notion of a "philosophic rule" for "Humanity" as a "Supreme Being" 
based upon nothing. This abstraction of power from authority ig- 
nores all moral relation between the two, and hence all ground for a 
State. Napoleon was clear-headed enough to see that power and 
authority must have some relation to each other, and that merely for 
purposes of "order," the military relation was the most efficient, and 
even the best where no other would subserve that "Heaven's first 
law." Power, however, is itself triplicate for Man, and no true re- 
lation for power and authority can be found for him except in a moral 
design. Hence also his State must have some moral intent to which 
both the power and the authority are assigned. 

The United States, as a Nation, was explicitly based, as its written 
Constitution says, upon a common design, to "provide for the com- 
mon defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings 
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." And it was to "establish 
justice," — which would "insure domestic tranquillity," and all the 
rest. 

For this declared purpose, both individual and general, both to 
watch over the liberty of the citizen and the welfare of the Nation, a 
general government was organized. What is peculiar to it as a Na- 
tional government is, that it expressly limits its own share of govern- 
mental powers, and thus seems to leave it dubious whether its Consti- 
tution distributes or even regulates the other spheres of power, or 
whether these are wholly independent of it, and dependent only upon 
the caprice of a State or other local desire. 

But to leave this wholly dubious would also leave in doubt whether 
there was any design to form a Nation at all. A nation can have no 
government as such, except in direct relation with all as its citizens, 
and as based upon their design to be such. Unfortunately this design 
was rather implicitly than explicitly stated. And since the States al- 
ready existed, the confirmation of the National Constitution was 



DISTRIBUTION OF POWEIIS IN THE NATION. 43 

naturally submitted to them as States. This left room for difference 
of opinion as to whether they as States could not also undo the ratifi- 
cation. This was the cavil upon which secession proceeded. Con- 
scious, or at least warned by the moral sentiment of mankind, that 
slavery itself and its needs could present no moral claim, since it 
divided humanity itself into an immoral relation, the purpose of seces- 
sion sought to justify its right by the alleged ambiguity of the Nation- 
al Constitution as to its intent to form a nation. 

This controversy has passed. It is sometimes said to have been 
"settled by the sword." But the sword can settle nothing, except 
that where mere force claims to rule, force must decide for better or 
worse; it cannot decide aright. Whoever sees in force alone a law 
for nations, may therefore still be in doubt upon this point, as to 
whether we were intended to be a nation, though fully convinced that 
we are so, at least for the present. And no doubt the willingness of a 
people to use all its power of force to "promote the general welfare," 
and especially to "secure the blessings of liberty" as something 
which pertains to all men, may stand as a significant and final inter- 
pretation of what those words were designed to mean, whenever it be- 
came a question whether this nation as a whole should uphold the free- 
dom of man or the right to enslave him. 

Yet, looking with that "charity for all " which a good man has en- 
joined upon us, we may concede that, in view of the manner in which the 
Constitution was adopted, there was room for honest difference of 
opinion, to say nothing of the blinding effect of an educated prejudice 
and passion on both sides. The form of the government, whether in 
State or Nation, did not spring so much from clear and definite design, 
as we are disposed to say when we do not look closely at the real facts. 
This has already been noted. Just so the continuation of old forms in 
new States or other local governments, is rather an affair of habit than 
of logical design. To some extent, the American people have shown 
faculty of adapting old forms to new uses; but in the way of inven- 
tion, their forte has not been in the political sphere. 

And so, also, has the education into a National sentiment been an 
affair largely of commercial intercourse, — a logic of interests rather 
than of thoughts, a product of events rather than of design. Hence 
this undesigned product worked both ways; there was an education 
both for and against Nationality. All that served to specialize, or 
localize, tended to divide; all that served to generalize tended to 
unify. Thus the localization of shipping interests rendered New Eng- 
land so averse to the war of 1812, as to bring about the "Hartford 
Convention." and to moot the right of secession for the first time in 
that section which produced the "great expounder of the Constitu- 
tion," though he himself was no party to it. Again the localization of 



44 THE CIVIL POLITF OF THE UNITED STATES. 

manufacturing interests was the next bone of contention and pretext 
for dissolution, before the sectional distribution of slavery assumed that 
guise. Slavery however -was the only irreconcilable "interest." 
Others could be compromised; this could not. It was, as interest, 
tendency and educational influence generally, in " irrepressible con- 
flict" with nationality. It was necessnrily at war with national unity 
such as that sought for in the Constitution, because it was theoretically 
abhorrent to moral sense. As theoretically an arbitrary divorce of 
humaLity from itself, it was also practically an obstruction to all civil 
commerce. 

In the free-states the education to nationality was inevitable. The 
tide of emigration and of commerce to and fro across a whole conti- 
nent, washed over and obliterated the limits of States as much as those 
of counties. It was an expansion of the individual himself; he might 
be a man of many States, born in one, living in another, going- 
wherever he would, unfettered by any "special institution" or "pe- 
culiar property." His individuality was wherever his property was; 
and this might be, and for a commercial man generally is, in many 
States. Nothing but a Nation would suflice for such an intercourse, 
and for the greatly diversified and interlocked industries and interests, 
which it produces. Differences, when from a same design, only unify. 
In the free-States, designing was the watch- word and unity the results 
Where invention was torpid, there was a dead sameness, a dying lib- 
erty. Over mountains, and without that open sea which the slave 
States had for border, the free-States surpassed them in the race for 
empire, and educated themselves to nationality. The others were 
just as inevitably educated in provincial notions, or in schemes not 
statesmanlike because at war with the moral and inventive spirit of 
the age. The very obstinacy of their devotion to force, disarmed thenr 
of force itself when it came to war. Had they possessed the indus- 
trial and commercial development of the free States, they could not 
have been conquered. But then, neither would they have needed to 
be. Slavery would have died there as it did in the free States, of in- 
anition. For it was inconsistent with that freedom of design which, 
invents products and makes commerce. Hence it was at war also with, 
that political spirit of freedom which no mere State could hold, and 
which demanded to be exercised, as it really was, the spirit of a Na- 
tion. 

When we look merely at the express limitation of the National 
powers in the Constitution, and then again observe, with a literal eye,, 
that all other powers are "reserved to the several State-," we can see 
the source if not the force, of those technical and hair-splittiag interpre- 
tations, which the exigencies of political and parfis n discussions have 
placed upon it. If we ask, what was this reservation intended for, the- 



DISTRIBUTION OF POWEKS IN T]IE NATION. 4:5 

historical answer must no doubt be that its design was partly to avoid 
the tears of slavery, but also to run the gauntlet of local jealousies in 
general. These provincial feelings were by no means peculiar to the 
slave States when the Constitution was formed. Indeed the most 
strenuous advocates of it were not less Washington, Jeflerson, Madison 
and others from the South, than Hamilton, Livingston and others from 
the North. The great minds, the designing spirits were not in either 
case of the fearful sort. It is the small spirits which have an instinctive 
jealousy and vague fear of what is beyond their ordinary scope of 
thought, and habitual exercise of power. But the creative spirit, so 
long as it finds a moral reason impelling its designs, and preparing for 
its activity a larger field, only feels the freer for this outlook. 

Witness upon this matter of local jealousies the fact that little Rhode 
Island was the last of all to let subside its fears of grandeur ; and did not 
"come in " till surrounded and captured by an actual Nation. Thus it 
was a practical question for designing statesmen in those days, (and still 
is), to capture prejudices and soothe small fears in the best way they 
could. And their theories had somewhat to suffer in the process, and 
be shorn at least of their clearness of expression if not of their essential 
intentions. Yet they succeeded in embodying in the Constitution a 
clause which expressly empowers the National Government to "guar- 
antee to every State in the Union a republican form of Government." 

Not so fond of taking this literally are those who would regard the 
Nation as made and destroyable by the States. Yet they can stultify 
it and make of it a suicidal instead of a self-preserving power. Either 
by severing it from the power to amend, or by refusing any moral law 
for interpreting, they can make of it only a guarantee for what is, and 
render the past a veto on all progress. For what can it signify if no 
judgment is to be exercised under it, or if this judgment must be an 
immoral one ? In the one way, they make this very provision throttle 
the Nation ; in the other, they cut its throat. Such was the use made of 
it in behalf of slavery. Its intent clearly was that no new State at least 
should set up a Government immoral in form, or at war with the moral 
design of the Nation expressed in the preamble of the Constitution. 
But it was argued, on one hand, that since slave States were in the 
Union, there was no design to describe slavery as inconsistent with 
"establishing justice and securing the blessings of liberty." By that 
immoral interpretation it was claimed that the proposed object was 
absurd unless it recognized slavery also as a blessing, and that slave 
States, just as much as the free, were within the "guarantee." Hence 
it was further urged that the intent really was to make a perpetual wed- 
lock of slavery and liberty, as the acme of statesmanship. For such a 
design there was ample "power " ; for any other, none. (It was forgot- 
ten on which side jealousy arises in such unions). On the other hand, 



46 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

it was argued that the makers of the Constitution presumed and ex- 
pected that slavery would gradually die out. But in fact it did not. It 
also extended its area, and tried to keep pace "with the " area of free- 
dom." The Union became a mother of slave States as well as of free, 
and thus expressly conceded that the " compact " did not deny to Shy- 
lock also his pound of flesh. And Shylock took it, with all its conse. 
quences of widening the controversy, until it became a crisis for the 
life of the Nation and drew blood. 

So in respect to the admission of new States in gpneral, the national 
sense was not awake to any responsibility in respect to what kind of a 
State it should be, until the necessity tor so doing was pressed'home as 
a vital one. That tJiis requirement of a republican form of government 
meant anything in particular, unless a mere flimg at King George or his 
lieirs, was not seriously considered until a crisis came which called at- 
tention to it. Even then, how scrupulously it was handled, and under 
what a shower of constitutional pyrotechnics, when it came to be a 
question, even after slavery had been abolished, as to whether the Nation 
had right to supervise and secure such a reorganization of the former 
area of slavery as was conformable with the Nation's design. It was 
found necessary, on account of the previous thoughtless or unprincipled 
course of the Nation, to take anew, through amendments of the Consti- 
tion, the sense of the people as to what the design of the Nation, not 
vpas, but is. Even this was objected to, with a gravity and unction 
which now seems ludicrous. It was argued that it was unconstitutional 
to amend the Constitution, except in accordance with all that was in it ! 
and thus the ingenious politician would make of it a closed circle within 
which the Nation might amend as much as it pleased, but could only 
be like a kitten chasing its tail. 

The wisdom of the fathers no doubt was great; but that they 
intended to limit the wisdom of their children in this way, may well be 
doubted. What has been most unwise, however, in their posterity, has 
been just this failure to carry out the original design; which was, to 
freely devise for all cases, not a mere expedient, but a well-principled 
and thoroughly- thought method. Such methods alone can either ener- 
gize or secure rational action. They are, therefore, necessary to the 
Nation, and authorized by its moral right to be. How much this neg- 
lect depends upon the conflict of parties, deeming themselves made un- 
designing by a written constitution, and making that designless by 
carping interpretation and captious arguments, may hereafter be con- 
sidered. Here we must refer it to the careless conduct of the Nation, 
and its lack of self-consciousness of what it is. 

When we look at the manner in which power is distributed by a 
State of the Union, we find tbat the law of the State alone can deter- 
mine what shall be the local limits, powers or officers, of counties. 



DISTKIBUTION OF POWERS IN THE NATION. 47 

towns, cities or other subdivisions. So, also, the State takes direct cog- 
nizance ot'the individual, and provides general laws whereby the limits 
and exercise of his powers are to be regulated so far as they come 
within the sphere of State supervision. 

So also the National government, so far as it deals with Territo- 
ries or districts of its own, organizes them throughout. New States, 
on a question, of admission as States, are now recognized as subject to 
a thorough scrutiny of their proposed Constitution and form of Gov- 
ernment. But how far this responsibility of the Nation, for the chai'- 
acter of government in any actual State extends, is not at present 
deemed settled upon any ful'y exjDressed principle. It is fully ex- 
pressed and settled, however, that every law of a State must be in ac- 
cord with and subordinate to the Constitution and laws of the Nation. 
And the power to amend the latter shows the former to be wholly sub- 
ordinate to any National design. 

The National government, through its courts, is also explicitly the 
arbiter between different States; and by its armed force, the rightful 
preventer and queller of collisions between them, or of rebellions in 
any State against that State, or its laws, as well as against its own. It 
offers itself of right when called upon for judicial decision, between 
citizens or corporations of different States. It claims to be the sole 
proper judge for its citizen when acting as an officer under its own 
laws; and also, recently, for violation of rights of suffrage when com- 
mitted against its own laws, which are applied only to National elec- 
tions. 

But how far the National government protects the citizen himself,, 
except in foreign lands, or against foreigners, is a matter of uncer- 
tainty and wavering of opinion. Even in respect to suffrage, since 
the qualification is, not merely citizenship, but official, and as yet only 
under State laws, the National government does not enter fully jnto 
the question how far its responsibility to guarantee a republican form 
of government requires it either to qualify or defend the suffragan. 
At this other extreme of its relation, it has not yet defined its power 
to form or control its voter, any more than its power to shape or re- 
form a State. It may be said that in general this failure to use its own 
poAvers has even obliged their use by others. This has led of course to 
grave abuses, and to contempt of National authority in the sphere of 
suffrage as well as in that of State-rights. Neglect to devise methods 
to execute its powers has led to their denial, for it is itself such. la 
this way the Nation was long kept in poise between, instead of over 
both State and citizen, as something used by both on emergencies, but 
not as a general law-maker, and active designer. For example, the 
power to regulate inter-State commerce was expressly named in Vir- 
ginia's call for the new Constitution as a chief object and great need. 



48 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TILE UNITED STATES. 

Yet as late as 1811, ISTew York and New Jersey and Connecticut were 
making- conflicting laws about such comoierce; and Tip to 1824 such 
chancellors as Livingston were sustaining them by injunctions. 

Such deficiencies in the interpretation and methodic use of National 
powers, and such cases of their practical nullification, raise the ques- 
tion whether the distribution of powers, which is often so much lauded 
as a system, really tends to strengthen or to wc^aken the National sen- 
timent. At present the question is involved in past prejudices and 
passions which must pass away with time and the lack of the circum- 
stances and education which fostered them. It is not therefore to be 
decided hastily merely by current events, but with reference to princi- 
ples which are enduring. 

Now the designs of any man are to be read in his acts, and espe- 
cially in the method of his acts. Just so, a civil polity is to be best 
judged as to its designs by its methods. The Nation, as we see, has 
not fully methodized and used some of its powers. Taking, then, this 
universal criterion of the method by which to judge of the design in 
reference to this first most general matter of organization and distri- 
"bution of powers, it would seem at first sight that the intent was to 
make the National government really escape the attention of the 
people. This was -the great argument for it, that it was really a matter 
chiefly of foreign defence, a necessity for that in case of war and a pre- 
vention of war by being prepared for it. It was also shown that it 
would bear lightly upon the people, since its revenues were to be de- 
rived chiefly from customs, and that the National form was the cheap- 
est method of accomplishing such purposes. Besides it would furnish 
■a means, much needed, for liquidating the common revolutionary 
■debt, and for regulating the money system for all by its power of 
coinage. It was really not a proposition adverse to any local interests 
or which interfered with any local affairs. The National Government 
would tea sun for all without their realizing that it ever shone. It 
was to occupy, as it were, only a sphere of contingency as a provision 
agaicst possible necessity. It was not to be a system of government, 
centralized and all-absorbing and all-domineering. It was on'y to be 
an " agency " to transact some affairs, because in that way it could be 
done most cheaply, and mainly it was to be a union against foreign 
powers, like the confederation, but was to pay its way better. 

Doubtless it was these considerations more than any other which 
tended to the acceptance of the National government. But when it 
came to a question of actual war again in 1813, that same squeamish 
jealousy for local interests, which it was necessary to coax into assent 
by showing that the war-power was the chief affair, was the very first 
to find its fealty shaken by the exercise of that very power When it 
came to the Avar of 1846 with Mexico, — a war manifestly made in the 



DISTKIBUTION OF POWERS IK THE NATION. 49 

interest of slavery-extension, and made upon untenable pretexts, there 
was moral scruple in the best minds, both as to the war and its objects. 
Yet in the popular mind the enthusiasm for the Nation swept over all 
.scruples, the moment a collision occurred and the gauge of battle was 
thrown. How came it about that the national feeling had grown 
stronger with time, and with the operation of the government itself? 

Evidently it was not because the National government had con- 
fined itself to merely foreign relations, or secluded its operations 
within a sphere where it was not felt. Its methods had been such as to 
make it known to the people in many ways as a servant for all. In no 
other way, indeed is it possible for any government to reach the affec- 
tions of a people. It must be for them, not an unknown or unfelt, but 
.something which they know intimately and hourly. 

In fact, however superficial or locally jealous may have been the 
acceptance of the Constitution, we find that its makers were by no 
means superficial in their making of it. Not because "they builded 
wriser than they knew." It was the necessity which is imposed upon 
those who can build at all, to have some morally consistent design,^ — • 
some thoroiigh-going idea. The National government was therefore 
really made a system, a centralized system of powers wherein the 
States took a subordinate position and authority. Could the wiser 
makers of the Constitution have had their way wholly, they would 
perhaps have done better by doing more. At least they would not 
have been obliged, by small prejudices and fears, to mask under im- 
plicit forms the noble designs they had for the Nation. Nevertheless 
the event has shown that they succeeded. Although they were 
-obliged to plant an inevitable conflict in the very ambiguities of the 
Constitution itself, they did so with a noble faith that the essential 
morality of Man would eventually confirm and carry out the design 
■of the fathers by the acts of the children. "Exitus acta probaf was 
the motto of Washington. 

Despite all prejudices, they succeeded in so intimately blending all 
the methods of the Nation into a necessary harmony with, through 
subordination to, the operations of the general government itself, 
that the whole was really a system, and could not be torn asunder. 
The powers of the Nation in respect merely to regulating commerce 
and comity between the States were such that these alone would in- 
evitably have educated us into a National feeling, and made of us a 
Nation had we not begun as such. It is not because these powers 
necessarily distribute an army of otfice-holders within sight of all, 
•either as a menace or a burden; but because the Nation is there by its 
services, through post-otfice, customhouse, court; and so welds it- 
self with the common life of all, that it becomes, in Napoleon's 
phrase, "of the very fibre ot the people." It is true that a "paternal 



50 THE CIVIL POLITi'' OF THE UNITED STATES, 

government," even as despotic, can be this useful servant, if it will, 
even more than ours can be, either as State or Nation; and so it may 
vp-ed itself to the affections of the people, as did Napoleon's, despite 
all his despotism, merely as an admirable administrator. This is the 
forte of the French genius, to organize and to admire a thoroughly 
serviceable government. But the French mistake has been in suppos. 
ing that this order can be produced as merely an enforced order, thus 
depriving the citizen of all moral responsibility in the matter, and 
thereby taking from the State its only safe basis. 

Our National Constitution-makers were not victims of this error as 
to where the final moral unity of power and authority for a Nation 
are. While they centralized both power and authority in the Nation. 
as a governmental method, they also centralized them both in the in- 
dividual as the designer of this method, and hence responsible for its 
actual working, in accordance with its moral intent. For he is re- 
sponsible to a higher and Divine authority for having a moral intent 
in all his acts, single or collective. This is the very reason for his having 
a National government, and a universal harmony with all men if 
possible. 

Thus the relation is direct between the citizen and the Nation; he 
is the Nation in its essential character. No less than the State, does it 
rest directly upon him as its designer and responsible for its actual 
character as shown in its conduct. Even more immediately and cer- 
tainly does the National, rather than the State Government, reflect the 
character and conduct of the citizen. His attention is more directed to 
that as a larger object, a nobler object, — a mutual self-government of 
all by all. This is what creates a true afliection for the Nation; that it 
is for all and not merely for some. Even the vulgar mind intuitively 
sees this, however vaguely; and the professedly " local self-governor"^ 
in this country is just the one who can never find any local issues. 

Hence it is vain to talk about the distrtbution of powers in this 
Nation as though the Nation itself were not. It is. It is in direct re- 
lation with every citizen, so that in his thought, his affections, his 
practical conduct, he actuall}' subordinates all else to it. Its central- 
ization is in him and through him; and he both can and does reduce 
all other forms or methods of government into subordination to that. 
His "parties" are National parties, he knows no other. It is the most 
difficult thing in tlie world to give any local issue whatever a local 
status. It must be nationalized. The local politician, most of all, is 
the one who has a suspicious eye upon such issues. He thinks the 
great principles of self government are somehow endangered by them- 
He prefers to refer all such questions to a party verdict as a National 
question. Otherwise his full freedom as a citizen is not declared. 
Thus he ties himself up in the Nation, he will be nothing less than a 



DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS IN THE NATION. 51 

Nation in himself. He is not a man to be bound up in mere States or 
petty localities. He knows his largest freedom is in and through the Na • 
tion. When he severs himself from that, he feels lost, out of his 
native element. He cannot contract his habitual sphere of imagin- 
ation to a sense of personal responsibility for local affairs. 

In this way the National feeling has undoubtedly seized upon the 
imaginations of the common people, so that with them it is even more 
a passion than with the thoughtful. And when it takes this form of a 
mere habitual partyism which deprives the man of all "local sense," he 
may be said to lose his common sense. There is the danger of a cen- 
tralization springing from the citizen himself, from his loss of moral 
sense with respect to local affairs and to himself. 

In this view of it there may be just apprehension of an undue cen- 
tralization, through mere partyism in National policy absorbing all 
else. But how completely this form of the danger nullifies the notion ' 
that we were never designed to be a Nation! The danger comes in the 
form of a National issue, — a conflict in and supposed to be for the 
Nation itself on both sides. It is a question as to what the Nation 
shall be. Such i conflict has already passed to a decision by force. 
The moral sense of the Nation did not suflice to decide it. Thus al- 
ways will it be: the question of what the Nation is, or ought to be, 
must come at last to blows, unless the authority of moral sense iS' 
recognized by every citizen, as what empowers him to be a citizen, 
and must guide all his individual decisions with respect to public 
affairs. 

The moral sense, however, as the largest sense of true freedom, 
inevitably tends to the largest views. When enlightened and sensi- 
tive, it can make great statesmen. Subordinated to mere partyism, it 
will make great demagogues. When deficient and darkened it can 
make small politicians, whose blunders even are not the least of crimes- 
against the Nation. But there this moral sense is, in any case, as 
the recognized basis of the whole governmental system. Such as it is, 
it will make the Nation, and make it supreme over all, througn what- 
ever conflicts. It is in the Nation, as what forms the Nation for itself. 
The Nation will take the image of this its maker. 

It is in vain, then, to place reliance upon written constitutions. 
Judges may pronounce these sacred; and so they are, so long as they 
last; but there is nothing sacred for him who makes it, when he ought 
to make it better. It is vain to look upon the forming of governments 
as something fortuitous, and "hope that all will come out well" from 
some mere clash of interests or opinions. Equally vain to suppose 
that some mysterious " spirit of a Nation" is to care for what it is to 
be and ought to be, better than it can itself. All such theories are 
either physical or metaphysical fantasies Avhich take away the respons- 



52 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ibility of Man. In this country the relation of the Nation to the 
moral sense of the citizen is clearly stated. The latter will make the 
jSTation whatever it becomes, and must take the responsibility for it. 

This has already been so clearly shown in the history of the Na- 
tion, shown to be the very fact which inevitably involves all else in the 
form of the Nation as a Nation, that it is e i i.iUy vain to consider the 
distribution of powers as any more a limitation of the National power 
as to the States, than there is any limitation of the State power as to 
counties, towns, etc. Precisely because this Nation is directly related 
to the moral sense of the citizen, and because this is what gives him 
the deepest affection for the Nation as his largest sphere of free de- 
sign, he will inevitably subordinate all else to that, and only his moral 
sense of fitness and true method in respect to Civil Polity in general 
will guide him in his practical work of organization. 

Such has been the past, such will be the futurie of the process of 
organization. The citizen is directly in this as the perpetual designer. 
He does and will organize the methods and distribute the powers ac- 
cording to the state of his moral sense and intelligence. But citizens 
must act collectively; that moralizes them as one whole. Yet men will 
differ, will form parties; this seems to demoralize again, and even to 
keep the whole ever split in twain. There must, however, be always 
some actual organization and distribution of powers. The different 
use the two parties make of these will be the real and constant dif- 
ference between them. Written Constitutions furnish a first ground 
for this mode of contention, 'and prescribe limits for it. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE TWO PARTIES, AND THEIR USE OF POWER. 

The proposition to form a Union of States into a Nation, presented, 
■for the first time in liistory, the necessity for devising a written plan 
which should include the whole design, and be recognized as entirely 
the work of those men concerned in the act. There had been leagues 
before, and even confederacies upon w^ritten terms. There had bten 
written codes of law in Greece and Rome, coming from a Solon, a 
Lycurgus, a Numa. Nothing new, then, in having a written Constitu- 
tion, nor in deeming it a precise limitation and quasi sacred against 
•change. But what was new was to make a State of States, and its 
law, a law of laws; and yet to have all this complicate design recog- 
nized as the work of Man alone. The design was a moral one, a free 
one; — to constitute, not merely a law, but a free and orderly making of 
laws. The law-maker himself was to act only b}^ law; he has a moral 
authority and guide in his written Constitution, modelled after his 
conscience. 

It is because of this very fact that we have always had literalists 
who insist that everything in the design must be explicit, and nothing 
implicit. Other interpreters, seeing that the main features of every 
rational design suffice to show its intent, and indeed are better guides 
to it than mere letters or words taken apart from it, become the advo- 
cates of what is clearly implicit, — implied in the very nature of the 
power organized, since it is organized for action "and not as a mere 
static show. Yet it is evident that the general intention, in such a sys- 
tematic creation of governmental powers, is to be explicit, — to express 
as fully as necessary for a clear understanding of the general design. 
This is the more evident from the fact that the same method of written 
Constitutions is carried into the States, and beyond them into 
counties, towns, cities; — everything is chartered, given a definite de- 
sign to carry out and comply with. Here then is freedom limiting its 
own acts by recognizing a law for them. 

Evidently Man has here risen to the thinking of law in a new way. 
He has become a maker of laws and of a law for laws. He has fore- 
sworn superstitions about ancestors, Natural law and Nature-gods in 
general. What place, then, is there here for that comment upon 
"growth" as something sacred, (referred to in chap. II), which is in- 
dulged in by some writers on our Civil Polity? They are evidently 



54 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

fooking at the English system. Where there is no written Constitu- 
tion as in England, the origin of laws and of States may well be re- 
garded as hidden in some mysterious process called "growth;" and 
thus the present and real authority for them can there be muddled in 
away to sanctify classes, kings, and any other feudal absurdity grown 
really obsolete whether treated so or not. But for us to have similar 
yearnings after the past and to deify "growth,'' is to make ourselves 
doubly absurd. For what we are about is clearly a present and con- 
tinual designing and nothing else. The responsibility is ever present 
and actual. 

And this is just what constitutes our need, and the modern need 
generally, of written constitutions. They do not abjure the past but 
define it, so far as it hands down a law for Civil Polity. No such law 
can be found except as the designing power of Man: this is still living, 
and is all that is left of the past as such a law. Written Constitutions 
to-day are simply explicit recognitions that this moral power in Man 
has become not merely a capacity but even a necessity for self-govern- 
ment. They themselves express such an act. They are a made con- 
science, or common moral law by which to act. 

(1.) — In them, we have, on the one hand, a general design carefully 
marked out; and on the other, a recognition of our power and right ta 
change even that as often as we please for the better. They clearly 
contemplate continuity therefore, but only of law-making. Hence 
the method for modifying the general design is itself prescribed. 
There are to be no tumultuary proceedings. The persistence is not to 
be one of force but of law and of obedience to law. 

(2.) — Again, this general design must be recognized as authoritative 
over all others. It must overrule all particular designs opposed to it 
and be a guide for those in accord with it. In this way, the entire in- 
ventive, designing activity of the community is organized for one same 
general purpose. 

(3.) — But still further, such a general design implies intent to be 
stable, as well as definite, in our civil polity. This written and com- 
plete outline of its design will therefore be taken to heart, as more or 
less sacred or even final, by different persons according to their dispo- 
sition to be more or less averse to change, or reverential of the past. 

This difference of tendency in respect to our written Constitution is 
one of the grounds for our political parties. In this phase of it, as an- 
interpreting of Constitutions, it will come into view hereafter. Just 
now the difference between the parties is to be pointed out in a more 
general phase, as different tendencies in respect to use of political 
power, and especially of such a distributed system of power as ours. 

As already stated, the citizen is the ultimate organizer, the maker- 
and changer of methods. But, at first, with a written Constitution,, 



THE TWO PARTIES. AND THEIR USE OF POWER. 55 

lie is only a user of established methods. His comprehension of the 
design of these will be tested by the way he uses them: and that will 
■depend iipon his intelligence and moral sense. 

Now, a defective moral sense tends first to methodize its power 
•only in a formal way, by merely subordinating the sensibly less to the 
greater. Such a relation is expressible only in the form of force. It 
is therefore not really a rational relation: the big is not any better than 
the little, nor does number make wise. Yet this very form commends 
itself to the defective intelligence, which is attracted by the principle 
of majority rule. It deems itself shielded thereby against superior 
craft. The real moral intuition here is, however, that there must be a 
community of wills, and hence a moral unity. And this is not an 
affair of force nor of number; for there must be judgment, however 
good or bad it may be. The true citizen is really satisfied only with a 
comparison of moral judgments. The bad citizen may not realize his 
moral responsibility; but he knows that he has a free will if not a free 
thought. He will have a vague moral sense that it is proper to " let 
the ballot decide; " for he really sees no other way to agree as a whole. 
Indeed this is the simplest and most general form of judgment, — by 
division. "There are two sides to every question." Hence its parties 
are the two sides of a judging Nation. The two form its differences 
and also its unity. It is a moral judging whole only through them so 
far as it is a popular judgment. 

This general division then is simply a matter of necessity so far as 
all are to judge. Hence, the " man of the people " will not so clearly 
see the propriety of those checks upon mere number, and those resorts 
to mixed methods for deriving the wisdom of the land, which are so 
much praised by more reflective minds. A mere counting of heads 
appeals to that moral sense which ought to be the same in all, and 
hence the ballot tends to develop it, even where the right to ballot is not 
determined by the moral character of the man as shown in his acts. 
But it also seems to appeal to all as though they were equal in intelli- 
gence, and in that phase of it it tends to partyism, and is very dear to 
demagogy. The voter duly flattered as to the wisdom of his choice in 
respect to " a great party," naturally falls under the illusion that he is 
not only " as good as any other man," but also as wise in that he be- 
longs to this great party. And he supposes that, in mistaking all its 
■opinions for his own, he is in the right way of authority, the true 
church. And so, indeed, the ignorant voter is under a safer discipline 
thus, than left to his own ignorance. In spite of himself, he learns to 
look elsewhere and higher for his intelligence, and thus lays down his 
claim of equality in that respect, though he does it only as a partyism. 

Such is the philosophic necessity for parties in a free government, 
.and for all issues running into a division as National parties. It or- 



56 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE TNITED STATES. 

ganizes the whole intelligence of the Nation into definite oppositions^ 
stales the issue definitely, and put? it in its largest relations as it be- 
comes a nation to judge of it. Such a method for escaping from the 
meshes of mere ignorance, and the necessity tor putting every serious 
question into a National form, should make of our politicians not mere 
demagogues, but statesmen. For, under this party method, party lead- 
ers become responsible. Party leaders must have brain and heart 
worthy of a great nation, must have both moral sense and intelligence 
worthy of its confidence, if they are to make of this devotion to party 
upon which they insist as a fealty, and to which ignorance in general 
attaches itself instinctively as its only guide out of its ignorance, any- 
thing more than a mere leading of the blind by the blind into the ditch. 
Evidently the mere getting of offices as spoils is the ordinary form of 
this ditch; and the blindness is a defective moral sense which would 
make of every issue, local or other, a mere question of such a partyism, 
and turn every kind of offices into an entrenchment for such a party. 

A more reflective moral sense, which realizes its responsibility to 
act intelligently according to the actual nature and limits of a question,, 
demurs to this exclusive party-system of government. It would recog- 
nize local questions and organize methods for treating them within 
their own sphere. Yet, oddly enough, it is precisely the merely in- 
stinctive democracy, — the imperfect intelligence which needs a party 
for its fealty and leaders to guide it, — from whom the cry against cen- 
tralization is loudest; although it is so chiefly, to be sure, only when it 
is itself out of power. The danger comes only from that merging of all 
into a national partyism; and, yet, that is just what this party is most 
of all intent upon doing. It would foist all manner of sins upon the 
Nation; and thus it makes of itself indeed a national party, (and that 
only) in the sense that it always wears that badge, and will recognize no 
other flag, — so long as jYs party carries it. It must be said that this is 
its education to a National sentiment, and in the only way in which 
narrow views can be made to overleap the bounds of mere localities, or 
the prejudices of section, and enter into a larger sphere of thought. 
Even the seceders were as " national " as any, — in this way; their views 
and intentions were by no means "sectional"; the trouble was rather 
the contrary, that they wished to make the whole Nation after their 
own notion. They took the name of democracy; the principles of de- 
mocracy were their especial care; and upon this form of it as devotion 
to party they counted for securing their designs. 

When, therefore, we hear of jeremiads over the degeneracy of the Na- 
tion, such as Mr. Tilden was wont to indulge in, and of promises to re- 
turn to the "strict construction of the fathers," in respect to the distribu- 
tion of powers, and the exact limits of each, and dwelling with especial 
unction upon the importance of limiting the National government and. 



THE TWO PARTIES AND THEIK USE OF POWER. 57 

restraining its encroachments upon tlie powers of the States, — we may 
perhaps question whether so intelligent and ingenious a leader does not 
rather see in these recommendations the best possible means for erect- 
ing such a system of party entrenchments and defenses, as shall secure 
for it a return to and indefinite lease of power ag a " national party" 
indeed, — but of the strictly parly stripe. 

So, also, another of the most eminent, both intellectually and mor- 
ally, of this same party, — Hon. Horatio Seymour, is eloquent in depict- 
ing the educational effect of local divisions, and their administration, 
upon the people at large. He seems to see in it a wise design of the 
fathers to prevent the confusion of all in a despotic centralization, and 
to provide in these humbler spheres a preparatory school and career for 
true statesmen. Mr. Seward, likewise, was wont to point to these 
subordinate spheres as proper steps for that experience by which a 
noble ambition should fit itself for the highest duties and honors. There 
is no doubt ample provision 6f this sort, which, owing to the various and 
ever-varying political complexion of the States and other lo-al spheres, 
is not likely to be made wholly subservient to the uses or intents of any 
party. And the very fact that the National feeling divides itself into 
parties, and must show itself in that general form, also creates by its 
own operation these local differences. These latter, therefore, do not 
depend upon any distribution of powers, as a limitation of the Nation; 
for the National power would in any case differentiate itself in just 
this way. 

In other words, so far as this local difference depends upon party- 
ism it is inevitable; but so far as it depends upon the actual opportu- 
nity for distinguishing local issues from National questions, that 
exclusive devotion to mere party, peculiar to the party of which Mr. 
Seymour has been so eloquent an advocate, is precisely what prevents 
this opportunity from being used, whether such were the design of the 
fathers or not. Town meetings, especially in ruj'al districts, may pos- 
sibly be free from all political guile; — but even there this may be 
doubted, if the charmer is about, and the schoolmaster abroad. 

But it is chiefly in large cities where this "local government" 
ought to have its test as "principle;" and there is just where it fails to 
get any such test. The government of cities reverts into the system 
of party-government, and this is inevitable where either party insists 
upon using every local opportunity merely as an entrenchment and 
base of supplies for the party. The "principle of local self-govern- 
ment " is thus referred to some higher principle as it always must be; 
for there is no such thing as a self-government in an abstract way, 
independent of everything else. Only here, the reference not being 
made to the moral sense of the individual, with regard to the men and 
the methods suitable for this local sphere, it seeks its alliance with 



58 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

some higher authoritj" than the locality itself, through the National 
party. Hence "party" must take the responsibility as it does the 
profits, aud bear the stigmas of shame as well as whatever weight of 
glory it may earn bj^ its bad or good administration of such " local self- 
governments." Governments must always be referred to some unity 
of both power and authority which can bear a moral responsibility. 
And since the vulgar and ignorant sense of responsibility which pre- 
vails under a mere ballot system in large cities looks rather to some- 
thing external than internal as its " authority;" and is prone to relate 
the lesser power to the larger in a merely formal way, such is the 
solution " self-government " receives in cities. It resolves inevitably 
into the system of National parties, so that cities, in this country, raaj 
be said to be seceders from States and to hold themselves responsible 
only to the Nation. In this view of it as a fact, the question would 
seem to arise, not whether city governments are something sacredly 
foreclosed against all interference even from the State itself; but 
whether, indeed, since they insist upon a National complexion only, 
thej ought not to be redeemed by the Nation itself from their usual 
subjection to mere ignorance, or their actual use as mere party fortifi- 
cations. 

Such a suggestion would of course startle that instinctive demo- 
cratic sense, which is clamorousfor " local self-government," butwhich 
always makes of its "great principle" merely a party principle, and is 
always ready to share the loaf with others when i* is offered part, but 
never when it can have the whole. Thus, in the case of New York City, 
Mr. Evarts, who is supposed to know something about laws, argued in 
favor of a proposition to let the business men of the city at least have 
an oversight, a mere censorship as it were, over the financial adminis- 
tration of the metropolis. But Mr. Kelly, who is supposed to know 
much about facts, stood up at once as the guardian of a " great prin- 
ciple," and as a "great party" stood behind him, it was useless to 
contend against such a fiat. It was not so much a "flat justitia " as 
a " fiat the partj-!" — "though the heavens fall." And so New York 
City has f ullj^ seceded not out of, ( as one of its ex-Mayors desired ), 
but into the Nation, and from the State. What its government is under 
party control, must judge that party both as to its designs and its 
methods, and this responsibility cannot be escaped. 

State governments also, and all other local spheres will be subject 
to the same judgment. This pei-haps is their highest use, as a criterion 
by which parties can be judged, as to their designs and methods, by 
their acts where they have the power to act. Since a National govern- 
ment, like any other, inevitably resolves itself into parties, and these 
parties, through the insistance of one or the other, make the difference 
in every locality, this is what the distribution of powers throughout 



THE TWO PARTIES AND TIIEIB USE OF POWER. 59 

the Nation practically amounts to. States, counties, towns, cities, all 
fall under the supreme sway of a National feeling, and thus the Na- 
tion is kept before the eyes of all practically by that very partyism 
which insists upon them most theoretically and uses them as a slogan. 
It makes of them party interests and principles, and hence National 
issues. And thus the conscience of the whole Nation is appealed to, 
and called upon to judge of a National party by its local character 
and acts; by these, its motives and methods are to be scrutinized, 
with reference to their fitness for a higher sphere. True party spirit 
therefore should take pride in the superior excellence of its local ad- 
ministration. If it cannot point to this with pride, it is not wise. But 
just here is where exists the "degeneracy." 

This tends, perhaps, on the whole, to give us the best general, but 
the worst local government in the world. The latter is notoriously 
costly and almost always suspected of corruption. The former stands in 
the full blaze of concentrated criticism, and its financial management 
especially is jealously watched. Attention is so exclusively directed to 
the National legislature, that all others burrow in a comparative ob- 
scurity, immensely important though they are. Higher ability is 
secured for the Nation's congress ; for the reason that ambitions in all 
sections tend towards it as the culmination of the political career. The 
National judges bear a higher reputation, though less paid ; and their 
courts and juries a higher character, both as to methods and intelli- 
gence. 

It follows, since the higher intelligence of all parties has its ambi- 
tion directed toward the National sphere, and this sphere is the center 
for all eyes, that the recklessness and ignorance which often prevail in 
local spheres cannot be tolerated there- There is no difiierence in par- 
ties in this respect, that they feel a higher sense of responsibility when 
they actually touch the National helm. The leaders, if men of any 
moral sense whatever, find it quite unprofitable there to serve a mere 
party at the expense of the Nation ; it is the surest way to weaken the 
party itself. Too much capacity is called for there, to permit the weak 
long to conceal their inefficiency. If a party has no principles, there 
will be the place to soonest show, that all the designing capacity it is 
conscious of is a design to rule, — a design wholly barren necessarily of 
any real projects of reform. 

Now, ''reforming " is unquestionably the essential business of every 
self-government. A truly moral man is constantly reforming himself, 
and trying to do so for the better, in accordance with that higher idea, 
wtiich growing intelligence develops in him, of what he ought to be be- 
cause he can be. But in a system of government which adopts through- 
out the method of written constitutions as a sort of charter for its ideal of 
duty so far as yet developed, the question of reform turns at first, mainly 



60 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

upon matters of mere administration. This limitation of the ideal to be 
obserred, is no doubt a wise monition by the fathers to reflect well upon 
the method of general organization, before concluding 3'ou can better it. 
And the method of amending constitutions is made such as to take time 
and cull forth full debate. But it also tends to the system of mere party 
government, since it creates a prejudice against constitutional changes, 
against progress in the ideal, through moral sense and higher intelli- 
gence. And this makes of all " reform " a matter chiefly of formal ad- 
ministration. 

Hence the ground of difference for National parties, in this country,, 
is, so far as a matter of principle, a difference as to where to look for 
the " authorit v," or rather for that unit}' of powe'- and authority which 
alone can be moral. The question is, whether it is to be found in an al- 
ready collected and established public opinion, — a past ideal, expressed 
ii' a written form, and held as something sacred and unchansreable; — or 
whether it is to be always recurred to at its fountain-head in the indi-^ 
vidual voter himself, as one who ought to judge of everj- question ac- 
cording to its logical limits and proper sphere. But such a judgment 
requires more morality than is possessed by the vicious, and more intel- 
ligence than is po>se38ed by the ignorant. Hence, tor them, party gov- 
ernment is the safest system. It organizes intelligence for them. 
Especially do they need it as a Xational partyism which requires for 
them leaders of higher intelligence and greater sense of moral responsi- 
bility, from whom to derive their views. It also tends to broaden their 
views through their leaders, from the necessity of the case, with the 
progress of events. But since this party always looks to something in 
the past as an ideal, no constitutional reforms (unless from its leaders),, 
can be expected from it, no progress of the moral ideal itself, no im- 
provement in the methods of organization. It will be essentially a con- 
servative party ; and fortunately is it thus tied by its very faults and 
deficiencies, to what at least is already attained, wiih devotion to that 
rather than disposition to destroy it. 

This party, therefore, will have a mere " persistence of force," from 
its very deficiency as moral ; or, to speak otherwise, from the abstract 
character of its morality, — its reference of tbe moral to something ab- 
stract as the party, and not to the creative one in all the citizens which 
creates the Nation itself. Thus it invites that first despotic form which 
all government must take for those who cannot or will not govern them- 
selves; and for them this is the absolute government of them by a party. 
On the other hand, the more intelligent and reflective class will form 
a party which is weak as a mere force, just because it refers its moral 
authority not abstractly, but to every individual conscience, it will 
bear the name, and take all the consequences of the name of " the party 
of moral reform." Such reform seems immoral to the mind which is. 



THE TWO PARTIES AND THEIR USE OF POWER. 61 

wont to regard the " whatever is is right " as a theory of the uuiTerse 
generally, and also to the thoughtless man who is caught in the net of 
party prejudice, or in the general habit of regarding habit itself, 
whether public or private, as something " constitutional," and thus sa- 
credlj^ hedged against reform. A party which bears such a name will 
no doubt subject itself to just criticism on account of now and then fur. 
nishing a hare-brained reformer of the world. And the addiction of its 
members to moral reforms generally, will tell against it "in odd years"; 
to say nothing of that peculiar style of " independent criticism " by 
which a certain ciass of its journals act towards its leaders the part of 
the monitor in the Roman "triumphs," and reduce them to the due 
sense of equality by the "tu es homo" This is, indeed, a just warning 
to all in this party; their reference of the moral is generally only indi- 
vidual, and hence imperfect. Nevertheless, this alone can be a " party 
of progress," — the party to advance the moral ideal of the Nation, and 
to reorganize its methods, so far as they are methods of recognized free- 
dom in real self-government. For no such method can proceed except 
from those who have a moral sense demanding it, and intelligence ade- 
quate to design it in a consistent form. This party will also be a 
National party ; yet not like the other, merely conservative of progress 
gained, but seeking for progress. It will be the true soul of the 
Nation while the other is its body. If this soul, — this intelli- 
gence and active moral sense of the Nation, sleeps in a fancied 
security, or indulges itself in carelessness and neglect of public 
affairs, then the degeneracy of all will ensue. The whole body 
politic will become corrupt, or else stiffened in an old age, 
since it makes of itself mere body and likens itself to what 
perishes. 

Hence, when there is no serious National question before the public 
conscience, parties will differ only as to matters of administration. 
But their main difference will now show itself again as determining the 
methods in which they propose to use the distribution of powers in the 
Nation, and in a way which depends upon the ground difference in 
the parties themselves. The one, having only an abstract purpose — to 
rule, wUl confuse all local designs with the general one, and bend all 
local governments to the party end. The other wiU differentiate its 
purpose, and seek to accomplish different designs in the various local- 
ities according to the special object of the government there erected. 
Hence it is that the party system which is in general a guarantee of 
conservatism, as a slow and safe going, for the Nation itself, is, on 
the other hand, quite a nullitier, especially in cities, of that freedom 
and reality of local self-government, of which it professes to be the 
special protector. It is rather a source of debauchment for local 
governments and a guarantee for their going so slowly as to go back- 



62 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

~ward ratlier than forward. So far as this is true, it is evident that the 

" design of the fathers " has not been carried out in respect to local 

affairs . 

Instead of being "checks" upon a tendency to centralization, the 
distribution of powers among local governments, when thus turned 
to mere party use, has just the contrary efEect. And while it tends no 
doubt to the supremacy of the National feeling, yet it does this only in 

an abstract way, or only as a constant division in the whole Nation itself. 

It does not truly educate the individual to real self-government, by 
referring him to his own moral responsibility and calling upon him to 
use his own judgment within spheres where his own personal knowl- 
edge and judgment may suffice. It leaves him ever in a vague and ab 
stract sphere of morality, where, however he may flatter h mself to 
the contrary, he has no real self-government. On the other hand, it 
practically nullifies for him the foolish supposition that any locality 
can really have an exclusively local interest, or a government apart 
from that of the whole Nation. It thus tends to destroy the fatal ten- 
dency of the individual man to seclude himself in his " private inter- 
ests," as though he could really have any in a moralized society which 
protects all his interests for him. 

This tendency prevails chiefly in the other party, where indi- 
vidualism is prone to be too abstract and to separate itself both from 
the party and from the Nation. This it does, either by total neglect of 
all public interests, or by unreasonable objection to all party rule, 
leadership, or combined action of any sort, as though inconsistent with 
moral independence of opinion. But, after all, an individual cannot hold 
himself to be sole judge of common affairs. Nor is he alone respon- 
sible for his State, his party or his Nation in its total action, any more 
than he is for the Universe. But he is responsible for doing his part. 
Methodic unity of judgment implies unity of action in accord there- 
with, in a party as well as in a Nation. So far, the instinctive democ- 
racy is right; order, for them, may often be only "order in the ranks!" 
Yet order is a first necessity of all government. Hence the persistent 
unity of this party on all questions teaches the "businessman" the 
necessity for organization in public affairs as well as in his own. It 
brings him perforce out of that false "business spirit," and obliges him 
to educate his fellows in the same boat, if he deems himself more in- 
telligent. 

Both these parties, then, are necessary as well as useful, because it 
requires both to complete the unity of the Nation. They do not merely 
divide it, nor divide it at all; rather the Nation divides itself into them 
and stands as their unity without which neither could be. The one 
party represents the abstract formal unity of the Nation; and the other 
its side of many moral individuals. The moral unity of the Nation 



THE TWO PARTIES AND TIIEIJS TJSE OF POWER. 63 

must therefore include both, and be represented by the organized form 
of government, whether this be in the hands of eitlier. The thought- 
less party is in danger of being used by demagogues and for merely 
party purposes, of a wholly abstract and unmeaning National charac- 
ter, to the neglect or misuse of all local interests. On the other hand 
the thoughtful party is in danger of being too individual in a private 
way, both as to neglect of public affairs and also as to mere individual 
whims of a visionary character as to public policy. The other party 
enforces upon it the necessity of recurring to a general judgment, and 
thus subordinates the individual to the Nation. So, on its part, it cures 
the abstract chara3ter~of the other party's allegiance to the Nation, 
and obliges it to take National life and character, at least when it 
reaches the National government itself. 

In general, the incapacity which every individual, however intelli- 
gent, feels for deciding upon public affairs of any moment, even in 
local matters, without recourse to the better knowledge or judgment 
of others, enforces for him this essential fact, — that the necessity of all 
true government requires an organization of its intelligence, whereby 
the moral sense may be enlightened, and the method for reaching the 
desired end be properly designed according to its purpose. In organ- 
izing for any practical purpose, whether of business or civil politj^ 
the three powers of man must always be brought into a harmonious 
moral subordination. The intent to do this is the main thing; the 
method of doing it is the next, and this requires a designing capa- 
city. 

These methods of doing things, as before noted, are what evince 
the design and its moral character. We have traced this in regard to the 
nature and designs of l^'ational parties, in respect to their necessary 
difference as parties, and their use of the distribution of powers. By 
the same criterion of the methods adopted, we may now proceed to ex- 
amine the policy, the design of the Nation, in 'respect to its three 
powers, Legislative, Judicial and Executive. 



CHAPTER V. 

METHODS OF GOVERNMENT. 

The method adopted for- relating the three powers together in a 
moral way in the National Government, has been substantially copied 
or imitated in all local governments. States^ counties, cities and even 
towns, all have their legislative, judicial and executive departments. 
For the town, these are the Town Board, the Justice of the Peace and 
the Constable. The County has its Supervisors, its County Court and 
its Sheriff. The City claims a double Legislature analogous to the 
National, a more diversified judicial organization, and a Mayor 
with a veto. Thus the National statecraft shows its influence in the 
imitative impulse which responds to it. 

Nor is this all. Each of these local governments has its constitu- 
tion, its limitation by charter or law provided for it by the State; just 

as that of the State itself is subject, in the first instance to the assent, 
and always to the oversight of the Nation. Thus the unity of power 
and authority is everywhere recogaized as coming both "from above 
downward," and also "from below upwards." There is not allowed 
any abstract divorce of the two and thus a practical demoralization of 
each, as in Sieyes' scheme. And this method of distributing power 
shows no design to isolate any loc ility or government as independent, 
but r ither to constitute the whole systematically, and unite the indi- 
vidual on the one extreme and the Nation on the other, as inseparable 
in every sphere. 

The same general intention to organize intelligence, to make a 
division of labor for it appropriate to its special sphere or character, 
and to recognize all three of its powers, is shown in each branch of the 
government. (1).— Take first the methods adopted for legislation. In 
the first place, the requirjment tor order is provided for by rules of 
order with executive officers to enforce them. Then the projects for 
legislation are rescued from the blind din of verbal discussion, and 
from that merely private origin which is freely allowed in this coun- 
try, by a preliminary reference to committees appropriate to each, and 
whose members are designed to be specially acquainted with and fit to 
consider the subject methodically. These committees have in fact 
, come to take the main burden of legislation and bear a large share of 
the responsibility for it. Tuen follows a general debate designed to 
bring the intelligence of all to decide upon the acceptance, amendment 



METHODS OF GOVERNMENT. 65 

or rejection of a definite proposition. (2). — So also the Executive 
may have its Cabinet or Council for advice, its special power for or- 
derly administration of its several departments, and thus have an 
■organized and active specialized intelligence to assist its judgment. 
f3) — In the same way, the administration of justice in its most general 
form gives to a judge his executive officers for order, his attorneys as 
amici curice,, in that, even as debaters pro and con, they are his official 
■advisers, and enlighteners of his conscience. So also wberever there 
is a matter for deci-ion by any other of the three branches of a gov- 
ernment, it also must "judge." Each of these branches, then, must 
Tesolve itself into a self-government and organize all the three powers 
for itself in a moral way, for order, for advice, for methodic, enlight- 
ened judgment. 

I. The Legislative branch is the highest practically; it makes the 
laws, — the working-methods of the community. " Bills," can, in this 
country, be originated only by one of the two legislative houses, and 
not by an Executive. But these two houses must concur to make a 
law; so that they also constitute a moralized judgment-form wherein 
difference must be made into unity. Each is designed to amend the 
•other's judgment; so that each must act separately and methodically. 

The requirement for the reading of a bill three times, has been 
dwelt upon^by some publicists as a matter of great importance as a 
security against haste in legislation. It no doubt was so before print- 
ing was invented or before the legislators could read. Like many 
•olher forms derived from English practice, it has been really super- 
seded as to its intention by other and better forms. To prevent hasty 
legislation would seem to be sufficiently provided for by having two 
houses. Prevention of careless legislation ought to be secured by ref- 
•erence to committees, and reprinting with every new amendment. 

A more important requirement, and which touches the necessity 
more nearly as it actually occurs, would be to require the passage of 
really important bills in an order specified, before all others. An ex 
ception might be made in cases of emergency, or for bills which had 
the recommendation of the executive as urgent, or wei'e met with no 
dissent. This would prevent that postponement of the most import- 
.ant and necessary bills to the last of the session, which practically nul- 
lities the intention of the "three readings" as to them, and would 
subject to the exigencies of haste that flood of comparatively useless 
bills with which the statute books are constantly crammed. Less 
legislation and better is one of the needs of the country; the more so 
because it flows largely from a private designing at first, and not from 
an organized judgment. Committees are the first check upon this; 
discussion the next. In respect to the general debate in the "Com- 
mittee of the whole " and the right to check an endless flow of it, or 



66 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

a merely obstructive opposition, by the " previous question " or oiher 
method, no doubt each party should be allowed ample opportunity to 
call public attention to the merits of its cause; but this does not re- 
quire long in this age of telegraphs, and it cerlainly does not justify a 
threat to obstruct the necessary legislation of the country for a merely 
party purpose. Such a threat, or such a purpose plainly exhibited, 
should suffice to indicate the duty of the legislature in the case. At 
the same time, a measure merely for a party purpose, or a matter of 
comparative indifference or of "special legislation," should not be al- 
lovped the benefit of vphat the French call a vote of "urgency." Let 
the less important bills be remitted to the last for consideration, and 
then let these remainders be given a preference by vote of urgency, 
and we should have less legislation and better. 

The existing methods of proceeding, of this general sort, whether 
in legislatures, courts or executive departments, can no doubt be im- 
proved. Yet they may suffice, when used by prop' r representatives, to 
secure the essential objects,— full investigation, dispassionate judg- 
ment, and subordination of all else to to the public weal. The adop- 
tion of these orderly methods by party conventions shows their recog- 
nized necessity for arriving at any explicit expression of a common 
design. Even our parties are not managed like the Greek and Roman 
democracies, by assembhes subjected to the turbulent, to the passion of 
the moment, or to the sway of demagogues. In all iheir Conventions, 
especially the National, rules of order direct the discussion, committees 
prepare its subject-matter, and the "resolutions" are warily drawn 
by those expert in such work. This organization of intelligence is 
found necessary, for both the discovery and the best expression of 
what is in the common intent, and only in that, and hence is the mor- 
ality of the whole. The man who undertakes to air his hobby, finds 
it singularly out of place; all the more so, the more peculiar it is to 
himself. He may deem it asphyxiated by an immoral atmosphere; and 
so it may be; but, so far as he is there, the common thought of that 
convention of intelligence must be his morality. Whether it is only 
his hobby, or he himself that is out of place there, is for him to reflect 
upon. Wherever there is to be a designed and harmonious unity of 
men it must be based upon a common thought, and not upon an indi- 
vidual opinion; — the purpose so concluded upon may be far from re- 
ligious, but the mode adopted for it is a moral one; it states the pur- 
pose as ideal, and makes the responsibility for it a common one. Thus 
it points towards a complete community of opinion as the very object 
which moral methods seek, not professing to have attained it, but this 
is its moral "struggle for existence," wherein each man can best do 
his part by recognizing the authority of others' opinions as well as of 
his own, and especially by recognizing the necessity for this moral 



METHODS OF GOVERNMENT. 6T 

method of proceeding. This method itself, is what lifts him above 
the brute on one side, yet restrains liim also on the other from mistak- 
ing his opinion for the culmination of wisdom, and as the true ground 
of all morality for others. 

Analogous to the hobbyist before conventions, is the lobbyist be- 
fore legislatures. The moral method, if properly used, shuts both out. 
The sense of bis dutj^ ought to prevent the legislator from being button- 
holed by private interests, as much as it does a judge. If he repre- 
sents such, he is out of place upon the judgment-seat to which they 
come. Committees are organized as the proper places for hearing 
argument in behalf of such interests; but even there they are bound 
to prove themselves public in their designs and fealty before they can 
claim special legislation. The public side must enter into their pri- 
vate nature, as much so as in the case of an individual; so that, in so 
far as special, they must expect special supervision as well as special 
legislation, and for the very reason that they require the latter. If 
they are really of this character, and do not seek to escape from it in 
the legislation asked for, any one interested in them may perhaps be 
justified in acting as a legislator upon them; but he must take the risk 
of suspicion. This sending of " representatives of all interests" to 
legislatures is loolted upon by some as in fact the real way to legislate; 
for they regard government as only a practical conflict and compromise 
of interests. Unless however there is an application of this moral cri- 
terion to determine whether they are all public interests and recog- 
nize their responsibility so to act, such views tend merely to confusion 
and corruption. 

The conflict of National parties is really one by which the public 
interest is submitted to parties as two final sides for a total judgment 
of what it is as a common interest. But to many this seems only a 
division into two party interests, between which the public interest 
falls dead or else is absorbed into only one of them. In this guise the 
party conflict comes to a head in legislatures. Party interest, there as 
elsewhere, judges itself. It shows itself to be not the public interest, 
and hence not its own real interest, when it has no moral criterion for 
judging and acting. Yet in this immoral form as merely a party inter- 
est, it is often made to decide all questions, even those of the moral or 
other qualifications of a member (upon which each legislative body is 
made final judge), or those of fraud in the election of members. In 
this field also, the two parties show their difference in respect to a 
thick and thin fealty to mere party, a devotion to party right or wrong. 
In respect to such matters as require merely judgment on existing law 
and fact, and not the making of law or fact, it is a serious question 
whether the present methods ought not to be superseded by the re- 
mission of such questions to courts which can be held liable to im- 
peachment for manifest partyism. 



'68 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

To modorate this conflict of parties; to show them their origin in 
the two phases of the Nation as individual and collective, and that 
only together do they make up the Nation, to protect each against its 
own incompleteness, by making of the other a necessity for it, both as 
check against its own excesses, and as partner in the same acts, — has 
been the essential reason for dividing the National Congress into two 
legislative houses. And much more has the practical effect of it point- 
ed to this as its design, rather than to that object often assigned to it, 
to preserve the autonomy of States, or to indicate them as, at least in 
part, makers of the Nation. Historically derived by imitation from an 
English form, it seems, like that, to recognize an existing fact, not in- 
deed in the shape of two conflicting classes in society, but as two con- 
flicting forms or spheres of government in the country; — the one Na- 
tional and the other not so. But the theory that two such antagonists 
were to hold each other at arms length, and thus describe the Nation 
itself as a never-made and an ever about to be unmade, has been quite 
nullified by its own manifest absurdity. The Nation either was, or 
was not, and could not thus be perpetually held over a j^awning abyss. 
The English method has also found that a free Nation cannot be class- 
ified by a Hindoo metaphysics; so that, despite its same form, it has 
also nullified this theory of two distinct powers and authorities for 
law-making. No real Nation can recognize any such bisection of it- 
self. In respect to its law-making power, it must be morally one, and 
hence in direct relation with the individual. Great Britain has solved 
the ditficulty by having practically only one law-maker, and denying 
to either Lords or Monarch, anything mo^e than "a check.' 

In this aspect of a mere check against hasty legislation, the method 
of two houses no doubt recommended itself to the makers of the Na- 
tional Constitution. And in this respect they bettered the model, by 
making the one house smaller than the other, and securing for it a 
higher rank from its longer term of office, and limiting it to " older 
men for counsel." They also saw in it a means for conciliating the 
current fears and jealousies of the time, by giving every State an 
equal representation in the Senate, without regard to population, and 
by leaving optional to the State the method of electing its Senators. 
Much speculation has been expended upon the question what the Na- 
tion would do if the States should refuse to elect their Senators; and 
the inferences from this "if" are of course to the conclusion that the 
Nation does not really exist. But this query also applies to the elect- 
tion for both houses, since each is left to the action of the State. 
States, however, have evinced an anxiety to exceed rather than fall 
short of their due quota; so that the "if" never arises as a peaceful 
question-, and has been settled as presenting really a war question. It 
may suggest the propriety, however, of a method for National elect- 



METHODS OF GOVERNMENT. 69 

ions more consistent with tlie Nation's declared existence, and leaving 
no loophole of cavil in respect to its design to continue. The fathers 
no doubt had their fears that it would go to pieces; the fear now seems 
to be that it will grow too centralized. 

Now as this new fear is most cherished by those whose devotion to 
party most tends to realize it, and least by the party which finds in its 
individualism a sufficient representative of repulsion, it is fortunate 
that the two houses are formed upon a plan which tends to unite both 
parties in common hopes and common fears. In general, the two 
houses, like the two parties, represent the past and the future. Yet 
the longer term of Senators serves as a check upon either party's su- 
premacy, and so does the shorter term in the other house, serve as a 
monition respecting the tendency of National opinion. And as long 
terms of office are dear co man, the holding of these by representatives 
of States seems intended to render States themselves pacific, and 
quiescent under more grievances than they are ever likely to receive. 
Such a distribution of representation is sometimes spoken of as un- 
equal. But in the form we have it here, it evinces an intent to organ- 
ize intelligence and to recognize that this does not depend upon num- 
bers, and is not an affair of numerical equality. The present mode is 
perhaps the only one in which could be signified this inequality of in- 
telligence, wlich it is more important for a free nation than any other 
to keep in mind; since both its parties need to reflect upon it, though 
in different ways. 

This conflict of parlies, upon the intelligent harmonization of which 
all must eventually depend, finds thus its best solution through the 
actual composition of the National Congress, where it appeals to the 
practical necessity both parties have for each other. The representa- 
tives of either party must refrain from falling behind, and from going 
rashly in advance of what the actual National sentiment is. The rela- 
tive positions of the two parties in the two houses indicate both the 
state and the tendency of public opinion. Thus, '■'■festina lente'^ is made 
■the method by which a great Nation must make and test its progress. 

It cannot be said that this division into two legislative bodies, so 
generally copied, even by cities, throughout the country, always serves 
elsewhere the same wise end. It may often evince only that imitative 
impulse, which confesses its own lack of designing faculty according to 
a special purpose. But it indicates the power of the National exttmple, 
and that this has enjoined upon all respect for a moralized method of 
government, at least in form. In any case, such a method may be made 
to present greater obstacles, both to hasty and corrupt legislation, and 
does not tend to serve the purposes of either. 

II. The Executive, also, is given a check upon legislation through 
a veto of more or less power, — usually requiring a two-thirds vote in 



70 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

both houses to overcome it, as in the National Congress. Since the 
grounds for this veto are left unspecified, the Executive is often de- 
scribed as "a part of the legislative power." But this Executive func- 
tion was evidently intended only as a check since it may be overcome. 
It is another protection of legislation against haste, mistake or a tran- 
sient passion of the hour. It also guards against encroachments upon 
the constitutional authority of the Executive itself, but it cannot decide 
what that is. The Executive is not a legislative "third house," whose 
assent must be had. Nor is he a monarch with divine right to legis- 
late, and hence to veto absolutely; (tbat has quite gone out of fashion 
everywhere). And, therefore, his right to veto has not fallen into de- 
suetude as in Great Britain. The power to pass over his veto explicitly 
declares him to be no maker of laws, but only to a certain extent a pre. 
venter of their being made. Neither is he, therefore, a final judge of 
what is constitutional, as has been claimed whenever a party advantage 
seemed to hinge upon it. His judgment in that respect can also be 
overridden. His veto is only a wise demand for unanimity in cases of 
doubtful character. 

Equally uncritical is the opinion on the other hand, that he has no 
judgment; whether of constitutionality, because the legislators must 
judge of that in the act of making laws; or as bound to follow in any 
case the opinions of his " oflBcial advisers " when he has a cabinet of 
other organized body of such. As to constitutionality, neither he nor 
his advisers, nor the law-makers themselves are the final judges. Yet 
they all are bound to judge of it, as a matter of course, in order to per. 
form their several duties, in considering the propriety of a proposed 
law. This question, indeed, goes to the fact as to whether it will be a 
law at all when made ; but this is no more a question for the Executive 
than for the Legislature, after the law has passed formally ; otherwise the 
Executive would also be "a part of the Judicial power." This latter 
foolish claim has also been made for the Executive ; and he has been 
called upon by party heat "not to execute a law against his conscience." 
The same class of constitutionalists will box the compass by declaring,, 
in another case where it suits their purpose, that the conscience of the- 
Executive is really in the hands of his constitutional advisers. Thus,, 
they would give him either a final judgment or no judgment at all, as 
suits their turn. They make of him either a despot or a tool. But when 
we consider that no man can decide upon any act whatever without 
making a judgment, all this confusion of judgments with powers to 
judge vanishes. The necessity for judging is upon all who act at all 
rationally; and that is just why there must be a final judgment in com- 
mon affairs. The organization of intelligence for this purpose must be 
made apart, when both Executive and Legislature act under a written 
constitution which they may interpret differently. Where an Executive, 



METHODS OF GOVBKNMENT. 71 

is called upon to decide so many grave questions both of law and 
fact, he also is wisely furnished with an organized council of intelligent 
advisers. And foolish would he be who should venture upon the task of 
the President of the United States without availing himself in some 
other way of the highest intelligfnce in the land, if this were not pro. 
vided for his aid. Yet he must judge for himself nevertheless, and take 
the responsibility of the decision. If he yield his own opinion to that 
of his advisers he may act wisely or unwisely ; — in most cases probably 
the former ; but in either event, he is morally bound to do what he 
judges on the whole to be best. 

Every man must judge of what is best, but in two phases, — what is 
best to think, and what is best to do. Yet for one who is to act— for an 
Executive, — these must unite in a moral relation of thinking and action, 
in any final judging of either of them. Thus, as to merely theoretical 
judgment as to what is best to think as true in itself; the absolute au- 
thority must be found in some method of thinking, settled upon as a 
sure means for truth. Whether a man finds this method of thinking 
within him, as such a necessary relation of ideas in a truth as to seem 
to him an absolute actual form of thinking, or whether he considers it 
revealed to him from without by a higher moral and actual intelligence 
of other persons, in either case he feels it imposed upon him as an au- 
thority by which he is to judge of the true ; and this judgment is his act 
of accepting the true, a practical moral act of subordinating himself 
thereto. In respect to matters which he considers merely theoretical, or 
in which no apparent necessity for unity of action with others prevents 
him from being speculatively free, a man may or may not see that he has 
a religious relation in the very natureof truth itself, in the very fact that 
he is and must be a judging form of thinking activity, even when he 
seems to himself to be "informed " and even capable of being informed 
only from without. But since this apparent necessity of being informed 
pertains always to particular things, the question of what is best to do 
at once evinces to the man that, in respect to his external acts, he is in 
the very nature of things subjected to many authorities, according to the 
particular act in view. Hence the necessity for moralizing all such acts 
by reference to a common judgment of truth pertaining thereto. This 
is a moral process for which the State organizes the means of informa- 
tion and temporal authority. For the acts in question are acts of men ; 
and what is sought is a unity of thinking-beings in their designing and 
acting as men. Such a unity may advance, from step to step of outer 
authorities, till it also recognizes the inner moral sense as a Divine 
and ever-working judgment that the true is all-authoritative, and is in 
this process working out for itself ils own universal recognition. 

Hence the State is a higher sphere for this process of finding the 
True, than that of a merely material science of the laws of force. In 



72 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TlfE UNITED STATES. 

the State this process presents itself in a moralized form, — as a related 
system of judgment within judgment, in greatly varied forms The 
resultant of it, for a thoughtful observer of it, with a clear conscious- 
ness of the part he takes in it, can be no mere abstract truth for him, 
but a feeling that he is a morally- obligated working-form of Truth it- 
self. Nor can he regard the source of it as external and vague, or as 
some unknown Jupiter Optimus Maximus. That also must be an in- 
finite Judgment-form, — a Moral form of truth, a Spiritual Reality in 
which all judgments are working out their design, and wherein the 
individual judging is to find the Reason for his being also judged, — 
ever judged both within and without, — but always by persons, not by 
things. General Jackson had come to feel this religious relation 
of human judgment when, upon his death-bed, he called his 
servants together, and expressed it, as the ground of his reli- 
gious hopes and faith, by saying: "I am in God, and He is in 
me." 

More clearly and definitely, as he is more enlightened by others, 
and more conscious of what is going on within him, does Man obey 
this absolute law which he intuits, not as a mechanical necessity, nor 
as an abstract law even of truth, but as an absolute relation of per- 
sons, — of thinking persons. The same law of Reason which is in 
each must be recognized as also in this entire relation of per.-ons, as a 
moral relation there also, through which it can best "work its good 
pleasure." Hence when, and so far as, men adopt a moral method of 
private judment, they, as a community, also organize this into a sys- 
tem, for purposes of mutual education, as well as for common action. 
Thus they organize rational law without, because they feel it within. 
In doing this they organize authority itself. 

Now nowhere has this been designed, at least, more completely and 
systematically than in this Nation. As before noted, its design is 
plainly to furnish in all cases a legal authority for acts. It provides 
a legal method for amending the design itself. And with especial care 
does it provide an umpire between the Legislative and Executive 
powers. Each of these needs it, just because each must exercise judg- 
ment; and for this, as an absolute act of thinking, every man must re- 
fer to an absolute law of thought, a law of truth. Only thus can he 
act morally as a thinking power. This is the side of the matter upon 
which those insist most who really reflect least; for it is the religious 
side of Man, which will assert itself even when it is deemed denied 
or ignored. 

But it is just because this judging act is absolute in each, that legis- 
lators themselves require a majority rule, or other law for agreement. 
Were not this thinking-act thus absolute in its personality, there 
would be no need for a State at all. But the very object of the State- 



METHODS OF GOVJBiRNMEKT. 73 

is to provide that mutual conventional authority for acts, which is just 
as absolutely necessary for agreement in action as is a same innei 
authority for Reason, for agreement in thoughts. 

This has been purposely dwelt upon here, in relation to the Ex- 
ecutive branch, — the power to act. Since acting here involves use 
of force, it is important to know what sort of a law or judgment is to 
guide it. And if any deem what precedes needless, they should bear 
in mind that a President of the United States has claimed, in official 
documents, a right to decide finally upon what is Constitutional, and 
hence also to execute a law or not according to his own views in that 
respect. Here the act of private judgment was looked upon in its ab- 
solute nature as it really is. But it was divorced from all relation to 
other judgments. And it was not designed that any private judgment 
should be sole judge of either law or Constitution. If all are to do 
that, then, says Webster: "when every one is his. own arbiter, force 
and not law is the governing power." Such arbitrary private judg- 
ments dissolve all relation with others. They make any unity of ac- 
tion impossible. Hence it is not singular that a President who propa- 
gated such atlieory and practice of disunion, did not "save the Union,'' 
but made sure an attempt to destroy it by force. To such views are 
due also other corrupting and destructive agencies and methods, as will, 
appear hereafter. 

The methods of Executive action have clearly been organized so as 
to call for and enable an intelligent moral judgment. This judgment 
cannot be final as to what the Executive sphere is; yet it must be 
morally independent within tlie sphere. The proper subordination of 
the Executive requires the former, its efficiency the latter. Since an 
"Executive," eo nomine, is designed only to execute, to perform acts 
of an external sort, it is absurd to claim that its share in the method 
of making laws continues after its judgment upon their constitution- 
ality has been overruled, or that it has call for any such judgment ex- 
cept in the manner prescribed and at the time. The judgment of a 
new Executive that he would have vetoed a law, will not justify him 
in leaving it unexecuted, even though his veto would have been effec- 
tive if there. His theories of the Constitution do not warrant him in 
practically nullifying any laws once formally made under it. If he 
doubt their constitutionality, he. may resort to the mode' of "making 
a case" whereby they may be tested by the proper tribunal. The oath 
of the President to "execute the laws and maintain the Constitution of 
the United States," refers in its latter clause, no doubt, in part to his 
duty to veto for unconstitutionality; but since that is expressly made 
ineffective in itself alone, the reference is mainly to his duty to main- 
tain the supremacy of both the laws and Constitution of the Nation 
over all others. In this respect, also, he must be conceded a power tO' 



74: THE CIVIL POLITF OF THE UNITED STATES. 

judge, wliile bound to judge in a moral way, by resort to the best intel- 
ligence and the best method of rendering it operative. A flagrant vio- 
lation of the law of the Nation would call for immediate executive 
action. 

The neces'sity for efficiency as an Executive demands an independ- 
.ence of its moralized and organized judgment within that sphere, as a 
mere judging of the mode of action called for by the emergency. 
Hence the war power of the Executive is essentially in it as a police 
power, a duty of self-defence, with respect to its maintenance of the 
Nation, or suppression of rebellion, at home, whereas against for- 
eign powers it requires a "declaration of war" by Congress to give to 
what it might perhaps venture upon as a mere act of retaliation or of 
self-defence against a foreign power, the recognized status of war. 
The war power of the Executive as against Indian tribes is also used 
without formal declaration. Although these tribes are reputed to be 
quasi foreign nations, and are dealt with formally by treaties, they 
have no such national character or moral self-government as to really 
entitle them to the name of foreign nations, nor to the delay which is 
accorded to such for purpose of more mature reflection in case of col- 
lisions. This war power of the Executive, so far as it is a judgment 
merely of acts of force required, can of course be limited only by the 
laws of that cruel necessity which always declares itself whenever the 
merciless law of force is appealed to; except so far as this may have 
been modified by what are called the "laws of war," and by such 
"army regulations" or police rules as are usually prescribed to the Ex- 
ecutive force. Thus the rebellion of 1861 brought up the questions of 
emancipation, confiscation, treatment of prisoners, and others too 
numerous to enter into here; and of the relative powers which the 
Executive might have in respect to such acts, whether with or without 
the cooperation of Congress. So also it appeared that while the 
Executive, for efficiency's sake, is left quite unlimited in its own proper 
sphere, so that it seems, and is sometimes said to possess, more real 
power than any monarch of the day, yet it is also so hampered in re- 
spect to the "sinews of war," and in general with the question of sup- 
plies, in order to act either in peace or war, that the practical suprem- 
acy over it of the legislative power is obvious. And back of that, the 
National sentiment must justify the acts of both, and prevent either 
from embarrassing the other, either by insufficient supply or by torpid 
use of the means for carrying into executioa a National purpose. The 
haggling and immensely costly mode in which the rebellion of 1861 
was suppressed, also shows that a people must know its own mind and 
not fall into squabbling parties, in a case which calls for action, "quick, 
sharp and decisive," and hence calls for those who mean it and are 
capable of it. Otherwise, its Executive "cannot make generals" ex 



METHODS OF GOVERNMENT. iO 

cept as they are imposed upon it, nor even choose them by a true 
standard, until a hitter experience has opened the way for it to do so. 

III. The Judicial sphere of the government is theoretically its 
highest sphere. It is a judging of judgments themselves. It is a judg- 
ing of the theory — the constitution — whereunder laws are made by 
the Legislature, and of whether such laws are compatible with that 
fundamental design. This is its highest function as a coordinate 
branch of the general government. By this the self-government is 
morally completed, or furnished with a final judgment as to its own 
design, so far as this is already determined in an existing constitution, 
which is authority for the Judiciary and referred to the entire people 
•as alone adequate to reform it. 

But the organization of the Judiciary requisite to render it wholly 
cognizant of the actual operations of the law, and to give all access to 
its decisions upon it as law, brings it also into direct contact with the 
people. And since it is merely theoretical in its own sphere, as a- 
judging only of judgments, whether as to the consistency of a law 
with its authority, or as to the consistency of the acts of an individual 
with a law prescribed for them, it is furnished with a jury to advise it 
respecting the facts. The policy has sometimes been adopted of mak 
ing juries "judges both of the law and the facts in the case." This 
description is rather vague. As it tends to be construed into letting 
the jury make the law and even the facts as they please, it should 
never be risked where there is not a very strict selection of intelligent 
and virtuous men for jurors, — a matter which is greatly neglected, in 
cities especially and in lower courts, just where it is needed most. 
And this has often brought the entire jury-system into disrepute. It 
is precisely this "judging of both law and facts," by those unfit to 
judge of the former or even of the latter, which makes of such a 
policy a very grave tendency to general demoralization and lawless • 
ness. 

Letting a jury be judges of both law and facts is no doubt intended 
to leave law in its character as general rule, and allow its particular 
application to be modified by those circumstance which can be judged 
of only in each case for itself. Such a policy should doubtless be lim- 
ited to cases of private conduct which, from the variable nature of 
liuman actions as affected by education or the lack of it, overgo the 
possibility to define by formal terms the exact nature of an act so that 
the description of its external character will denote also a uniform 
moral character or same degree of guilt for it. This is analogous to 
the general tendency to codify criminal and civil practice in a way to 
avoid old technical forms and estoppels; and especially to unite an 
equitable with a merely formal adminstration of the law, and thereby 
escape those "delays in equity" which resulted from the English 



7G THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

separation of those branches of practice. If law can be equity it 
ought not to be delayed. The tendency to such a general policy is. 
furthermore stimulated by a supposed habitual disposition of judges 
of the average type, to fall into mere formalism, as interpreters of the 
law, and to rest rather upon precedents than upon reason as their 
ground of decision. On the one hand this disposition of judges is. 
theoretically justified by the consideration that the law must be con- 
sistent with itself in all cases; but on the other hand it is practically 
impossible for a law to be consistent Avith its design in such a merely 
formal application of it; nor is it possible to find that design of it in 
any or many past cases, (shadowed as they must be as to their circum- 
stances), but only in a recognized rational application of it to the case 
in hand. The technical, is what parts "law" from "equity." 

An incapacity for reasoning is therefore by no means a qualifica- 
tion for a judge; although even with such a capacity he will err if he 
do not avail himself of all suitable enlightenment of his judgment,, 
and yield to all proper authority for it when against his own opinion. 
The immense accumulation of "precedents" as well as laws in this 
country, has made of deciding upon precedents the task of a dray 
horse, both for judges and lawyers, and may serve to work its own 
cure. It must revert ultimately into such a variety of precedents and 
such a freedom of choice respecting them, as to throw the judgment 
back upon the reason of the case. Every case is in fact a "law for 
itself," just because it involves an infinite variety of reasons which re- 
late it to all other laws, and hence to an absolute reason. 

The judge has thus essentially a theoretical sphere and yet also a 
practical one, since he has the all-important work of relating all to a. 
good reason — a practical reason which is found in the nature of the case 
itself. He is indeed an interpreter of laws and of constitutions. But 
he is also bound to a practical sphere, beyond which he does not go. 
This sphere is an actual systematized relation of self-governments, 
various in kind yet evidently designed to be made into a consistent 
whole; and bj*" this design he is authorized and bound to judge them 
and their relation to each other. This is a work for the highest Reason 
— a Reason which can see a design wliere it is only implicitly stated, 
and grasping it as a creative power can give it its explicit statement 
and application. 

Hence the immense debt which this Nation owes to its first National 
Judges, especially to Marshall. What if the Constitution were not 
wholly explicit, or if it apparently involved inharmonious elements? 
Interpret it as Marshall did, according to its intent to form a selfcon- 
sistent system of government, if any at all. All must be made to har- 
monize with the subordination of powers and authorities therein de- 
clared and organized as a system. 



METHODS OF aOVEKNMENT. 77 

Thus tlie Nation owes its solidarity more to Marshall than to "any 
other one man,— more than to Webster, more even than to Washing- 
ton. For Washington drew all only by the feelings which may change; 
Webster only by the understanding which has many reasons and is 
disputative; while Marshall holds altogether by the Keason. How dif- 
ferent this Reason which, like a creator, works out its own harmony of 
moral design, and points to that as its authority, its actual self-govern- 
ment, its power in act, not merely in potence or asleep, but knowing 
its own design and effecting it, — how different this is from that ultima 
ratio of force which some deem fit to settle great questions. How 
much superior even to that understanding which can only classify, 
show likeness and infer unity therefrom, or appeal to precedents, thus 
requiring them to be made for its guidance, — as they were made by 
Marshall. Upon the precedents made by this noble reasoner, the 
Nation has rested its authority in the most vital questions, and found 
them to bear the shocks of war and insure the welfare of the Nation. 
A model for judges, his successors may well doubt their equality in 
this divine gift of Reason, but not their duty to follow his example, in 
£0 judging of the constitution, that its design to be a systematized 
self-government may be carried out through all its subordinate spheres 
in a rational manner which must harmonize all- 

This truly interpretative act, this seizing the design in its own 
creative Reason, and thus recreating it, is the act of true judgment in 
all its phases even up to that which judges of an absolute revelation of 
truth to Man. As an interpreter of laws and constitutions, a judge is 
no doubt limited to what they are; yet he must seize this what they are 
in its rational design. Legislators should be held indeed to a clear ex- 
pression, as part of their duty, especially where their keeping within 
their sphere is questionable. Yet to apply a merely literal or technical 
interpretation, in manifest disaccord with the intent of the law when 
within its sphere, is no right judgment of it. So also in respect to 
Constitutions, though the limits of judges themselves, they are to be 
interpreted upon the presumption of a rational and self-consistent de- 
sign in them. The people who made them are not to be stultified by 
finding in them absurdities, when their main intent is clear. Rather 
as they ought to be, than as they are, should they be interpreted, when 
this is merely a matter of rendering more explicit what is fully implied 
in the main design itself. 

The Senate of the United States under the presidency of the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, is ma'^e a High Court of Impeachment, 
for trial of charges of official misconduct presented by the House of 
Representatives. This method, with slight variation of form, is 
imitated by the States for the same purpose. The persons liable to 
such a trial are held to be only Executive and Judicial officers; since 



78 THE CIVIL POLITY" OF THE UNITED STATES. 

each legislative body is supposed to take cognizance of the official con- 
duct as well as the fitness of its own members; — though they do very 
little of this on the ground that the people who elect men must take 
the responsibility for their character. The purpose of such an im- 
peachment being merely to determine the character and moral qualifi- 
cation of an officer, it does not punish for any actual crimes if any, but 
leaves those to the ordinary courts. The "crimes and misdemeanors" 
which are subjects for impeachment are not necessarily crimes of the 
private individual, but only crimes against his office. Hence the con- 
viction is really only a public remedy, whether it only expels from the 
office or further, (as generally), adds "disqualification from any office 
of honor and trust." The offense, however, being called a "high 
crime," is always strictly construed. Although any plain abuse of 
official trust is clearly the only crime that can be called "high," it has 
been deemed unwise to apjjly impeachment to every such abuse, and 
especially to Executive abuse of patronage. Even in the case of judicial 
officers also, though they are removable only in this way, it is not allowed 
to remove for unfitness, imbecility or even misconduct unless of a 
grave character. This is partly on account of the penalty of disqualifi- 
cation. It would seem that this process ought to be given a more 
efficient character, and greater extent. 

This power of the United States Senate to judge of moral and other 
qualifications for purposes of expulsion from office, is also partly en- 
trusted to it in respect to admission to appointive offices. In regard 
to such as are filled by the President, it has the function to "advise 
and consent" to his appointments: — and the States imitate this method 
also. This function is performed in what is perhaps miscalled an 
"Executive session." For it clearly involves judgment: but of what 
sort seems to be open to difference of opinion. The impeaching func- 
tion clearly indicates the design that no office, either elective or ap- 
pointive, shall be held except by "good behavior." This other func- 
tion of the Senate seems, at first, to make of that body an adviser only 
in respect to the fitness of an appointee. But this judgment, like that 
of the Executive, must involve also the fitness of the appointment, — 
whether there is any vacancy or other good grounds for it. Thus 
it seems to go to the whole extent of the Executive's trust to appoint, 
in so far as that is a judgment which determines the policy of appoint- 
ments, or the method and tenure of Civil Service in the sphere of ap- 
pointive officers. 

Both these functions, therefore, are presented in their more general 
relations in connection with our next topic, the Policy in respect to 
Suffrage, Official Qualifications and Civil Service in general. 



CHAPTER VI. 

METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 

The Civil Polity of the United States brings it to the people as 
Court of last resort, both in respect to the amending of its form, and 
in the matter of supplying its official force with means and persons. 
Thus the people constantlj'- recreate or keep in actual existence their 
National system, and they also transform its nature according as their 
design advances. This is analogous to the constant creation of a me- 
chanical world, and its transformation through many phases of design. 
And yet how different, in that it has many authors, each a moral de- 
signer. It is no mere thing, dependent upon a one same abstract oper- 
ation of a law of force, and hence with "dissolution" written on it, 
not as a "law of fate" but as a necessary part of the method by which 
it is made. But in this moral method by which a free Nation consti- 
tutes itself, there are distinct^ three powers in a coordinate opera- 
tion. It is so in the individual himself, so in every sphere of this 
systematized self-government. Throughout the whole, the power of 
force is to be made subordinate means; the ruler and harmonizer of all 
is to be a law of Reason. 

This law of Reason, so far as it creates and upholds the present ex- 
istence of the Nation, is to be referred to and found in individuals as 
a many who are one in it, and amenable alike to it as a common law. 
The tendency of this law to unite its dispersed many is what has 
created the Nation. It is also what preserves and changes the exist- 
ing forms of the government. In this latter character it is appealed to 
in the Suffrage. 

The policy of the United States has been to appeal to and rest its 
authority upon this law of Reason which, as it unifies in idea, is also 
a uniter of persons, a builder of societies. It is regarded as a law of 
which all men feel the operation in themselves, and recognize it in 
others, feel it as a law which has authority to control their acts, not 
only from within, but also from without when it is recognized as there 
also the operative and all subordinating law in the Nation. 

That the ignorance of the individual, (at all stages of his education), 
requires him to recognize this authority of Reason, as appearing with- 
out, in others as well as within himself, hence as not his authority but 
essentially a religious one, not derived from Kings nor a plaything for 
Man, is recognized in many ways in the original design of this Nation. 



80 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

It is declared iq that clause which secures the sanctity of the reli- 
gious sense, yet means that it must be a rational one, not a mere indi- 
vidual whimsy, nor one which would separate men like atoms, but one 
which unites them by a rational view of their moral natures. It is also 
evinced in those reservations of the suffrage, whereby the man is at least 
required to come to the consciousness of his reason; and also, by that reser- 
vation fi'om the suffrage of appointments to offices, supposed to be more 
wisely or consistently tilled by a different method. In general, it is re- 
cognized by the effort to so organize intelligence in a rational way, that 
the individual can find this authority of Reason without as well as within 
him. 

The declaration that " all men are by Nature born free and equal," 
is by no means a confusion of Natural equality with moral freedom. 
Nor is it at all inconsistent with the fact that they at once find them- 
selves unequal, both from the force of natural laws and from the au- 
thority of moral law. Their "being born" has very little to do with 
the matter: their freedom and equality both depend chiefly upon what 
kind of a Nation they are born into. Each is essentially "equal" in 
being designed to morally govern himself, and in his right and duty to 
■do so. But what success he has in it depends very much upon the aid 
he receives from others. And whether he realize this design at all as a 
reason, and the only reason for his being " free," will depend so much 
upon his education and habitual associations, that the importance of or- 
ganizing these in advance for his benefit as well as possible, is what is 
chiefly "self-evident." 

And such was really the view of the case taken by the formers of the 
National Constitution, as is shown in the methods they contrived. To 
remove, so far as possible, that inequality, both of capacity and oppor- 
lunity, for a moral and real self-government, which is more or less in- 
evitable, is the main object of a free State. Such an object cannot be 
left to chance, nor secured by arbitrary means. It must be rationally 
provided for, since the very purpose is to organize Reason itself, so that 
it will appear as authority both without and within, and thus as a 
whole, — not as self-severed. And this is accomplished best, by so or- 
ganizing a Nation's highest intelligence, that its results will be attain- 
able by all, so far as they choose to look for such aid and guidance. 
The duty of every voter is to seek for information from this highest 
actual intelligence wherever he can find it, both without and within, ac- 
cording to the matter upon which he is called to vote. 

I. The suffragan is thus called upon to judge, but to be a moral 
judge, recognizing the authority of what is best. As a suffragan he is 
a "privileged" person; but privileged by what alone can make him 
a moral "person," — that operation of Reason both in himself and others 
which can also recognize its own optration and authority without and 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 81 

beyond him. Now, it is notable that the makers of the National Con- 
stitution called upon the sutfrage to decide rather upon men than meas- 
ures, to judge of persons and their qualifications, rather than of difficult 
nnd complicate questions of policy or method. This is a fact that many 
seem to lose sight of, and deem themselves " wiser than the fathers " in 
-calling for an impossible so-called " public opinion" on every kind of 
question No doubt, if this sort of ready-made omniscient "public* 
opinion " does not really exist, at least in respect to matters as yet un- 
broached, there are some vrho deem themselves adequate to "make it " 
for all emergencies; so that in their hands the Nation is safe. But 
neither these would-be guardians of all, nor those who have a vague im- 
pression that the "counting of heads '' is really the finding of wisdom, 
and the all-authoritative mode of forming opinions, even their own, — 
are at all fashioned as to their ways of j udging in the image of the 
Nation. 

Suttrage has, indeed, respect and application to two things, — electing 
to office, and modification of the constitution, — the one to preserve, the 
other to reform the entire system. But in respect to neither of these is 
simple suffrage made all-powerful. It is used in such a way, and de- 
rived through such channels as to its actiial effects, that both the result 
aimed at and that attained must depend upon the authority and direc- 
tion of intelligence, both from without and within. Even in mere elec- 
tions the advantage is given to enterprise, action, organization of effort, 
— in short, to real public interest in the subject; and in this contest the 
highest moral intelligence, if it will, can have its way ; if it do not so 
will, it must take the consequences of its apathy or neglect of duty. But 
then it has also a second opportunity with respect to the actual effect ; 
since the suffrage, merely as an election of persons, implies a finding of 
higher intelligence by which the result is to be shaped, under a sense of 
responsibility and the criticism of others. Thus there is no necessity 
for our government to fall to the level of the " average intelligence," but 
rather to rise above that, even when the lowest and even the immoral 
elements have seemed to carry elections. 

Hence the wisdom of letting suffrage elect persons; and not decide 
upon measures. Reason is essentially a maker of real persons, and 
"judges" only in and by them. A bad person v^fill serve best to kill 
any measures he correctly represents ; a good person cannot abide by 
them. A fallacy which has served to delude the ignorant dies still-born 
in a higher light, or collapses under its own imbecility to form a practi- 
cal measure. 

A moment's reflection will show, that, in spite of all demagogy or 
mystic metaphysics to the contrary, the confinement of suffrage to the 
selection of persons is, in fact, essentially a necessity of the case. The 
people, as mere scattered individuals, cannot design any formal meas- 



82 THE CIVJL rOLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ure ; they can only select persons to perform that work ; and then, if the 
result is again submitted to their acceptance, they can only decide be- 
tween that or nothing. The main point then always is to select persons 
fit to design, and fit to execute a design by comprehending it. 

It was partly from this view of the case, perhaps, that the fathers 
showed such an apparent indifference to the qualifications for suffrage,, 
leaving these to all the variety they then exhibited or might take under 
the laws of States. They had provided with such care for the making 
and judging of the law and the Constitution by the highest intelligence 
of the Nation, and for securing a wise, if any, amendment of its Con- 
stitution, that they deemed the Reason of the Nation to be sufficiently 
organized to find and use its highest intelligence for governmental pur- 
poses of any serious moment. The very mode to which they limited 
amendments of the Constitution shows that they knew that only the 
highest intelligence can design or modify such an instrument in consis- 
tency with itself. Such modifications, whether they go to the remodel- 
ling of the whole, or of only part, must proceed from some selected 
persons ; either the two houses of Congress by a two-thirds vote of each, 
or a National Convention for that purpose, to be called by Congress on 
application of two-thirds of the State legislatures.- The subsequent sub- 
mission of such amendments to the several States for a three-fourths 
ratification by count of States,— whether this ratification be made by a 
State to |,depend or not on its popular vote, — must be at least formally 
made by their Jegislatures; so that here, too, is the rational rule, that a 
judgment upon such an intricate design should be made only by or 
through the highest intelligence, and after full discussion. On such a 
matter, thus presented, the voting by States, al so, becomes in fact more 
and more immaterial. For the States, also, as merely individual, only 
balance each other, in such a controversy, the small by the small, the 
large by the large, so far as mere size can enter into such a question. 
Atomism is not the form of Reason, nor is Number its last word. 

With the same care they took to organize intelligence for judging; 
of the law and for shaping the designs, the fathers sought to organize 
it also for judging of the facts. This latter judging, so far as it can 
act by voting only, must be essentially as to what persons are best 
fitted to shape the designs, or to execute them if already made. In 
respect to executive officers as well as judges, the National method is 
mainly one of appointment; and this fact has given rise to what is. 
called the "Civil Service Reform." The tendency in State and local 
governments has been to make all offices elective, with some reserva- 
tions for Executive appointments, supposed to fix responsibility upon 
the Executive, as well as to secure for it that harmony and eflaciencyin 
its own acts, which was a chief reason for the appointing power vested 
in the National Executive. The appointment of "inferior officers," 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 8 3' 

however, (construed to mean all not expressly assigned by the Consti- 
tution itself to direct appointment), may be, and is vested by Congress, 
in the courts of law, or heads of Departments, or the President. 

In respect to elective officers, the fathers clearly sought to secure a 
selection (as in the case of appointees), from personal knowledge. The 
whole system of elections is so design ed as to distribute voters into 
particular bodies voting for particular representatives within a sphere 
not too large for their own knowledge of candidates therein; while 
fitness for higher spheres is left to a more general judgment, either by 
a larger constituency, or through the minor representatives of the 
smaller voting communities. It is thus sought to organize a higher 
intelligence as to persons according to the sphere in which they are to 
act. In the first instance and in every case, it ought to be a personal 
judgment of persons. For in its very natiu'e, so far as it is merely a 
process of voting, it can be only a selection of persons to act for those 
who select. Otherwise the voter has no rational act; his judgment is 
11071 est, unless it embodied itself in the person he selects. Unless it 
rise to a higher intelligence than that required merely for the act of 
choosing a good person, unless it act so as to organize this higher in- 
telligence so that it can act as such, there is no liuman work really 
done at elections. There is indeed an animal judgment of persons in 
respect to their "good nature;" but animals do not judge of Man's 
fitness for his own sphere as a moral thinking person But human 
judgment knows how to organize its own speech; nor does it, when 
properly organized as the judgment of a Nation, become voiceless 
again in the "vote." When this silent speech is used, as intended, for 
right judgment of a person who is to speak and act for the Nation, it 
is a creating of the organs essential to the Nation. As the scientist 
extends the scope of his visual organs by inventing microscopes and 
telescopes, so does a civic community organize its means for broader 
intelligence and rational action. Mute in itself, it passes beyond its 
muteness, and takes speech through its created organs. But since the 
work to be done here is not a mere mechanical reflection or 
refraction, the organ for it must be a real person, a rational person. 
That is a qualification for the office-holder often overlooked, — or 
at least not judged of in all its due meaning. — because the 
voter himself is not fully aware of his own rationality, and of the 
limits which it assigns to him in the exercise of this particular 
function. 

The fathers sought to so limit the qualifications for office and the 
modes of election, that the voter could not go far astray. But they 
evidently intended to direct his attention mainly to the person he was 
voting for. Choice of persons, they deemed, should depend very much' 
upon personal knowledge. 



.S4 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The "Electoral College" for selecting instead of electing the Pres- 
ident and Vice-President of the United States, was no doubt intended 
to carry out this principle of securing a personal knowledge, judgment 
and responsibility for fitness. The Electors, chosen either by the State 
legislatures or by State elections, were left free to select; and hence 
were bound to judge of the qualifications of the persons they selected, 
being limited only so far as these were stated by the law. Upon the 
same principle, the National judges were reserved from election and 
made appointees of what was presumed to be a more personal knowl 
«dge or better capacity to judge of their fitness; namely, the President 
and the Senate, The selection of senators by the States, though left 
to their option as to the mode, is a similar case, where the more select 
method has been preferred and retained as the custom. The choice to 
the House of Representatives, even, was not made distinctly elective; 
but where so. it was to be by a system of districting which should 
bring the candidate within the personal knowledge of the voters. And 
thus a popular choice for the House was brought into contrast with a 
more organized choice for the Senate; with the design that in any 
case there should be a selection from personal knowledge. 

The advance of general education, but still more the greater op- 
portunities for immediate information and for a large scope of it, due 
to Man's inventive genius in extending his personal organs by tele- 
graphs and printing-presses, have doubtless greatly modified the situ- 
ation and its needs since 1789. The capacity of individuals to judge of 
personal ability and merits may have so increased that the election of 
Senators by the legislatures or by a popular vote is a matter of com- 
parative indifference: but that was left to option. It may be doubted, 
however, that the National judiciary would be improved by having 
its selection thrown into the merely partisan arena. Even when ap. 
pointed by and as partisans in name, they are now delocalized, both as 
to their character and responsibility, and also as to the sphere of choice 
from which thej^ may be made. 

With respect to the popular election of President and vice-Presi- 
dent, the question was decided long ago, although the old mode of the 
"College of Electors" remains in a fossilized form. The original in- 
tention may have been to secure for the one partj^ the President and 
for the other the vice-President; but upon this rock it split. The sup- 
position that either party would consent to thus share the loaf was an 
innocent one at a time when the Nation did not seem large enough, or 
conscious enough of its own existence, to really have two parties in an 
actual opposition. Such was the case, however, speedily, and in fact 
the necessity of the case, as we have seen, for any actual nation. And 
the scheming of Aaron Burr showed the necessity of pledging the 
electors by each party, and for each candidate, in respect to the ofiice 
intended for him. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 85 

Thenceforth the Electoral College has been merely a second techni- 
cal form of eiection to pass through, after the popular vote for candi- 
dates expressly selected by party conventions. The main intent of 
the electoral college is carried out before it is elected, if it be to take 
the real selection from the suffrage, and give it to a select body of eaoh 
party. Legally, however, the suffrage is still only for the "Electoral 
ticket." The Electors are pledged by custom to vote for the desig- 
nated party candidates, though not bound to do so by written law. 
This second gauntlet to run has been shown to involve some dangers 
of frustrating the popular choice, — or rather the choice such as it is, 
not necessarily by a popular majority, nor ever subject to that alone. 
These dangers may spring from mere accident, carelessness or fraud. 
Though many, yet many also are the eyes that are watching for them. 
They involve, however grave possibilities. Why the efforts lately 
made to abolish or modify this Electoral method have not succeeded, 
would be an interesting subject for special inquiry. The only object 
it seems to subserve, in common to both parties, is the opportunity it 
offers for substituting another for either of the candidates of the suc- 
cessful party first nominated. This will apply in case of death of 
either before the Electoral College meets. But it will also apply to any 
occasion for a renomination. The Electors are legally free and morally 
responsible, at I'east to see that the legal and even moral qualifications 
for the office are complied with. It would seem, then, that they can, 
.and are in duty bound to take cognizance of incapacities unknown at 
the time of the nomination, or which may have supervened thereafter 
up to the moment of their action as Electors. "Whether such an ad- 
ditional guarantee for fitness in these high offices is desirable , or likely 
to be efficient, in this form, is a question for serious consideration 
without regard to party. Another, is the need of a clear specific 
method for taking note of and providing for temporary disabilities of a 
President, by accident or otherwise. Why not empower him also to 
temporarily call the vice-President to his place, either in case of sick- 
ness, or when far distant from the capital, at least for some purposes? 
Still another matter, which it is very shiftless to leave vague or doubt 
ful, is the method of counting the Electoral vote by Congress. 

II. In speaking of "qualifications for office" it is usually over- 
looked that the suffragan himself is an official, holds the most general 
oflSce in the land, and must therefore be duly ' ' qualified " for it in a 
rational way, by express law, and not by some vague reference to 
"natural right." The so-called " offices of honor and trust " are those 
of which the incumbents are to be selected, either by voting or appoint- 
ment, as suitable persons for constituting or administering a common 
government. The absolute necessity for such a selection and the im- 
portance of its being a good one as to persons, should serve to over- 



86 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

throw the vagiie and foolish notion, fostered by demagogues, that the 
voter either is able to decide upon all the affairs of the Nation or is 
really assigned to that as his ofBcial duty. 

The qualifications for suffrage, then, practically determine what 
the qualifications for office will be in elective offices, and partly so in 
appointive offices also; and may even nullify their legal qualifications. 
These legal qualifications for such offices need not be here specified in 
all their variety. In general, a proper intellectual and moral qualifica- 
tion, if not expressljr required, is implied in a tribunal for impeach- 
ment. Various qualifications respecting age are supposed to secure 
for higher spheres a better knowledge by and of the persons chosen to 
officiate in them. Less noticed is the difference between legal quali- 
fication for these offices and for that of the suffragan himself; and to 
this we may call attention in tins connection. 

The Nation has thus far left the qualifications for the suffrage to the 
several States; only the latter must not exclude from it on account of 
"race, color or previous condition of servitude." So far, a State is not 
bound either to admit or exclude foreigners from its suffrage. But a 
foreigner is not a citizen; nor can he become such of his own free will, 
but only by law; under which he forswears his foreign allegiance, and 
accepts all the duties of a citizen. He is protected by the laws so far as 
he observes them, in his merely personal and business relations, bvit is 
not called to army duty like the citizen, though subject to all the other 
contingencies or necessities of war, in case it arises with his own or 
other nation. Now the Nation alone can legalize naturalization; and 
does so by a "uniform law" requiring five years of actual residence to- 
gether with at least two years previous intention to become a citizen,, 
signified by a sworn statement filed in either a State or National court. 
The United States law has excluded, and may still exclude, all but 
"white" foreigners from naturalization. Then, unless "white" means 
only "not black," no colored men can become citizens, save by birth 
here, — the "native born citizens" to whom a native right of citizenship 
is attributed because it involves the native duty of the citizen to its full 
extent, his subjection to the duties of war as well as those of peace. No 
State, then, can naturalize, and thus make foreign born citizens. Nor 
can it discriminate between citizens as citizens, since every National 
citizen is also a State citizen wherever he may reside, and the latter is: 
also a National citizen wherever he may go at home or abroad. Among- 
the " rights and privileges" which a citizen of one State is to be award- 
ed in another State, however, are not such qualifications for either vot- 
ing or office, as he has in his own State. As a traveler, he is a citizen 
there, but has no vote. Even if he settle there, though he can neither be 
admitted nor rejected as a foreigner, he may be discriminated against 
by long term of residence as qualification for either voting or office. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 87 

This power of tlie several States to discriminate eittier for or 
:against foreign or other specific citizenship, in qualifications for the 
suffrage, was left to them so far as the Nation did not undertake to 
regulate the suffrage uniformly but left it to variety of laws respecting 
it. The State laws and Constitutions have generally excluded for- 
eigners and provided that the voter should be a citizen. The disposi- 
tion to exclude colored voters, however, has been shown to still exist, 
.and appears in evasion of the State law itself by fraud or force. A 
National law on the subject seems called for. But the two National 
parties have shown different tendencies in this respect, the one to 
strict laws for the foreign born, the other tor the native born as to 
their proof of citizenship; with a corresponding disposition on the one 
hand to enforce the right and on the other to enforce the wrong of the 
voter. Such a difference of tendency and disposition is no doubt 
greatly in the way of any proper law or enforcement of it on this sub- 
ject; but the difference is also one of the marks by which the parties 
must inevitably characterize themselves, make known their designs, 
and be held responsible for their acts. 

In describing the qualifications for elective oifices, the National 
Constitution could not use the word "voter" since that might mean 
differently for every State. The word "citizen," however, was ex- 
pressly used. None but a citizen, (either foreign born or native-born), 
can be an elective officer of the United States. If we extend the 
meaning of the word "officer" to its proper scope, we may imply an 
intention to have a similiar qualification for the voter; at least when- 
ever he acts at an election for United States officers, either directly, or 
'indirectly as in the case of electing a Legislature which is to choose a 
•Senator. This intention is shown also in the strictness of qualification 
prescribed for the Electoral College. These implications would 
guide the making of a general law for suffrage, as they do also judicial 
interpretation of the official character or responsibility of a voter in 
general , 

The President and the Vice-President, (and hence their Electors 
also), are required, however, to be native-born citizens of the United 
States. Here we have a clear z?iclusion of all the States as to their 
native-born, and a clear exclusion of all foreign-born citizens. This 
provision marks therefore, on the one hand, the National character of 
the citizen, whether native or foreign-born. If it discriminates against 
the foreign-born, the intention no doubt is to secure, in the Executive 
head of the Nation, one who has no native prejudice either for or 
against any foreign nation. The right to entertain such prejudices of 
education or habit or personal experience of any sort, seems to be the 
only "natural right" properly so called; audit can scarcely claim to 
be rational enough to appear at the head of a great Nation. Even 



88 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

when it is native-born, it has no right there; and when partj^-born, 
still less. Against the native-born form of this natural right to prej- 
udice and passion, the fathers provided by requiring the Executive to 
rationalize himself by reference to, and co'iperation with the whole 
Nation. And experience has shown the wisdom of their providing 
against the foreign -born form of it in the manner specified. It is done 
in such a way that the party-born enthusiasm for foreign prejudices 
must at least have one check, and one place held sacred against it. 
The "foreign vote" has already quite enough influence over parties, 
and has shown too much disposition to project and precipitate foreign 
wars. It ought not to be subjected to further cajolement by dema- 
gogues, who seem to think it is the native-born, instead of the foreign- 
born, who are to transfer their allegiance and nationality, as a qualifi- 
cation for office. 

B ut this is the only instance in the National laws, and also (with 
rare if any exceptions) in State qualifications for office, where the for- 
eign-born is not put on a par with the native-born citizen. In fact, the 
law must be explicit in respect to qualification for either elective or 
appointive offices, or else the choice is free. The National law re- 
quires a citizen, and even a "male citizen" for all its elective offices; 
but either a male or female citizen is eligible to its appointive offices 
unless the law specifies which; and even a foreigner, for example as an 
interpreter, would doubtless be held to be an "officer," both privileged 
and responsible as such, either at home or abroad, when appointed un- 
der due authority. So also foreigners may be admitted as officers in 
the army or navy with consent of the Senate. Women, therefore, hold 
offices under the United States although they cannot vote. So also by 
State law, if the candidate or appointee is to be merely a "citizen," he 
need not be a voter; and a women may be elected. If he is to be a 
"voter within the district," that must be specified, or else as a "citizen 
of the State' ' he may be chosen from anywhere in the State. If he is 
described merely as "a citizen of the United States," he or she may be 
selected from anywhere in the United States. If he is not described 
even as a "citizen," he may be a foreigner, and if not described as a 
"male citizen" the choice may be of a female. It might be considered 
desirable by some to widen this field of choice for representative, ju- 
dicial and executive officers of a National character, and even for those 
of States and cities, in analogy to the system in Great Britain and 
France where a distinguished and well known man, failing in one lo- 
cality may appeal to another; or so that merit generally may be called 
into use without regard to the locality. The way is open for any im- 
provement of that sort by State law; but in States is just where it is 
obstructed by local ambitions and interests, which are not likely to 
favor such a scheme. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 89 

Methods of securing "minority representation," have been devised 
and used in some localities; usually by "plumping," as in England, 
an(f not hy allowing a candidate to stand for anj^ or many localities at 
once, as in France. Such methods are highljr desirable where there is 
danger of a good minority being left in the lurch, and perhaps also to 
give voice to a bad one. It gives intelligence its second opportunity 
in the field of closer discussion and shaping of measures, where all 
views should at least be heard; even the worst, for that is their crucial 
test, to stand in the light of Reason and take beautiful shape. Ignor- 
ant and vicious localities may rarely choose the best men. But they will 
also rarely choose the worst; when they do, it proves afelo'de se in many 
ways, and is one of those instructions by experience which are so 
"hard" j^et salutary. Thus is brought home to the voter the sense of 
his own official duty and of his need of a proper qualification for it. 

The qualifications of the voter must needs be rational, determined 
by a law of Reason, an actual law put in operation by a rational com- 
munity. They are not and cannot be based upon a vague "natural 
right;" for this is limited by moral capacity and must be restrained to 
a rational relation. They are not based upon even an abstract in- 
dividual right or duty, as for example, to mean well, nor upon a sup- 
posed equality of power to think truly. They must necessarily be 
based upon the National or other common right and duty to be well- 
governed. Hence they are not based upon the mere quality of "citi- 
zen." The voter is not a mere citizen, but an official, selected as 
rational and fit for the practical duty of choosing persons as organs for 
a common rational action. He is a judicial officer as to his choice of 
persons, and an executive officer in respect to the manual act assigned 
him. 

Those who confuse the terms "citizen" and "voter" are apt to fall 
into two grave mistakes: first, they suppose any "citizen" has a "natur- 
al right" to be a voter; which he has not any more than to attain to 
any other official trust; second, by this vague notion that all depends 
upon the secluded individualism which thinks only of itself and its 
opinions, they degrade the voter from his true function and responsi- 
bility of acting as an official, not for himself alone, but for the good 
of all concerned. 

In respect to the first error, it is evident that all " citizens " cannot 
be "voters." Babies in arms are citizens. Voting is not an affair of 
mere eyes and ears, nor even of a prospective rationality, but an actual 
exercise of reason. Some rational mode must be devised for deter 
mining those who are fit for it; and this mode, in an organized com- 
munity, must be by law. A law on such a subject cannot strictly con- 
form to any abstract theoretical notions; it must be devised as a prac- 
tical measure adapted as well as possible to work out its practical in- 



"90 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

tent. For example, qualifications respecting residence cannot fit a 
voter for his office, nor work equal judgment as to fitness, except in r, 
general way; while as guarantees against fraud, they must work 
against it at the expense of the virtuous. So also qualifications as to 
age cannot fix the time when all men are really fit to vote, or equally 
so; yet in this form the discrimination is a rule which by "working 
both ways" secures the general purpose, better than could be done by 
"civil service examinations" with a view to determine just when 
each individual had reached the "years of discretion." No wrong is 
worked upon^ any by such practical common sense methods, so far as 
they avoid modes more cumbersome and serving no better the practi- 
cal end. And every one is bound indeed to accept the legal method, 
however he may deem it capable of improvement; since there is no 
working together except by a common method, which must be a law 
for all, A merely individual uneasiness respecting existing methods 
may spring from the second error respecting the character of the suf- 
fragan's duty and the requisite fitness for it. 

For example, the question "why cannot women vote?" is often 
asked, oblivious of the fact that they cannot vote merely because citi- 
zens, and ought not to except by law. "But they are rational." True, 
and their rationalitj^ seems to show itself in the sex at large in an ac- 
ceptance of their exclusion from the suffrage as best. In any case, 
this common sense of the sex in general, must be formed on the sub- 
ject, and will be likely to harmonize with that common sense of all 
which, in one way or another, is sure to make itself into law for ex- 
ternal relations A merely individual anxiety to vote, however, is no 
harbinger of any such law. It is apt to overlook what many deem an 
essential feature of the question of woman suffrage, — whether woman 
does not already occupy a higher sphere of moral influence which she 
can abjure only for the worse, and where even her political influence 
is now better used, and more efficient for good than it could be other- 
wise. Besides, although all women are not married women, yet the 
tendenc}" of woman-suffrage might be towards the disharmony of fam- 
ilies, or else to merely double the vote without change of result; and 
the whole question is as to its practical effect, in this and other respects. 
Such is the real question with regard to every law which creates essen- 
tially a public act and an oflBcial to perform it. It is not a question of 
individual righi as to who shall perform the act, but whether in the 
mode proposed it will be done best and with least "fuss and feathers." 
Some States have adopted woman suffrage and the experiment will 
show whether any real difference at all results from it. Yet it ought 
also to show that the difference, if any, is for the better, before any 
practical end can be considered subserved by it. Woman is not 
' wronged," but rather relieved, in respect to the duty of voting. She 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 91 

•seems to have a duty in driving ilie "business men" to the polls at 
present, so absorbed are they in forgetfulness of their "rights." 
There may indeed be a question whether we are not called to 
compel all who now have the otfice of suffragan to perform its 
duties, rather than subject it to any more extended misuse or neglect 
of it. 

The suffragan, being thus "qualified" only bylaw, is bound to 
act as an official according to law. Receiving his function from a 
rational authority, he is bound to act by a rational law, and hence for 
all. Chosen as a rational man, he is impeachable for irrational acts. 
For him to act against the law of which he is an officer, ought to work 
this impeachment, deprive him of his office, and disqualify him for it 
thenceforth. The laws of the country do not specify the real obliga- 
tions of the suffrage so far as they might and perhaps ought. They 
are implied rather than expressed in the qualifications prescribed for it. 
But whether or not an actual conviction for crime is made disqualifica- 
tion by law, such an obstacle may be said not to exist practically. 
So far as self -protective, such a provision is indispensable for any ra- 
tional government; though so far as it is "punishment" the offender 
should have recourse to mercy in case of mistake or obvious reforma- 
tion. But even in the case of candidates for elective office, the public 
is not properly protected against the candidacy of convicted criminals. 
The election of such pei'sons may perhaps be made ineffectual by re- 
sort to the legislatures, courts or other means for their expulsion. But 
it ought also to be made illegal to nominate them. Otherwise the 
voter, either through ignorance, or under party-pressure, or with a 
view to some object beyond that of electing the man himself, (as, for 
example, when a Senatorial election depends upon choice of a single 
member of the legislature), either acts at random or at best is obliged 
to choose only between two evils in a way repugnant to his conscience. 
The voter himself needs this protection, not merely by election laws, 
but also by laws so regulatmg party or other nominations that the 
list can be previously scanned and purged. 

It will be seen that the office of the voter is by no means one which 
calls for slight qualifications, even for the mere judging of persons 
and their fitness for office. It may have seemed to some that this part 
of its duty has been overrated in what has been said hitherto, and that 
the faculty and right of the voter to pass upon "measures" has been 
underrated. But all theory must yield to the practical result. In fact 
the voter must vote for persons, and let the measures take their 
chances. Of all parties, that one which makes of every measure a 
party issue, is the most certainly judged by the persons it elects, 
and the most dependent upon them for its success; although it is 
also the one most subject to a bad selection of them. Thus bad 



92 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

measures and bad persons inevitably go togettier. Good measures- 
require good men, and are thus best youclied for to tlie judgment of 
the voter. 

Nor is this selection of a good person, so easy a task on account of 
the practical difficulties above pointed out. The voter, in fact, gener- 
ally has only a choice between two candidates. Moreover, to judge- 
properly of the fitness of a candidate for any office, the voter should 
have some general knowledge of the office itself, and of what it re- 
quires. This calls for a practical acquaintance with political afEairs, 
and with the nature and methods of civil government, which few men 
can be said to have at the age of 21, and which most women w^ould 
perhaps never find it in their genius or tastes to attain at all. A more 
thorough teaching in this respect than is usually accorded, is no doubt 
desirable in our common schools and even in our colleges. As a matter 
of fact, the infallible voxpopyli is left pretty much to the education of 
a canvass. But if in this school, (which is no doubt one of essential im- 
portance and vast influence), there were, if not less discussion of 
measures, at least more discussion of the nature of the offices and of 
the fitness of the persons proposed for them, it would seem to have a. 
more practical character. What is most discussed is the character of 
parties, but in a way to give no information. 

Election laws are usually- confined to scrutiny of voters, and to pro- 
tection of their official act. Legal voters have the right and duty tO' 
judge and to act in a public capacity, free from all restraint or compul- 
sion from others in any form. The secret ballot was supposed to sub- 
serve this purpose, but is practically no longer secret, though still so as. 
matter of right, and perhaps is in general as needless as it has proved 
ineffectual. The freedom of private opinion does not need so mucl^ 
protection in this country as the freedom of public opinion. The lat- 
ter is apt to get too much involved in the former or in party-opinions, 
and lose sense of its official duty as well as right. On election day the 
voter is to be protected in his official act like any other official. To- 
bribe, terrify or otherwise interfere with his official act is to interfere 
with the law itself. The duly qualified voter has therefore the right to^ 
be protected by the whole power of the country. 

On the other hand the public has equal right and duty to challenge' 
him as to his official character, and as to whether he has disqualified 
himself by overt acts of crime. All this scrutiny of his right to vote 
should, however, be so thoroughly provided for previously to election 
day that little if any occasion for delay may be occasioned by it then. 
A proper registry law is the most efficient guarantee against illegal 
voting, yet it also tends to keep from the polls legal voteis who are 
either too ignorant or too "wise," too careless or too indifferent, to 
keep informed of their public duty and of how it is to be performed.- 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 93 

Judged by their use of election laws, the one party is inclined to 
overrate yet abuse, the other, to disdain yet protect the suffrage. The 
one wants to vote too much; the other too little. The party which loses 
least of its legal vote by election laws, opposes them most. And where 
majorities are greatest it likes them least; this local suffusion wants to 
govern others "freely," also. Such a greed for mere votes betokens a 
low sense of the character of voting, and great danger as to the uses 
to which it will be put. Nothing will prove so fatal to a party itself as 
this voting without law, which must turn against all law, and make 
chaos. The party which has favored strict election laws has other sins 
to answer for, — a stupid neglect of duty under the law, forgetful of 
the fact that a law made by Man must also be executed by Man or be 
a mere effigy of his folly. 

Upon party methods all turns in this country, practically; — the 
health of parties, and the welfare of the Nation. They, and not public 
offices, are the proper " schools for statesmen " and also for voters. Each 
should test himself first in this school, and learn the folly of boy's play, 
before he ventures upon public trusts. The health of a party depends 
upon its having a good organization, good methods, and the habit of 
exercising them. This is no mere " party-drill." To organize is a high 
art ; to devise good methods, a still higher ; the former checks, the latter 
purges a party. Let the young statesman try his hand at these arts, and 
he will find he is in a -good school. Let the voter also enter it, and he 
will find that the execution of all good purposes depends almost wholly 
upon the selection of good persons by him. 

Hence, the public welfare depends upon this primary schooling in 
party methods;- -because there it may be learned, without serious dan- 
ger, that good methods alone are profitable, bad ones worse than useless, 
— and that each must do his part or the best designs will fail. But the 
public welfare is involved here in any case, whether this schooling is 
attended to or not. For it is clear that so far as elections run into party 
issues, both men and measures will depend upon the choice made by 
parties, and hence upon their methods and their habits of using or not 
using them. On this account the question has been mooted whether 
party methods ought not to be regulated by law. At present a remedy 
is sought for only in "scratching." But the party which nominates 
worst scratches least; and the one which scratches most does so because 
it does not nominate. The former gets a bad repute from the men it 
nominates; the latter for neglecting to nominate. The former, on account 
of its strong party fealty, loses no votes by bad choice, yet gains none ; 
the latter loses, but only from neglect to make choice. Both are inter- 
ested, therefore, in having good nominees, and in using party methods 
so as to get them. 

The less reflective party sees this least; their leaders must see it for 



94: THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

them if they wish to -vrin. The more reflective party sees it most, yet 
only as a practical result; it lacks theory, and hence foresight in poll, 
tics, — waits for the "facts." It neglects that organization of the party 
itself upon which depends the selection of men to devise either public 
or party measures. The complaints respecting " primaries " and other 
.party methods for organizing, therefore, come chiefly from this latter 
party. But inasmuch as their failure to work well comes chiefly from 
negleet to use them, the practical question is whether law on the sub- 
ject would make any real difference for the belter. It is the same ques- 
tion here as in respect to the public voter, whether the legal suff"ragan 
should be compelled to do his offlcial duty. 

On the whole, the party system, since it is a free-school and shows 
each party's notion of education, may serve its purpose best if this 
schooling of each party is left to itself. The practical result shows that 
a party must learn to govern itself in order to recommend itself to the 
2^'ation as fit to govern that. The methods for both parties in respect to 
organization are substantially the same. If the one misuses, and the 
other disuses them, each must learn its fault if it hopes to win. The 
nomination of proper persons is essential to the party success, because 
the election of such is the main demand of the public welfare. In op- 
posite ways, the two parlies come to learn this truth from experience. 
The one finds, that however indiff"erent it may be to real moral self- 
government by the individual, there must at least be no such reckless- 
ness of law in the self-government of a party ; its candidates must be 
moral men ; and its leaders especially need to be men of real genius and 
moral worth. The other party finds also that it must show itself really 
self-governed as a party; and hence not by a mere individualism which 
neglects its duty and then grumbles at the result, but by a proper regard 
for the difficulties its leaders find in its own faults, and by a proper 
fealty to those found worthy of practical trust. 

In general, then, we have this result — that the voter finds measures 
presented to him only as they are devised by two parties ; and he has 
choice of men only as between two party candidates. This is the inevi- 
table resolution of any free government by suffrage, into a choice 
between organized parties. The suffragan can vote only lor an organi- 
zed form of opinion, and only for an organized choice of men. Both of 
these ought to be better than he can form alone, and will be, if all do 
their duly. 

Again, the result in respect to elective offices is, that they are filled 
with party-men ; and every change in such offices is a party change, 
however frequent. The tendency being to short terms, that is the mode 
of removal from such offices practically. Short terms are perhaps pre- 
ferred on the theory that zeal for party will make officials use the offices 
for party ; but they also tend to aggravate such use while the office lasts. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SEKVICE. 95 

This system of party removals is therefore inherent in the method of 
elections where that runs into issues between parties. It will conse. 
quently pervade appointive offices also ; because these depend upon men 
elected to appoint. Although appointments can be subjected to a wise 
management, like that of any good business man over his employes^ 
yet they can also be perverted utterly to a bad use. And this will de- 
pend partly upon the character of the party, and partly on that of the 
man who appoints. A party might organize its selection of appointees 
as it does for elective officers, and thus get better representatives. But 
so far neither party has done this. On the contrary, each has subjected 
its elective officers to assailment after, and bargaining before their elec- 
tion, in respect to appointments. This is likely to beset them from the 
worst rather than from the best applicants. The character of the one who 
appoints, therefore, is so much tested in this way that it is the main 
question ; the kind and mode of appointments depend mainly upon it. 
The importance of electing good men is again obvious here. Good ap- 
pointments are otherwise hopeless. 

III. The unwise indifference of one party and the neglect of the 
other in securing proper nominees for eleciive offices, is therefore what 
has led to the " Civil Service Reform," which relates to the methods of 
appointment to office. In general, the proposed reform is based upon 
the observed fact that, by both parties, appointive offices have been used 
and even promised, as rewards for party service, and with disregard for 
the public service. Such a use of them will be made only by officials 
who lack a proper moral sense of what is due to the public. In making 
these appointments, they are responsible, both for the fitness of the ap- 
pointees in all respects, and for expelling them when found or become 
unfit. The duties of many of these offices, however, are such that it is 
indifferent to which party the occupant belongs. Of other and higher 
appointments, some are supposed to be so intimately related to the 
Chief Executive, or so important to the policy of his party, that since 
he is distinctly elected to represent that policj^ so far as it depends upon 
his own legal action, such offices are properly to be filled with partisan 
appointees, and left to the responsibility of parties. Hence the attitude 
of parties differs on this question, as to the extent to which the proposed 
reform shall be carried, if not also on the general question. Indeed, it 
has presented itself, rather as a moral reform than as a political one. In 
the States, so many offices have been made elective, that those left ap- 
pointive are mainly either confidential, or only clerical. The latter, 
however, are numerous enough to call for regulations which shall ensure 
good service. And such service often requires a certain experience in 
the office to be secured, against a party demand for "rotation," to which 
the good sense of the appointee himself is somewhat loath to yield. In 
all the States taken together, there is, therefore, much more demand for 



96 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

the reform than in the National Government, to Tvhich it has so far been 
almost exclusively confined. Of this fact the two parties are perhaps 
unequally sensible, since the reform carried out thoroughly -would no 
longer be a reforming of only one party, but of both ; and the effect of 
this upon the piuly machinery looks best at a distance for those whose 
faith is in "the party." Yet the object in view is generaFy recognized 
as a good one ; the only serious questions are in respect to the limits and 
the methods of the proposed reform. 

Each of these muit of course more or less determine the other; a 
method must be within and according to the limits of its operation. 
The limits of the reform having been confined to clerical officials, the 
methods devised to secure a proper knowledge on their part are entrance 
examinations to begin with, examinations for promotion, and a system 
of promotion to stimulate eflQciency, together with a right to promotion 
except so far as it is limited by whatever right of selection is left from 
those of different or equal rank. 

How great may be this liberty to prqmote, and in what way merit 
is to be judged of, is an important question. Except by the Chinese, 
merely literary examinations h ive been deemed quite insufficient de- 
cisions upon qualifications, although valuable so far as they go. Espec- 
ially for executive officers, for example in the army, has it been found 
necessary to have liberty to overstep the method of mere rank promo- 
tion, and judge of the capacity of the officer by his actual lierf ormance. 
So many things besides mere knowledge, even of a technical sort, are 
to be judged of, in order to select the right man for the right place, that 
a merely formal method is not suitable for the proper management of 
any system of offices. The same rule holds good with respect to the 
principle upon which an official is to be either removed to a lower 
sphere, or banished entirely from the service. The Civil Service Rules 
however, can be binding only so far as accepted by the appointing 
power, and should be amendable. 

It is no doubt difficult to make any law which shall perfectly har- 
monize even a proper sense of public responsibility with the method 
under which it must act in the matter of appointment, removal and 
promotion in office. One limitation proposed in the matter of selection 
is that the new appointments must be regulated by a pro rata distri- 
tion among the different States and Territories according to population. 
While this provision seems to rest upon a due sense of the probably 
equal distribution of merit in the Nation, it also smacks cf a stronger 
sense of that supposed right which, not the Senate as a whole, but indi- 
vidual Senators, and also members of the House have to ' ' advise and 
consent"' to appointments to office. It does not seem, however, that to 
mere clerks, under the President's own eye, such a guarantee for 
merit and efficiency need apply. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE 9T 

The limits of the Civil Service Reform thus come into apposition, 
-if not opposition, with the limits of party action, just where their 
methods also differ. The Reform seeks to substitute personal char- 
acter for personal influence as criterion for appointments. And this 
is confined to cases where the official dignity of the one who appoints 
may be protected rather than offended by it. The methods of party 
management have been such as almost to force upon the President, or 
other appointing power, selections presented and really made by 
others. These party methods might be improved, but only by the 
party itself. Any one who appoints largely, must need advice from 
some quarter, and is entitled to receive it from any quarter if it is good; 
but he is bound only by legal advice. 

'The Civil Service Commission, also, is and cin be only an adviser; 
since Ihe power to appoint must be vested either in the President, the 
Courts of law or the Heads of Departments. Its function is to advise 
methods of dealing with " inferior officers " in a way to promote busi- 
ness efficiency. It is questionable whether either party regards its action 
with much sympathy. For these subordinate offices constitute by far the 
greater part in number, and they are aspired to by "the rank and file." 
The getting of them of course depends upon personal influence chiefly: 
and whoever is supposed to have such influence is pestered to death 
about them. It would seem that any good man of either party, whether 
member of Congress, Head of Depai'tment, or President, would wel- 
come any proper irelief from such " pressure." For the inferior sort of 
politicians, however, these inferior offices are the party machinery, and 
the personal influence itself. And since they, too, are the most nu- 
merous, they and the Civil Service Commission represent the conflict 
between the spoils theory and the business mode of administration. 

This conflict, however, has appeared higher up, beyond the reach 
of the Civil Service Commission, between the Executive and Legisla- 
.tive powers themselves. From this sprang the Tenure of Office Act. 

The President and Senate were made the highest judges in the Na- 
tion of the character and fitness of candidates for high appointments. 
The function of the Senate to " advise and consent " no doubt author- 
izes the Senate as a body to advise such or such an appointment 
but not to demand the President's assent to it, any more than he can 
require the consent of the Senate to his own nominations. A joint 
action is obviously required for appointments, and upon the word " ad- 
vise " might perhaps be based the theory of a necessity for like joint 
action in the case of removals. Such a' theory, however, could not go 
into effect so long as the term of office was left by custom at the discre- 
tion of the President, or terminable only by actual impeachment as in 
the case of judicial officers. "With respect to executive officers, it was 
(evident that imbecility might not be a high crime yet a cause for 



S8 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

removal; and that even good behavior might be a good cause for change 
by promotion. Hence the President was at first left a full freedom of 
removal, for the sake of executive promptness and efficiency, and be- 
cause it was not supposed that he would act from other than public 
motives. 

But his use of this freedom might, and did also take on a wholly 
partisan and even personal character, as a use of patronage to "reward 
or punish,'' to build up a personal following or to further a policy of 
the Executive not in harmony with that of the two houses of Congress^ 
This policy might be either not to execute existing laws, or to secure 
new legislation by other modes than those by which the Executive is 
made a partner in it. For example, Jackson, before his election, pub- 
lished a protest and a pledge against appointing members of Congress 
to office, as tending to corruption. It evidently may be used to buy 
votes for Presidential law. Yet after his election, Jackson did more of 
it in three years than any previous President in eight j^ears. 

On a similar occasion the Tenure Act of 1866 was passed. It was 
essentially designed to keep the President within the political limits of 
his office, within those methods provided for his use so far as he is to 
have a legislative policy or function. By giving to all high ap- 
pointees, and even to Cabinet officers, a certain term of office, "or 
until a successor is appointed," there could be no removal until the 
new appointment received a consent of the Senate, except by the pro- 
cess of impeachment. And to provide tox public exigencies, it permits 
either provisional appointments or temporary suspensions to be made 
during the recess of the Senate, subject to its approval. Indirectly, the 
effect of this law has been to relieve somewhat the "pressure" on a 
new President, by distributing over a longer period the falling va- 
cant of offices, since that can be only by resignation or new appoint- 
ment. It has also taken away his exclusively personal patronage, or 
rather, it reiterates the early doctrine that he has none; and in this'res- 
pect, it is a Civil Service Reform as against merely personal policies 
and methods. 

It might seem that this act unduly limits the freedom of a Presi- 
dent to carry out the policy of the party which elects him. It makes 
him depend on both parties. But in this way it shows him the unity 
of both in the Nation, and requires him to be the President of the Na- 
tion. It remains to be seen whether both parties will see the wisdom 
of a proper use of it, so that it may not subject a President either tO' 
dictation or to bargaining with parties respecting appointments to 
office. A President may at any time be encountered by a Senate of 
the opposite pa^t3^ Reflection upon this subjection of both to a same 
contingency, ought certainly to secure, from such a body as the Senate 
a "middle way of safety." Kefraint from merelj^ obstructive action. 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 99 

may be readily agreed upon. The President's choice of his Cabinet 
officers, is indeed less likely to be scrutinized closely by an opposite 
party than by his own, except for merely legal and express disqualifica- 
tions. In respect to local appointments, if they are of the same party, 
the Senate cannot at least compel a change; the incumbent will con 
tinue in office; if the appointment is from a different party, an oppos- 
ing Senate may also continue the incumbent of the other party in the- 
office. Both parties are thus necessitated to unite in some method 
whereby party ends can be made harmonious with a common sense of 
public dutj'. 

Any change or repeal of this law requires the "consent" of both hou- 
ses. Any proper use of it requires the consent of both parties. Its intent 
is to prevent abuse of the Executive's trust in respect to appointive 
offices. An Executive might leave in office persons who deserved to 
be impeached; in that case the House arraigns and the Senate tries. 
But the Executive must also have some way of removing and promot- 
ing for good reasons; and then, since an appointment must follow as 
part of the same trust, the Senate is to aid his judgment in respect to 
the whole matter. Now, in this case, as well as the other he is depen- 
dent upon the action of both Houses, and also upon both parties. Thus 
we find again that the two parties become necessary to each other, and 
that the variability of the two Houses is what here also makes them so, 
in respect to this matter of Civil Service Reform, and also in respect to 
a President of either party. 

In the Tenure Act, the Executive is really regarded as having both 
right and duty to remove for auj good reason, and only the method of 
doing it is changed, and is designed to be guarded against bad reasons. 
But the National opinion has changed upon this phase of "reform;'*' 
and in a way so singular as to deserve attention. From 1789 to 
1820, the President, upon the expressed interpretation of the Constitu- 
tion by Madison, was uniformly treated by Congress as having alone 
the power of removal. All that time, however, removals were unpop- 
ular. They were regarded as improper if the official gave no cause for 
it, other than his being of an opposite party. This general jealousy of 
any overuse of the Executive power, in a way deemed kingly and irre- 
sponsible, seems to have embarrassed even proper removals. Only 
three or four were made in the first twelve years; and Jefferson felt, 
obliged to publicly justify a few made by him. 

In 1820, a law was pa-sed limiting certain offices, mainly financial, 
to a term of four years. This made vacancies. Yet, between that 
time and 1829, the old habit of retaining their incumbents and others, 
if efficient, in spite of party differences, was continued until broken 
over by Jackson; and then the "spoils" theory and practice entered 
into full play. In 1835, on the passage of a law amending the law of 



100 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

1820, Webster conceded that the admitted interpretation was that of 
Madison, yet expressed his dissent from it. He argued that the ap- 
pointing power not being an incident of Executive power in general, 
(but needing express grant of it), neither was the removing power, 
but that the removing was incident to the appointing power, and liad 
always been used thus, no formal removal being necessary, whereas a 
formal commission for the appointee was. The act of 1835 did not 
dispute the previous view of the power of removal. It amended the 
law of 1820, by abolishing the fixed terms, by making their incumbents 
removable by information filed that their accounts or official acts were 
wrong, and in other cases under that law the President, if he removed, 
waste ''State his reasons," — that was deemed a check. 

The Civil Service Reform, then, only goes part way back to the old 
popular opposition to all removals. And the Tenure Act only goes 
partly back to the Madisonian interpretation, (not yet fully stated). 
Finding Webster's theory too formal, it follows closely his more prac- 
tical suggestions as to what might be done in the future. These Avere 
to the effect that so far as both houses must either create the offices or 
determine their tenure, they have complete power over them. This is 
the real point which the Tenure Act seizes, as a clear right of the 
Legislative power to "regulate," so far as it creates. But this does 
not reach the whole case. The power to impeach does. Had the 
Tenure Act been based also upon the power of the two houses to im 
peach, the reasons for it could have been made cleai'er, and those for 
removal better. 

The two houses are indeed express;y the power to remove from 
office by impeachment. And for such offices as they create, they 
can assign such cause for impeachment as they consider "high 
crimes," — breaches of official trust; — and they can also provide for any 
methodic system of managing such offices with respect to removals 
and promotions. Besides, the mode and causes for minor impeach- 
ments can be changed by amendment of the Constitution, and need 
to be. 

For in general, the true remedy for any abuse of official trust is a 
prompt impeachment. Those who elect officials cannot remove them; 
those who appoint, can. There is therefore a better opportunity to 
secure efficiency from appointed officials, if the appointing power does 
its duty. Such a power has a double trust — to perform its own duty, 
and to make others perform theirs. To violate this trust for merely 
personal objects, is evidently a high crime. To do so for party pur- 
poses is equall}^ so; because if less petty it is more dangerous. It 
seems, at lirst sight, that no public damage ensues from changing 
officials of one party for those of another, since the new may be just 
as fit as the old. But the trouble is that both are unfit. No such prac- 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 101 

tice can be made into a system without at once spoiling the appoint- 
ments. For example, in three years, Jackson obliged a Senate of his 
own party to reject more bad appointments than had been rejected for 
forty years before. No doubt the spoils party was then in the first 
Hush of a new style of party management; and had not learned that 
4,he lease of a party also must depend in the long run on good behavior 
.and not on carrying things by force. A party which continues to call 
itself a Jackson party should remember this; for it has occasion to do 
so, considering how long it has lost the spoils from seeking them at 
first too eagerly. Spoils of war they were unblushingly called; causes 
of war they inevitably became. 

No doubt Andrew Jackson deserved impeachment, even more 
than Andrew Johnson, for this reason, as well as for that arbitrary and 
passionate character and conduct which unfitted each of them for 
the office. If any one doubts it, let him read the Veto Message of 
Jackson in 1832, where he declares: "Each public officer who takes 
an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as 
he understands it and not as it is understood by others." Now .the 
Jackson party, we all know, is the "strict construction" party. It is 
strict in this way, — that in saying the Constitution itself shall not be 
changed, it denies the popular power itself; — yet it is '" the party of the 
people." In this way, it fastens the party at least to what is, — makes it 
"conservative." But when it comes to interpretation, the Jackson 
principle is simply an arbitrary one, which, by avoiding all thought of 
the general design, allows every man to pick out his word or phrase, 
and construe as he pleases. That is how we get so many Bibles out 
■of one. Literalism is always arbitrary. And in this way the party re- 
turns to its "popular liberty;" — but it is a liberty to break all to 
pieces. 

The President of the United States can be removed only by im- 
peachment. Jackson could not be impeached because the "popular 
party" came to his support in bolh houses. He "succeeded." The 
spoils system was a novelty then. It took. It was popular with the 
unreflecting. Yet it "deserved impeachment." That was the Madi- 
son doctrine; that if a President used the power of removal for per- 
sonal objects, or even "when not demanded by a public exigency," 
he should be impeached. 

It is clear, however, that impeachment in its present form will 
never be an effective remedy. The court and the accusers will have 
to be different from what they now are, at least in ordinary cases. 
The process is altogether too lumbersome and "awful " in its present 
shape; — and yet it is ineffective and inconsistent, or so treated. The 
crime is so high as to be out of reach. It is treated as no real crime to 
abuse an office; for if the party resign, he is allowed to escape the dis- 



102 THE CIVIL POLITr OF THE UNITED STATES. 

francliisement. This punishment of not being allowed to hold an 
office is deemed too great for abusing one!— especially if the " forever"' 
is out of the reach of "pardon.'" Something more to the purpose than 
this must be devised to be of any use. Let needless parade be dis- 
pensed with in cases which deserve none, and perhaps we may get 
at least a removal, if not a punishment occasionally. What is wanted 
is a quick, sure process, to serve the public and give the public the 
benefit of the doubt. Inefficiency should be sufficient cause; for the 
object is not to punish it, but to get rid of it 

Such summary process will of course not answer for high offices 
where deep disgrace is involved. Yet some modification would seem 
desirable also for such cases, in connection with a new general system 
of impeachment. At present the legislative houses constitute the ac- 
cusers and judges; — themselves not impeachable. It is worthy of re- 
flection whether they also and all the rest, might not better be subject 
to such a process constituted in a way independent of them all. But 
until this is done, the Legislative power has obviously taken the only 
practical course in the Tenure Act and the Civil Service Act. Yet how 
these will work depends upon the two parties. 

The administration of the Nation has clearly not been so perfect as 
the organic design The methods of Civil Service have not been 
well regulated nor promptly made even when needed. The real diffi- 
culty has been, in all branches of the government, the lack of genius 
for true interpretation. The main design has not been seized fully 
and clearly. Rather only by being denied point-blank was it made to 
come out at all; — and hence only by force. 

For whenever there arose occasion for devising means to execute 
this design, there was at once a squabbling over what the design itself 
really was. Of course this grew worse with time, especially after 
Jackson. An arbitrary literalism could make anything it pleased out 
of the Constitution,— except what it was, a design for unity of action. 
A vague way of interpreting it, left also vague all the methods it de- 
vised for Civil Service ; as we have seen in the case of methods of ap- 
pointment, of impeachment, of counting votes, &c. Nothing was to 
be done till an emergency called for it; and then passion prevented 
its being done at all or else did it badly. Yet never was design more 
clear than this in its general character. It provided a legal method for 
doing everything, peaceably and in order. The formative law was a 
law for transformation also, if change in it were necessary. And each 
branch of the government had a simple legal way to determine their 
several spheres and their relations to each other. There was a moral 
unity of the three, wherein the power of force was 'subordinated tO' 
the law of Reason, the only law of freedom. 
But instead of grasping this legal freedom in its fullness, and acting; 



METHODS OF CIVIL SERVICE. 103 

-according to its plain design, this design itself was overlooked, or only 
vaguely seen, or denied altogether. There was a theory of "balance 
of powers;" a sort of animal theory, whereby the three branches of 
the government were to lock horns. They must either stand and do 
nothing, or else fight it out. This is the process by which the triune 
design of the Nation was obliged to develop its unity by force, because 
of the stupid mechanical notions entertained of it. 

These same fallacies have pervaded and perverted all the Business 
Methods of the Nation, and of the people, as we shall see hereafter. 
And this blindness to the nature of free design, this incapacity to in- 
terpret the Constitution as such a design, showed itself in that sphere 
of Taxation and Finance next to be considered, and where the "bal 
ance of powers" theory developed its combative nature into the form 
of disunion. 



CHAPTER VII. 

METHODS OF TAXATION, OF FINANCE, AND OP COMMER- 
CIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. 

That a people are organized as a Nation, implies that they are in 
relation with other Nations and peoples. They must have an organi- 
zed policy respecting foreign commerce, and also for self-maintenance 
at home. Taxation is the simplest form of this necessity. Even robber 
Nations undergo it, and in its grossest forms. Nations with a taste for 
war find it an expensive one, especially when they indulge in conquest. 
This greed for mere material acquisitions shows itself most in monarchic 
and aristocratic governments, and usually, as with individuals, it loads 
itself with burdens which it counts as riches. Neither its methods of 
taxation nor of expenditure evince any invention or true regard for the 
welfare of the Nation. Thus the old Roman methods of farming out 
the revenues were continued in France almost up to the Revolution. 
Great Britain, under a colonial policy, resorted to taxation which cost 
her the only colonies that in the end she would count as profitable. Her 
aristocratic schemes of conquest, and domination over other Na- 
tions, resulted in a debt which isunextinguishable, hence must ruin if 
not let rule, and so comes into power as the next one to rule or ruin per 
force. Hence, the fall of the aristocratic and the succession of the 
money power to the helm of a State, completely water-logged by i's con* 
quests of the Ocean, and convinced that its colonies have at least cost all 
they are worth, if they are not worth all they have cost. 

A money-power once dominant over a Nation, though apt to have 
rather vague notions of the origin and nature of property, has at least 
very clear views of its reality, and of the importance of keeping what is 
left of it. The financial methods will improve under such a manage- 
ment, and become expert, so far at least as experience has shown the 
ground firm ; for money has an elephantine bulk and feels its way with 
a small faith in theories. And a Nation saddled with an enormous debt 
is clearly bound to good faith, especially when it borrows from itself; 
and almost equally so when it needs to borrow from others, since that 
also is borrowing from its own future. A lack of good faith in either 
case reduces it to the only alternative for the future, — a recourse merely 
to taxation, and in a mode and degree which may prevent any proper 
devel: pment of the resources of the country. For this latter, a stilL 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 105' 

higher type of statesmen is called for. A Disraeli may suffice for a 
money power, but a Cobden, Bright and Gladstone come with the power 
of a '-middle class," asking for freedom of invention. 

This financiering policy is then, at least, a step towards a higher 
sphere of thought. Its necessities oblige it to consider not only the 
actual, but also the possible. If not it, then others for it, must invent. 
It cannot tarry in Jericho with a sort of " experience " which is scared 
even at the experiment necessary to create it. If this old acquaintance 
have become too antiquated, a Rip VanWinkle only dizzied with the 
new, incapable even of grasping the facts, it must be cut as having no 
longer any speculation in its eyes. All this revolution from the neces- 
sity of a new situation, we have seen also in this country, with its 
theories, good and bad respecting taxation, finance, business in general. 
In fine, it is found that to be properly equipped for all emergencies, a 
Nation must seek to so organize its intelligence respecting all the re- 
sources and possible activities of the country and its people, that these 
may receive a free and yet moral development to the fullest extent. And 
the methods for this purpose used by the Nation, or permitted to in- 
dividuals must be such as comport with good will to all and by all. 

The National government has more or less relation to all matters 
concerning the commercial freedom, industrial development and finan- 
cial methods of the country. But it does not control, nor even occupy 
the whole sphere. This fact is often forgotten; and theories are ad- 
vanced upon the assumption that the National laws are to make or mend 
all, and be responsible for all defect or error of other laws. The States,- 
however, have power so to legislate, or not to legislate, as to thoroughly 
demoralize the country with gambling methods of speculation, witb 
banking and other corporations unduly empowered or not properly 
regulated, "visited" and controlled, and even with repudiation by 
States themselves of their own financial obligations, — after all of which,, 
the private moral sense in matters of commerce and finance must 
naturally be somewhat confused. So, also, in respect to taxation and 
debts. States are somehow held to a less rigid responsibility for " bur- 
den " than the National government, and even quite overlooked in 
learned discussions upon free-trade vs protection, as well as in party 
cries for "reform." Yet this State taxation, and the interest on State' 
debts and other municipal debts authorized by States, constitute by far 
the greater portion of the governmental expense of the whole country 
independent of the debt due to the civil war, — to say nothing of the pen- 
sion list, great as it is, yet in a like inequality with vast railroad debts 
also authorized by States as local burdens, with view to local develop- 
ment, or else recklessly allowed to be improperly accumulated by 
methods not moral if legal. For the right of a State to borrow 
money is as unlimited in quantity as that of the Nation. Its power to 



106 THE CIYIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

tax is also equally unlimited, except that the National gov^emment can 
alone tax imports or exports, while the State has also practically a 
monopoly of " direct taxation." 

With all this latitude for misrule and no rule in lower spheres, the 
National government cannot justly be held responsible for everything 
that is plainly necessary for the welfare of the Nation, as is often done; 
especially by those who, at the same time, warn it not to overstep the 
sacred limits of local self-government. The Nation's monopoly of im- 
port taxes, its power to regulate foreign and inter-State commerce, and 
its control over post-roads and navigable highways, as well as its power 
to coin money and regulate its value, evidently give it an intimate con- 
nection with all the larger commercial, industrial and financial interests 
of the country. The limits of this sphere may be said to be somewhat 
indefinite ; they are held to vary in time of war from what they are in 
time of peace, especially in respect to the financial power and the mode 
of borrowing money. In either war or peace, they ought to be ad- 
judged by the broadest principles which underlie the public good. The 
true safety and self-defense of the Nation rests at all times upon the 
existence of a general morality,— a rational relation and conduct of the 
whole. It is clear, then, that the actual methods of taxation, finance, 
&c., should be studied from this point of view; and that no true system 
can be reached until the need is realized and the effort made, to har- 
monize all the methods, State, National and local throughout, with a 
common view to the highest and best purpose. 

I. The National government, though nominally unlimited as to its 
sphere of taxation, is practically dissuaded from " direct taxes " by the 
requirement that these must be distributed 'pro rata among the States to 
be levied by them. Twice only has this been attempted, and though ii? 
small amounts, the result in delay and deficits was such as to prove it 
an inadequate and embarrassing resource. " Direct taxes" are held to 
be those laid upon lands and personal property ; hence, substantially 
what are also called " taxes upon production," in distinction from 
"taxes on consumption." These latter are, therefore, wiihin the 
scope of the National government to levy and collect for itself. Its 
" Internal Revenue " does not occupy this field to the exclusion of the 
States; for they also, especially for municipal purposes, levy taxes on 
consumption, both of domestic and foreign products, in the form of 
"licenses" and "excise taxes," rarely, however, if ever, in the latter 
form. Practically, then, the States alone tax according to property, and 
the National Government only according to consumption. The latter is 
usually held by economists to be a less hindrance to production, since 
it does not tax the instrument, but only its product. This view looks 
only to the future and may regard capital itself as only an instrument 
for production. Others, looking only at the past product, consider the 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 107 

property tax more equal, especially in its distribution, since the property 
is unequally distributed. This view is apt to overlook all use of prop- 
erty, though that alone gives it any public interest. This use of it can- 
not be by the owner alone ; hence, not he alone bears the tax on it. 
Evidently both these methods need to be united and act in harmony ; for 
no property protected and held by the use of law ought to escape its just 
share of taxation. But, on the one hand, products of pure invention, if 
useful, should be encouraged ; they may or may not become " necessaries 
of life," after appearing first as mere luxuries; they ought not and even 
cannot be estimated as to their worth to the community by the property 
invested in their production; nor can they be equally taxed at all except 
through their consumption, and upon that property the inventive pro- 
ducer acquires therefrom. This principle has a wider applicati n than 
the patent laws ; but those laws show that good sense is awake to the 
difference between inventive, useful applications of thought, and that 
mere stolid .possession of property which claims a right of protection 
even when it disuses or misuses this " capital " of the country. On the 
other hand, land and personal property are themselves among the neces- 
•saries of life, and of all productive action. Such property cannot be 
taxed at all without, in so far, shackling the freedom and variety of pro- 
duction. Nor can it properly be taxed without discrimination, not only 
as to its real value, but also as to the actual use made of it. To en- 
courage a:^y investment of capital which is useful, so as to prevent its 
idleness, to discourage any reckless or harmful use of it, is the most im- 
portant of all matters. It serves to develop all the resources of a 
country, stimulate invention, offer more varied choice to labor accord- 
ing to its capacities, and keep its capital active for the good and re- 
strained from the bad. It is the way to effectually dissipate all 
visionary " communism " ; for it matters little by whom property 
is possessed, if it is properly used. It may be difficult to find a 
proper criterion for this rectification of property; nor can it be 
applied merely in the sphere of taxation; but when found, and 
rationally applied there and elsewhere, it will make the valleys blossom 
as the rose. 

All taxation is protective, self-preservative, a means for living. 
The power is therefore held to be unlimited except by the power 
to live and the sphere of the life. This power is also extended 
by the "power to borrow money" into a draught upon the future, 
as a distribution of the taxation equally unlimited. The first 
impulse of an ignorant, despotic government is to tax all its prop- 
erty indiscriminately. After overuse or misuse of that resource, 
it learns its power to borrow; and overstraining or losing that, 
it may resort to debasing its coinage, or to equally false promises 
to pay never to be paid. Thus Austria is "redeeming" only the 



108 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

sins of her past by leaden taxes, which alone crush out her energies,, 
without lessening a heavy debt or redeeming her depreciated paper- 
money. 

But a Nation organizes itself for a rational life, and to protect, 
nourish and develop this life in a rational waj'. It is held to be em- 
powered, therefore, to discriminate in its use both of the power to bor- 
row and the power to tax. As between these, it is a question of the 
best distribution of what in either case is a tax to be paid. The choice 
is at the discretion of the taxing-power itself, in any of its spheres ac- 
cording to their legal limitations, so long as it is recognized that there 
is a tax to be pnid. Hence, in respect to the National government, it 
has never been held that it has power to issue an unpayable debt of 
any kind. It has never been held even that it has discretion, except 
in case of war or a clear exigency of defending the life of the Nation, 
to compel a circulation of paper money by mailing it a legal tender, 
whether issued by itself or others. The best intelligence of the Nation 
has always been averse to such a quasi money; and at the only time 
it was ever legalized the exigency was clearly stated and acted upou, 
as an inability to find other means for "borrowing money" to an ex- 
tent adequate for the emergency. Wherever this ability exists, there- 
fore, the Nation is held bound to issue no more -'legal tender," and to 
justify its past issues by redeeming them. A life which depends upon 
such means must needs strengthen the faith upon which it relies. 

The States have no power to legalize a currency of any kind, not 
even if issued by themselves. The paper-money formerly issued by 
State banks, under imperfect provisions for its redemption or for the 
solvency of the banks, proved itself one of the worst forms of taxing 
a people. The system of National Banks established since 1863, was 
intended to rationally organize that "power to borrow," and the 
means for it, which proved lacking; and jn this respect they have 
proved very efficient. At the same time, their circulation is so fully 
secured that their notes are in fact more definitely redeemable and cer- 
tainly payable than the legal-tenders themselves; while their solvability 
in other respects is carefully guarded, so far at least as to the securities 
required to begin with, if not as to the modes of their management. 

The States also usually limit, or allow only by special law, any bor- 
rowing by their subordinate governments. These latter are also very 
wisely limited in their power to tax, especially for merely govern- 
mental expenses, either to a percentage on the valuation of the local 
property, equalized under a general law of the State, or by requiring 
their tax schemes to receive the scrutiny and sanction of the State 
legislature every year. In these or other ways, the local power to tax 
is limited in extent and sometimes as to the kind or mode of tax. 

The power to discriminate rationally in the application of power to 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 109 

tax or borrow, then, is found complete only in the National and State 
governments. And, apart from the power to borrow, this discrimina- 
tion respecting taxation must be made by the Nation chiefly in the 
sphere of "taxes on consumption" and by the State chiefly in regard 
to "direct taxes." Of the two, the State power has far the larger moral 
responsibility, according to the criterion already laid down. Not only 
does it practically control the taxation of property as such, and the 
ordinary methods of using and abusing property, but its "police 
power" also is a discriminative one for taxing purposes, and brings it 
in immediate contact with the morals and habits of its people. This 
fact creates a variety of results which may be more fully considered 
hereafter in connection with our policy respecting morality, etc. But 
here it is evident that "licenses" and "prohibitions" form but a small 
part of the power and duty of States to give to the public that real and 
full "protection" which alone deserves the name, since it is self-pro- 
tection, — defence and development of what is vital. Even in regard 
to property alone, State can do far more than National legislation to 
promote its accumulation, diversify its character and improve its use. 
National taxation can practically discriminate for such a purpose only 
within its own sphere, and to do so rationally, must take into account 
what is done or left undone in other spheres. Any protection its laws 
might intend or afford, may be effectually baffled by States allowing 
methods of business inconsistent with any business except gambling. 
And these same methods, wh'.'n habitual, serve to create an everlasting 
call not for really developing, but for merely preying upon or wasting 
the resoui'ces of the country. "When such methods are allowed, or 
their spirit fostered, discussions become a mere conflict of particular 
interests, in which the public interest is wholly lost to view. It is the 
prevalence of such methods which has created in many minds a vague 
notion that this "conflict of interests'' is in fact the proper judge in the 
case; — if not the ne plus ultra oi wisdom, at least the only possible 
method of deciding great public questions. From such a blind habit of 
thinking, it comes that discussions upon protection and free trade get 
lost in a maze of particular cases, where each advocate finds plenty of 
authorities, but neither finds a principle. This seems a fine field for 
parties; but let them beware how they take either side exclusively, if 
they expect to live by it. 

In the nature of things, there can be only self-protection for a Na- 
tion, but whether this consists in free trade or not may suddenly 
change with circumstances. It does not in fact depend wholly upon 
taxation; — a fact which ought to shine among the truths self-evident. 
Taxation is indeed a vital power; and hence, if rationally used must 
discriminate in favor of what is vital. 

But what is vital for a Nation, even in respect to taxation, is not al- 



110 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ways what is deemed vital for a party. Heuce strange inconsistencies, 
and even "treacheries," in the view of those who consider their party 
the only j udge of what is vital. Thus Sir Robert Peel, finding he could 
tax no more on party principles without reducing instead of raising che 
revenue, yielded to the necessity of the case, and found in that a gen- 
eral ground for a new policy of taxation. This was called "free trade' ' 
because it protected the manufacturers against a land monopoly which 
had proved unable to feed the Nation, although previously itself "pro- 
tected" by the corn-laws. Just so the farmers of Illinois may be called 
"protected," by "free trade" with local manufacturers who eat their 
grain, against being obliged to burn it for fuel in order to "protect" 
transportation to distant markets. Here also the roadsters, railroad, 
or other, who, like commercial men generally, at first sight prefer long- 
routes and want them "protected" as "free trade," find that in the 
long run the shortest road is the most profitable one and the freest for 
trade. Otherwise, why do they protect themselves with steamers, tele- 
graphs and every new invention Avhich serves to annihilate distance? 
Clearly there are two sides to this question which have a way of chang- 
ing sides, or of running into a larger question of many sides. It is not 
worth while for a party to have a moral strabismus on the subject; nor 
for an individual to become monomaniac for particular interests, so 
that, having only one idea, he cannot rightly estimate even them in all 
their bearings. Calhoun and Webster changed sides on the tariff 
question between 1816 and 1830. 

Every clearheaded government of Nations has discerned this diver- 
sity and change of the situation in respect to the necessity or policy it 
prescribes for'taxation. In all cases the "property" must of course be 
protected, since it is the source of revenue; but it is this also only in 
proportion as it serves all; and that is the proper guide for discrimin- 
ating the tax upon it, as well as the methods prescribed for its use. 
States ruled by classes or despots will generally show no discernment 
in this respect. Being ruled selfishly, they will be ruled ignorantly. 
They may tax the property where it is, in the hands of a few land- 
holders, and then protect them against the people by corn-laws as in 
England, and yet the result will be starvation. So, on the other hand, 
as in France, they may tax it where it is not, and leave it protected in 
the hands of clergy and nobles, and the result there also will be starva- 
tion, bankruptcy and revolutionary change in the government. 

But where a shrewd government discriminates its taxation on pro- 
perty according to the actual form of its investment, and seeks to 
modify this by the use to which its revenues are to be put by the gov- 
ernment, this will not vary far from a proper method for protecting 
and developing the country into a condition of true self-defence, so 
long as such a government and its proposed use of revenue are 



METHODS OF TAXATION. Ill 

necessary or politic for the JSTation. In other words, the real 
interests of a suitable government, and of the people themselves,, do 
not differ. 

For example, Napoleon saw that "idealogists," — men of fixed ideas, 
did not quite understand the situation. By the new distribution of 
property and other results of the Revolution, France had been placed, 
as it were, like a child, with all the needs and opportunities. for a com- 
plete development ab initio. If he was forced to a war policy, which 
made her poor at the time, he sought to make even that serve a peace 
policy which made her rich in the future. So also Bismarck, if it be 
necessary for Germany to maintain an arm-ed peace in Europe by so 
weighty and material a form of influence as he has given her for a gov- 
ernment, is doubtless justified in protecting the home manufacture of 
Krupp cannon, and all other inventions for destruction, as well as in 
favoring a thorough development within the country of all that is 
needed to make it self-sustaining either in peace or war. In such a 
case, it is not a beggarly question about the precisely eciual payment 
of the tax, but a vital question as to the use of it. If that use be 
necessary, it is for all, and all are equally benefited by such a discrim- 
ination respecting it. 

So, again, for Great Britain, her commercial ascendency is a vital 
question, for offence or defence, for self-sustenance or self-preserva- 
tion. Whatever favors this, whether "free trade" or "protection," 
or a little of both, will undoubtedly be the policy of her sagest rulers. 
And the cat need not hide under meal. Whatever is really vital to a 
nation should be its policy if it have any right to live, and it may go 
under a right name. Hence Great Britain does not hesitate about pro- 
tecting her mail-steamers. Dominant though she be already in that 
respect, she means to preserve this superiority by preventing others 
from equalling her by a free competition. She does not chaffer about 
names for this, nor about expense for subsidies. Those who do so, in 
cases which involve a vital need or development of the nation, show 
how a merely material habit of thinking defeats even its own propo- 
sitions, and on its own ground is incapable of rising to any large view 
of the situation. It is like a miser who cries: "Another dollar gone!" 
in a case which imperils his life. Such views get voice here, in respect 
to proper compensation for high officials who are to make or adminis- 
ter the laws of a Nation, or of the judges who are to interpret them. 
Low demagogues suppose a great people has a low estimate of service 
in its highest trusts; and if they are there to speak for it, it certainly 
does. But their cry is usually heard from the lower offices where they 
do not have the same scruples. By their rule, the worst paid must be 
the highest trusts, the widest service. As to these, we must judge of a 
man's fitness by the money he has made; and as to other offices of 



112 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

trust, by the money he can make, — his " smartness." Such a ma- 
terial criterion overlooks any necessity, in positions of either public or 
private trust, for men of probity, who evidently cannot "make so 
much "there as others. It always bites those who use it; and most 
certainly of all when it is applied in such a paltry way to any disburse- 
ment of its taxes by a Nation. 

The exigencies of foreign relations are thus matters which become 
coordinate with what is essential for a suitable internal development 
of a nation. Neither can be isolated and considered apart from the 
other. And however favorably a nation may be situated with respect 
to others, its own policy must still be affected more or less by what is 
necessary for theirs. There can no more be a simple abstract unity 
between nations in method of foreign taxes, than in method of domes 
tic taxation; neither can be divorced from the other by any nation 
Nor can any fanciful vision of "free trade" be permitted by any 
thoughtful people to delude them in regard to the real requirements of 
the actual situation . Both their internal and external taxes must be 
discriminated and adjusted to meet the case as it is. 

The "idealogists," the abstract theorists, have been fond of discuss- 
ing this matter as a mere question of "cheapness," — another acZ cap- 
■tandum appeal to the lowest material views. The practical statesmen 
have always found it to be rather a question of self-defence and self- 
development. Preparation for war is prevention of it: and in any 
case a full development of various industries, while requisite for war, 
is always and chiefly valuable for diversifying the intelligence and in- 
vention of the people. It is no more a question of mere cheapness or 
even betterness of foreign goods, than it is a question for the indivi- 
dual whether he had better rely upon others altogether for whatever 
he uses, and never should make anything for himself when he can get 
it easier and better from others. Even his opinions may be thus 
nought for with advantage, and all the more so the less he thinks for 
himself; in that case he needs a "paternal government." But it re- 
quires to be already "rich," for a man thus to use the wits of others 
exclusively and let his own rest; though it is usually a costly price a 
man has to pay for being a fool or acting like one. So with a coun- 
try; only if already "rich" can it afford (on this absurd theory) to buy 
everything elsewhere and remain idle itself and witless. It cannot 
thus buy sustenance, all from abroad; need for that would prove it 
"poor," and really a case for charity. For what would it pay with, 
since it is witless, or idle and uninventive? But if it does not under 
stand inventions neither will it buy them. Only a country which 
makes inventions, hnys, them. 

This so-called rich country, then, can have only natural riches, like 
that of China, which needs to have luxuries forced upon it in the shape 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 313 

of opiates to keep the nation asleep; or like that of the West Indies 
where natives have gold to give for beads, and get slavery as the only- 
fit state for their wits; or like that of Hindostan, where also the 
"prey invites the fowler;" and where, as in the previous cases and all 
similar ones, there is discovered an " incapacity for self government " 
which seems to justify on their behalf the "paternal" use of a higher 
intelligence. Such are the lessons of history for a merely material 
view of "riches." The trade in such alone resolves into a Slave 
trade. 

But il a Nation be already rich in the true sense of the word, — in 
<;re itive activity of the designing capacity, — then, also, it would seem 
to have no need for buying from others, nor even for intellectual inter- 
course with them. Such a state of things does indeed give it a capac* 
ity to be thus free and independent, and self-sufficient even in seclus" 
ion. if the necessity for that arise. The true wealth to be sought for 
hy a Nation is thus in a possession of all it needs through a capacity to 
make it. If it were possible to be independent of Nature itself in this 
respect, that would be the ideal acme of self -helping power. Hence 
the value of having theoretic science of the laws of Nature, and of en- 
couraging use of these laws by practical inventions, so that a nation 
will be full-furnished, and up to the times in this freedom of resource 
which comes from knowledge and use of Natural laws. On the other 
hand, not to be able at need to make all that self-subsistence or self- 
defense requires, is to be at the mercy of others, — scant mercy when a 
matter of mere force. To be caught unawares in such a situation, is 
now-a-days more speedily fatal and costly than ever, by reason of this 
very advance in material science. So far as this has invented engines 
of ('estruction, it has increased the expense of nations for self-defence 
and their necessity for mechanical industries. Thus it has severed 
peoples by iron walls and arrayed them against each other m enor- 
mous standing armies. Vae viclis, is the inexorable criterion of force. 
■On the other hand, this same science, when guided by nobler designs, 
has made so artificial the necessaries of life, that Nature has compara- 
tively little to say in the matter; her "productions" are only "raw 
material." These necessaries of life for an American mechanic, or 
farmer, or laborer of any sort, are greater, in respect to artifice, than 
those of great Charlemagne in all his glory. This transformation of 
the Natural, by higher inventions of Man, is what now marks the pro- 
gress of peoples, their capacity for independence and self-delence. 
But it is also what unites them through their higher faculties. By 
overstepping the lower and merely Natural differences of production, 
and wants of men, it makes of their world-wide intellectual intercourse 
And aid more and more a necessity to all. By this higher power alouO: 
•can the lower power of force be put in its proper place and kept to its 



114 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

proper use. "Whoever excels in this higher is the "best man." What- 
ever Nation secures its sway and prevalence among its people will be 
the most wealthy and the best prepared for all emergencies. Its wealth 
will be of a sort which calls more and more for exchange with others 
just because it is so happily constituted and used at home. 

This "higher law" which transforms the law of force, does not then 
contradict itself like the latter when taken as a criterion. As it is 
what unites men, so it is what unites nations, and makes of their mu- 
tual commerce more and more a necessity the wealthier they are, — the 
more completely self-sustaining each is in itself. It is not a question 
here either of having all and no need to buy, or of having nothing and 
too poor to buy. "The more a man has, the more he wants." In its 
true sense, this is a pregnant truth for him, and also for nations. SO' 
long as they do not see precisely what that means, (it appearing very 
mysterious indeed to any mechanical theory of Man or nations), they 
will doubtless seek to compromise the matter, and follow devious 
routes towards the heaven of "free trade." The artificial rather than 
the Natural necessaries of life are already what most feed the com- 
merce of nations. A great law of Reason is working itself out 
through their inventive faculties, while they are fumbling it with their 
hands as a "law of force." No nation is independent of another in 
respect to inventions, nor in respect to their products. This is the situ- 
ation of nations as well as of individuals; and to some extent even in 
regard to what are now considered the necessaries of life. 

Hence both good policy and good will for others enjoin a mutual 
regard for each others' interests. No merely selfish views can be 
wiselj' substituted for a broad and generous policy of live and let live 
among nations, as well as individuals, in respect to interchange of 
products. Practically , it is a question of what, on the whole, is the 
best division of labor consistent with the safety, individuality and dig- 
nity of each nation, and with that degree of trust in each others' jus- 
tice which the character and conduct of each properly inspires. 

All conventions between nations upon this and other subjects are 
made by treaties. The treaty-making authorities in this Nation, — the 
President and Senate, — are not the whole of the law-making or taxing, 
power. Nor indeed, it would seem, are they alone the power to make 
treaties, when anj'' legislation is requisite to render them effectual. A 
harmony of the whole legislative action is therefore necessary in all 
questions which affect or require taxation. A general policy respecting 
all taxation may be adopted with or without resort to treaty. Other 
nations may make this policy complete both as to internal and external 
taxes. But m this country, State-taxation cannot be modified, it would 
seem, by any treaty nor by any National legislation; it must be 
taken into consideration such as it is, so that the rest must be 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 115» 

adapted iu view of that, and made so fai' as possible complementary 
therewith. Foreign treaties respecting taxation must be more or less 
special as between nations, and have not been very frequent, but they 
tend no doubt to become more general, and more steadily to be depended 
upon. For this Nation, however, the state of its foreign trade depends 
very much upon the extent and methods of local taxation ; — a fact usually 
qiiite overlooked in all discussions of the subject. This local taxation, 
mainly direct upon property, does not appear in our National budget, 
as it does in those of foreign nations; so that even our National' 
legislators themselves are liable to forget its due influence, if not its 
very existence. Upon them, now-a-days, it is used mainly only as a 
harriment for reduction at any price, of import taxes, losing sight alto- 
gether of the fact that these, as taxes on consumption, serve to coun- 
terbalance the taxes on production, and thus complete the more general 
method which other nations hav^of disti'ibuting their taxation by con- 
sidering the whole subject in all its features at once. 

Quite differently did the subject present itself at the beginning of 
the National government. Then the direct taxation by the States was 
observed as something which could not be greatly increased with im- 
punity, and the customs tax was exclusively resorted to as "indirect," 
and hence more likely to escape observation. This latter was also re. 
garded as necessary to be used as offset to that of other nations, since 
all habitually used it, and it could be used here only by the National, 
government. So far, this initial policy showed only a fearful chariness 
about increasing the burden of State taxation, and a mere counter- 
balancing of foreign discriminations; and perhaps had not in view, un- 
less in the most foreseeing and designing minds, any effect in develop- 
ing the industrial resources of the country, or any adjustment of the- 
whole burden of taxation for that purpose. In fact there was but 
little rational thought and action upon this subject anywhere; as may 
be seen from the historical instances already quoted. 

But, besides this avoidance of observation, such a tax upon foreign 
goods took the air of a tax on luxuries. It seemed a tax upon the rich, 
and although upon consumption, yet substantially upon "property." 
This is the form in which taxation at first appears simplest and best 
to the "positive" mind of individualism, especially when that con- 
trols the disbursement; and also to the vulgar mind, since that fancies 
it escapes the tax. It is thus agreeable to both parties; and either is 
apt to use it without any rational discrimination. At that time, this, 
and almost any country seemed adequate to furnish the necessaries of 
life. Although these enlarge their sphere with groAvth of intelligence 
in a people, yet the distinction may always apply as against foreign 
goods, and even so far as to make discrimination against them a 
necessary of life. Hence this reason, at least, for tax on imports has- 



116 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

come down the years, and until the Civil War, no other tax was levied 
by the National government. Even then, the Internal Revenue tax 
was designed to bear, so far as possible, only on consumption of "lux- 
uries," or what was unnecessary to life. 

The National government, thus launched with a policy of taxation 
essentially only upon property indiscriminately, naturally drifted into 
conflict at first with individual or particular, and then with sectional 
interests respecting property. Both of these, of course, demanded 
"free trade," though for different purposes. "Free trade and sailors 
rights" made the war of 1812, for the " freedom of the seas," the free- 
dom of foreign commerce itself, and thus a National object, since tlie 
revenue of the Nation was to be derived from customs-tax. But this^ 
war itself and oth^r events of the time, such as the long wars and clos- 
ure of ports in Europe, stimulated perforce the building up of home 
manufactures. This occurred, however, only in one section of the 
country; so that the free trade demanded by South Carolina in 1831, 
with threat to nullify the National tariff -law, was in behalf of a sec- 
tional kind of property in slaves who had not, and could not be al- 
lowed to have enough intelligence to manufacture. Thus was posed 
for the first time the question of "cheap labor," and whether the 
policy of the Nation should be such that this labor should be cheap, 
merely because it needed and knew enough only to eat and drink, 
This point in the case was not taken in all its force, however, at the 
time. The parties of the Nation were discussing the tariff question 
from all points of view but the right one; and the nullification tempest 
was quieted by a compromise, — a " sliding-scale " for the tariff to taper- 
off towards free trade during twenty years, while the Nation itself was 
sliding towards the main question. 

The debates during this time, and the perip^ties of parties, show 
what folly it is to undertake to base a National partj^ upon merely sec- 
tional or other particular interests in respect to property or its merely 
National taxation. Neither party evinced any clear apprehension that 
State taxation had aught to do with the matter. The tendency was 
rather to encourage the same vague notion respecting States, which 
thoughtless individuals entertain respecting their own use of property, 
that "every one has aright to do as he pleases with his own." Neither 
party seemed at all conscious that in this way, it was also posing the 
question, whether the National government also had not a similar 
right to disregard all general interests; whether, in respect to its life 
it, too, had need only of enough intelligence to eat and drink; and so 
its character was degraded till it came to the question whether it had 
any right to live at all. Such is the logical descent every man makes 
to self-slavery, and every nation to self-annihilation, when either un- 
dertakes to determine the right to use property or any other form of 
force, by other than a truly rational and all-comprehensive standard. 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 117 

When it came to a question of the National life, the relation of 
parlies to this matter of taxation necessarily became somewhat mixed. 
Both were at least compelled to awake to what had been, in the views 
of each, a latent incompatibility with any rational life and action of 
the National government; of the one, in claiming its right to discrim- 
inate in favor of particular interests as such; of the other, in denying 
its right to discriminate at all, and averring it to be only a stolid eater 
of taxes. The slumbering powers of the Nation in respect to taxation 
had to be brought in play; even after a great augmentation of cus- 
toms, indiscriminate enough to protect everybody, and perhaps on that 
account also calling for a counterpoise in the internal field. A second 
resort, by way of trial, was made, on a small scale, to the dilatory and 
ineffective mode of direct taxation collected through the different 
■States. Then the Internal Revenue System, at first quite complicated, 
but obviously a discriminative tax throughout, was put into operation. 
This brought clearly to view, not only the reserve power of the Na- 
tion to live, but also its power, right and duty to discriminate in 
respect to taxation. Discrimination in respect to taxes on consump- 
tion is in fact a necessity of the case; the only question is as to the 
"Criterion. But taxation direct upon property must also be discrimina- 
tive when made by a nation; and to be rational should be according to 
its general necessities, as we have seen. Hence power to tax m gen- 
eral is held by the courts to be a discriminative power in all its 
l)ranches, — the power which exercises it being supposed to be a rational 
one. The States themselves so exercise it in all its phases. They pro- 
vide in their constitutions usually for an "equal tax" upon all prop- 
erty "real and personal." But this is only a security for equal valua- 
tion; and does not wholly guarantee that; for an unequal one, if made 
lay proper legal authorities, is a judgment sealed and made up without 
appeal;— those who are to judge must be fitly selected. Neither is an 
■equal tax upon property as such the last word for States. They at 
once overstep this limit, (just enough as to mere property), into a right 
of discriminating respecting its use. This power, used in the form of 
licenses, &c., is indeed one way of securing a due taxation from per 
sonal property which often escapes the regular form. It also catches 
that as a tax upon its privilege, greater than that of land, to go and 
come; as for example in licenses for "amusements." It is also some- 
times used as a tax upon occupations, professional, commercial or 
■other. Here the tax must evidently be discriminative, and may be so 
either as to the value or the character of the business. The Internal 
Revenue imposed a tax on lawyers, but not on doctors in medicine, 
{doubtless deeming the latter more necessary in time of war when 
"laws are silent,") and equalizing the tax on the former by an "income 
tax" on their receipts in respect to which the license tax made no dis- 



118 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TItE UNITED STATES. 

tinction. The discrimination usually made by States, even when no 
other business is "licensed," is made with respect to the selling of 
liquors and other intoxicating drinks. Here the two ends meet, and 
there is a division of labor between the State and the individual in the 
process of consuming the tax; — what the one eats the other drinks; 
and doubtless both are held to due discrimination respecting the quan- 
tity and quality. Here, too, the debate between tariffs for "revenue," 
"protection" and "prohibition" comes to a crisis;— a moral climax is 
again reached where it is to be decided whether the individual shall 
"do as he pleases," or whether he must not rather find his "good," in 
most 'espects, in what is a rational discrimination in behalf of the 
"good of all." The legislation of States upon this particular subject 
has been carried to an extent which has certainly evinced on their part 
a sufiicient sense of the power to tax and of the right to discriminate 
in its use. Some of them have gone so far as to outlaw a particular 
kind of property; and such a legislation against any form of property 
whatever, since it presumes the property to already exist and be prop- 
erty, is beyond the capacity of any State, and indeed of any law- 
making power. The law of man does not make material propert}': it 
can only recognize it as a. factum, an already made. It is an "inven- 
tion," and the question is only how to use it. Poisons seem at first to 
be only "inventions of the devil," yet a good doctor makes them serve 
the good. The extent of legal power in this respect would seem to 
be only the right either to encourage or to forbid any particular manu- 
facture within its limits, and hence to destroy any which is manufac- 
tured against its prohibition, or even any which is brought from else- 
where with intent to violate the law. Thus we are brought back to the 
National relation as between foreign and home goods; for precisely 
these principles are applied 'bj way of discrimination and in the "con- 
fiscation" of contraband articles. 

Xor can there be evaded in the jSTational sphere this necessity to 
discriminate in respect to taxation by some criterion of the general 
nature and use of the articles to which it is applied. Least of all there; 
since there is only a tax on consumption in its various phases. The 
discrimination must be made, and the only real question is what cri- 
terion to apply to it. Local changes, general spread of manufacture, 
have tended to kill party attitudes on this subject for one party; and 
diversity of individual interests are perhaps even more fatal to partj' 
unity on it in the other. This is as it should be; for this is no party 
question, to find its criterion in a party policy, running into sectional- 
ism. Nor is it to be presented as. an annual hurry-scurry of local or 
particular interests, wherein any. mousing politician may ride into 
office upon some hobby which he is to offer as fit to determine a Na- 
tional policy. The result must be parti-colored and wavering in either 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 119 

■case. What the Nation needs above all, is to know its own mind upon 
such a vital question, and have a settled criterion, by which a steady 
policy may be secured from either party. The National interest re- 
quires that the public shall not be subjected in this matter to just such 
a gambling method as everywhere else proves so demoralizing and 
wasteful. The general loss from such irrational ways of treating it, 
are in fact among the greatest at all likely to be incident to National 
legislation. 

Yet the tendency of parties difEers on other questions, so that on 
this one also they seek to take or at least affect different attitudes. 
This effort must be vain unless it is vicious throughout. It is espe- 
cially on this question that either party, unless reckless of the life of 
the Nation, must, in that life, recognize its unity with and need of the 
■other party. When parties regard this question in its full extent as a 
matter of State as well as National taxation, this must be apparent as 
a necessity of the case, whether they will or not. 

The unreflective party, when ignorant, is easily led to shout for 
■"free trade," by the delusive abstraction of "cheapness," and because 
direct taxation seems to be on the rich, and because such a party is not 
given to special interests as against party. The other party is not 
scared, but rather attracted by the name of "protection," because to it 
the very function of a government seems to be to protect "property" 
.and its "growth." This party may therefore tend to a "protection" 
not properly discriminated by reference to the life and interest of the 
Nation as a whole. Yet it is balked in this, both by the other party, 
and also by the fact that it tends thereto only in an individualistic way 
which renders it difficult to harpionize the party on its own measures. 

By common consent, however, the Internal Revenue system is to 
be gradually withdrawn from the field, and the Nation to eventually 
return to import taxes exclusively for its revenue. This renders the 
name of "free trade" an absurdity, and some other must be found to 
stand in its place. Hence a certain shrewdness seems to be embodied 
in the cry for a "Revenue tariff" by one party, as posing it in favor of 
the greatest possible freedom of foreign commerce, and in opposition 
to another party which seeks to obstruct this by mere reference to in- 
dividual interests. The greatest demand for foreign goods, however, 
depends, as we have seen, upon the greatest development at home of 
individual wants. Besides, individual and local interests themselves 
are fortunately not determined by parties; so that they ferment within 
the bosom of each in a way distracting to the " idealogists." Wide- 
awake business-men themselves watch the current of events, upon 
whose waves third-rate politicians merely rise and sink without any 
foresight for the future. And as any tariff whatever must needs "pro- 
tect" somebody, the cry of "Revenue tariff" has an advantage for 



120 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

the party which, takes its " principles" from its leaders, since these- 
can arrange their "protection" en famille. It comes to the same re- 
sult, however, for the other party, in Congress if not in the "can- 
vass;" and each party must also eventually legislate with the other, and 
no steady policy can be secured except by both. 

What is most objectionable in the cry of "Revenue tariff,'' how- 
ever, is its latent denial of the right of taxation, by stripping it of its 
power and duty to discriminate, and making of it a stupid mechanical 
affair. This is no way to secure thj life of the Nation, nor to find any 
true criterion for taxation. On the contrary, it is a drifting policy, 
which forswears for the Nation itself any rational foresight of its 
future, and thus denies it any right to live except by chance, and at the 
mercy of whatever demagogy may arise in it. Hence it is also a gamb- 
ling policy which is kept ever uncertain and distorted by mere smart- 
ness, and never guided by statesmanship. 

"Revenue tariff" or "Tariff for revenue" is a fair-sounding 
title, albeit rather pleonastic to the literary ear. A tariff is supposed to 
be for revenue; but to say so twice perhaps clinches it. But what is 
the rose that smells so much sweeter under that superfluous descrip- 
tion? Simply a rose as yet unblown, one that does not "show its 
colors." In that respect, the name is not manly and above board. It 
savors of "treason, stratagem and spoils." Does it deny the right to 
prohibit, even in case of infernal machines, Orsini bombs and all that 
ilk? If not, then there is discrimination even for purpose of prohi- 
bition. Does it claim to not at all "protect?" Prithee, no; but to do so 
only when obliged to. Then there must be discrimination as to the 
character and use of this obligation to protect when it cannot be 
helped. Most serious obligation of all is that, to judge of what one is 
obliged to protect; one doesn't care to prefer the sinner. 

"What criterion, then, has this "Revenue Tariff" under the rose? 
In answer to this query, its title is usually still further lengthened into 
a "Tariff for revenue only." But is it to be laid stolidly on regardless 
of expense ? Or are commodities to take their turns like the Greek 
generals at Marathon? Is each to have its ten day's trial, more or less, 
to secure both variety and equality by a sort of potluck? Or are the 
"gods" to be appealed to by lot or otherwise on account of Man's im- 
becility or lack of "divine right" to decide such vital questions? And, 
in fact, what question more vital, more difficult to foresee in all its 
bearings, than what shall be a system of revenue laws least harmful 
to the present prosperity, most helpful of the future of a great nation? 
And in any case, there must needs be at least an involuntary protec- 
tion. More's the pity if it cannot be voluntary in a good cause; for 
otherwise the good and evil must go by lot; or, in other happy-go-lucky 
form, "take their chances." 



METHODS OF TAXATION. 121 

But in fact this discrimination must be voluntary, and Man must 
take the responsibility for it. The ' " gods ' ' and their ways of chance 
have departed from the methods of Nations, and left them to Man and 
his ways of Reason. A tariff ought not and will not be laid on 
''necessaries of life," if that can be avoided. But what are these? 
The very ones "for revenue only." For that purpose they are the 
first, simplest, surest resort; and this is so obvious that the least pos- 
sible amount of discrimination compatible with humanity would be 
adequate to select them. Even a dog could do it according to his 
views of that article, — as something only to be eaten, and hence to be 
considered only as to the amount. 

This least effort of diseriminative energy, then, simply goes flat 
wrong. A "tariff for revenue only," is exactly what is not wanted. 
Indeed, unless the revenue itself is wanted for revenue only, it would 
seem that just as much statesmanship ought to (and generally will) be 
used in discriminating how it is to be raised as how it is to be spent. 
It is just as well, then, to drop the word " only" from the title; it only 
cures a literary pleonasm by a far worse blunder. 

Will this party seeking to escape its wits, go next to the other ex- 
treme — "luxuries," and " tax the rich" as a demagogic ad captanclum 
for the poor? But if they want revenue from the rich in a sure and 
steady way, and with the least escape from such an energetic discrim 
ination, the simplest way is to tax their property directly. This, how- 
ever, will not be a tariff at all. This method kills the "tariff" part of 
the title, and the other method shows the " revenue " part of it to be 
even a worse absurdity than "free trade." The whole gist of the 
matter lying between these two extreme methods, each of which, if 
consistent, would tax property direct, reveals a theory inconsistent 
with any tax on foreign commerce at all. "Free trade " says this 
openly: "Revenue tariff" says it covertly, and in away denying to 
the National government any proper use or real right of the only rev- 
enue power which is exclusively vested in it by the Constitution. It is 
perhaps needless to fear that such a theory may run to a sectional is. 
sue, as once before; yet it is very certain that bad theories breed bad 
actions. 

The question, then, returns to its reality: What is the proper rule 
for discriminating in a tariff, since discrimination there must be? Such 
a rule has appeared in one of its phases as a favoring of "necessaries 
of life." But these differ among intelligent and barbarous peoples, 
and between free and oppressed nations. This fact is what brings up 
the matter of "cheap labor" as an item in the controversy. On thi& 
point, parties are more or less obliged to show the same colors, but yet 
also to reveal what, on the whole, are their views upon the process of 
civilization in general, if they have any. 



122 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

But to discriminate •' against clieap labor," — that occasions a little 
puzzling of brains as to what is meant. If it be only to oust the Chi- 
nese, that is simple enough when backed by a race prejudice, and not 
complicated by any "votes" among the ousted. But are we not all 
the while receiving with " hospitable arms," and not to bloody graves 
but to ballot-boxes, swarms of cheap labor? And has not the " ma- 
terial development ' ' of the country profited, whatever the moral strain 
it may have suffered, thereby? A merely material development may 
then be gained, either accidentally or intentionally, at the expense of 
the moral, and in that case with the result of rottenness for itself. 
This calls for discrimination of a high order. The material must be 
subordinated to the moral by the rational; yet with mercy for the for- 
mer when it involves humanity. 

Cheap labor is well enough if there is also cheap capital, and all 
other "necessaries of life" are cheap. Capital itself is a necessary of 
modern life and for an inventive people. Hence for every nation these 
matters all go together into a wholly particular relation which that 
nation must determine for itself. The real question is. what these 
"necessaries of life '' and the relation of its capital and labor to them 
are for a free nation. A " cheap labor" which is so only because it 
neither knows nor needs aught but meat and drink, (however "strong" 
either of these are) we cannot afford in this country; for such a cheap 
labor will be fatal to the life of the Nation. We have seen this once 
when such a cheap labor had owners: we will see it again, and then in 
a ruinous form, past remedy, when such laborers are slaves to party- 
leaders, as they alwaj's are when they vote. Can such leaders, then, 
discriminate against cheap labor of this sort? No, they favor it, and 
pander to its own self -destructive ignorance, in two ways: first, by 
treating capital (the past), as something unproductive and only to be 
eaten; second and still more, by a policy of taxation which says it 
must not discriminate in favor of invention, (the future) but against it, 
against intelligence. 

For the true statesman, when studying the best policy for either 
raising or spending of taxes, none of these mere subterfuges against 
responsibility suffice: and none of that petty thinking which gets lost 
in a labyrinth of merely particular facts or interests. He aims at 
something steadfast t-^ true principle and worthy of a great Nation, — a 
Nation sailing on, not by "stars of fate," but with Reason at the 
helm, organized to guide it as one of the servants of a God of Truth, 
one of his educators of men in the ways of wisdom and of virtue. 
National and State governments, and individuals as well, share in this 
noble responsibility. The whole musi move on togelher a very con- 
stellation of Reason in its own sphere, no mere mechanical galaxy but 
true "sons of the morning." 



METHODS OF TAXATION, 123 

The cases already quoted show that the Nation has, at two periods, 
"been led by circumstan«es to prepare itself for a coming emergenc}'. 
Without its enforced internal development before 1812, it would 
scarcely have been able to bear the shock of war, either on land or sea, 
against the veteran arms and the colossal power of England. Again, 
before 1861, the reception of cheap labor to the suffrage by the North 
and the exclusion of it by the South from all but meat and drink, had 
much to do with creating in it everywhere a zeal for the Nation. Be- 
sides posing the question in its most abstract form as between free 
labor and slave-labor, this cheap labor had served well the purposes of 
that inventive genius which the South deemed unnecessary and the 
North found necessary; the former judging "free trade" best for its 
interests and the latter "protection." Thus came to be determined 
what free labor is, and how it can be best fitted either for peace or war. 
Its real freedom was found to consist in an acquired and disciplined 
capacity to make whatever it needed, wherever it had not this already 
made, and not be dependent on another for it. The necessaries of 
life, either for such a labor or for the Nation it defends, cannot be 
taken away. Not to recognize, in either man or Nation, that tireless 
creative genius, which alone makes free and triumphant over mere 
force, is only the blinded judgment of the brute. Had not the South 
disarmed itself, by its own policy, and the North been doubly girded 
for the battle by the progress of its actual skill and invention, neither 
on land or sea could the Nation have been victorious over a host of 
brave men, with their recourse to English " Alabamas," which would 
have been plentier then and accompanied by foreign intervention. 

These points as to what are necessaries of life for a free nation de- 
serve to be reflected on and receive their due share of influence. It is 
important, also, to bear in mind the burden the States bear for Edu- 
cation. This is what is necessary for skill and breadth of invention. 
It also prevents "cheap labor'' in two ways: first, by this very tend- 
ency it has to, resort to inventive genius, — to say nothing of a less em- 
ployment of children in actual labor as in foreign lands: second, by 
increasing the scope of what are considered necessaries of life. Edu- 
cation, then, is just what feeds foreign commerce in a permanent 
■way; and foreign commerce in its own interest ought to feed that. 

Suppose, then, that when the extinguishment of the National debt, 
or approach thereto, has removed a merely financial reason for a large 
customs revenue pledged to that purpose, the Nation should then come 
by this means, (or even by the Internal Revenue if not too cumbrous 
when applied only to stamp tax on manufacture of liquors), to the relief 
or aid of the States in the matter of education. In comparison with 
such a motive of the general welfare, how petty would seem such quib- 
bling considerations as are often applied to the subject. If a particular 



124 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

tax excludes what we can make as well, is is indifferent ; if it does not 
but only increases the cost, either of what we do or do not make, the- 
compensation is there. Do we expectto get education without "cost," un- 
less possibly in this way ? For it is duly certified, by those who count the 
cost in that way, that taxes on foreign goods sometimes do not augment 
their price, but only decrease the profits of the maker or carrier. But 
when applied to education, such a paying for it by foreigners need not 
be so closely calculated upon, albeit they send us a large supply of 
scholars whom they have not educated themselves. This eviction from 
education by them is just what evicts their people from free labor into 
"cheap labor," and finally from the land altogether in search of a free 
country. And this is just what destroys their home markets, and makes 
them need foreign markets for their inventions. But it not wise enough 
to build up at home this market for both home and foreign products, let 
them help to make it abroad at least. That is the true route to free- 
trade. A refined intercourse must manufacture both its tastes and their 
supply, — an endless, but a noble task, for it is a rising career in free- 
dom. No " cheap," uneducated labor will suffice for it. Nature will 
suffice for animals, but not for Man. 

II. The Financial history of the Nation also shows this fundamen- 
tal need of Education. Its financial methods may be shaken at the base 
by the ignorance of those who vote, and distorted by the whimsies of 
legislators with too little knowledge to meddle with them. Here, quite- 
as little as in methods of taxation, will it comport with Eeason to decide 
on great questions by a mere counting of noses. Do the highest deed,, 
and mourn not over the lower ones slain. Trust in the highest law for 
its compensation, where there seems to be a sacrifice of material things ;, 
— even that may prove an error as to fact. A Nation must also confide 
only in its best men for the judgment of best methods; for the highest 
intelligence is requisite to make them. 

The Nation was specially favored in this respect by having Hamil- 
ton as the organizer of its financial system. With a genius for design 
which showed itself also in the making of the National Constitution, 
that great statesman laid down a general system of finance which has- 
proved itself adequate to the extension required by the greatest emer- 
gencies. Both in its principles and its method-, it marked out a course 
of honor for the Nation, and of secured responsibility for its officials, in 
/espect to finance. The task he had in hand for his methods, — to man- 
age the resources and pay off the debts of the colonies, — may seem a 
small one when compared with that which beset his successors in 1861, 
But the precision of his judgment, the fertility of his genius, and his- 
grasp of the highest principles, have made of him a model financier, 
and of his course a chart by which to avoid great blunders. 

Doubtless, Hamilton, also, had his advisers of repudiation, and; 



METHODS OF FINANCE. 125 

croakers about impossibility; though it would seem the Nation was not 
so fully furnished then as latterly with would-be iuventors of financial 
ruin. He and his designs, however, came out triumphant ; and the " re- 
sult approved the deed." The debt was funded and paid, a National 
coinage replaced the Continental " shinplasters " ; and for the National 
government there was at least the smoothest of financial sailing on the 
rouce he had laid down. And to him also, next to if not equally with 
Marshall, we owe that clear recognition and decided assumption of the 
National character of the government,which alone could give it credit in 
the financial world, or assure it against metaphysical sophistries and 
irrational impulses. 

Since then, indeed, the Nation has nowhere regarded with more 
jealousy and dislike than in its own government, or its oflicials, the least 
wavering from the strictest financial probity. Such action is felt to taint 
a National character, no matter whose particular interests are affected. 
None despised more heartily than secessionists themselves, the effort of 
one of their number, then Secretary of the Treasury, to discredit a loan 
which the emergency called for. The National action in this respect 
seems to absorb all the attention of some ; so that the State i themselves 
are not similarly watched; as though the Slates did not help form the 
National character financially, or only that, and needed none them- 
selves. Demoralization goes all of a piece, however. If it begins on 
such a point in a State, the National character and life will become in- 
volved in it, whether by a provincialism, partyism, or narrow individ- 
ualism of any sort, — all of which unconsciously look elsewhere, or seek 
to form elsewhere a character, simply because they begin by refusing to 
recognize rational obligations of their own. 

"Justice and honor are practiced with danger," said the Athenians, 
naively, to the islanders of Melos whom they came to subdue. Useless 
and foolish they told them, was it, " after visible hopes have failed, to 
betake themselves to such as are invisible. For of the gods, we hold 
as a matter of opinion, and of men we know as a certainty, that in obe- 
dience to an irresistible instinct, they always maintain dominion 
wherever they are the stronger. And we neither enacted this law, nor 
were the first to carry it out when enacted ; but having received it when 
already in force, and being about to leave it after us to be in force 
forever, we only avail ourselves of it, knowing that both you and others, 
if raised to the same power, would do the same." 

How "Natural " all this reasoning is, and how natural to act upon 
it for even a Nation of poetic and immortal genius, if it looks only to 
Nature for its theories, and for the origin of the " laws " it has " re- 
ceived,"- not designed. The Athenians subdued Melos, " put to death 
all the Melian adults they took, and made slaves of the children 
and women." Vce victis! But the fate of Athens itself shows the cruel 



126 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

reaction of such a policy, even when advocated by a people capable of 
reasoning upon the hopes, feelings and instincts of men, and of Nature- 
gods, as like mechanical motives, " irresistible " and derived irresponsi- 
bly. And so Sparta, shrewdest of rulers by force, but reputed by 
those keener iotellects from whom alone we hear of her, to " consider 
what is agreeable to be honorable and what is expedient to be just," has 
perished utterly, without leaving any monuments even of mechanical 
skill, any evidence whatever of creative genius. Not even inventive 
for destruction, the only word she has left to mankind, and that through 
others, is of a capacity by discipline and habit to enforce a stupid, 
mechanical bravery. 

Finance now-a-days has in fact come to deal far more with the " in- 
visible " than the visible. Property itself, and also the methods of hand- 
ling it, have taken on more ideal forms which discard the material as 
much as possible. That is the reason of Beauty in Art, (no excess), aad 
the way in which Reason *riumphs over Force in all its forms, by or- 
ganizing its administration. This renders the domain and ineihods oi 
finance more speculative; hence broader and safer for wise men, nar- 
rower and more dangerous for foolish ones to meddle with. For the 
blunderer, indeed, it is the " visible " which seems the right and sure 
thing, even when it is wholly invisible to anybody except himself. 
Only by the true statesman are the mvisible powers of a Nation's finance 
grasped in their reality, and the visible safely transformed under their 
sway, by methods which are rational. 

Never was this need for financial skill at the head of a Nation and 
■of financial good-sense in its people, more tuUy demonstrated than dur- 
ing and since our Civil War. A similar demand in France recently has 
perhaps had the benefit of more actual and disciplined skill in the 
government, and even more unanimous aid to it by that acute and 
patriotic pt^ople, there being no party-division there as against la patrie. 
Their handling of the Bank of France, its branches, and all other or- 
ganized financial means, so as to aid the emergencj^, and prevent any 
recourse to a quasi money by the government itself, are especially ad- 
mirable lessons in finance. Their notable and even wonderful success 
justifies the farseeing policy of Chase in organizing the National Bank 
system, both as a remedy for the past, and a better provision for finan- 
cial needs in the future. 

For this crisis, (as usual with all others in this country, where so 
many practically neglect public affairs), came upon us unprepared 
financially as much as otherwise. That very exclusiveness with which 
the Nation had been looked to as the model of honor, and the only 
one required to have financial character, was now the source of con- 
stitutional scruples by its friends, and of hopes of its impotence by its 
enemies. Especially in respect to the legal-tender act, (a matter in 



METHODS OF FINANCJ^:. 127 

which the sage constitutionalists of the extreme sort were themselves 
speedily brought under the law of necessity), were the power to make 
such a law, and also the expediency of it even if the power existed, 
both matters of grave deliberation, and neither of them was assented 
to save as a dire necessity. A Nation fully prepared in its financial 
means would not have been faced by such a necessity, nor subjected to 
the evils and dangers inevitably incident to such a law. Although the 
issue under the law was pledged to a limit, which was not exceeded, at 
least in that form of non-interest bearing "legal-tender," (unless by 
the "fractional currency" sent chasing after a silver currency also dis- 
appearing from a country which produced both silver and gold), yet 
the fact that necessity alone was its basis and birthright was forgotten 
by many: and such is the financial drunkenness apt to follow from a 
first draught of a "monej^" which can evidently be made ad liMtum, 
and on which every one can get rich in imagination, that we have had 
bred by it new professors of the financial art, who would put the finest 
French finance to the blush and make our Hamilton hide his diminished 
head. 

More grave, perhaps, than this spawning of imbeciles, (against 
which, on the whole, the sober sense of the people has proved ade- 
quate), have been the decisions of the courts respecting the application 
of such a legal- tender to preexisting contracts. Even those of the Su- 
preme Court itself have been both ways; but finally, and under the 
presidence over it by Chase himself, adverse. Such clearly is the true 
holding; since the value of a universal or real money is not varied by 
the issue of a particular and unrcvil money. This latter being only 
quasi, not money, but promise, its extent of issue and credit only changes 
its own value as "promise" leaving that of the other unaltered. A 
previous promise or receipt of the real money therefore maintains its 
character and requires its like for payment. Indeed, this principle was 
acted upon as one of business honor by the Pacific States, and enabled 
them to deal onlj^ in specie all through the war, not by the legally re- 
quired special contiact, but as the standing custom. 

This same principle, however, has been seized upon and distorted 
by partisan frenzy into a justification and even duty of the govern- 
ment, since it received only in legal tender, to pay only in that, and 
even to expand its issues so as to bring the value down to the actual 
"equivalent." The craziness of such a proposition would seem to be 
evident enough from the very impossibility of execviting it at all, much 
less with any justice. How to find a "par" or equivalent in such a case 
at all, even for those who still held what they bought from the govern- 
ment itself, to say nothing of vast after-sales at home and abroad on 
the pledge of the government to pay in gold, puzzled such theorists 
themselves; certainly not by varying the issues of the legal-tender. 



128 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

now to one point and now to another for this purpose, for they never 
had been so varied except by rapid increase up to a certain limit which 
was not to be exceeded, — a promise essential to keep any "value" at 
all in them. 

There being no sane way to do it, the usual proposition was the in- 
sane one to transform the entire debt into legal-tenders. But that would 
wholly destroy their value for anybody. Others, with sense enough 
to see this, yet fancied that, in some other way, if not in this, the 
promise to pay in gold ought to be repudiated, and the bonds be paid^ 
if at all, only in legal tenders, — what the}' were bought with. This was 
"just," we were told by its advocates, and "more than just," since 
the bondholders "had already received in gold interest, more than they 
paid for the bonds," — an addition which betrayed some confusion of 
ideas respecting "great principles." Yet this criterion of paying a 
man just what he paid, obviously differs somewhat from the principle 
referred to which holds that he is to be paid only what he agreed to 
receive, no matter what he paid. It is in fact quite the contrary of 
that. It is a return to first principles of barbarism, where the debtor, 
if credit exist at all, contrives to pay in what he pleases or not at all. 
Just so in this case; a Nation manufactures and alone controls its is- 
sues of what it is willing and anxious to receive in exchange for its 
promises to pay in gold, and then it is advised that a great principle, 
' more than just " enables it to repudiate these promises, and pay in 
what it pleases, or not at all. No one who had not witnessed it, would 
believe the extent to which such theories pervaded unreflecting minds, 
and dizzied the heads of all in respect both to what is expedient and 
what is just. Neither party escaped the vicious taint of that financial 
drunkenness which accompanies a resort to a currencj^ which, though 
promised redemption, may be made irredeemable in many ways. Each 
furnished its champions of views more or less hostile to the Nation's 
welfare. Yet perhaps the surest proof of the utter demoralization to 
which such a currency tends, is found in the effect of it upon a great 
party which deemed it unconstitutional in any case, j^et was brought, by 
its actual presence and its possibilities for party purposes, to call for 
more, and lend itself, even in party platforms, to catching votes on 
vague promises which it would never have dared to fulfil. It would 
seem that this party quite loses its head, when once it departs from 
principles already laid down for it by "experience" or by some 
recognized external " authority.'' Its inventions have not been happy 
ones. 

The wise prudence of Chase and his successors in the Treasury De- 
partment, and the general legislation of Congress, deserve high credit 
for their increasing skill in finance and stead}" maintenance of good 
faith. The reward has been reaped in achievements similar to those 



METHODS OF FINANCE. 129 

•of Hamilton, but far greater in. degree and as sureties for the life of 
the Nation in the future. Whoever shared in this great work can 
justly look with pride upon it as one of the worthiest and noblest, 
albeit unseen and unrecognized, that can be done for one's country. 
However much harpies, (which inevitably flock to the feast either in 
peace or war, in a Nation undisciplined or unprepared), may have in- 
fested custom houses or internal-revenue bureaus, 3^et genius and moral 
worth and rationalized methods were also there, and more and rhore 
gaining the supremacy. However much fears, home and foreign, 
Tespecting our financial good faith may have helped to refund the debt 
at its present low rates unheard of in the past, yet while the officials 
of the Nation were aided in assuring and insisting upon good faith by 
the advice and support of the best business men, these latter were also 
at home directing and organizing the vast energies of the country so 
that the debt was actually being paid beyond the hopes of the most 
sanguine. Business men have themselves been educated to larger 
views, to broader methods, by the crisis the Nation has passed through. 
Let them not fancy the crisis has passed. There never is any time in 
the history of a Nation when its business methods in general can be 
let run wild, on a vague theory of " every man for himself," without a 
sure following of that "crisis " which will not be content with merely 
■" catching the hindmost." 



CHAPTER VIII. 

BUSINESS METHODS; PROPERTY AKD PERSONAL RIGHTS. 

Yet this " great principle " of "let alone," — " the least government 
is the best,"— looks plausible on the face of it. Especially as to busi 
ness and industrial development, it seems to promote invention, and 
to stimulate all by that great motive of "self-interest" which it is said, 
"makes men wo'-k." The motive is here left vague. It is not that 
law of design in all which makes men work and unites them all in 
good work. Self interest thus viewed as only compulsive, is made 
arbitrary also, lawless, must be left to collisions to regulate. And such 
has been the policy practiced respecting business in general and its- 
methods, — to let alone, to govern as little as possible, to be jealous of 
any general methods, to trust the State rather than the Nation, and 
thus have no general methods; and in States, n5t to foresee and devise, 
but to wait till an abuse comes, or let individuals themselves devise 
what private methods they deem fit, or what corporate powers and 
management best suit their purposes. The result in the Nation at large 
was that it had no general financial methods or means fit for a great 
emergency. And in respect to business in general, no doubt a great 
variety of methods has been secured, more profitable for lawyers, how- 
ever, than for business, and running into abuses of whose injuries 
wise business men are the most sensible. Whatever experience has 
been gained in this way, has been at the usual high price charged by 
that teacher; — and the lesson taught has been, the profit of wise regu- 
lation, and the loss from lack of it. 

The maxim that "the best government is that which governs- 
least," is a manifest absurdity; one of those contradictions which a 
habit of material thinking and metaphorizing is always making but 
can never solve Thus it looks solely at the side of constraint and 
makes that its definition of government; so that the subject has nothing 
to say about it. Evidently it is a government by force. But if, on the 
other side, there is also nothing but a power of force, it is merely a 
mechanical affair; that which constrains most will prevail, whether for 
chaos or for a dead crystalized order; there is no "best " about it 

If, on the other hand, this government defined as constraint of an- 
other, be set off by itself, it, also, must constrain something in its own 
sphere if it is to be aught but a mechanical thing. And what does it 
constrain in order to be the governor of another? Evidently a power 



BUSINESS methods; pkoperty and personal rights. 131 

of force of its own; this is the only means it is supposed to have for ex- 
ternal i^overnment. If it constrains this least, it is a despotisn); if 
most, a chaos, or overpowered and extinguished hy the other 

This theory thus disregards the fact that no real government can be 
defined except in relation to other governments, as mutual; hence, it 
merely isolates instead of uniting men. It regards government as an 
evil, and would have the least of it possible; because it is perceived 
only in the form of external lorce, which is indeed hateful when thus 
let loose without any higher law over it. A government which gov- 
erns least in that way is indeed the best government; but according to 
this material reasoning, if there is no need to govern in this way, there 
should be no government at all. And so the need of government at 
all consists in the fact that men are not really rational beings, but mere 
"products of force," and hence to be ruled by mere force. While this 
is correct as to the bodily side of Man, he seems to have another side, 
and another " derivation," which protests against it. The maxim it- 
self endorses this protest, but only in a blind way, appealing to force 
alone to settle the question. The man who thinks at all, deems him- 
self in no rightful subjection to mere force; and as no other govern- 
ment is posited as at all existent, or even possible, he endorses the 
maxim heartily. The "least government" of that sort suits him best, 
— all the more so if he is viciously inclined. 

Thus this maxim, which wishes to dispense with the "indispensa- 
ble" — the only government it sees, that of force, — is also simplj^ — 
" let us have the impossible if possible." It ignores Reason as having 
anything to do with the State. Hence it naturally runs straight to the 
verjr despotism it thinks to avoid, through the chaos which calls for 
force as the only possible ruler where Reason is forsworn. 

But this maxim, with its mechanical thinking, has no application 
in the sphere of real government. For that is rational government, — 
that which governs most, since it is mutual relation of self -govern 
ments. Self-government is always governing itself more and more, 
both bj' itself and through others, because it is ever evolving a larger _ 
and larger rational design, of which it finds the necessary means both 
within and without It is not a mechanical affair, which needs no 
government because as "perfect " it runs like a machine, or because as 
a mere " abstraction " it is really 7ion est. It is no mere "growth " to 
be traced to "irresistible instincts'' which ai'e to be studied as tie 
very essence of wisdom, and thus lead Man back to the ape as his an- 
cestor, or to Nature for his laws of State. It is a development of crea- 
tive Reason which does not disperse itself mechanically, but relates 
itself rationally; and is thus revealed in an infinite relation of self-gov- 
ernments, and hence in an infinite variety of designs, both individual 
and general, in an infinite fructification of the power of design itself. 



'132 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

In this process, the law of Reason subordinates by its divine right the 
law of force, and makes of that the servant of its designs. There is no 
end to this process, in the Universe, the State or the individual. It 
looks essentially, not to restraint by force, but of force; ana to the 
right use of it in all its forms, as the only rational title to their posses- 
sion. And it governs most where it seems to govern least, in its own 
self; hence it is the only free government. 

Apply this to the individual. When he proudly proclaims himself 
"freethinker," free moral agent, "able to take care of himself and 
wanting no interference with his designs," he is apt to forget that he 
was born a baby, at the mercy of the loves of others. 

He would not much thank a parentage that only nourished his body 
and took no care of his morals; nor a State which took no care of his 
education in that acquired science which so enlarges his views; nor a 
religion which did not see to it that he was taught in that Truth di- 
vine which alone ' 'makes free. " In all these respects, he is such a debtor 
to an organized Reason without, which is watching and working for 
his welfare, that it is singular he should feel no obligation to preserve 
all this much governing, and even to better it for others, but should 
rather wish to act as though he were born in the woods. No need of 
his worrying about his ''freedom of thought" ; no force can control 
that; and hence his anxiety should rather be to know what it is regu- 
lated by, and whether it is so free as he deems it unless it be regulated 
by a law of Reason, which does not appear exclusively in him. So 
also, respecting his designs , would they be quite so free, so infinitely 
varied, were he a Robinson Crusoe, a pirate or a savage? No, even as 
bird of prey of any taste, if not mere vulture, he must find some place 
Tvhere designing power is at its height, at least in a material way But 
this power is in its glory, its true freedom, for him as a rational man, 
only in a State where genius has taught him the route to the temple of 
Art, where science has taught him the laws of Nature, where Religion 
has taught him his duty to all, and where the immense diversity of 
wants affords opportunity for good invention, and an educated good 
taste both puts to shame the bad, and brings into being the good as by 
a charmed word. 

"Let us have the impossible, if possible?" That is the cry every- 
where so long as Reason only glimmers and is reputed only an "ab- 
straction." For then it is just this "impossible;" sighed for because 
it is regarded as impotent to come, and needless if it did come. On 
such a theory it is evidently a very useless affair. And governments 
founded on such a theoiy, or looking to them for support, must evi- 
dently find their "god," force, more and more "indispensable." 
Such a god takes various forms and its religion is always more or less 
.a "mystery." Thus in England, this State god is called "property." 



BUSINESS METPIODS; PKOPEKTY AND PEESONAL RIGHTS. 133 

They do nob profess to quite "understand" it, how it came about and 
all that; they only know "that it is." The "power" of this god is 
evident; that is the main point, — the fact; as to "right," that is too 
abstruse a matter for "real science," which can derive its "laws" only 
from the actual matter in hand, and hence only as laws of force. 
Thus "property" is posed as a Juggernaut, and the "commoners" are 
called upon to worship it there in the shrewdest way, by not paying 
their law makers; so that only rich men can afford to be such. The 
matter is clinched by expenses of elections, which also impress upon 
the suffragan the intimate actual relation between might and right, — 
and the "no particular necessity" of having aught but riches in those 
"elected;" in fact the mass of the House of Commons are not reputed 
to shine by their wits. In this country, the same theory shows itself 
in low salaries, as before referred to; also in a vulgar notion that the 
money a man can make is the best measure of his wits for legislation; 
and still worse, in an ignorant or vicious feeling that "property" 
alone does rule, and hence must be made to "protect itself" by buying 
its way. 

Such are the vitiating tendencies of seeing nothing but a law of 
force as a means of government, and seeking to base a "right" upon 
that. Such a theory is essentially irreligious, and the State supported 
loj it goes logically, by its own professed law, to dissolution in one 
way or another. But, happily for these blind guides, the "fact " is not 
such as they state. A government of mere force is just what is "im- 
possible" for any modern State, any civilized State at all; and a gov- 
ernment of it by Reason, to some extent at least, is the only one pos- 
sible or indispensable. The true question is as to the right relation of 
Reason to force in this matter; and true progress is towards reaching 
and recognizing that. 

There are evidently certain aspects of this absurdity, " the best gov- 
ernment is that which governs least,'' which belong to the topics of 
Education, Morality and Religion. Here we are concerned chiefly with 
those which affect property and merely business methods respecting 
it. Yet here, also, morality and Religion must have their share of in- 
fluence, and according to their own proper methods. The State can- 
not, even if it would, do all; and every power must observe the limits 
of its own sphere and methods, and recognize those of others. This is 
that self-restraint which is one form that restraint takes in rational 
government. Nor is this to be exercised as little as possible, but, in its 
true sense, as much as possible, whether by the individual or anj"- other 
self-government. The maxim referred to fails to note that no power 
vrhatever can be otherwise than formless without restraint,— shapeless, 
abstract and null even as force. Indeed the highest power is proved 
only by its capacity for self-restraint. It is not a mechanical outflow 



134 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE r]^JITED STATES. 

that cannot be prevented, but an intelligence whicb can bold itself in 
reserve, and need neither show all that it is, nor necessarily discover 
or let loose all its designs. 

Yet this rational power also, without its self-restraint, and self- 
forming, would be expressionless, mute, non est. Xow the law or 
method for this constraint is what is to be found and observed. And 
the true maxim is that everj^thing and everj'body is to be governed in 
a ratio'nal Avay, by a rational law. It is for this purpose that a State is 
formed and preserved, and transformed according to a higher view of 
its design. If we are here to mention its relation to moral suasion and 
religious methods, we may say briefly; that Religion is the obedience 
to an inner Divine authoritj^ respecting thinking the True, whose 
outer authorities it must freely determine for itself. Moralit3% how- 
ever, is the obedience to an authority respecting both designs and acts; 
and so far as acts are external and affect others, they should have a 
rational outer authority, just as the designs should have a rational 
inner ruler. Here is a sphere for variance between outer and inner au- 
thority or design, where the outer must be dominant as to acts 
wherever it can be rationally legalized and detemiined, whereas the 
sphere of inner designs can be dealt with only by moral suasion and 
proper education. The limits of human legislation in this respect, es- 
pecially as to " personal liberty," cannot be precisely defined; it must 
vary v/ith the morality of a community, and may be consi'^ered more 
fully hereafter. 

With resjDect to property and the use of it, however, it is obvious 
that property, so far as it is a power, requires, for its own safety and 
highest profit, to be used only in rational ways, and to be limited to 
rational methods. Such is its interest. But such also is its only true 
basis as property. Any other sought for it will be a blind leading into 
the ditch. It cannot be established on a mere power of force; for that 
declares it to be nothing but force and hence irrational and without 
right. It thus disowns its own nature; takes untenable and fatal 
ground, by assuming to be what it cannot be. Not force, but design, 
creates property. Force has neither power nor right to maintain itself, 
even in things, against Reason. Irrational itself, mere force cannot 
be an authority anywhere. It is only what Man uses, and trans- 
forms; and his authority for transforming it is a rational design. As 
between men, a rational judgment must be formed of this design, and 
made law for all. Thus the law itself is the common holding of a 
common right, — a right to rational design 

This power to transform mechanical forces or things, which creates 
property, must work by a rational and common general design which 
gives right to it the form of law. Hence the rational use of property 
is of the very essence of its right. Its use must in any case be a con- 



BUSINESS methods; pkopertt and personal rk.hts. 135 

stant transformation; so that the best mode of this is what is alone in 
question. Shall it be mere waste ? or seltish expulsion of others from 
any benefit? or a use by irrational persons? No, the la,w of all lands 
rescues property from insane hands at least, if not altogether from the 
selfish, or wasteful, or vicious use of it. In many nations, custom 
prevents a rescue of it from the selfish; and there, is breeding a " com- 
munism," because property is based on force-theory and practice. In 
other lands, custom gives full swing to waste, and even to vice; there, 
also, oa account of an evident thoughtlessness in respect to the true 
nature and needs of property, its basis is in danger, and contests be- 
tween capital and labor take irrational forms, because there is no true 
recognition of their rational relation. 

There is need, then, everywhere to think the truth on this subject, 
and find a real basis for property, which shall not leave to it, 
either pro or con, only the merciless mercy of force; for in neither 
case can there be any justice; the law of Reason alone can give that 
to either rich or poor, capital or labor. 

But we have seen that property finds its origin solely in a rational 
law,its power and right only in a rational design. Thus obliged to re- 
sort to design and to organize it, the "property" has been refined 
beyond all recognition in the past. Obliged to resort to a common law as 
to its use, the legal methods of holding, transferring and transforming 
it have also been refined, till only the "word" of Man is needed for 
greater than the magic powers of Aladdin, and is vocal beyond that 
of the ancient gods. 

All the old grossness of the nature of property has disappeared as a 
mistake. The savage holds in his hands what he calls property; and 
has to hold it there to keep it. He did not invent it, he only "found" 
it, — like the "true scientist." He knows no other sort of property. 
Put him and his fellow "founders of property" in New York, and 
property would take flight, not recognizing its "origin." Where 
would be the value of this property in their hands? They have no 
ideas, no business-designs to give it any value. It would go to ruin. 
The property in a house is not the brick and mortar, but the form of 
the whole that suits the design for which it was built. — Mere "abstrac- 
tion " that, no doubt, — invisible, intangible nonsense. Yet it is the 
property itself; for material science assures us that it is all that can be 
lost. Force "persists," but designs in that for.n are perishable. 
When Chicago's business-centre burned down (or up) there was no de- 
struction of "matter" or of "force," all of this that had been was 
still there. Nature's laws are very equable in the distribution and ex- 
act equation of this kind of "property," they always give back just 
what they take away. So it was in Chicago. And yet they were not 
satisfied. Even the best theorists were convinced that thej^ had lost 



136 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE TJI^^ITED STATES. 

something. The property was not this material substance or form of a 
Natural sort, but the form given b}- design,— the adaptation to a civil- 
ized man's ideas of comfort and business. Small comfort for prop- 
erty, then, in the "indestructibility of matter." Since property has 
to be created, it can also be destroyed. And the finer its forms, if ma- 
terial onlj-, the more is force an enemj- and not a friend to it. 

So with the law of property:— the old English fictions to prove an 
actual "seizin," a manual holding of it, are the merest barbarisms 
now, relics clung to by a material habit of thinking. A man neither 
does nor can thus "possess" in New Jersey lands he "holds," 
stronger than with his hands, in Iowa, Nebraska, and where not. He 
holds by a law which puts the whole force of the country at his dis- 
posal if need be, and which, in his business generally, he and every 
other man of great wealth, uses, for such purposes, a hundred thou- 
sand times more than do the vast majority of his fellow-citizens. Nor 
does he need any actual seizin to buy or sell, but only a piece of paper 
and a legal formula. He says, " go here," "go there," "do this." "do 
that," with the voice of the law itself. Without this, indeed, his prop, 
ertj^ would be unmanageable, for he needs an armj^ of ser\itors. With- 
out this no property could be even "held," for, dispense with it, and 
squatters overrun his land, and barbarism in general overruns the 
whole country. Law provides thus for easy and large use of property, 
for distribution of losses by insurance, and charity opens a like good 
heart for all by sharing the destruction of force by fire, flood or whirl- 
wind. 

Now to say that the man has no obligation to regard the public wiU 
as to use of propertj^ when it is by that will, and not his own, that he 
holds it, operates it, buys and sells it, is only undermining his own 
right to it. Design respecting material things has to be organized, 
both as to its rights and its power, in order to work on anj^ large scale 
either for one or all. Shall an organized holding and use of property 
go against Its own law? That will soon make an end of it. If the 
property were a mere heap of useless matter, it would be no property 
at all. The forms given it by design are what make it property. And 
it is made so, not because these forms suit merely an individual, but 
because the public finds its ideas and designs subserved thereby. Take 
away this common use of each other's property, and it would no 
longer subsist except as among savages. The network of a civilized 
community in property is such that no one could live as he desires, ex- 
cept by thus finding his own ideas and designs satisfied and fur- 
thered by his diversified relation to those of others. And all these 
must, in respect to the act of invention and its transformation of ma- 
terial things, have a common representation through property forms; 
that is merely the field of this sort of expression in which all com- 



BUSINESS methods; property and persoxal rights. 137 

mune. The need of one in this respect is the need of all ; so that this 
is the only rational form of communism. Yet it is communism, — of 
the highest sort, — in the realm of law. The law itself is the highest 
property; through that, all can design and make it. This law of the 
community protects it, and is vital in it, as we see, as a necessity for 
its best management, best use, greatest variety, most rapid accumula- 
tion. Thus property is secure in the bosom of the law itself, — a 
rational law which has not been made by it, but it by that. 

The personal right to property then rests safely for all upon this ra- 
tional use of it to serve a rational design. Just so the right of the 
State to itself possess or to regulate its use by others and afford means- 
for its best management rests upon the same basis. It is owner, or' 
falls heir, to what is not otherwise owned or inherited. Its principle 
for regulation can be rationally only the best use for all. On this prin- 
ciple, a State has "right of eminent domain," and exercises it to secure 
roads and other public designs as superior to any private holdings or 
uses of lands, even though the legal "compensation" adjudged may 
not be satisfactory. This technical term "eminent domain" might 
just as well be applied to personal property as to land, since as we 
have seen, the power of taxation is such a "domain" over both, and 
the "personal" has become far more important in itself, and in the 
need to regulate its use in business and finance. In respect to sensible 
property, — that sphere for mutual comparison and exchange of em- 
bodied designs, — there is no separating private from public interest. 
The private interest could not exist long outside an organized society, 
nor have its highest value anywhere but in the best organized State. 
A State is organized expressly to create and conserve this rational use 
of force in ever}^ way, not merely as to property but also as to per- 
sons. Proper education secures it in persons, proper restraint of them 
conserves it, and ensures for all a rational personal liberty. For the 
body itself is not ' ' owned' ' by Man in any such Avay that he can use 
it irrationally with impunity. Its own vital laws partly provide for 
this with respect to himself, the State provides for it in respect to 
others, and moral suasion and religious culture provide for it in both 
respects. 

It is well to note also that this organized mutuality of interests 
which makes of a Nation, so to speak, one person as well as one prop- 
erty, gives it also a "right of eminent domain" over " personal lib- 
erty." This is shown, of course, in the case of criminals, and also in 
the case of insane persons restrained from liberty as well as property. 

It is shown also in that general police power which varies according 
to the emergency over both the innocent and the guilty. But it icS 
shown at its utmost hight in its utmost need, — the case of war. In thiS' 
country, the States alone have the technical " eminent domain" over 



138 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

land within their borders, (and the Nation only in its territories, &c.,) 
but the Nation, since it alone has the war power , alone has, together 
with that necessity of war which overrules ali other domains, " the 
general power uf conscription This absorption of personal liberty in 
an organized defense of all, may then be used either for evil or good. 
When only an ultima ratio of kings, it may be used quite as much to 
subjugate within as without. But when, in a free Nation, it is the ra- 
tional recognition by the individual that his government, as law, is a 
"government of the people, by the people and for the people/ then it 
is seen to be no self-sacrifice but a duty, and "volunteers," flocking 
to the standard, bear it ' from the mountains to the sea, ' — "demons 
oi war " transformed, for, as they smite this grim monster of force or 
die beneath Its blows, they cry "glory, gloiy halleluiah!'' 

In Great Britain, where feudalism has made individualism a char- 
acteristic of all classes, since there is a clannish worship of it in the 
aristocracy bj' the vulgar, personal liberty also has been made a sort of 
fetich, like property Hence the war power of conscription has been 
used only on sea, — not on land where It could be seen, armies have 
been bought rather than do that, while tor the navy, even surrepti- 
tious methods were deemed justifiable, where only 'traders ' were 
concerned But "trade" has proved the life of the Nation, and this 
principle of inventive design which creates and thus bases "property/' 
though not yet grasped in that rational form, has at last risen in the 
English horizon, under the clouds of "free trade." 

And in such a country the poor will be cared-for forcibly rather 
than kindly. Charity will have a condescending rather than a gener- 
ous view of its acts, on the part of a proud individualism- while the 
pitiful will " wonder why there are any poor. ' When it comes to or- 
ganizing charities, we shall hear such line spun debates as George 
Eliot records for us, upon 'whether after ali it is useful," and also such 
growls as those of Carlyle, which show that, even from a poor man, 
poverty and helplessness get as little sj^mpathy as crime itself, in such 
an atmosphere murky with materialism. 

In Germany, where also there is this teudalistic worship of exclusive 
individualism, but also an abstract idealism with its visionary commu 
nism, the wai power, being m the hands of the former, subjects the en- 
tire personal liberty of the Nation to its uses at all times, whether in 
peace or war. So long as this serves only National interests, it re- 
ceives no doubt the hearty assent of all. But let it serve other interests 
oligarchic or monarchic, claiming "divine right,' and its oppression of 
other peoples will surely be an oppression of its own, — a mine to be ex- 
ploded some day from within, or an overproud and overf earful tyranny 
over others to be crushed from without As with individuals, so with 
peoples, the interests of one and those of all are the same; and these 



BUSINESS methods; property and personal KrGHTS. 139 

■can be adjusted rationally only by Reason and not by force. The right 
of personal liberty, as well as that of property, in one which a Nation 
is organized to determine rationally- There must be a rational form of 
judgment in common whenever anything is in question upon these 
vital matters. From Germany on account of the facts above stated, 
and a still higher philosophic thinking there than anywhere else, per 
iaps, by at least a few, we get in their immigrants to this country all 
"views, and the worst as well as the best. 

In respect to property, then, it is idle to go back to the past for 
"titles," or to derive "descents," as though the title and the right did 
not both presently and always exist in the law itself, and have all their 
real vigor in that as a law of Reason. The law also regulates "de- 
scents," and it secures the public against the irrational "will" of a 
mian in the matter of bequests. The use proposed for the property is 
here looked to, and also the sanity of the testator. It is idle to get lost 
in wondering at the actual distribution of property as to how it all 
came about, and whether it is for the best. Undoubtedly it would have 
to be distributed even by the communist himself, m just such a way 
and on just such a principle as it is, to be used rationally and hence 
according to the special capacity of the user which every one now 
seeks to exercise. The last sphere the blatant communist would care 
to have assigned him, would be the management of a farm in bucolic 
peace and quietness. The last that the highest intelligence would care 
for, would be the burdensome care of a vast property or business, for 
though that requires a genius of its own. of a high order, yet it always 
Jias been and will be shunned by both the highest and lowest talents, the 
latter being both incapable and unwilling, so that, in any case, it goes 
into other hands. Thus practically the essential matter of use is de- 
termined by that faculty to design which prefers the form of property 
as the sphere of its creations, and actual possession must follow this 
law of its creation Not every one who holds " property uses it, nor 
can use it alone; and few who hold much of it get either the most profit 
or the most enjoyment from it. Its so-called "unequal distribution,' 
therefore, is practically a fiction as to the real fact, — the use, and as to 
the merely visible side of the "fact," it is a matter of course, and not 
to be wondered at. We might as well ask whether it would not have 
been better, or shown a more benevolent design, to have iron ' given" 
lis pure instead of in intractable ores, and then lose ourselves in a mere 
particular and endless thinking of that sort. Capital is, in any case, 
nothing but an ore to be wrought out, it can be fruitfully used only by 
rational design; and all must share more or less in such fruit of it; just 
as necessarily as all share in the benefit of a genius which reduces iron 
ore and makes it as shining and more useful than gold. 

The main question, then, always is, as to this use of jaroperty. Is it 



140 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

used, and used rightly? The pubhc takes cognizance of that, and its- 
law prescribes a rightful use. The fact that inheritance, or other luck, 
often delivers property into the hands of those who have a wonderful 
genius for wasting great opportunities, or, more fortunately, are born 
imbeciles, is one of the facts which leads every State to make laws re- 
specting inheritance and wills. It thus modifies the dice throws of 
chance by the voice of Reason. Even 'Natural laws and instincts ' 
are not allowed to gamble m the house of Reason without restramt. 
And as the ■ best blood is also subject to these lapses into imbecility, 
which render a fortune a misfortune, it is reasonable that human wills, 
should be restrained as to the future as well as the present, and that the 
law of inheritance should diffuse their property, for men who neither 
have nor make any rational will of their own. It is also lucky, per- 
haps, if such get rid of it as soon as possible. This they usually do ia 
various ways, useful and useless. Among the latter, by visiting for 
eign nations, where, like Alcibiades, they reckon they are "represent- 
ing their country favorably, " and giving a high idea of its "power," 
by exhibiting a great capacity for waste of power. 

Those nations which protect their ' ' best blood, ' ' as something mys- 
terious in its nature since it may oft fail of its efficacy deem it nO' 
sacrilege to guide even the god property in the entailment of his favors. 
Tlius England contradicts her abstract worship of property in two* 
ways. In her laws of primogeniture, she seeks to preserve an aristo 
cracy formerly ruling as a monied class, but now defunct in that phase 
and hence based, not merely on property, but on ' blood.' This 
"blood," being also something sacred, must be taken care of when It 
fails of the capacity to do so itself. It, also, is regarded as a kind of 
"property": not a visible one, but a 'property peculiar to some 
people," — to some races, — even horses evince it. It 'tells, ' though it 
is not visible, 

Again, she has sought formerly to limit accumulations of property 
in land by forbidding these m the form of bequests withheld beyond 
"two lives in being." This is indeed rather a limitation of trusts, and 
perhaps inspired by the old dread of any but an actual 'seizin;" it 
would not answer to long dispense with that ' fact " of a visible nature 
which was alone consciously realized as 'evidence." The same fear 
of the invisible overrules the right to land, when unclaimed during 
twenty years, in favor of the actual possession, and very justly in that 
case, when the latter has completely transformed the land by its de- 
signs and thus given it all its value; — but this is the real • fact'' of 
property itself, not recognized as such except as a case of necessity 
or because the other mysterious "right" does not put in a bodily 
appearance. 

This blind parrying against the invisible, however, quite overlooked. 



BUSINESS methods; pkoperty and personal eights. 141 

its real whereabouts, — in the inventive genius whicii shows its pro- 
ceeds in personal property. Against undue accumulations of this no 
laws have been made. But English laws respecting use of them, by 
corporations at least, have been far wiser than ours and the execution 
of them more rigid, accompanied by a loss of reputation, even for a 
'"business man " who fails at all, and no mercy even for those who 
' fail rich " Somewhat crude this moral judgment is when it has to 
judge trade" and protect property against invention. It discrimin- 
ates badly m felling poor methods or bad luck, just as much as evil 
designs by a loss of business reputation. Yet in all this, the English 
have secured a safer business than ours which lets a man fail as often 
as he pleases, and peculiarly admires him if he 'fails rich." The 
Englisli sternness towards mismanagement of property, and especially 
breach of trusts, is one of the indices of a true moral sense in the 
community, and of the sterling English character for honesty and an 
intent to preserve it at any cost. The cost of it has been so profitable 
that personal property has become the real property of England, the 
property which now rules there, — although, or rather because, its in- 
vention and activity are vv^hat has accumulated the value of land- so 
that the aristocratic owners of "land,'' in commercial centers especi- 
ally., are involved in that very interest of '"trade" wrhich they for- 
merly despised, — as showing ' bad blood. ' This inventive spirit may 
not show the "best blood ' of England, but it nourishes it It showed 
in a Shakespeare; who. though a nourisher of all souls who think, was 
"willing or obliged to husband his pennies, in a time which had no 
wealth or power for such as he. But when it showed itself in a Cob- 
den and a Bright with property to back them — the scepter passed. 
Yet there is no primogeniture in respect to this personal property. 
The old fiction about the "real ' holds still, though long laid low with 
pennies on its eyes. The testator of the "personal" may distribute 
it as he likes, only subject to such general limitations as above referred 
to. Although the very key of the situation it is one which aristocratic 
interests deem it well to pass around, (unless they marry to it), in as 
miscellaneous a manner as possible. And thus it is that they pass 
from power of all sorts, so far as they fail to see that inventive genius, 
in its various phases, is the highest and most real because ideal 
' ■ property ' of Man. and the creator of all forms of property visible 
or invisible. 

The French take a different view of their situation, and favor a 
small holding of lands, and more or less equal distribution of property 
by inheritance; requiring it also as to wills. In this country, wills are 
regulated less than by the French and in respect to land less than by 
the English, We retain the English cumbersome methods respecting 
land- titles, a great burden on transfers, and subjecting the possessor 



142 THE CITEL POLITY OF THE TTXITED STATES. 

and iiser to eviction, for frauds or mistakes, with which he has had 
nothing to do. and even for mere omissions of legal description when 
in fact he has legal title, but cannot be allowed to prove it by oral, in 
visible, against wntten, visible " evidence. ■ This old harpy of a false 
and materialistic philosophy is there still, as usual, making a god of 
the mere form. Partly we have broken away from this costly worship, 
but much remains of it. Further amendment would seem to be both 
just and feasible, in respect even to the ruling out of oral evidence 
When that is certain why ignore it? Are the ej^es so much better than 
the ears, as an avenue of "evidence." and in any case, does not a juiy 
take it wholly by the ears? Especially is it easy and just to get rid of 
"mousing titles " by adopting a true view of property, and thereby a 
right principle for deciding how much can be claimed under such a 
title, long disused, and which has had nothing to do with creating the 
actual nature and worth of the property. 

Besides, land in this countr}- has been so free to have, that personal 
property has here also become the inventive and active factor of ac- 
cmnulation both for land and itself. It is also what has been most ab 
used, wasted and nusused from lack of proper regulation. In fact to- 
day in ever}- civilized State, the power and use of personal property is 
what reaUy attracts the envious eye of the communist. If vulgar, he 
sees onl}' the spending, not the using the destruction, not the creation, 
is what he wants to share in. If a thoughtful man, yet he prides him 
self upon being a "positive " thinker, and hence is the most visionary 
or blind of all as to "facts." He deems he is thinking about some 
thing visible and tangible, — ^land, money Like Proudhon, he dreams 
of making "credit" and ' monej"" bj" machine. And however much 
he maj' talk about "land" and even liken that to " the air' as some- 
thing to be 'held in common," what really haunts him is that invisible 
— the power to invent and create. He sees the fruits of it in propert}', 
but he does not comprehend that this is one of the forms necessarj' to 
it. It is in himself; but there it is onlj- inventing how to make prop- 
erty without making it, and to enjoy it without having it. Blinded to 
the real facts, he does not realize his own possessions and their source. 
He does not see that this problem of " enjoj'ing without having " has 
already been worked out for him bj' others, in a state of societj' where 
more and more goes on this merger of the visible "real" in the in 
visible, ideal communion of all in aU that is. Confused in his ideas, 
he does not see that personal propertj^ is thus swallowing up the real; 
and that the person himself, — the man, is what really swallows up all, 
and that he who feeds best is not he who feeds most on material things. 
But even in respect to his own bodilj' feeding, he could scarcely" find s 
rule by which {.o put it in common with others, either as to its needs. 
its tastes, or its capacity; while if he sinks it into community ic 



BUSINESS METHODS ; PROPERTY AND PERSONAL RIGHTS. 143 

Other respects, lie is a slave who has lost his personal libertj^ like an 
animal, and is not a free man who has pledged it to his country with 
his "sacred honor." He does not see that this designing power can 
be best used and developed, in all its practical good for all, when it is 
organized and recognized in a State, as a creative power which has 
right to its creation, and that thus alone can it realize its infinite crea 
tion and total enjoj-ment He does not see that all this result is essent 
ially an organized and hence increased power to invent and to ex 
change inventions- that without freest rational invention there can be 
no freest trade . and that hence the main question is not the possession 
but the right use of all property, and especially of the personal; for 
that involves the right conduct of all persons. 

This is what gives such close connection of personal property and 
its uses with personal liberty and its due bounds. All spending, all using 
even, is of personal property. The accumulations of land are by 
and through it. All management of land all titles and means of hand 
ling that or other property Avill yet be both held and proved as personal 
property For all property is really personal, and is becoming recog- 
nized as such. It is felt so to be It is but a bodily extension of a 
man's designing activity, more sensitive than the body itself Touch 
it and he winces. You have touched it in Maine, he has winced in Cal- 
fornia. 

And if you touch it wrongfullj" the whole country winces with him. 
Hence the methods of criminal and civil remedy are of extreme 
importance, and have manifest need of improvement here. To em 
barrass and load down the resort to them iS: of course, partially to 
destroy them. To allow them to become corrupt is to render them 
worse than useless, the tools of knaves. The distrust of criminal 
remedies in this country is shown in the frequent resort to "lynching," 
and even to organized Vigilance Committees ' ' against a crime which 
riots the streets and sits on juries. These volunteer vengeances are 
most apt to be applied by those who create a need for them by a no- 
tion of personal libertj^ which wants as little law as possible, — thus 
this "least government" Avorks itself out m violence. In cases of 
great fraud also, both civil and criminal remedies have often been ill 
devised and worse executed ' For oft 'tis seen, the wicked prize it- 
self outbies the law ' Whether this is effected b}^ corruption, or by 
costs and delays, which make it useless and even dangerous to prose- 
cute, and expedient to compromise with successful fraud, the effect is 
to bring the law into contempt. And were this confined onl}' to large 
cases, the impression it creates is that even the public itself has no law 
against the wholly unscrupulous, but rather admires their smartness 

But such a worship of ' success '' denotes a general practice of the 
theory that " the least government is the best. ' with its tender for fuel 



144 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

labeled- ' nothing succeeds like success." Under the inspiration of 
such maxims of life and goTernment, there is remarkable success in 
packing juries, in leaving the selection of juiles in such hands that 
the}- can be packed to order and on short notice, 'for a considera- 
tion," and so that business men." also for a consideration, (it would 
be a pity to limit this spirit of enterprise and not let its rule work 
both TVf.ysl) may be excused systematically from sitting on juries. 
By a similar excusing of themselves from political duties by business 
men, in a way which seems to them costless and even profitable, they 
let these geniuses of 'success," who run the machine which govern 
ment naturally is in such hands, nominate and elect to the local and 
State legislatures a few men who know or are taught how to provide 
or leave all needful loopholes for " success,' and a great many legis- 
lators, of a t}"pe evidently capable of the most successful blundering 
into everything but the right or good, and who remind one of Dr. 
Pancoast's sajing to his medical pupils "you will kiU a good many 
before you learn to cure anybody " 

Under such a legislation for successful business, of the kind whose 
very success succeeds, it is not singular that even in the 'Empire 
State,' the courts have been kept in a perpetual fester of " interpret- 
ing laws of theory and codes of practice, till legal principles are quite 
whistled down the wind, and the most "successful practitioner "is he 
who knows or cares least about these, and knows best the illegal, and 
uses most the immoral "principles. Business men. there, have them 
selves seen the necessity of getting out of this muck running called 
"legal remedies. ' and have sought to do so bj^ a special court of 
arbitration, which will have proper juries, if any. and judges whose 
awards will not have to climb a long ladder of appeals, and at top wait 
years for their turn. 

It is this sort of legislation, no doubt, which convinces a half way 
reflection that the less law we have the better "If it must come to 
this, why. oh! why are we legal creatures at all! '' And certainly the 
quantity is something to make us cry "pause.' for law is not supposed 
to be a -quantitative affair even b}' the most ardent materialist. The 
quality then is the main point but so also is the administration: for 
unless the law is in that, it is non est The actual law of a country is 
just what is administered, no matter what is "written" or "common 
law " New York has had some of the wisest hands seeking to make 
her law explicit and clear like the French, and consistent with itself in 
as brief a statement as possible But she has also had some of the 
worst hands administering her law, and tearing holes in its integrity. 
In other States, where the English law. with its absurd separation of 
'equity' from "legality." has been kept, the case has been no bet- 
ter, and often worse The administration of the law itself, and the 



BUSINESS METHODS ; PROPERTY AND PERSONAL RIGHTS. 145 

general business methods of the community, combine to make the real 
]aw. Thus, for example, in Illinois, legal "costs" are small, yet this 
requires each party to pay his own lawyer, and thus dissuades from 
small suits, for the Roman scruples about rewarding eloquence do not 
oblige our Ciceros to work for nothing Besides, the legal delays are 
so long as to be quite inconsistent with the needs of a uni\ersal credit 
system of doing business. This sj^stem naturally includes failures as a 
part of it, and even an essential part where business is not business 
unless it "goes booming." The failures, then, are part of the play. 
and are systematically^ provided for by making the travelling salesmen 
.share the losses by them from such as each credits. When it comes to 
law, a compromise is cheapest and most available means of getting 
"whatever is left b}^ a failure. And in such an atmosphere of universal 
credit, based on the chances and going, with most, ' ' by the rule of 
thumb," and under a general worship of "boom,'' it is not surprising 
that there is a frequent wondering "why money should be so high, 
■especially for business uses." — What is that but the boomerang? It is 
only Proudhon's 'credit ' coming back to brain itself. And this 
■credit system, obviously the most costly of all modes of exchange, is 
logically accompanied by the desire to be stimulated by a Proudhon 
paper money, based merely on credit. For this wasteful method of 
business springs from lack of real capital. 

In respect to civil and criminal remedies in general, it may be said 
that a chief aim for prohibitory laws is to make their operation dis- 
suasive, so that no actual punishment will be called for or cost of 
remedy occasioned. The surety of the operation is more important 
than the degree of the penalty, in criminal cases; so that we have 
"wisely discarded the middle-age barbarisms of English law, as to pun- 
ishments, but without securing a prompt and sure execution of the 
law. But this principle applies also, and with even more force, to the 
■sphere of civil remedies. Legal remedies in general are made by us 
worse than the disease; because we let the disease itself make them. 
This is justified on another "great principle," an Esculapian one: 
"The disease will cure itself." This policy does not seem to work 
well in the criminal sphere. In the case of civil remedies it has its ad 
<vocates, in .those who favor cost for these on the ground of securing 
^eater care in contracts, closer mutual inspection of character, — in 
short," caveat emptor.'' This putting up a general notice that the air 
is full of fraud, and the ground full of traps, is supposed to secure a 
"moral result," — an insistance upon good character in those with 
whom we deal. But it also gives solemn warning that there is no such 
good character extant. It describes a state of things where trade, in- 
stead of being free must go armed cap-apie, or else proceed vi et amis, 
on "first principles." 



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BUSINESS methods; PEOPEiiTY AI-TD PEESO^'AL RIG-HTS. 147 

from the past" cannot be changed safely thus suddenly; and that 
opinions in general, hke other "things," must be held fast to until they 
wear out On this principle, an Englishman also builds his new opin- 
ions, as he does his houses, as though they were to last forever. That 
is the glory and grandeur of England, that the State holds together. 
and requires always rational, total action For while she theorizes tiiat 
"all ideas come from without.' her practice is to demand that they 
shall all come from within, and be harmonized, as well as possible un- 
der such an exclusively individualistic method. 

Now after such free criticisms of others' shortcomings, it would be 
silly not to anticipate others by telling our own. This is not reputed 
to be the habit of the American people ' They are young yet and do 
not even know their worst faults." The full truth indeed may have io 
come from elsewhere. Truth, in fact, never flatters anybody much. 
Yet let it be told. "Though the heavens fall," as they will under that 
voice, it will be in blessing; they are not solid and heavy, as formerly 
supposed, nor harmful when they tumble in. Why should we not have 
the faults of all other nations, and others to boot"? We have them all 
here, and the "free born American"' besides- Our sources of deriva- 
tion are the most ample that could be desired 

But foreign nations are at least obliged to make one common legis- 
lature do the whole law making, so that what is general is attended to 
at once and by all. Here we have a gi'eat variety of legislatures; all of 
them have or assume something to do with what is general, especially 
in matters of business and property- Yet only in " politics " does our 
"local self-government" suppose itself to be general- and then with just 
as vague a notion of what is general . — in short, does not realize that 
all law is such. Hence we have only two parties, neither of which has 
any definite views respecting property; unless it be, that for a party, 
as well as for a man, ' it is a good thing to have." 

Abroad, however, this matter of business cannot be thus divorced 
from pohtics, and the latter left as a sort of bodiless ghost to talk 
about, whUe the real question is being unconsciously or surreptitiously 
handled. Either property is made the fetich of all as in England, or it 
is subordinated as in Germany to a worship of actual "power and 
place." Hence it is lucky for France, where ideas are really most hon 
ored, but where they are also too materialistic, and insist upon the 
"positive," that she cannot be reduced to two parties as here. For, 
in that case, the property question would at once be put in issue by 
both parties in a merely "positive" form, as to which "one," the in 
dividual or the State, should hold and manage the commonwealth. 
This positive thinking never sees any wealth but the material sort of it. 
All its "ideas ' are lost in that "positive evidence." And so the 
many are wholly stripped of their character as self -rulers, and hence 



148 THE CniL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

designers of all possible wealth, and especially of that rational wealth 
which is best, and can alone be organized as t lie rational "one" to 
rule. Hence the "one" to rule "positively," as required here, must 
be either the despot acting by force only, and thus "setting all to 
rights" by the simple law of order; or else the communist hierarchy, 
obhged to act in preciselj^ the same way, since its '■ people " look only 
to the "positive," — the material fact as "property." And this is 
merely "Hobson's choice." But since our parties alike dissolve into 
mere individualism on this question, is not each of them working out 
by local legislation precisely the same result? 

Shrewd observers, then, may be quizzically looking upon our the- 
ories and methods of "local self-government," (as thej^ actually are, 
in practice, not profession), and seeing a reality far different from' 
that " freest nation in the world " we brag about. For, trace this sub- 
dividing process down, and it comes to the individual as ultima thule. 
Now, if he is really doing nothing which affects all the rest, he is as 
dead as a door-nail; bury him. But if he is, and if each is doing 
something different of this general sort, then there is a fine model for 
chaos in brew. Both the despot and the communist are looking to see 
their theories justified; and it matters little which horn we get speared 
on; for in either case there is a mechanical slavery to one or manj^ 
despots, instead of a free obedience to rational law. 

It is clear, then, that all legislation, that of Nation, States and 
municipalities, and also that of each individual over his own heart 
and soul, must be made in view of the interest of all, if it is to be for 
the real interest of any. That is the real " declaration of independ- 
-ence," — the law which organizes and declares this mutual dependence 
■of all upon Reason, as what is the very necessity for the free Man, 
"because it alone is fit for the noblest things, such as he is designed to 
design. 

Respect for law, however, is claimed to be very general in this 
couutr}'. To regard a law as law so long as it stands, though it be 
merely the "will of a majority," or even if not so, if it have gone 
through the regular enactment, is considered-a matter of good common 
sense. And this "palladium of our liberties" is also YdYj justly re- 
garded as no Jove-born Minerva of wisdom in itself, no sacred 
"growth" of opinions or institutions in a mechanical way, but a 
purely rational affair, ever subject to the voice of pure Reason when 
it says: "be thou otherwise !" In this recognition of the freedom of 
its Reason, yei also of the obligation to appeal onlj- to that and change 
only through that, the American people have their highest glor3^ 

So far as this principle is consciously recognized as a rational prin- 
ciple, it is the safeguard of the Nation. But so far as it is looked upon 
.only as a "matter of common sense, " it is liable to be treated as a 



BUSINESS methods; property and personal rights. 149 

mere mechanical necessity, with no "faith in ideas," no confidence 
that " truth will prevail," and prevail most when it puts itself in the 
guise of Reason and not of force. When it is not recognized at all, 
except as a "mere matter of force," then where the force is absent, 
the law fails — "is wrong." 

Whether the two latter views of it are not more prevalent than the 
first must be decided by the acts, not the professions. Respect for the 
National law is most general; and rightly so, since that has been sub- 
jected to the most thorough discussion and shaped to the most general 
interests. But where there is need for force to execute it, is not the 
reason of it hard to see for those who make the force necessary? In 
our political canvass, there is generally an observance of order and 
seH-management by both parties at which an Englishman expresses his 
astonishment; even ignorance in cities has learned not to disturb 
meetings, nor enlighten the other party with brickbats, or even with 
counter-orators. But how is this in the North, when the Nation stands 
guard over ballot-boxesj or in the South, when, her force being absent, 
Jier law is silent respecting a voter's rights? 

So also State and National laws are nominally respected as law, ac- 
cording as they are more general; and perhaps particularly so in the 
-case of business laws. But when it comes to making or changing 
laws, does not every man suddenly become shut up in "his interest? " 
At this crucial test, even many professed altruists wilt under the first 
fire. And it must be confessed that many indeed are those who do not 
blush at, but boldly declare the " great principle " of self-interest, as 
"what we are all after." Such men are true "jewels" in a Nation; 
they crystalize into "shining lights," — if there be anything to shine 
upon them, — mere dead things which give notes of warning. 

It must be conceded, also, that in this country there are few who 
Ihave other than the vaguest notion of personal liberty, as well as of 
property rights. If the two National parties differ at all on these ques- 
tions, it is only by the one talking more, in "local affairs" especially, 
about "my property," and the other about "my liberty;" for both 
liberty and property seem to them something local and exclusive. 
Hence each likes to shove the communist taint on the other; and the 
<coinmunist really knows not which to prefer; he decides that according 
:ashis penny turns up with the liberty-head, or the property-title: "one 
■cent." The one party is reputed to be most given to an arbitrary care 
for "my property" at the public expense; and the other to a peculiar 
guardianship of "my liberty,'' chiefly to live by "politics" and plun- 
der property. But in private life, the partisan of either side is apt to 
regard property as only individual, if he is a capitalist; and liberty as 
also only an individual affair, if he is a laborer. Neither realizes that 
he owes aught of these to the Nation and its laws. 



150 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Hence we have our full share (if not more), in this " free country," 
of labor-organizations to shut out apprentices native-born from learn- 
ing a trade, in favor of full-grown foreigners, perhaps not yet natur- 
alized nor intending to be, but only to "make their pile " here and go 
to spend it where "things are cheaper." Like the Chinaman who, 
bred on rice, and impervious to the delights of a rational life, goes back 
"like a dog to his vomit," so these would go back to their "beer." 
Thus pitting themselves against any mechanic education here, they 
carry out this principle of enmity to intelligence, by requiring employ- 
ers to pay as much for an unskilled as for a skilled man. This is 
deemed necessary no doubt to the solidarity of their action; but in 
this way they put their organization under the control and at the serv- 
ice of ignorance itself. 

What is most Important, however, to observe in respect to these 
"labor-organizations" is, that they are deemed by their members 
necessary on account of counter-combinations by capitalists. Thus is 
clearly declared an existing state of war between capital and labor, in 
which neither side recognizes that there is any Itiw for all except "my 
interest" or my force. Hence we have our full share of "strikes" 
and "lock-ups." These words, derived from a foreign nation, have 
been literal here as well as there. There have been riots on the one 
side, and hence force on the other. The French, with a truer view of 
the situation, call these stoppages from work "waitings," and con- 
trive to get a rational arbiter for them. A Pennsylvania law has re- 
cently been made to provide such a tribunal; but in a way that indi- 
cates only a half-realization that the law itself, as the most injured of 
all and in which all are injured, has any right in such a matter. The 
most dangerous feature of all, is the popular sympathy expected, and 
usually got, by " strikers " in this country; for this declares a battle 
really set between capital and labor, and a disposition on both sides to 
regard only "my interest," and to combine and organize each against 
the other. Of course this is rampant communism on both sides; and a 
sympathy which has no sympathy with the law, will side with the 
poorest, without stopping to ask: "What prevents them from choosing 
an arbiter?" But the true question is: "Why does not the law itself 
provide and enforce an arbiter in such cases, if either party attempts 
to force the other to serve it?" For what prevents their choosing one 
is their mutual efEorts at compulsion, under a very vague view of their 
rights in the matter. Capital, on one side, combines; and thus it de- 
serts its claim that all such things " must be settled by the great law of 
supply and demand;" for, if capital combines as against labor, it tries 
to make that law work just as it pleases. But capital, led by a false 
principle as to its own best interests, and a total ignoring of its debt 
and responsibility to the law itself, can discriminate always in behalf 
of " cheap labor," and thus ultimately (and not slowly) ruin itself. 



BUSINESS methods; pkopeety and personal rights. 151 

On the other hand, while labor-organizations have perhaps no more 
here than elsewhere resorted to force, and to mobs for beatiRii:off 
laborers even of their own number, yet it would appear that nowhere 
so much as here have they shown such a poor sense of what is due to 
their own intelligence, or such a high handed disregard for any law or 
any general w^elfare of the nation. The former is shown, in a matter 
before referred to, and also in the absurd proposition that one party to 
a contract may make the whole of it. Suppose this to be so, would 
not a real sense of fairness see the justice of either scaling its prices, or 
else reducing them to an average for best and worst service? But this 
shows that either the most intelligent must always suffer by such 
methods of "forcing things," or else that injustice must be done out- 
side. Hence the most vicious and ignorant are fattened by such meas- 
ures, and naturally'- take' the lead with their usual ignorance or con- 
tempt of all "rights," and with a high handed communism that 
would burn its own house over its own head. Xowhere else than here 
has been seen a vast "railroad strike," paralj'zing the business of a 
continent, causing immense loss, riot, and an alarm like that of a con- 
flagration; and at last calling out the Xational arm itself, — to the joy of 
all, even of those weak "sympathizers" who had had at last enough of 
this novel reign of force. 

And why this sympathy at all in such a Nation as this which boasts 
of its freedom? "Was it not because this freedom was not sufficiently 
organized, and good methods provided for it, in the law itself? Was it 
not because State and other laws have allowed capitalists to organize 
pandemonium "on "Change," use mines, railroads or other propertj"- 
in the form of false stocks, as mere bait for gulls, and "water" for the 
c immunity to drink with the gambler's views of how to make a 
fortune ? 

Under such a making or contempt of law by capital, the notion of 
law must naturally grow rather confused in the minds of all. In this 
particular case, railroads seemed to be calling for sj-mpathj^, and got 
little of it from any quarter, xllthough many of them have been built 
almost by gifts, yet they are loaded with debts which onlj' show what 
has gone into the pockets of their builders, or managers. They have 
been used sometimes by their managers merelj^ to accumulate fortunes 
on 'Change, by methods so manifestlj" fraudident that only gamblers 
can at all admire a smartness which, in England, would soon be made 
to wear the coat of many colors which is its due reward. When such 
Josephs are held up by their millions to the admiration of all, it is no 
wonder the humble laborer sighs: "there is no law for a poor man." 
In general, the management of our railroads, in respect to their finances 
and stocks, is worthy of the scorn of mankind, and receives it. Freed 
by neglect or corruption of State legislatures from all rational super- 



152 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

vision. Board after Board of so-called ' ' directors " have used them a» 
mere Judas bags, by methods essentially as bad as those of highway- 
men, regarding themselves as put there onlj^ to betray trusts, whether 
public or private, and use all with an eye single to "selfinlerest." 
Were all railroads rated at their actual cost, and their stocks determined 
by such a criterion of honest book keeping, Iheir stocks would, as a 
total, be at par or above it, and all their debts paid. As it is, they 
carry a vast debt, the origin of which is better known than liked. Xo 
justice can be subserved by now^ repudiating the consequences of these 
monstrous methods. The people have been themselves guilty of trust- 
ing knaves and admiring their smartness; let them bear the burden of 
it manfull}', and see in it only a monument of their folly in the past 
and of warning for the future. 

The simple cause of the "conflict between capital and labor" iiL 
this countrj' is, therefore, that neither of them has rationally perceivei 
its own interest. This consists for each in the rational form of law 
made and followed. By using a contrary method, capital has run in 
debt heavily, and labor has jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire. 
Both ought to be satisfied with their experience and take a new start. 
There has been a mutual mistake, if not in the facts, at least in the law . 
of this" conflict." 

And a mistake of both law and facts in regard to self-interest. Let- 
any one read Bastiat through, arid note how that impetuous but honest, 
thinker came to see more and more, that " free trade " as well as "pro- 
tection" has its " fallacies," if it starts from a supposed reality of ex- 
clusive self interest for any man. He came to see and even declare the- 
necessity of discarding this "principle " upon which he began to build;, 
but premature death prevented his intention to do so, to his great 
grief, for he at last caught ' glimpse of the broader, the true principle, 
and, in the light of that, realized that the so-called . self interest 
neither protects nor frees a man. but makes him the veriest slave,., 
whether he be capitalist or laborer. , 

This "self-interest," just because it is materialist and atomist, and' 
" positivel}^ " going for the ' ' solid fact," starts out stone-blind. It does 
not even see that, taken in a merely material way, the w^hole universe is 
a personal matter to every one alike, both as to liberty and to pro- 
perty. Nothing less than that is what is " body " for every one. Its 
air and its light are just as necessary to hearing and seeing as are the 
ear and ej^e. Every one is affected bj' its storms; whether they touch, 
others or himself, they touch all. True, this is nothing but a big 
mechanical body for man and beast alike, yet which man, by rational 
laws, can "make the best of" — as a "law." 

But in the organized State we have all a commonalty rather of soul 
than body in a special extension, through human law, of personal lib- 



BUSINESS methods; property and personal kigiits. 153- 

erty and property. Whoever moves in a State, affects and is affected 
by whatever is done. He is ever touched and touching in his own Na- 
tion, and the same mode of rational extension is carried by the "comity 
of nations" into his relations of commerce and intelligence with the- 
whole civilized world. Thus a man has his freedom enlarged, in a way^ 
analogous to the extension of his organs by telescopes, telegraphs, &c. 
yet by a far higher method and for far nobler objects. Those mechani- 
cal means carry him "far," but may only make him a "fast man"; 
whereas, these others are designed to make him a better one, — a work- 
of charity which must indeed begin at home. 

And what are these nobler objects, for which the very soul of Man- 
is extended, and his thought organized for business? Merely to eat 
and drink? Is a capitalist of all men so poverty-stricken by his wealth 
that he "has to work for merely his board and clothes?" The poor 
rich man ! 

On the other side of this purblind self-interest, we hear from the~ 
ignorant laborer who sees no riches for him resulting from all this toil- 
and travail of Reason. He is provided by mechanical economists with 
another "great principle,"— that "all must come out of the soil." 
This he uses to exalt the office and justify the rule of " hard knocks." 
It seems to him that all depends upon these at last; so these are the- 
" last that ought to be first." But, apart from the chemical fact that 
even food itself, and especially luxuries, get their valuable qualities, 
very little from the soil, and least of all from hard knocks, the same is 
true of everything in the shape of property. Hence, the capitalist wha 
goes for cheap labor in the shape of ignorance, is just as ignorant of 
his real interests as this honest laborer, who is enemy to machines, and 
rejoices that they "can't vote," when they are all the while working 
for him while he votes and "strikes" against them. "What, pray^ 
would there be left for labor to work upon, if the whole " must come 
out of the soil?" And what would capital find to be accumulated or 
invested in, if mere eating and drinking were in question, as "neces- 
saries of life " to be immediately devoured or wasted? How would 
capital have any "growth" at all, or exist at all, have any vitality or 
function, but for that host of luxuries at once becoming neessaries of 
life, even for the poor for whom they are also the very support of life,- 
— the object of their labor? And these spring, not from the gross 
earth, nor from the man of clay, but from the Divine man with his 
inventive power, and soft viewless touch of Reason. 

But this rational man is one who knows himself held and in duty 
bound to a Divine Reason which alone makes him a Man and shows itself 
in him as creative. This sort of "individual" is indispensable to all in- 
terests, because he sees the impossibility of "self-interest." He alone- 
is the "source" and the owner of either liberty or property. They were- 



154 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

not "derived" from any "differentiation " of mere force, however fine 
.spun He alone can rationally make, or rationally destroy, or preserve 
and make of what he preserves a means for more production. For this 
rational process, he needs to be educated; yet that is not putting some- 
thing into him, but drawing him out into his own freedom. What is 
wanted is his creative power, taught that it is freeest and happiest only 
as rational. Hence he cannot be made a machine; he is free to make 
whatever is profitable to all, and free to enjoy a use of it which also he 
renders fruitful and accumulating to the profit of all. He alone is the 
one who does or can create "capital," whether as knowledge or 
property. 

That " capital " can really persist only as a means for greater pro- 
duction for all, is not at first recognized in civil polities. That capital 
in the form of accumulated knowledge is the most fertile and indispen- 
sable for this purpose, is the last thing of all to be recognized. Yet the 
man who has a genius for accumulation is instinctively admired by the 
ignorant; for they of all have most need of this aid, and think most of 
the sensuous form of it. And, in fact, no one can really effect an 
actual increase of capital except by rational methods,- — by creating it. 

But when in a free Nation, this inventive, creative power in all is 
organized expressly for this purpose to create, all ought to recognize 
that design. Their methods and objects of association, whether of 
capital or labor, should be subjected to the law of Reason alone. This 
is vital to the object sought, — accumulation, increase of property and 
knowledge, in a moral way, a good way. The design is to organize, 
not a stupid quarrel about what is, but a mutual creation of what is 
not. All human doing of this sort is creating. And it does not mean 
merely to "struggle for existence," but to transform Nature, to apply 
a rational art superior to the Natural, and to live, not "merely on artifi- 
cial luxuries, but on rational joys. 

Hence it is that when a Nation provides a law for all laws, a ra- 
tional means for devising and judging all methods, this system of 
human laws itself, if observed, may be made the best possible de- 
velopment of personal liberty and property for all. The law it- 
self is the "capital" of all, — that by which all is held, operated 
and increased for the enjoyment of all. Each rational man finds 
his' own designs, operative in and through the law, and has no 
self-interest, other than that all law and method should be rational, — 
which is the interest of all. Not his body, but rather his soul is 
touched by the irrational everywhere. Not his own life, but the life of 
all is his, and its death is his. 

Compare this with the old theory of feudal States, and of commerce 
as a feud, now made into feuds between men and between associations 
of employers and employed, under the flag of "self -interest." 



BUSINESS methods; teoperty and personal eights. 155 

What does " self-interest " want of law at all? To defend his in- 
terest while he has no regard for others? Then he deems himself, and 
all, mere robber barons under a law of feud and force. What does 
the communist want of law? Merely for getting his share of some- 
thing to be distributed. He, too, thinks that without law there will be 
only a grab-game. So it must be a law of force. But he would not 
have it merely static, to prevent taking things by force, but a dynamic, 
real law which also gives by force, and thus settles the "taking." 
Thus communism is really the force principle for property, resolved 
from general robbery, into general possession, of " things." It is the 
logical "evolution" of the ' Natural theory" of property, held by 
English feudalism, and by selfish individualism everywhere. It merely 
•completes that theory by adding its dynamic side. 

This basing of property upon the law of force then simply invites 
its dissolution. It relies upon a "self-interest" in a state of feud and 
cZistrust, as a mere protection of property, instead of upon a rational 
law of trust in regard to that designing power which creates it. This 
reasoning is blind from first to last, whether without law or with it; 
for it sees only a law of force. Thus- (1) If one deems his own in- 
terest opposed to that of others, then, to gain anything, he must de- 
prive others. But then his interest for gain is wholly in others, and 
in their being as fat a prey as possible for him (2) Yet in his view 
there is only a conflict of self-interests; and hence there must be a law 
of force. The conflict is only about what exists. Not the increase, but 
the distribution is the question. Not the creation but the possession is 
to be protected. Each wants to keep all he has, and get all the rest if 
lie can; but cannot do so by force. Gain, then, can be only by ex- 
change. There is no general gain by that, for there is no increase. If 
there is private gain thereby, it must come from cheating or fraud. The 
general result is only a diiferent distribution. But if this comes by 
fraud, the law of force ought to prevent it; for it must protect the 
actual distribution, or it fails of its intent. (H) These two views, then 
run together into mere consideration of distribution of property. 
There is no getting any more except by force or fraud. Hence the 
contempt of the feudal aristocracy for trade. They despised in that a 
getting by crafty act of thought, instead of by bold act and royal law 
of force. And they held the land, — the only real property, the Na- 
ture-form of it. All other forms of it are ignominious. For Nature 
^lone produces anything: Man cannot. But if all this be true, if force 
is the only noble way of getting property, and land the only noble 
form of it, and distribution the only question, then land and all other 
forms of it must be distributed by force as the only law . Thus this 
law of force can only set itself against itself in battle array always. 
When Reason is not recognized as creator and only true protector of 



156 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

property and all, it will be rejected as arbiter. No other law but tliat 
of force will be found. And this is communism; whether as outgrowth of 
feudal law, or as logical result of feudal thinking, on the part of either 
capital or labor, or elsewhere. 

Communists and feudalists alike treat human law as only one of 
force. Hence both have false views of its functions. The one Avould 
have it restrain all, the other, direct all. Thus both invert its true re- 
lation to the rational law. Both treat the man, not as already made by 
a law of Reason, but as to be made, and by a law of force. The com- 
munist only developes this theory from its passive to its active side 
and thus shows its absurdity. He has the hobby of ordering every 
one despotically. He would organize an army of creative men on 
merely mechanical principles, to be directed in everything and to in^ 
vent nothing. Thus he would really deaden all creative power by 
treating it as dead. He would liven it up by law of force; " wood it 
up " like an engine; Man is only a machine. He does not differ, then, 
essentially, from the Natural theorists, and feudal practice; Man is a 
product of force, to be ruled by force. He only says that the Natural 
man and law have failed; and he wants, by a subtler legal art, to 
create an artificial man; — a man who, recognizing that he is made by 
force, will know no other reason for obedience; and hence, no doubt,, 
will obey cheerfully — when he must. 

But human legislation cannot make a man. This has been con- 
ceded even by the British Parliament, — which rather wonders at it, 
because it " can do everything else. " Neither can human law direct 
men in everything, were it foolish enough to try. A world would 
have to be destroyed before it could try. An eternity would be 
needed to rebuild again by that method. The "whole duty of man " 
cannot be written down in that way, nor in any way. Human law 
would simply stultify itself, if it treated man as a machine, or as an 
agnostic; since it is made by man himself. It cannot treat him as. 
Condillac proposed to treat a marble image with view to render it 
sentient. It must treat him as already designing, and as having in 
him a rational law-making power. . 

The civil authority o f a free Nation can therefore only require that 
all action shall be rational; and to this end, provide an organized 
judgment of what is rational, so that rational methods may be devised 
for all cases, and irrational methods condemned. This is all it can do, 
just because it is all the moral law itself in Man, does, or can do and 
leave him free and responsible. A free Nation can do no more nor 
less than adopt this moral law itself, and its rational methods of relat- 
ing the designing power of Man to his other powers. Thus it simply- 
reenacts his own moral nature, and holds him responsible to it. It re- 
quires him to be self-governed always by the law of Reason. 



BUSINESS METHODS ; PROPERTY AND FEKSONAL KIGIITS. 157 

But Kcasou is creative. Human law recoguizes it as such in Man. 
It treats him, liot as a machinf, but as a creator of machines, and a 
designer of methods. Hence he must be left free to make his own 
machines, unless tiiey are infernal, and his own methods of business, 
unl-ss irrational. Butamacliine always needs some one to guide it 
or watch it. This funclion, eve i wlien a child can ijerform it, is higher 
than that of any machine. It calls for judgment; it necessitates a 
trust. What can be trusted but Reason? Even more than anything 
else, the mechanical calls for it, and is helpless or destructive without 
it. B,;t so also are all forms of force, all kinds of liberty and property 
and methods of using them, in an external way, — all are trusts com- 
mitted to Man. This is necessarily so in respect to what is mechanical, 
for he alone, as rational, can be trusted with it. It is also true in 
respect to his gift of Reason; for he risks his own and all others' in- 
terests by misuse of that. In every case and for every man, the fund- 
amental truth is; "a trust to keep he has." There is no escape from 
it, — he must be trusted, since he is free, by men as well as by God. 
And by the law of both, he is held to this principle of trust, as the 
basis of his personal freedom in all respects. A true State is 
not organized like nor as an army, nor by a mutual distrust, but 
upon a mutual trust. Created b}^ the "word" of Man, upon that 
it rests. 

Whoever looks elsewhere than to this sacred trust, this word of 
honor, gets false views of Ms liberty and his property. Thus a rail- 
way engineer, or even flagman, is invested with one of the most exact- 
ing trusts; he is watching the stupid mechanical. If he deem it a right 
of personal liberty for any man to get drunk when he pleases, he will 
show to all his unfitness for such trusts. And even railroad managers 
are led by catastrophes to perceive at least that "their property " is in 
danger where there is no due sense of trust. 

The half-way business man is fond of saying he wants to have men 
" who will look after his interests." He knows his own sort, yet he 
mistakes his man. He wants smartness more than honesty; and he 
prefers fast men who are not slow to show him how self-interest 
works. Or else he wants all the intellectual qualities and moral 
virtues for less than he gives his wife for pin-money to help 
"keep up the credit of the business," or otherwise spends in show 
or worse. 

All this, however, seems to be confessing there is little if any of 
this "trusty" extant, or else little of the Reason which looks for it. 
But who said that was the state of things in this country? If it were 
the general verdict of all, then we are self ■ convicted of com- 
munism, and of the meanest sort. But if the conscience of the 
Nation can rise from this self-examination, and, like the Persian 



158 THE CIVIL POLITi' OF THE UNITED STATES. 

maiden winging lier way towards the Light, can exclaim: "I 
too, am PURE, am innocent," — tlien Reason is indeed amongst us, do- 
ing its work. Creative in all, and ruler over all, it is telling us that a 
blinded self-interest can lead aU only to poverty, and that the ways of 
ignorance are not the ways of freedom. 



CHAPTER IX. 

BUSINESS METHODS —PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRUSTS,— 
PATENT RIGHTS —CORPORATIONS. 

T,. The individual, then, must be trusted; for in him alone can Rea- 
son be absolutely free to invent, preserve and transform. From this 
creative individual activity alone can come property and its increase. 
Property is the embodiment of a man's inventions; and no otherwise 
can he show them in this external way. If he be hindered in his hold- 
Ini? of that material upon which ne must act, and which Reason, as 
superior to force, has right to rule over and power to transform, then 
he cannot be freely creative and thus beneficial to all. This is just as 
true and necessary respecting property as it is in respect to person. 
The right to person and property stand on the same footing. For to 
say a man shall have no free rational use of the means by which alone 
he .can act externally, is simply to say that he shall not even stir of his 
own will. 

With regard to either liberty or property, then, of this rational sort, 
there is no real means of "protecting" it which is not also a true 
method of freeing it. This we have seen already is the rule for dis- 
crimination in the matter of taxation.^ Here, in looking at the methods 
of holding and using person and property, we find the same rule holds, 
and appears now, also, as a getting the most and best out of that indi- 
vidual inventive power which, as rational, can alone be creative. 

But, as this is a rational basis for libertj^ and property as both es- 
sentially personal, so also must they have a rational authority without 
as well as within. The man is trusted only because as rational he 
knows his duty, his obligation to a Divine Reason within, holding 
him to the true and the good as authoritative for all. But this rational 
judgment of what is right can also appear to him without; and must in 
fact be there organized for all alike with respect to external acts. 
Otherwise, common rational action is hindered, and that of every indi- 
vidual is thus obliged to be more or less irrational, (rather than to be 
wholly rational), just so far as this common law or custom is so. Such 
is even the excuse which many make, that they "have to do as others 
do" Since this implies that they know better and would like to do 
better if they could, it only enforces this necessity for making the ex- 
ternal authority for acts the most rational possible. Were it fully so. 
It would entirely correspond with that Divine authority which within 



160 THE CITIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

is Keligion, and there, as ' self -forming Reason itself, makes Man him- 
self. But this thinking self -form of it cannot thus appear in anj^ par- 
ticular creation of Man's own, like a Nation; and still less in the Uni- 
verse itself as a material affair, the mere slave form of force over which 
Reason rules as creator; but only in the Universe of Intelligence, — that 
soul of Reason of which the organized Nation is a tj^pe, in that its law 
is a common thought for all its citizens, — a thought known within, 
and a thought expressed without. 

This made-law of Man, therefore, is' to be rationally made, and thus 
be an authoritative external judgment by all respecting acts; and its 
system-form is to be organized so that the higher law shall prevail over 
the lower. This external authority of Reason in a Nation must take, 
in part, the form of moral suasion. This is so because. the law itself 
acts in that way when it acts best; and when it does not, moral suasion 
must needs take other forms. For the specific form of law can act very 
little directoril}'; nor can it prohibitivelj' reach all cases, because a Na- 
tion may have a low moral intent; in which case it will legislate accord- 
ing to that or even below it. This accounts for the fact that in all civic 
States the " authority " is made no more rational outside than they are 
willing it should be inside; these two are ever practically made to cor- 
respond. 

The grade of moral design in a Nation will, therefore, be shown in 
its laws, and in its kind of products material and other. Its actual 
morality will be practically revealed in that inventive intelligence 
which creates all its laws and all the productive activity which they 
regulate. By this criterion ever}- Nation must be judged. Our Na- 
tion has prided itself upon its material growth, its business enterprise, 
its activity of invention in that regard. These are what are shown to 
to the visitor, and his admiration is naivelj^ expected to be ecstatic. 
But if he chance to ask: "Are these products of a high grade even of 
their own kind?" — what shall be said? If he ask: "What sort of 
taste do they evince?" or, going beyond these, inquire: "What are 
the moral tendencies, sensual? or spiritual?" "What are the busi- 
ness methods; honest? or dishonest?" "What are the effects of this 
boasted system of local self-government? — do cities rule themselves 
any better when a State resigns to them its function of a higher or- 
ganized judgment? or do States rule themselves any better when a 
whole Nation is held to have no right, and even to be inapt and unfit, 
for controlling and regulating by its highest judgment matters of the 
most obvious and pressing common interest?'' 

Such questions go to the quick, to the very life of a society. And 
while to the superficial thej- seem, when they come from foreign ob- 
servers, to be quite "impertinent" in a double sense, yet we must 
remember that the}- have been forced to think more deeply than we of 
all the elements that "o to make un the life of a Nation. 



BUSINESS METHODS : PRIVATE AND PUBLIC TRUSTS. 161 

But have we not also had sufficient occasion to thinli a little' beyond 
the surface, and distrust a merely sensuous theory and practice of life 
for either individual or nation? Listen to the prophetic words of 
Webster in 1837, respectin.^ the Nation's disarming itself of all large 
financial capacity, by stupid interpretations of its "powers," which 
denied to it all right to create any safe means of its own, even when it 
was declared obliged to use State banks which were deemed unsafe; 
—thus it was the clear duty of the Nation to remain unsafe; and it 
had a clear right to do wrong for that purpose! 

"Sir, on the subject of currency and of the exchanges of commerce, 
experience is likely to make us wiser than we now are. These highly 
interesting subjects, interesting to the property, the business and the 
means of support of all classes, ought not to be connected with mere 
party questions and temporary politics. In the business and transac. 
tions of life, men need security, steadiness and a permanent system. 
This is the very last field for the exhibition of experiments." 

And yet it is the very field where we have made them. We have 
even prided ourselves upon doing so, upon the theory that it is really 
best to let every local government meddle with everything, high or 
low, general or special. Thus we fancy we get a fine variety of ex- 
periments, as the only real road to truth respecting what is already 
known ; as well as affording the finest school for statesmen, in a free- 
dom as irrational as possible. 

All this way of thinking runs straight down to that merely individ- 
ualistic sense of "my property," and "my liberty" which prevails in 
England; but has with us no such check as there, in the necessity for 
a total judgment upon everything- Even there, it shows itself essen- 
tially despotic; for, as "every man's house is his castle," so is the 
whole Nation itself ruled like a feudal castle. But here, it rules like 
a communistic worship of the sensuous. It runs to views of personal 
liberty, which not only plunder cities as political " spoils," but also de- 
moralize the inner authority so thoroughly that marriage is made a 
mockery, divorce a mere convenience, and the home itself is invaded 
by a spoiler who has lost the last sense of all sanctity and calls himself 
beast " derived from the beast." 

Thus property and person go to wreck together, when no rational 
principle is found from which to "derive" them, and by which to rule 
them. Business cannot safely tear itself loose from its only sound 
basis. Noble and not few were those business men with head and 
heart enough to realize this, and go to the rescue of the Nation when 
that "experience'' arrived which Webster foretold. Many there are 
still who see that all is not done; see the absurdity of this lack of su- 
]-iremacy for what is general, and the insanity of subjecting it to so 
r.-:\r\v different authorities, some as plainly too vicious as others are 



162 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

too ignorant. It is not a party question; so tliat there are business 
men of both parties who linow all this better than it can be told. Yet 
such are the various difficulties of the situation, moral as well as legal, 
that some of them might be led to measures from which others would 
refrain on account of "constitutional scruples " These are apt to dis- 
suade even good men; and even when there is only a question of 
amending the Constitution, some shrink. But in any case, for the 
plunderer to mount on one of these, swells him beyond all recognition. 
He becomes a truly inspired man when he is "defending the Constitu- 
tion." Why should he doubt its perfection when he is told it prevents 
good legislation? In that case, the bad is constitutional, and no other ^ 
is justifiable; he is the only man who does his whole duty or fully un- 
derstands it. In such debates it would seem that the Constitution 
might well ask: "What am I, that this man should speak well 
of me?" 

Besides, there are in both parties many so-called business men who- 
cannot be reached by any considerations which take them very high 
up; they are not used to it, and call it "going up in a balloon." It is 
difiicult enough to asphyxiate them, but easy to take their breath away 
in pure air. These are usually "personal liberty" men. Others are 
Gradgrinds, knowing only their own "experience" and calling for 
"facts" of a rocky solidity. Such men are unaware of facts of the 
most universal sort, in which all live and breathe, and without which 
they and " their business " would perish instantly. There are many 
of this baser sort who deserve the contempt Napoleon expressed for "a 
nation of shopkeepers.'' Neither readers nor thinkers, as our farmers 
usually are, they maunder only about "my property," "my interest." 
Politicians have learned their nature, and that it requires an appeal to 
the pocket-personal. Touch that and you wake them up; "the coun- 
try is in danger!" Otherwise — " let the country slide!" 

But we must not be too hard upon ourselves; that takes away our 
courage. The national vanity is not easily put down, it is true. It 
likes to have a whack occasionally at those foreigners who criticise us; 
that consoles it. It may not soar as much as formerly; nor spread the 
eagle so* unlimitedly on Fourth of July as to render him static, and 
declare him already there. This is better; he is still on the wing; 
then he has higher and better worlds to conquer. Yet, on the whole, 
we deem ourselves at least "as good as anybody," — if not a little bet- 
ter, just a shade or two. 

II. That we might at least become so , the fathers of the republie 
seem to have fancied. They provided for such a contingency, by put- 
ting in the Constitution a National right to regulate and give property 
trust to that rational power of invention which creates all. They did 
not deem it necessary that we should "get all from without," whether 



PATENT EIGHTS. 163 

as things or ideas. In respect to things, it is conceded that we have 
not. In respect to ideas, English theories on that subject still prevent 
their admitting the same. But the former case reall}^ seems to include 
the latter, and confute the theory itself as purelj^ nonsensical for any 
Nation to entertain, and a very poor one to practice upon. There is no 
monopoly of idea; none is possible. Hence no one can "get" nor 
"give," buy nor sell it. It is free to all. On this great fact, patent 
laws are founded. 

Patent laws say that no one can patent an idea, but only a machine 
which represents its application in some particular form. Any other 
man who looks at that machine may or maj' not recognize at once 
"just my idea, (as we often say also of some language-form in which 
we find idea expressed but not monopolized). But, in any case, if he 
"gets" any idea at all from it, that idea belongs to him also. And if 
he can give it another form, and by different means better or worse, in 
another machine, this latter is his "invention." For this universal 
creator. Reason, is not possessed exclusively by any; it is in all a per- 
sonal liberty to "invent and create." But its products are possess- 
able and ownable by their maker, under that divine right in all ta 
transform the power of force for good purposes, by the power of 
Reason. The products of this process are the mere " bodies " it takes, 
and must take to thus appear at all. But their usefulness must deter- 
mine their worth; and competitors are put upon that criterion. Hence 
the idea, being free to all, will in time run through all its usable forms 
of this sort. This will exhaust all the fertility stimulated in it, by 
what at first seemed a privilege to the inventor, but which experience 
has taught him is rather a stern demand to begin with the best, if he 
expects any special advantage from his "patented right," — to merely 
that machine. 

The case of copyright is similar. The law can make property only 
of the form chosen to give expression to ideas. This is no monopoly 
of the ideas. Some form of expression is necessary to their being 
read; but for the same ideas this expression may be varied infinitely. 
Each chooses his own form and has right only to that. Others can 
give different expression to the same ideas, either originally or by 
translation; and each has right to his own invented form, be it better 
or worse. 

Thus the fathers clearly grasped and expressed the principle of 
rational invention and creation, as being, by its right to the fruit of its 
labors, and by the necessity of this external form in which to secure 
that reward, what lies at the basis of property, — merely the creative 
energy of a rational personal liberty. And the supervision of it in this- 
particular form w^as given to the Nation, no doubt, in order to secure- 
it in a general way, and not leave it subject to many different modi- 



164 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

fications by a merely local legislation. It was also given, perhaps, bo- 
cause there vras little clear apprehension of this principle of invention, 
either as to its right or its fertility. Had its reach been foreseen, 
wotild it have been " " expressly granted T ' Apparentlj- not, since 
Xorthem States assumed to grant steamboat rights, and Southern 
States helped planters to steal Whitney's cotton-gin. Every power, 
"express" or implied, of the Xation was wrangled over, simply be- 
cause this designing, inventive power was not seen to be the very basis 
of the Constitution, and to have expressed, in that, its intent and power 
to be a free self -forming. The "express power" to amend implied all 
that. There was to be a free devising of all needful means and meth- 
ods for this complete self-government. For even the general design 
was not presumed to be beyond amendment. As in the case of every 
inventor, what is "best" is always to be sought; that is the interest of 
each because it is the interest of all. 

The right of each to make, and of all to have good inventions, 
whether mechanic-al or intellectual, thus illustrates the true principle 
of government. The comity of nations has also recognized the ra 
tionality of such a property or rather personal right, and seeks to assure 
its due reward as for the interest of all. For, as before noted, commerce 
between nations depends for its growth upon this exhaustless principle 
of invention. This creative Reason, since it is in all, has a word for 
all to the soul, as well as a toj" for all to the ej"e. By this double 
bait, it unites all in an ever-growing use, because need, of each 
other. 

But under our system, the States were left quite free to devise 
laws and methods respecting personal liberty and property of other 
sorts. Were these any less general in their nature? Xot at all. But 
in respect to them, there seemed to be a 'common law," and a very 
general agreement as to principle. But this being the English no- 
principle, the feudal view, the real principle of trust as basis was over- 
looked; it was treated as exceptional instead of general. Hence also 
was disregarded the essential need of securing general methods for use 
and management of that inventive principle which shapes both liberty 
and property. The vagaries resulting from this in respect to views of 
personal liberty have already been noticed in part, and will be further 
considered under the topic of Morality. Such as resulted in false 
views of property have also been largely treated; but it remains to 
note, in what way the general business and commerce of the Xation 
can best seize upon a remedy. 

In general, it is clear that the remedy for all abuse or misuse of 
either liberty or property, so far as the law can furnish it, is in carry- 
ing out the main design of the Xation. — to seek for and devise legal 
methods, rational methods, wherever needed : so that there shall be 



no excnse for resort to force or to other irrational modfA of action. 
How r»oi to do tbw, neemsi to hare l^>een for many the "great principle" 
for interpreting, and hence alAO for admini.4tration, 

III. This neglect of general methrxl^ for re^ilatinif nse of property 
hai been chiefly irrational, and most widely injarions, in the ea«e of 
cr^rporation*. S"© dfynht, in respect to other forms and tii^es of prop- 
erty, laws r;an he made well enoasfh by the States, if they realize the 
need, and a«^^ under a rational view of it. Bat personal liberty and 
property of all kinrls are r "" '•< of ^S'ational vitality. They are 

even pJar;^! tinder a Xatior, : a that "* no one shall be deprived 

of tbfeTrt without due pror;e!*s of iaTW. * Bat a merely technical, feudal 
interpretation ha^ hef^r; ^ren to this. Hence there are a ;rreat many 
ways of doin^M't her law or reason, JifatA constitutions alsfo 

repeat this ter;hrii' ^ which means only that parties shall have 

a " trial " after they come into conflict. Bat we do not live in a 
feodal a^e, nor under a feudal theory. Oar Kberty and property are 
designed to t^e gmded only by rational law, since they exist '■^nly in 
that- The Xational guarantee should therefore be rescued from its 
nserely technical form, and "law" be made to mean rational law; ao 
that wherever that d^jesnotexi- ' ' ' ' ' , and wf»ere irra- 

tional law exists, there shall be :? superviaed and 

overruled by a 3»i ;:;men:. Are .-.x',t li.er.,, •^rty of a 

rational sort, enti ,u? TTrider what other . they be 

secure, than this of a general, r .igment in accor«i w^ith the 

design of this Xation at least, i . the ''spirit r,f *he 5^=-'" 

Without it, the roots of V>th wiii oe sapped by corr. 
demagogy. Without it, both capital and labor wiH h~'-.:. 
"deprived, (for even now they are), of their 'Sbeny .rry 

cess of law." 

Corporations, however, are said to have "no aooL" And if »o, 
they are pe^-rnliariy in need of proper charters and supervision; for the 
soulless cannot be tru-sted. But these charters are their souls. Cor- 
porate powers them-selves are merely trusts. C ' ,.^e, 
have property committed to them in its most gf -m, 
as something to be managed, and in a certain a a 
charters, and for public purposes also de<»crf*?e4 
such trusts req aire as much caution as a -: -r, 
they relate the trust in such a way as to o:^ !" 
general. This is the more obvious when we ^. 
of power thus accumulated in a mechanical fr, / 

■whole, and often allowed to be so in sin^e cases: wMle the manage- 
ment of all this business is to be exercfaed, almost ^way- - - - - -'- if 

sot all the States. The Nation most organize the corpora ^y 

axe to operate in Territories; it may do so, if they operate :a > >i.c:oa» 



JTUiUs^ IE ajmofs ^vsrr asm- I2 i? cHETPsaaenx. 3» ^kbHil. t» locve Si 
rrtnns li£ib &Qii£isae iqwezi ^ssmz. l^Bt t^f- seed sea lie put^taaaa i. 

nc^^^B-KSsar-vfoOdi! befar Sasxes ani fa- aB. Hmm Ap »eai r M i 

SR^— SB jdl Aings gadaagBiya jmfirnflTnanT ef ■wiiiiiml ilim ii li>%g 

csoqmn^aL. aski ^e .f^iinii"*> aoe miAtuBSaMS^ cbk^ is aa. cas^aaaaed ft?- 



Ib laoLas ^K^ Isept seoa. »» sed aao^t as oiiiB- Ham. gemeadi. 

}asr. "tnn dj rrxaonal ac^ T^j^slgrMm oam «a3r aeoE^^aoat. pR»je:: lt:! 
jBBSErvi- mem ait ^^kIs^jti^ ttdss. \mS ^aee ii 3f csOBYvaaenS - 1 ~ 

as? xiEaaniS ^r SB^H^ pm\knD aa^ ^nssES aoun a d Sag la cracaa*r;.i^:-"^ 
iflB£' iTSf: oit'igsaijk i^»» ^eaM lie esailiS^aed «b aa aa r "enesifl peznr- 

feec aeffii i*w«j£ tiTi riai*"!!*. .ia^PCTrti^mB, tmA ^SBwaatag aaid pre^vst Ae 
aBxaoBil. Tig mw^Haaa-^ fa^aesB ^eAate seaas. ataaa. «»he 

wigabnflR^ aail miwi aiii wiiai irit l^s^aaoae geaegai Ife i^Aia t 

ISuSf I mtJ i m i nu ■wtfhiiaK ll>paB s^S iei&~ IcSiMieiB 

l^aex 3»ssd a em^iBB law, g^st cs^ves^ «r " ' t^'' ^ tnr 
liasfgesardagiaMga^ jJBi'Ugji aa^g lad ne^nds, «idi^ 
«aod •BaKS.^^R>e ses Imeb MHfend.lHEt nifttEa- aJi*»Mt «! J , Igr 

Jiilmiiw Tifes js:^««a ! tait g'dMe-!feae fB7ii i r^jlf :: a»d fif mwaLim- 

Timialiiir wini Tirinn rrrprrrafimir iwir tt^bt toE'^er? mmAviae, 
L? Oeat^TBej are aaeadiraB layieMaB d aas^md ^ii aecg- 

' ii a3i£^ ^HBa^feaKBL icr a csei^«%- papasc 
ThCTaagfa^awat^tiKg Af ■d«8egflBaig|Btg lit;<arf ae iK!i i p^ rti 

iBMnR «w>aatiLfBrfiBAaemMteacdaBBBai-l>i.LBMi.ii apaflfc seraoeK 

la ^ p£3i«ai^ed. Tip i lali "11 iliii Jihi jflii m 11 1m 111 Hiij jii n y n iii im i i i i B i 
sne^ -wMciii afl caa n^ aadaae ai^fcsd l» tite. £a dss caee. Acs' 

afi JKaadit^i£ a vaar asdsgeiB le Ak. md deeaK ^UB cwsn* fine can 
gi^araEH^inrlatAii^a] 





CORPORATIONS. 167 

powder-force is necessary to carry a shot far, or just as a liigh and vast 
reservoir is necessarj- for distributing water widely and raising it 
everywhere to the height at which it starts, so are accumulations of 
property necessary for any large purposes, and for securing the highest 
ascent of a whole community, not merely in material welfare, but also 
to the fruitful hill of Science, and the shining heights of Art. For their 
object is not merely to distribute "water" ; they propose a higher or- 
ganization of intelligence, and better methods for its combined action; 
so that the highest intelligence may be secured and used both for de- 
vising and executing. This is analogous to what is done in organizing 
a Nation for its best and freest designing activity. And it would 
seem that so noble a purpose ought to exalt those who further it to its 
own height of moral design. Especially when many join in it, and say 
a few are not enough, but that even all must help where all are bene- 
fited, they rise, awares or unawares, to the very kej^stone of all inter- 
ests, and say that the property and liberty of each are but trusts, to be 
used by each so as to work for all. 

In fact, corporations have been, for English law. the great means of 
escape from feudal notions and methods of government. In them, was 
first discerned the moral relation Man has to both liberty and property. 
As self-governments, morahzed by the law of trust, and thus in confid- 
ing unity with aU, they were in strong contrast with feudal forms; which 
were always bristling with force, because grounded on that independ- 
ence which deems itself solitary, of no benefit to others, and hence in 
war with all. Feudalism knew not what use to make of its liberty 
except to fight, nor of its capital except to keep it; they were rights 
without duties, so long as no rational use for either was seen which 
made of them a common benefit. Then corporations came forward, 
not merely as capital, but also as labor; — they did not sever but ce- 
mented the unity of these. They claimed to give to capital, through 
inventive labor, a creative use, and for the benefit of all. The power 
to do this was also a duty to do it. Thus property and libert}^ had each 
found a duty as well as a right. They were redeemed from the feudal 
Natural law, and brought under the moral law of Reason; and corpora- 
tions were a means for this great step. 

For, in the corporation, the creative power was to be regulated as a 
trust, and rationally confined to good objects and methods. It asked 
the sanction, use and help of law, because its purpose was for the good 
of aU. That such subordinate associations were created to act apart 
from the rest of the community, only bound them closer to it by a trust 
in behalf of aU. And the object of this public trust was the same as 
that of the oflacial trust which the members must commit to the man- 
agers; the latter, therefore, had reaUy only the public interest 
to consider, and should be held to it for the sake of the private 



168 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

interest itself. Thus were both liberty and property held up in their 
public character, and no longer as mere rights without duties as to 
their use. 

While the English have made of corporations, and of associative 
effort generally, an education into free government, we have made of 
them a school for communistic selfishness. The English have used 
them to organize their manufactures, and to methodize generally that 
inventive power which has been winning its way to the government of 
the whole Nation. They have there helped to overthrow the old 
notions that property could be onlj^ a Natural thing, and liberty onl}' a 
Natural right; because a corporation, when administerad rightly, re- 
quires both of them to be treated as rational trusts. The English have 
thus found liberty and property to be, not static things to be held by 
force, but dynamic powers to be used as trusts; not something rigid 
on which to build and maintain permanent classes in society; but an 
ever active, and hence changing realitj^ depending on an inventive 
genius which really makes Man what he is, and is the only rational 
ground for distinctions between men. 

But we have looked only on the abstract, "soulless" side of cor- 
porations. It would seem that from all associative effort, more or 
less, we have abstracted the essential character of trust. Hence labor, 
calling its corporate opponent soulless, has made itself also soulless to 
mend the matter; — or, rather, it becomes feudal. For it does not gen- 
erally make itself into a laboring corporation, but rather into a fighting 
one. Nay, worse, it may avoid all law and all light; it may become 
secret, and even eschew all rational criterions. Does it not habitually 
pledge itself to act, not by rational, but by arbitrary methods; not by 
the best but by the worst judgments; not to seek arbitration or ask for 
legal methods of any sort, but to try the law of force, and see which 
party can stand the injury longest? In all this, labor deems it is not 
bound to think at all of the public interest and injury, because capital 
does not. Clearly the law of trust is what needs to be seen here, in its 
all-pervading nature, and to be made, by legal methods, a regulator 
for all. Otherwise, corporations used by capital under law, and by 
labor without law. will simpl}^ disorganize both capital and labor, dis- 
solve the whole Nation into mere communistic agitation, by abuse of 
trust on one side, and blindness to it on the other. "With this vital law 
gone, aU is gone; chaos returns. 

Now, in the corporation, we have invested in the "directors," a 
double trust for them apparently. An honest man, so regarding it, 
might hesitate, perhaps, between his duty to the public, and his duty 
to the corporation. 

A half-way thinking here will fail to see that these duties are but 
one and the same; and that no really profitable management can flni 



CORPOKATIONS. \69> 

it Otherwise. It is uo more than the same apparent double-trust which 
every man, rich or poor, has, to treat the public interest as alone his 
interest. The half-way thinking of this principle by corporation- 
managers will, however, if honest, be desirous I'f having such a higher 
supervision and authoritative guidance by public law, that they will be 
relieved from what seems to them to be a judging and choice between 
two duties. But how silly, for either the corporation or the public, to 
put such questions to men of self-interest. Such men, as directors, 
soon put into effect that " law " which takes for the lawyer the oyster 
and gives to the litigants the shells. To such directors is due also that 
kind of litigation in courts which makes of the law itself a travesty o^ 
justice, and eater of the oyster; so that no interests whatever are sub- 
served by it; not even that of lawyers; for that depends, like every 
thing else, upon the general interest, and in this case, not upon such a 
locking-up of courts, but upon their being open and just to all. 

Thus a true theory is stultified, and a noble purpose frustrated, by 
the misuse of corporations. It simply defeats the interest of all con- 
cerned. Corporations themselves might see it, must see it. What is 
their excuse for it? Is there no proper law on the subject, or do they 
allow even their own law to be maladministered? Take for example 
a corn-exchange. The reputed object of this is to keep the run of real 
prices; and hence the creation of artificial ones is a crime against the 
business itself, and ought to bring expulsion of the offender from the 
association in mere self-defence. Let this same thing be done by a 
newspaper professing to report the truth, and they would deem it a 
public offence, a fraud on the public. Is such a use of the corporation 
itself any different in its character? So also with a stock-exchange. 
The importance of this seems to be, if not magnified, at least quite mis- 
understood, especially by those close to it, and with that dead-man's 
penny on the eye which shuts out all the world besides. All over the 
world, such institutions seem mainiy used for the merest gambling 
purposes. They create a general demoralizing thirst for getting prop- 
erty in that way, by betting upon everything, — horse-races, prize- 
fights, dog- fights, billiards, boat-races, and worst of all, elections; — 
even they are put in this dirty "pool" and come out from it stained 
and ghastly with fraud. This is an education into gambling. Wor- 
ship "success" by that, and chance or fraud is the god; rational gov- 
ernment becomes impossible. 

But what gives to a stock-exchange some moral purpose and right 
to be? To watch the corporations. These, in every civilized country, 
very largely involve and manage the public interests. And just so far 
as large accumulations are in that form by reason of not being in any 
other, they do so more and more; so that they would become a neces- 
sary communistic machinery of the most rational sort, were there no 



170 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TItB UNITED STATES. 

Other form of property but their stocks. Hence the more a stock-ex- 
change uses these for individual gambling, the more it defeats its own 
ostensible purpose, — to determine the actual values and ratios of such 
corporate trusts as exist- All truth goes by Ihe board, overboard; and 
lies are the food afforded to the public. A poor diet for them, it is not 
less so for those who profit than for those who lose thereby. The 
truth avenges itself. Such uses of a stock-exchange outlaw it, declare 
it to be nothing but a nuisance, to be avoided by honesty. It thus 
runs more and more into the hands of dishonesty, till it must be sup- 
pressed by law, if it be not already an utter wreck. That is what a 
• moral public opinion will say and do respecting such institutions, how- 
ever tenderly legislative committees may deal with them and send far 
and wide for opinions about them. If they gamble, they must fall. 
The criterion is clear, the remedy also, for them. 

But in these stock-exchanges we have the most general view of all 
the corporate interests of the country, There, is professedly ajudg- 
ment by others, or an exhibition by themselves, of their several char- 
a,cters and dispositions. Such a judgment of them may be made a 
very valuable one, if it be just and severely held to true principles. 
Let such a verdict be made up by noble-minded men, out of whose 
very presence the sharper slinks abashed, and It protects the public as 
well as themselves. Then, neither fancy stocks nor fancy men are ad- 
mitted to any consideration. Noble would be such a purpose, but 
noble also must be its execution. Is there any sign of its existence in 
such a form? Surely not in this country nor any other can the stock- 
exchange be found which is kept clean from gambling. Is there any 
where "self-interest" is not either practically allowed to rule the board, 
or theoretically regarded as the arbiter of all? 

Corporations, then, stand forth as peculiarly personal trusts created 
for public uses, and hence requiring the noblest men for their manage- 
ment. They thus refer themselves directly to the highest principles 
for their government both from within and from without. They, too, 
it would seem, must be trusted; especially by a nation where property 
is most equally distributed; also by a free people, since only in this 
way can they realize their highest inventions either in property or in 
methods of business. And when the people of this country are asked 
to let the National government itself, the highest corporation, either 
builS or manage its railroads and telegraphs as well as its post-office, 
they generally object to this, as involving an "army of officials," 
and add that "we cannot trust even those we have already." If that 
be so, it betokens that we stand as yet on no boastworthy height in 
the matter of elections and civil service reform. And this renders still 
more necessary a recourse to corporations. But suppose the govern- 
ment created and used them, or even only competed with them, for 
such purposes? 



COKPOEATIONS. 171 

An English expert, in comparing a government service of telegraphs 
with a corporate one, concedes that the latter is more wide-awake in 
securing the best mechanic instruments. Unscrupulous it maj^ be in 
watering its stock, and in claiming percentage on the water as a cri- 
terion of the cheapest service, while it also enforces this claim by a 
very inventive and ingenious gobbling-up of all competitors. Some of 
the latter, indeed, only enter the field to be gobbled . And thus we 
have between corporations a handling of the prior powers of monopolj'", 
which must put the great law of competition quite at its wit's ends. 
This does not work so, as we have seen, in the case of pure inven- 
tions; they begin as monopoly; but can continue such only by being the 
best at first. But corporations, like patent-rights, are limited in dura- 
tion; so that their subsequent career must depend, if it is rationally 
judged, upon their conduct in the past: any renewal of their powers 
should be adjusted to that. They too, therefore, may be made to de- 
pend, as to their monopoly, upon the fact that their invention and use 
of methods is the best. And so far as these are mechanical methods, 
their very life depends upon their having the best. They cannot make 
way against competitors with a better patent-right. But so indeed it 
would be, were all their methods watched and treated, as some of 
them higher trusts than patent-rights, and all held really on the same 
principle. The law of competition works, either for or against them, 
only through better methods of all kinds. And these will assure suc- 
cess to the best, if the worst be not favored by a corrupt or stupidly 
neglectful legislation. 

We thus come back again to the true principle that the good inven- 
tion is to be stimulated and the bad invention suppressed. That is • 
what human law is for in all its phases. And how is this purpose of it 
to be best secured in this vastly important sphere of corporations? 
Professing'to be peculiarly public servants, they cannot object to be 
peculiarly held to the highest and most general judgment. The people, 
little as they may trust these corporations, profess to trust still less, 
the men they elect, or who are appointed to subordinate offices. From 
both sides, then, comes a reference to the highest tribunal — the Kation 
itself. Under its own eye, in its highest sphere of legislation let them 
be shaped and fitted for their work, and by its highest courts let them 
be judged. 

Particularly is such a reference proper in the case of banks, rail- 
roads and carriers of all kinds, and all corporations which offer a gen- 
eral stock to the public at large. The two former indeed, come under 
"express powers" of the Nation to regulate its general commerce and 
finance. What has been said of the latter shows that it conies even 
more under a power vital to every nation to protect its public against 
fraud and bad management of general trusts; a matter veiy essential 



172 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

to the "public welfare," whether that be taken as material, intellect 
tual or moral. It is merely a guardianship of that principle of rational 
invention creative in all, and of that sacred trust reposed by all in all. 
And there can be little doubt that had telegraphs existed when the Con- 
stitution was made, they would have been treated as a form and part 
of the postal service. 

As to scruples in respect to constitutional power, Mr. Webster is- 
very safe to follow. He never exceeded that clear understanding of 
"what is," which, in statesmanship as elsewhere, looks only to what is 
already definitely organized and actually formal, and not beyond this- 
to (what also is), the rational power and right to organize whatever 
ought to be. It WIS just this looking at the Constitution as fixed, and 
quarrelling about what it was, that blinded to what it was — a general 
power to design, hence a moral responsibility to devise whatever was 
necessary. But it was denied even power to devise such financial 
methods as were conceded to be needed. Hence the experience which 
made us wiser on that point. And in speaking on that subject Mr. 
Webster announced what is surely a very safe general principle re- 
specting all corporations. ''No government creates corporations for 
the mere purpose of giving existence to an artificial body. It is the 
end designed, the use to which it is to be applied, that decides the ques- 
tion in general whether the power exists to create such bodies." 

Now when we look to " the end designed, the use to which it is to 
be applied,'' as a criterion of power and right to create a corporation, 
a great many existing corporations would seem to stand a poor chance 
under the National eye. If the end designed is to "salt mines," or if 
the "'use" of the corporation is to enable issue of false stock, if, in 
general, the end and use are simply to fleece the public, and to hide 
the way it is done, such ends and uses would scarcely bear the blaze of 
a National discussion, nor even dare to present themselves in their 
ugliness before it. A National Congress would indeed gladly deny 
itself any power for such purposes. But how readily is such "power" 
and "right" conceded to States! Have they, then, expressly reserved 
to them all the powers to do wrong and call it a right? This end and 
use of an evil sort presents itself unabashed before State legisla 
tures. There, under the unblushing front of "my interest." it in- 
vents freely enough how easiest to "pluck the public goose." And 
the constitutional orator quite outdoes himself in defending this great 
"reserved right" of the States. Such absurd views run quick into the 
veins of all. The individual deems himself only provided by the State 
itself with an invention which he can use to better serve his selfish 
ends. The corporation also has the notion that it is, at most, only 
"making a contract," which is to be literally interpreted in favor of its^ 
interest, by a judge blind to any trust in it, either as to its end or use. 



CORPORATIONS. 173 

Is it singular that, thus made and judged, corporations have 
heen fruitful servants to villainy? 'Either by management of them, 
or by gambling in their stocks, have usually been acquired those 
sudden, suspicious fortunes, which betoken that no work has been 
done for the public, except to damage it. When such fortunes are also 
managers of corporations, they are their own enemy in possession of 
them. For the only reason for a corporation is, that the fortunes of 
many must needs be thus united for a common end and use, and that 
thus alone can a good and great design be carried out. Ordinary means 
certainly suffice for evil uses. Large accumulations for evil purposes, or 
using corporations, either direcily or indirectly for such ends, are a 
terrible sign for a Nation. 

A proper regulation of corporations will therefore tend to prevent 
these quick and ill gotten accumulations, which curse a community 
" both in its basket and in its store; *' corrupt its inventive genius and 
thus wreck the vitality intended to be aided by corporations. These 
will be restored to their only logical basis, a need of mutual coopera- 
tion; because, no man having got by evil means, none are so rich but 
that a really grand public work requires all to work together. Such is 
the Nation itself, — a cooperation of all. The corporation must come to 
its own type as a sacred trust, must be formed and controlled b}^ the 
same principle. 

While a great public interest will be thus subserved by the due ex- 
ercise of a public right, no individual interest can be other than bene- 
fited thereby. Vast accumulations in private hands are conceded to 
be an evil in many ways, both to this and other countries, but no- 
where so much as here, have they been due chiefly to a misuse of cor- 
porations, the very means supposed to imply their absence But, how- 
ever got, they can only make a slave of their owner and thus be in- 
jurious to him In others they excite beyond all measure an irra- 
tional greed, and tend to make its methods more unscrupulous. 
They at least seem to impoverish others, and must really do so either 
when ill-got, ill-spent or ill-managed. In any case, they tend to be 
wasteful and demoralizing. No wise man would wish to put upon his 
children such burdens; nor would they wish it if, by a proper educa- 
tion, they had escaped their temptations. 

The misuse of capital, and chiefly by corporations, is what has 
roused the ire of labor, and thus blinded it also by pugnacious views 
of self-interest. But, as we have seen, capital and labor are really 
both organized in corporations. The true corporation cannot exist 
without uniting both and working for both, as its very purpose. It 
secures the best use of both, by best division and methods of labor. 
This fact alone is what makes corporations profitable to all. Hence 
here are labor organizations which also enter this field. Their object 



174 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES, 

is at first usually deemed to be, to get a larger share of the profits for 
labor. But if the real object is not to increase the total profits, where 
is the larger share to come from? The business must be small, if cap- 
ital is lacking; wasteful, if done on credit. Such associations, there- 
fore, often fail through false views of their object, or of what is neces- 
sary to attain it. "Wiser perhaps, is the method, sometimes adopted, of 
partly paying the labor by a share of the profits. This recognizes 
what the rational purpose of all must be, — to create, so that there shall 
be profits to divide. 

Any splitting asunder of capital and labor, therefore, is simply ab- 
surd. Poor men cannot bring much capital together; some none at all. 
They depend wholly, then, upon there being something created as 
profits. Capital also depends wholly upon the same creation; for its 
object is to increase, not grow less, and this is the interest of all, since 
capital is a needed means — its increase is not merely for profits, but for 
augmenting one of the means for profits. In this relation of capital 
and labor, capital represents the past, and labor the future, connected 
in a present which is creating a better future for both because for each. 
Split them apart, and there is no such present. In that case, capital 
is an idleness, and labor a want. Let them organize against each other 
in this attitude, and this is only a declared feud between past and 
future. The one is an organized idleness, the other an organized hun- 
ger, and each is devouring itself. So long as it continues in this shape, 
it is the feudal ages revived. If it maintains this absurd divorce be 
tween capital and labor, its tendency, in modern times, must be to com 
munism or other form of despotism. 

Now, in general politics, the popular party is the party of the past 
in respect to ideas. It is feudal towards property, jealous of its in- 
crease, though this increase is just what intelligent labor needs most. 
It sees only the property side in corporations. And the other party 
tends to false views of self-interest, and hence to regard capital as 
something independent, to protect it merely as a past and not as some 
thing to be made productive for the future, and so it, also, parts it from 
labor. But when capital and labor are thus falsely divorced, capital it- 
self is the party of the past, and labor a party of the future, but of a 
communistic future. The parties thus change sides, but only as parties 
of force, the one to devour capital, the other to defend it on a principle 
which attacks it, and hence in a way just as fatal to it. No wonder 
communism grins at this contest, and licks its lips waiting for the 
feast to fall to it from feud between capital and labor. 

What rational object, then, can either capital or labor have except 
to organize legal methods whereby to prevent all waste and ensure the 
best and largest production? To resort to mere opposition and "war," 
is itself simply waste for both To resort to force is to overturn all 



COKPORATIONS. 175 

rational law, aud hence all creation. To use bribery is also a waste 
and a corruption: if begun, it must be kept up till it rots all. Here, as 
in politics, if either capital or labor looks only on the past as spoils, it 
only betrays itself into slavery: whichever worships money will be 
ruled by it. 

In both spheres of organization, therefore, whether that of politics, 
or that of business, it is clearly for the true interest of both capital 
and labor, to secure a better future, through legal, orderly methods 
which will prevent waste, idleness or corruption. No other recourse 
is at all rational or profitable for either. The main object of organ- 
ization, in any case, is to secure the guidance of the best intelligence, 
and the most efficient methods which that can devise. Ignorance there- 
fore is to be avoided. What is bought and sold in politics is ignor- 
ance. What a despotic wealth can easiest rule, but cannot best pro- 
duce with, is ignorance. What divides capital and labor into mere 
feud, is nothing but ignorance, whether in the one or the other. Every 
intelligent worker knows that the ignorant and vicious are always the 
best tools for every bad policy, whether in the supposed interest of 
capital or of labor. The only true safety, then, is in education, winch 
gives all a respect for intelligence, and a desire to see it organize legal 
and rational methods in all spheres of action. The use of such methods 
is itself a good education; that of any other, a bad one. 

Sound business men of both parties know well the need for some 
such legal measures as have been suggested, to be wisely devised and 
rigidly executed. They should in all business methods secure that 
view of their purpose which recognizes business, not as a feudal 
strife between men, but as a mutual common creation of a common 
benefit. They should honor that honesty which we should blush to 
call " the best policy'" since it is the very life of all manhood, and 
hence also of all nationality In getting such reforms, let them take 
counsel of their conscience rather than of their fears. Surely those 
who came to the rescue of the Nation from its financial distr ss, will 
also come at the first call to help in this matter, just as important, and 
perhaps even more critical, at this turning-point of our National his- 
tory. 

But it is a call to all. They who wish to acquire honestly also wish 
others to be prevented from frustrating them by dishonesty. Those 
who wish to employ money in ways useful to all, and thus reconcile 
capital and labor, would also have harmful use or waste of it pre- 
vented. Those who recognize as worthy of reward a useful inventive 
genius, a faculty for organizing skillfully, and fair play in an open 
field, want foul play put down, and a genius for evil tricks subdued. 
Those who have felt their own legitimate business shaken, under- 
mined or swept away by panics or ' 'corners' ' growing out of a gamb- 



176 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TUE UXITED STATES. 

Kng use of money by others, realize the importance of having 

gambling in all its forms, but especiall.v in this, made to hide its head 
in a penitentiary. 

The possession of many enormous private fortunes seems to subject 
the public to the effects of whatever whimsies, incapacities or faults of 
character may attach to the possessor. But the kvrgest possessor of 
property has the largest stake in this improvement of methods for use 
of property. K he wish to live at his ease, then others must use the 
property, and enhance or depreciate its value. If he wish to follow 
higher pursuits of study, he can scarcely fail to get higher views than 
merely selfeh ones of the relation of men to each other in a Xation. 
Men of all sorts and of jUI degrees of wealth, want their children and 
those of others protected against a mere lust for material gain, or sen- 
sual pleasures which waste money and man together. 

As Webster has said, xt s no party question, uor one of temponiry 
poUtics. It is really a moral question of simple honesty, and hence 
also an affair of education. Education is essentially a proper moral 
training and dcTelopment of personal liberty, of that power to invent 
which creates property while morality preserves it. Property, above 
an things, then, is best fiuctiiied and prodted m all ways, by a right 
pubhc education of all Even the English force-theorists begin to see 
that, though they confess it with a groan, and deem themselves only 
forced to see it. They see it now only dimly, but more and more every 
time they decrease the property qualification for the elector. They 
will see it more clearly, (and so shaU we), when they increase the in- 
teDigence qualification of the elected. 



CHAPTER X. 

THEORY AXD PRACTICE OF EDLXATIOX IX THE XATIOX. 

I. — Ethical Theories of Education axd Evolution. 
II. — Practical Education in Schools. 
III. — Litekatcre. 
IV.— The Press. 

Both in theory and operation, and in all its spheres, the civil polity 
of this Xation treats Man as a designing power. The utility of educa- 
tion, therefore, is obvious, for the purpose of it is clear. It is even 
among the truths self-evident that a designing power can be educated. 
For the power to design is also the power to understand. It under 
stands all just so far as it can redesign, think the formative law of that 
Avhich is to be understood. 

But if Man is not thus recognized as a designing power, both the util- 
ity and the purpose of education become uncertain, and its methods will 
be grounded on false theories. All such theories, therefore, should be 
•discarded, especially that which seeks to derive him from a law of 
force; for, if such be his origin, there is no basis for education. Xor 
is there any safetj' in it, on such mechanical theories, which would 
make of the biggest blow the best reason, and of dynamite the model 
Tuler. Our civil polity is in total opposition to all such views of 3Ian; 
and it is not worth while, perhaps, to notice the grosser forms of them 
here. 

A civil politj', however, is itself an evolution of Man's ethical think- 
ing. Education is his effort to reproduce and continue in others the 
morality thus developed into a civil polity. Hence it wiU be applied 
according to the ethical theorj-, — the conception of morality.— But 
education is, for the man to whom it is applied, itself a development; 
—but of what? and from what? This ultimate question is the modern 
question of "evolution." And onlj- a right answer to it can settle the 
true methods of education, and the "lirst principles'' of ethics. It may 
be weU, therefore, before touching upon our education, to notice 
briefly those theories of ethics and evolution upon which its theory and 
practice must alwaj-s turn. 

I. Education and Ethics are closely united. Theories of either Avill 
show their twinship. This has already- been indicated in what pre- 
cedes. The morality of a society is practicall}' their habits of action; 



178 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

tlieir science is their habits of thinking. Mere habits seem to go of 
themselves, and hence are called "very natural." They come to set 
easy like old shoes; so that it requires a sore place to induce us to 
change an old one even if bad. In serious matters, indeed, only a very 
uneasy inventive mind is audacious enough to demand something 
wholly new. In respect to shoes and the like, the imp of invention 
may have his own waj, under the smiles of the fickle -minded fair. But 
when it comes to "changing the customs of the country," the more 
rigid masculine mind stands aghast, and sees not how it can survive 
such deadly stabs at all our habitual morality, such disrespect for all 
authority. The shoes we can compromise about; they are not Natural. , 
But legal customs are Natural. Have they not become law of them- 
selves? Are they not derived from Natural instincts, and founded on 
the very ancestors of us all? 

Evidently there must be a change of such habits of thinkmg, before 
a change of customs reputed to have such an origin and authority. 
The habit of thinking has unconsciously acccepted for its only au- 
thority a common outer habit of acting; whatever thinking conflicts 
with that is "immoral." Hence the Ethics will expend all their en- 
ergy on finding an origin and law for these outer acts alone, and be 
wholly blind to any other law or origin for thinking. Its theories of 
Education will rather wonder why or whether there is really any 
thinking at all. And indeed it is a wonder any is left under such a 
treatment of it. It ought to be proof enough of its priority that it 
"can stand anything" since it can stand that. 

The " first principle " of Ethics, since it treats of a law for action,, 
ought to be the first that acts, — the prime doer, the all-doer. This can- 
not be an abstract force; it must be a moral form of doing, — Thought 
and Will. This, as we have seen, may be "found" externally as a 
moralized authority in States, but only when it is organized and put 
there by the creative word of Man. It represents his thought and will, 
not his body nor his Natural instincts. Hence the "first principle " of 
Education also starts from the same creative reality. And it should be 
recognized as such a reality in Man, or the "best-laid plans," for cul- 
tivating it like a potato-vine will "gang oft and far aglee." 

Yet "habit is aruler of men," — " 'Tis a second Nature? — nay, " 'tis 
ten times Nature," cries Wellington. For a mechanical thinking, Na- 
ture only seems, in habit, to intensify itself as force still: hence its edu 
cation of so'diers is only one of discipline, and considers their intelli- 
gence rather useless till experience teaches the contrary. So in civil 
societies, when the poor man cringes to the rich, this is said to be 
habit,— he "can't help it, it is a Natural law " And on the whole it 
would be very wrong to educate him out it; — " would you overthrow 
the institutions of the land., sir?" And as his duty to cringe teaches 



ETHICAL TJIKOKIES OF EDUCATION AND EVOLUTION. 179 

Mm his right when he gets rich to make others cringe, it inspires in all 
a mania to have this great power and right to make men crawl like 
their " ancestors.'' 

Again, in respect to '"established classes," when even an intelli 
genee king-like enough to be called to guide a Nation, as in a Glad 
stone, is supposed to defer to mere rank, that is very natural and 
Ethical, an impulsive Burns may protest against it, but no man of 
"proper education" will do so. Even the highest intelligence is 
Naturally inferior to " blood ;" for the custom and law of the land says 
so. And so this outer authority, when it ignores the inner and calls 
that an unknowable even for Ethics, makes, of what it calls doing 
right, and true morality, a sign of inferiority when it is done by intelli- 
gence, and of superiority when it is demanded, as it generally is, only 
bj^ an imbecile. Against all such Ethics or Education, Heaven defend, 
us! 

Where nations have made or kept for themselves that organization 
of society by "classes," which seems a sort of heavenly hierarchy to 
those on top, there is at the bottom a crushed-out class which can 
doubtless be made to serve as "the connecting link"- for deriving 
Man's origin from at least as far down as the chimpanzee, if not to pure 
"protoplasm." Education of this lowest class seems to the higher 
class very much such an affair as taming animals instead of letting" 
them run wild. They can see in them an inborn incapacity, but not am 
innate capacity. Such is the force of habit with these crushed-out 
creatures that the attempt to lift them by education is "absurd." It 
can only make them fall deeper into the dominion of their brutal in- 
stincts; because it merely energizes their desires, by giving them use of 
larger mechanical organs which extend their view. And indeed that is 
a danger for a mechanical type of education! True education is really 
a transformation of habits of thinking; but these Naturalistic theorists 
do not recognize any thinking at all perhaps, — no "innate ideas," at 
least not in the lower classes. Hence for the Hindoos, thinking was 
only for the few; and for the modern sensualist, there is none at all 
except as a " higher habit." 

Thus for the lower classes the habit of not thinking, or of vicious 
thinking, is regarded as invincible; and for the upper classes, habit is 
an affair of "blood," and thinking is a habit of good taste, and this 
also is invincible in the same mechanical way. Both classes come by 
habit to see and feel the "force" of this argument. Neither recog- 
nizes that for a thinking-man, habit, whether of thought or taste, is 
something he can transform ab initio, and need not be a slave to it in 
any shape. Hence the crushed-out class are prone to an abject self 
surrender to "instinct" and habit. They have been told so often that 
they have no capacity but much incapacity, that even a Shakespeare or 



180 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Burns springing from their class does not reveal to them the Divine 
origin of tliis gift of Reason, this genius for creation. They have not 
been taught to read even their own prophets; what should they know 
of them? Even the Bible held forth to them as inspired, must be in- 
terpreted for them; since they do not know enough to interpret it. 
And if they cannot, what is the use of it? Is it a mockery of their in- 
stincts which have no capacity for virtue and intelligence, yet have re- 
ligion enjoined upon them as a moral duty as obvious for them as 
for any? 

No wonder that a crushed-out class, like a crushed-out man, lose 
all i)ride, all confidence that they can rise. "Evolution," "develop^^ 
ment," seems suddenly to lose its virtue just where it is practical]}" ap- 
plied. It runs, after ail, into fixed things which cannot be changed. 
As a Natural law, it can only develop hke an elective affinity, even for 
men; so that for them there are fixed classes. There is no spiritual 
person, alike in all, and capable of being itself developed in all, as a 
same thinking, by education. This theory then refutes itself. It does 
not develop Men, but only things, bodies. And since these perish, all 
begin and end alike in a form of force. 

"Rising" depends for the man on there being, in himself and in 
those who educate him, a deep religious faith that there is in him a ca- 
pacity, a power, to transform all his habits, mental or bodily, and that 
he has right and duty to be a slave to none of them. Darwin has, 
(naively and blindly enough for his own part), led the English to see 
this merely on the material side,— the power of wish or wiU to trans- 
form that. But when asked to see that habits of thinking also are 
transformable by thought itself, deprofwidisultimis, and that "there's 
an end,' and also a beginning for all things, to be rightly seized by 
Education, they are somewhat bewildered by such a theory. The 
revelation is too sudden for a habitually sensuous view of things, 
which is seeking to derive the thought from the things it creates. This 
other view seems to leave nothing "solid" or "tangible" to rest upon, 
as inner "hypothesis" which will obviously correspond with the outer 
"solid" upon which the hypothesis "works " Hence, respecting the 
''probable" effects of education, there must be brought to bear the 
great and only method of thinking, — the inductive method. This 
method can proceed only by hypothesis, and never lets this hypothesis 
get out of a solid shape. And what it is that Education works on be- 
ing entirely "unknowable," the best, if not onlj' induction about its 
effects, and which can be "probable" only (for nothing is provable), 
must be reached by the method of statistics, which regards everything 
as coming by the law of chance. But whether this "chance" is any- 
thing solid or not, has not yet been ascertained, even by statistics. So 
this basis for hypothesis seems somewhat a reduetio ad absurdum of 



ErmCAL THEOKIES OF EDUCATION AND EVOLUTION. 181 

the hypothetical method. If even chance can have a law which Man 
recognizes, why not recognize that Reason in him makes its own hy- 
potheses, and changes them in Science when the old one can be bet- 
tered by a new? They are mere habits of thinking to which a maker 
of them is given to clinging after others see "it won't work any 
longer." 

Statistics are valuable in their way; they show that even mere 
chance must have a law, — a law of necessity. But used for all pur- 
poses, they betray a notion that all comes by chance Thus they bury 
one in chips and give a miserly habit of regarding straws as the most 
important affairs in the world. Reason, starting from its own law, can 
anticipate and use this very law of chance; and it can indeed see in 
every straw that drifts something it can transform and turn to use. 
But trying to find a law merely by counting straws, that is indeed piti- 
ful. '" Hie labor, hoc opus est." It is the return from a descent into 
straws, — the slow revocare gradvm of that facilis descensus Averiii. It 
is a determining merely by number what a law does, — a law treated as 
wholly unknown and unknowable. So that the reason of the fact is, 
after all, undecided. Since whatever occurs, (the straw itself), is only 
due to chance, by this logic, it is only "probable," and is liable to drop 
■out any day. And since whatever occurs only by chance must in every 
•case do so against the chances, the method itself shows the absurdity 
of believing that anything is really "made by chance." « 

Especially when applied to Education is this sort of science an ab- 
surdity. Can there really be found no reason for Education save by 
statistics, and no method but by guess? Yet how gravely it has been 
subjected to such a thinking; for example, to establish, first, whether 
" ignorance is bliss." And if that is duly found to be so, second, "is 
It folly to be wise? " For, in the first counting of straws, it would ap- 
pear that the " wisdom " to be next investigated has very little in com- 
mon in its "bliss" with that which is due to ignorance. Since the 
bliss of "wisdom, then, depends upon its own acts, how silly it is to thus 
put it in a supposed possible contradiction with itself as "folly," — 
something it cannot be. Such are the " antinomies of Reason" for a 
mechanical poet, who gives us another sample of this machine-work in 
" whatever is, is right." In fact. Pope's " Essay on Man " grinds out 
this chaff by the bushel. Since it makes nothing of Man, it leaves 
nothing of him, quite uses him up as grist for the mill. 

The "bliss" point being settled or not, the next one to consult 
statistics on will be, "whether education really makes men better or 
not — in fact? " Naturally that will depend somewhat upon whether it 
" makes " the man at all. But dropping that as "too abstruse" a 
fact to begin with, it will also depend a good deal upon what kind of 
education it is. The bug-a-boo in general, however, is always that 



182 THE CIVIL POLITr OF THE UNITED STATES. 

"unknown quantity'' sometimes called "Reason," sometimes "Intelli- 
gence;" while on the whole nobody knows "what it is," or what it 
will do if it IS let loose. It is a pity it must needs be tried before any 
proper guarantee for its good conduct can be found! This "good con- 
duct " is natui-ally estimated chiefly in view of "property interests." 
Cannot an intelligent rascal do more harm, steal more, than the ignor- 
ant one? Well, settle that by statistics if you can. It seems pretty 
plain that, the greater the general intelligence, the harder times it will 
be for rogues of all kinds, if this intelligence be properly organized in 
a State, and morally educated in its homes and churches. 

Again, the question of "development" puzzles the mechanician. 
Against all his theories, a mere "differentiation" of an "abstract sim-- 
plicity " like that of force goes back into a mere abstraction again, and 
its very name is "dissolution" instead of "development," death in- 
stead of life. Hence only straws and statistics can settle the question 
for him. That a man is wholly dependent on his "ancestors " for all 
that he is, seems, or is taken as duly certified. Yet, if so, why are not 
all just alike and equally capable, — man, beast and even the rock it- 
self. All these go back to a same origin in nothing at all except ab- 
stract force, like a house burnt up, according to this theory; so that this 
"force" may as well be taken at once as the ancestor. All is due to 
that, then, and how to educate force is indeed a profound mystery. 
That it is so educated Ave know, but in respect to this " first principle" 
of force, as of others, if there are any, we know only "that it is." 

Now, if that be so, we may as well take Reason itself as a first princ- 
iple; for we know at least this much about it — "thatitis. " Butwealso 
know "what it is" quite as intimately as we know anything. We 
know it is the only principle that can be morally educated, — developed 
as itself a designer and creator. It seems then on the whole the safest 
principle to "tie to." 

Besides, it is a pretty well settled fact that Education cannot make 
or unmake any facts, but finds them already made. It is almost 
equally certain that the mind is not a sheet of white paper. It is ap- 
pealed to to act and does act; and it is judged by its acts as to what ca- 
pacity it has. JSTo act can be got from any quarter unless the capacity 
for it is there. If the rational act were not originally in the act of 
mere force, then it was never got out of that, no matter how fine 
wrought the machinery or painfully long the "derivation " If there 
is not another and an active power in the world besides that, then it 
must itself be rational. And this is its reductio ad absurdum; for then 
the biggest blow is the best reason, might is right, and the less educa- 
tion the better. Such theories make of dynamite the best reasoner, 
especially when it destroys aU the creations of Reason. 

Merely in defence of such a thinking against its own foil}'', it is 



ETHICAL THEORIES OF EDUCATION AND EVOLUTION. ] 83 

necessary to declare Reason to be a reality, — a power in itself, an 
original capacity, and a lawful ruler over all else by divine right; — 
and owing nothing to the ascidian except its best wishes for ascidian 
welfare. 

But the higher thinking, at least, of evolution in our day claims to 
be a thinking of law. Under that form, then, it is itself a designing; 
it is Man's effort to conceive of the method by which he has been him- 
self designed. The development of this thinking of law was traced in 
Chapter II, so far as seemed necessary to show its relation to state- 
craft. But as this thinking of a law for Man's own evolution, it de- 
mands further brief attention here. For theories of his origin in a law of 
force prove self- contradictory, as already noted. They show no basis 
for his education, deprive him of morality, and make of religion for 
him an absurdity, since there is no such "class " as Man, if all are de- 
rived from force, and if thought be not the act of spirit. 

So far as Man is a body, he can fancy his derivation from another 
body in some way; and this even seems necessary, because body needs 
space and time to exist in. But he has no occasion to derive his 
thought in that way, to fancy it made by force, because it does not 
take on size or spatial body. And let him think what history he pleases 
of a spatial thing, he will also be thinking of a designing in connection 
with it. He is really trying to find a law of design for it now; and 
hence also to find, as origin for it, a prior designing power, and not a 
law of force. Let us trace this. 

(1). The first mode Man fancies for his bodily making is the plas- 
tic mode, that by which plaster images are now made. This requires 
.q,n act of force. But did this occur by chance, by necessity, or by de- 
sign? If by chance, there must be a law of necessity for that. If by 
mere necessity, that must operate by a law of chance. An abstract law 
of force, then, unites necessity and chance in its mode of operation, so 
there is place for choice to use it. (2). Hence, in thinking this law 
of force as mode of forming bodies, Man gets to thinking also of de- 
sign. He IS not forced to conceive of only one way or another of 
forming the body, but rather of many ways, according to either the 
chances or the necessities of the case. There is indefinite choice in this 
regard. And hence design must preside over the whole process, (in as 
])erfect freedom to use as he is to think, such a law as this of force), 
and must be prior to it at every step, and in every case. This is the 
second thinking of the process. (3). And because this is a thinking 
of law, and law is a continuing mode of action, it is followed by a 
thinking of development, of evolution. This is the modern thinking of 
it, the conception of a law of force developing one body into another. 
But, as we have seen, in such a process, since it can operate only upon 
chances and necessities, choice and design must preside over it. There 



184 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

must oe a law of design operating through it to form bodies, and this 
formative law must act in presenti, in every case. Is not this the way 
in which man forms bodies? It does not matter at all, then, what was 
the past of the force-forms out of which any body is made in the pres- 
ent, except that it has adapted them to the present design. The desigh 
which now forms it must, however, be present and active in it. 

(4). Hence this thinking of it must lead to a still higher thinking; 
a thinking of triune operation which includes all the others. There 
must be a thinking of the law of design itself, and of a development of 
that law, if development is to account for anything whatever. But de- 
signing is thinking; its law is a law of thought, its development is one 
of thought. Thought, then, is and can be derived only from thought." 
Design precedes all else for forms of force, and in forms of thought it 
is the thought itself. Hence the only logical development is one of 
thought and of its designs. As thought itself, it developes into think- 
ing selves. As designing power supreme over all, it develops the law 
of force into bodily forms according to its designs. Such forms can 
only express in space and time, in a perishable way, a designing power 
which is imperishable; yet in a continuous way, since thought is eter- 
nal. Now a power to design can be educated, for it is what can un- 
derstand all. It is what tries to redesign all, — to rethink all according 
to its formative law, even' man himself, — in order to understand it. 

II. These general views on what there is to be educated seem ap- 
propriate to any criticism of actual Education, for they are necessary 
to any due sense of its purpose or scope. Thus, for example, if, as in. 
former views of Education, the mind be regarded as a basket to be 
filled from without with " useful facts," the education will be simply 
a cramming, and the facts will be only such as are deemed useful. In 
England, Education was long regarded as only "polile," and classics 
were the polishers. Then Science took the spoon, and there was a 
rush for " solid facts," regardless of how such weighty valuables were 
to be got into the mind. No doubt the mind has been much opened up 
of late by such absurd treatment of it; and theories of Education have 
ventured so far as to suppose it capable of at least " receiving princi- 
ples." But until all such stupid blindness as to its nature and powers 
is done away with, it is evident that a system of Education will be 
anything but systematic, and its view of principles will indeed be a far 
off and vanishing one. 

So also it is clear that the moral side of Education, in families and 
churches as well as in schools, must be undermined and ruined by such 
materialistic views. To regard mere knowledge of facts as an educa. 
tion, is the folly of false theorists; to deem it an all-sufficient fitting for 
practical life, is the folly of parents and others who, on that supposi- 
tion, neglect all moral training, and then wonder why an "educa- 
tion " turns out so ill or is so ungratefully rewarded. 



PRACTICAL EDUCATION, IN SCHOOL, ETC. 185 

Education lifts or lowers the individual, and morality the commu- 
nity; and each does this for better or worse according to where it finds 
its " first principles." If the Ethics knows not where to find any, or 
regards them as unknowable, both Education and morality will be on 
a mechanical type. Such Education can only stuff the memory with — 
it knows not Avhat, and direct the community to do as it is told, — it 
knows not why. Thus we are taught that as individuals we "know 
nothing," and yet that as a community we know still less, — know least 
" on the whole," — since there we can only "take the chances," count 
the straws, and call the result "Ethical." By this reasoning which 
can see nothing but size, — quantity, the Ethical, which, for it, is the 
"largest," becomes merely the quantity, (which is nothingness), and 
there is no Ethical quality (whidh is the only active reality) anywhere, 

■ But we have seen that the fathers of this republic "discovered'' such 
a quality, — real because active, — Ethical because having a known law 
of its own, a moral law. They found it in a rational reality, not a 
"fact," but a maker of facts. 

They called it forth to the work of creative invention of machines, 
and also to do whatever instruction it might be capable of offering in 
the form of Literature,— an invention of mind operating only upon 
minds. How that can be done, — mind made to know only in and by 
its own sole action, (not in one merely but in many), is also a mystery 
for the mechanical thinking; — but the fact is beyond question. The 
how, the method, maybe more or less indirect; the external means may 
be infinitely multiplied in the Natural sphere, but even there the 
knowing itself must be at last an act for itself. The seeing, the hear- 
ing, is the same through eye or telescope, through ear or telephone. 
But whether near or afar be the object, and whether simple or complex 
the machinery, that which sees or hears must be an act of knowing and 
interpreting for itself. What at last is the highest outward knowing 
of this sort, but a resort to an outer means which, the more you com- 
plicate it, the more you need to condense the meaning of the cipher by 
which you interpret it? And, vice versa, the simpler the cipher the 
more it means; for it is made to mean a thought Hence the thinkiog 
must be highly developed either to create or use such means. It indeed 
must at every step be the creator of all it knows, the spirit within de- 
veloping that into "ideas;" just as all the means for organizing its see- 
ing and heaving must be created, either by it or for it, by an infinite 
thought and will which knows and acts. 

Thus, on the side of Education, not less than on the side of Moral- 
ity, we have a religious reality as "first principle" and only true start- 
ing-point. And this principle is peculiarly made clear in the sphere of 
literary education. That requires a language, — an absolute cipher- 
form' which Thought alone can make for itself or interpret as meaning. 



186 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

..nything. This, too, is a mj^stery for the Natural theorists. They 
think the "word" must have preceded the "power to think abstractly." 
Since it is made and used for that purpose, the made must precede the 
maker! This cross legged tailorism in scientific theory leads to a sim- 
ilar strabismus in religious theory of language, — it must have been "re- 
vealed" or how could man have ever "understood" it? But since this 
requires a second revelation to the "understanding," of what is meant 
by something created for it to understand, and which can mean only 
what it is thus actively understood to mean, it would seem that the 
simpler way to effect the desired purpose would be to enable this men- 
tal act, which can "understand," to also create for itself any such sj^m- 
bols which require to have their meaning "revealed." In this way, 
the "revealer" reveals his own thought after a method of his own mak- 
ing, and only requires another to know this method, this law of the 
operation. Whether this method, this law, is internal as a law of 
thinking, or external as a law of force, the "revelation" is always a 
knowing of law, and hence a free and active moral knowing. By the 
other supposition, there must be an arbitrary operation both without 
and within, and every false, as well as every true interpretation, must 
be due to some one who must constantly manage both sides of the 
"revelation" as fixed, and mechanical, and really unknowing: — hence 
it is not strange that such a view creates mechanical and horrid the- 
ologies as well as agnostic sciences. 

But the fact respecting Language is too plain to be mistaken. Man 
invents it, and its meaning is a purely conventional one; so that there 
must be an active knowing on both sides of it ; it requires unity of cre- 
ative act in its making and of interpreting act in its using, and thus is 
possible only for a rational community. It is Man's demonstration of 
his rationality; his affirmation that he is born of the Spirit and not of 
the worm. Until a foreigner is taught its meaning, he is a stranger in 
a strange land. He cannot read the law of this community, nor un- 
derstand the means by which they educate each other, — bring each 
other out into the freedom of a common intercourse in Thought itself. 
But he, being one of the children of Thought, can learn the meaning 
of all its formal creations. 

Until the little child is taught to lisp his "mother- tongue," he, too, 
is a pilgrim and a stranger, but from an angelic realm. For to him, 
merely by listening, is "revealed" the mysterious secret of his ration- 
ality, — that he, too, can create and act with those who create. He 
has a Divine commission and an infinite trust for the future. Blind 
and unfit to lead his steps are they who do not see this and comport 
themselves accordingly^ 

Education, then, when we look at its relation to individuals, has 
its greatest responsibility and power in beginning with the child. 



PRACTICAL EDUCATION, IN SCHOOL, ETC. 187 

Tlien, in Literature, it must appeal to men, and mainly to rightly edu- 
cated men so fir as it can be a power for good; but here it may run 
also into a vicious educating. Thus it goes with its good and evil 
teachings broadcast into the Press; and there, on the one side, festers 
iind fumes as a stench in the nostrils of Morality, while on the other 
it may be fostered for the good, by harvesters who would bind to ■ 
s;ether the precious sheaves, and by gleaners who would save 
■even the straggling grains, of a religious intelligence and morality 
vital to all. 

For schools, the American people have evinced a great zeal, — more 
and more where they have been most cherished. The taste for edu- 
cation is one for which "I'appetit vieat amangery It "augments 
with feeding," — a fact so contrary to all sensuous theories of it, that 
this alone ought to abolish them. There is no getting sated by a true 
education, for either an individual or a community. It grows more 
and more into a need because what it "feeds" is insatiable. Rather let 
us drop aU these sensual-tending metaphors, and recognize the real 
fact; that true Education is not of any devourer at all, but of the cre- 
ative which never tires of creating, and ever finds more and more oc- 
casion and means for it. This has already been pointed out as the life 
of commerce, the life of all human law, the life of the Nation. Here 
it is found as the promise and best proof of immortal life for the indi- 
vidual himself; as rational, there is no limit to his inventive aspir- 
ations, and no limit can be set to his outer power or inner intent as a 
•creator. 

The Nation has been liberal, rather than discriminative, in its aid 
to schools. Land-grants have been lavished more on mechanical pur- 
poses than on schools; as though the former were more pressing if not 
more important. In some cases perhaps they were so. But neither for 
the one nor the other purpose, has the Nation exercised a careful judg- 
ment and assumed its due responsibility. A suggestion has been made 
in a previous chapter as to how it can come to the aid of the States in 
the matter of Education. To this may here be added another: — 
whether it would not be well, under due reserves of power for exi- 
gencies, to dedicate the entire remainder of public lands to accumula- 
tion and preservation of an Educational fund to be administered 
wholly by National law. 

The need for these measures is the greater because, owing to cir- 
cumstances as well as choice, the States are unequally developed in 
their educational means and methods. Tlie Nation, acting for all, 
could properly discriminate in favor of those who have hitherto been 
willingly given least, and also of those who now need it most, — the 
same parties evidently. In such a case it would be difficult to tell who 
■would be benefited most; but it is generally the giver rather than the 



188 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

receiver, — if there can be really any difference for a Reason so 
"blessed" in its very nature that its "giving" can be only to its. 
"self," — as we have seen in the case of "revelation." 

The States which have most favored education have the best schools. 
Yet all which have favored it have shown a zeal, not only for "com- 
mon schools," but also for high schools and even for colleges and 
universities. Nothing seems deemed achieved in this sphere till the 
highest is reached. And this is the true spirit, albeit it sometimes fails to 
realize that, in such a sphere, the highest must also be in the lowest. It 
is an ungrateful task to criticise such efforts. To erect a university in 
every State before its other schools furnish any students tit for it, and 
to call every academical school a "college," may sometimes betray a 
habit of looking rather to the form than the reality of education. 

So also the method of teaching in the public schools is sometimes 
reduced to a merely mechanical round for the teacher and a mere 
stuffing of the memory for the scholars Especially in mathematics is 
this injurious: because to teach "by rule'' there is to defeat the whole 
object of teaching mathematics; and while it renders scholars ineffi- 
cient in its lower branches makes them incapable of reaching the 
higher. The only object of teaching mathematics for rational pur- 
poses, is to show the child that he is master and ruler in the realm of 
abstractions, and can deal Math those in a freely formative way, under 
the guidance of a pure Reason within him. That is the lesson of the 
"mathematical" when properly taught; — that, as creative Reason ini 
Man, it makes of the mechanical a servant to him. In that sphere, he 
need take no rules even when made by other men; for the Reason; 
which made them is in him also. And unless taught to see and use this 
Reason, he is made to deem himself the "mechanical." It follows 
that a bad teaching of mathematics is a good means for enslaving, as a. 
right teaching is for freeing men. 

Hence, though some women excel in mathematics, it would seem 
that in every public school the teaching of them should begin, as it 
generally naust end, with a male teacher. This branch of education, 
which is most of all made the foe of true theories, can be shown to be 
really one of their b?st friends when its own "origin and descent" 
are rightly taught. And since it is one of the "three R's," and c'est 
U premier pas qui coute," it is very costly to err in the beginning. 
Women have almost wholly taken the charge of public schools, especi- 
ally the primary; and much as they hate the mechanical, they are most 
apt to be made slaves to it by " rules and regulations." With the best 
intent and the purest desire of all, perhaps, respecting this duty to 
educate, they would no doubt, in general, gladly be reheved from any 
responsibility in this merely abstract sphere, where they see only the 
coldness of Reason and miss all its concrete higher forms. 



PRACTICAL EDUCATION, IN SCHOOL, ETC. 18 D 

It is the more invidious to criticise the actuality of our public 
schools and universities because their official critics are often more in 
need of being criticised. The views and intents of those inside are 
generally clearer and better than of those outside. The latter, when 
they consider that they alone are paj'ing the piper, would have him dance 
bj" the usual false notes which self-interest always deems true music. 
Thus, for example, a journal recurs to the statistical method to enforce 
its rod of rebuke, and will sagely point out a vital error in the fact that 
it actuallj" "costs more per head" to educate in the high-schools than 
it docs in the primaries. Yet, by the same criterion, we ought to won- 
der that it costs more to feed on luxuries than to diet on rice like cheap 
labor. If we are to judge the cost, therefore, merely by this sensuous 
rule, only a simpleton would fail to anticipate such a difference. But 
when we take a true criterion of profit and loss in such a business as 
education, are we quite sm"e the balance is not just the other way, the 
higher the teaching? 

Such absurd views of what is to be attained by education, on the 
part of those who falsely think that they alone pay for it, prevent those 
in charge of it from realizing their highest and dearest aims. It cannot 
be said that in this country the highest education can get even a fair 
hearing for its claims before the public, because a miscellaneous public 
is not really fit to judge of what it is. Nor can it get a very high real- 
ization in even our best universities; for even there the virus of a 
mechanical thinking poisons the well of true thought, and many would 
whistle down the wind all but a merely formal inductive science. This 
is deemed "practical education" by some of its bigots; because, accord- 
ing to them, it professes not to know what it begins with, nor what it 
works with, and to progress towards an "unknowable." Thus 
they declare it is "practically" dealing with what we know noth- 
ing at all about. It is quite absurd for one who concedes that he has 
no true theory to claim that he alone has true practice. There is no 
Truth really recognized at all by such a "practical education.' 

From the prevalence of such views, and because education has been 
left to States, localities, private effort and all other agencies rational or 
whimsical, it is not singular that we have no real organization of it in 
any complete way. Great as may be the "rush" for education, it 
seems to be at least higher-prized if not greater in the direction 
of billiards, boat-races, prize-fights and other "manly sports." Even 
our colleges are infected with the English taste for these; and it is 
really supposed that an intellectual man cannot be "made" without a 
large supply of muscle, — a theory which is apt to run into worship of 
the bull-dog. Yet any of these half-way physicians, not finding any 
muscle in the brain where alone he has come to look for the "mind," 
may safely infer that too much blood in the muscle betokens and will 



190 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

soon occasion too little blood in the "mind." Again, that "great 
principle," habit, is a very exigent one'^; it, too, "grows by what it 
feeds upon," but it perishes for lack of that. When this is applied to 
bodily habits, as a matter of health, it is found that in fact every busi 
ness must have its own habits, and that Man's adaptability in this re- 
spect quite distinguishes him from all mere animals. 

And while a habit of plentiful exercise is certainly very good for 
physical strength, yet let such a habit be accidentally interfered with, 
and the one who has taken even too little exercise will have the ad- 
vantage. The simple fact, then, is that "enough is enough;" and the 
enough is according to the business and the constitution and what those 
need most. When a Gladstone in his old age goes to chopping trees 
during raw weather, he finds that habits for the young do not hold 
good for an indefinite period. In general, habits of the mind, if kept 
good, can form, better than any physician, such habits of body as serve 
them best. 

But since the "practical education ''is in the ascendent here, it is 
but natural that while we have teachers' salaries jealously regarded 
and kept down to that of clerks, and while we have never heard yet of 
a prize for a best essay on methods of Education, and still less for any- 
thing philosophical, we have not spared the prizes for dog-shows, cat- 
shows, cattle- shows in general. And for the manly art of billiards, 
the "most enterprising city in the world' could venture prizes of 
$1,200, $800, $500, $300 and $200,— in all $3,000 for a single week's 
"play." Doubtless all this was seen to "have money in it," and to be 
■"profitable " in a quick way, however much it may have cost in gamb- 
ling, or other waste of time and money, and the kind of education thus 
favored. 

III. Nor in the sphere of our Literature have we, in the sale of 
what is printed, a guage by which to sensuously estimate its worth, — 
unless perhaps by the rule of contraries. Reason, indeed, in all its 
creations discards and despises such criterions, and they equally dis- 
card and despise it. The battle is forever set, forever waged between 
these two; let him who enters the field of Literature be sure of it, and 
rate not his "success " by what " succeeds most." So much the more, 
then, do we need a guardianship and encouragement of our Litera- 
ture. 

What is to be done here in the way of Education? Teach Men? 
They "don't want to be instructed" — say they who need it most. 
Even the "businessman" says "it is a bore; he is tired and wants 
only to be amused." Then he will scarcely seek the amusement in 
books at all, — but "outside" he finds a recreation which fast destroys 
him. And if he seeks a like pabulum in books, that will be quite as 
fatal, and perhaps prove even a more speedy philtre for "rest " 



LITERATUEE. 191 

But in any case, if Literature is to be only a field of amusement for 
men and women, then the curtain is up there as it is in theaters; and 
the same rule holds that " the public make the play," — decide the sort 
of Art they get. This is the great law of supply and demand which 
brings inventive faculty to its aid, by the supplementary law of com- 
petition. And here it is hard to get a monopoly; surely not by begin- 
ning with the best. The trick of the trade seems to be rather to begin 
with the worst, and to hold as nearly as possible to that as altogether 
the safest; — " there is millions in it! " Oh! the vileness of Man when 
he lowers himself to be merely amused, as though indeed he were now 
a mere grimacing ape, or even only a mechanical patch of nerves to be 
tickled. How much he pays for that, and how greatly more than he 
pays its costs. 

Clearly only right theory and practice of early education can save a 
people from the corrupting use of this baser literature and art, which 
are unworthy of the name. Even a good artistic taste, when generally 
cultivated, is better than nothing; for this revolts the pride of a habit 
of at least seaing decent forms and knowing what they are. This cul- 
tivation of good taste has made of the French the creators of fashion, 
and also given them the most finished literary art of any nation. 
Whatever may be said of their " corruption," it does not at least ex 
tend to their good manners; so that, according to the old adage, the 
"communications '' cannot really be so evil; this evil is made to bow 
to the good and say, "your servant;" as, on the other hand, the French- 
men says in battle: "our friends, the enemy." Hence, even in their 
worst literature, this "evil" cannot dispense with an artistic touch 
and some show of real inventive wit, if it goes elsewhere than merely 
into the gutters. This can scarcely be said of England or of our own 
country. Both the false and the morbid taste are freely cultivated by 
our literature; while that which shocks all human taste is certainly 
quite as "profitable " for publishers as that which appeals to the very 
highest literary taste even, to say nothing of that which appeals to the 
very highest thought and scarcely finds a response. 

There has been no National encouragement of Literature and Art 
here as in France. Yet has it not proved profitable there, even in dol- 
lars? Were our National Congress however, asked to enter upon such a 
policy, what outcries we should hear!— "Where is its constitutional 
power?" And "what is the use of it?" "Are we to spend our 
money in prizes for Art or for books? " Of course not, while we pre- 
fer to spend it on beer and billiards, and deem gambling the most prof- 
itable thing to encourage by law. 

It is probably useless to ask any such initativefrom Congress, how-- 
ever many we have there capable to find use for it and glad to do it. 
An "Academy" in this country for Literature, as for Science or Art, 



192 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

must probably depend for its origin upon individuals; though it might 
be generally organized by a cooperation of colleges, and thus come out 
of that higher education itself upon which it must depend for its first 
appreciation and reward. 

But the copyright law does not seem altogether perfect; it could be 
readil.y amended so as to encourage the best and discourage the worst 
literature. The principle of all property is trust. A man is also 
trusted when he writes a book. He must put nothing in it demoraliz- 
ing to the reader. If he does, the National law refuses to carry that 
or any other such vile art of his through its mails, and makes a crime 
of his thus using a National service; but it leaves to the States the 
punishment of his crime against public morals in making the article, 
and the right to Avholly suppress and destroy his production. The 
States do not fully perform this duty. And the copyright law does 
not extend to anything but what is offered to it; it therefore does not 
see the worst or legalize it at all as a "right. '" It indeed seems to need 
no help from law, but rather to feed only on the absence or ignoring of 
all law human or divine. It thus shows just what it is, an illegal and 
guilty art, — a device to destroy, not to recreate the man. Now the 
copyright law might be extended so as to require an inspection of all 
this "yellows-covered " trash, and prevent its publication by a National 
judgment upon it, which could catch it anywhere it seeks to show its 
guilty head and get its dollars. For these dollars are worse than 
wasted, twice. 

Those whose notions of "personal liberty" are squeamish, may 
well be asked whether that is not precisely the " article " which is here 
violated both by maker and buyer; and whether fathers and mothers 
have not some right of that sort also as against a corruj^tor of their 
children. England, France, Germany, ha\e forest laws against that 
" personal liberty " reckless of the future which is wasting our forests; 
and an old English law built up the " wooden walls " of a commercial 
supremacy, by requiring that every fifth tree planted should be an oak. 
But when a man writes a book, is he free to corrupt the young and 
waste the old alike; and has he no responsibility^ towards a heart cf 
Man, more vital to the Nation than that of oak? 

But, again, there might be and ought to be some discrimination as 
to the life of copyrights. It is needless for the man of constitutional 
scruples to rise up in behalf of "equal rights." The obvious fact 
about the merely amusing is that it can only have its day; it perishes 
almost with the using, and no publisher would venture upon anything 
very old in that line. Besides, the trust a man fulfils when he writes 
things of a merely temporary character is not to be judged as of equal 
right with that trust which tells him to look only to that good which is 
immortal, — that highest " truth which makes men' free." In short, it 



LITERATURE. 193 

"Would be easy and just to discriminate in the granting of copyrights so 
as to favor the best and disfavor the worst bv a true standard. Works 
of a higher Science, Art, or Philosophy should be a property at least for 
life, and in the highest cases perhaps even entitled to bequeathal, if 
not inheritance The law, however, is now liberal as to time; it grants 
twenty-eight years at first, and a renewal for fourteen years; either of 
w^hich is assignable; and the renewal may be taken by a surviving wife 
or child. But, only the filing of a "description " being required, 
:and no discrimination used, even the worst may be thus quasi 
legalized by the Nation, when it is subject to suppression by the 
State law. It would seem that, in this matter, there is quite as 
much occasion and right for protecting and profiting the very 
soul of the Nation, as there is in the case of Civil Service reform. 
And international copyright should keep the same principles in 
view. 

International copyright brings up another side of this matter, — the 
right of publication by other than the writer. This is at present un- 
limited except by State judgment of moralitj^ both in regard to foreign 
books, and also others when the copyright has expired. A book, then, 
is subject to the judgment of a reading public; and a publisher may be 
guided solely by his views of salability. Doubtless he should have 
no more freedom than the writer himself to pander to an immoral de- 
sire. Yet since the writer originates it, he at least would be justly 
limited in his profits from such work, by a term ever so short or no 
term at all; and others' profits are limited by competition. And if a 
State or National law does not prevent the publication of such works, 
home or foreign, it is because the community itself is debased in its 
morals. A literature calling itself "free," may thus become one fit 
only for slaves, and making slaves. The only way to make it fit for 
freemen is to insist upon its being good. 

Of course, the great principle of self-interest will be affrighted at 
all this, and again rise to explain how it is that the best government is 
that which governs least; and then it will count itself out by claiming 
to govern all. Clearly its own principle refutes itself as despotic and 
arbitrary; its " one " for government must be a tyrant either without or 
within over a many. Yet it points to the true principle that, for a 
many, any government, to be free, must be two-fold,— both from within 
and from without. And these two sides will correspond for a half-way 
government; if the one side is selfish in act, it will make the other 
such. But we have left that clamor of a blindfold selfishness behind 
us. Yet we may now hear an echo of it in the claim that " our litera- 
ture is doing well enough as it is." And then we shall slide off again 
into an exercise of our national vanity. But realizing our faults and 
trying to mend them is the only way to have anything to be proud of. 



194 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

especially in this sphere. Products here are serious always; the criti- 
cism of them by the comic shows that, and sometimes strikes for us the 
deepest and most warning notes 

Our literature has, on the whole, excelled most in the comic. In that, 
also, it has sometimes played mere buffoon; yet this is because the comic, 
with us is not witty as with the French, but moral as with the English, 
and freer than in England in this moral function. This sort of comic is 
always a note of warning proceeding from a sad sense of what is lack- 
ing, rather than of what is won by the human spirit.* Hence, in this 
way we criticise ourselves and mirror ourselves, by exaggerating, and 
thus showing the tendency — the whither we are going so fast. Thus- 
is revealed the unwisdom of any self that deems itself the whole, even 
of itself. Extremes are subdued, and the rational absorbs them in its 
own true work. 

On a higher key, but with as deep, and far sweeter, purer moral 
tone, our Whittier rises with his poet's wing into the true ^eaven of 
thought, and sings for us songs of an immortal virtue. How different 
these from the pangful strains of a de Musset, the restrained and 
doubting tones of a Tennyson; how nobler than either the classic oi" 
romantic, half-pagan, half-Nature worship of a Goethe! 

IV. Between this best and worst of our literature, take all the rest.^ 
and we shall find it printed more freely for us than for any other Na- 
tion by wrhat is called ''the Press," Whether so called because the 
most active and pressing in all its appeals, or itself the most urgently 
pressed in all its movements, it surelj^ exemplifies that the necessity for 
acting and being acted upon is quite as manifest in the sphere of 
thought as anywhere else. 

The Press, especially in this country, makes large selections from 
current literature, and is itself an inventor in that sphere. It is also a^ 
giver and a critic of opinions in all their phases theoretical or practical. 
Thus it is an educator for man and child. Finally, it passes over intO' 
the field of moral suasion, as a critic of private and public acts, and a 
reformer or deformer of the general morality. 

The Press, then, also has a trust to keep; and one of the most im- 
portant, since it is exercised over the whole ground of a civil polity, and 
even enters into the religious sphere. In general, this trust may be de- 
scribed as that of free speech. Education in schools is entrusted with 
the development of a thinking, truly free, because recognizing a religi- 
ous inner authority. Literature takes this trust in a creative way, and 
tries to show of what benefit the Education has been, and by its fruits 
to make known its character. The free speech of books may be legali- 

*For example, in our good-great Lincoln, — great in other respects as well as 
good in his " humor " ;— and whose favorite poem was that homely one: 
" Oh, why should the spirit of man be proud?" 



THE PKESS. 195 

zed or limited, or supressed, because it assumes a permanent form, and 
stands arrayed with a certain authority. Men talce from books nearly 
all their outer authority in Science, Art, Philosophy and Religion, and 
even in good taste and good manners. The Press, however, in propor- 
tion as it departs from the form of books and becomes " daily," loses 
this permanent character and authority. It assumes the trust of a free 
speech which must be hasty; so that some allowance must be made for 
this exigence which drew so plain a siieech from the old proverb 
writer. 

It is sometimes averred that he "might have said the same at his 
leisure." But the Press can do this only by printing what all men say, 
and thus letting the fact speak for itself. In our day the trust of 
the Press in respect to free speech has been everywere enlarged, but in 
this country far more than in some other lands; and this is but a mani- 
fest corollary of the electric rapidity of the age. But this larger trust 
should impose upon the press a deeper sense of its inner responsibility 
to speak only the true, and to speak it only in the spirit of the good, 
"more in sorrow than in anger;" for it has to say much that touches at 
the core of all morality. No censorship is placed over it; rather is it- 
self made the public censor. The law of libel in many of the States 
has been modified in its behalf, so that for merely stating facts of a 
public interest, it is not made responsible by the old rule that ' ' the 
greater the truth the greater the libel." That rule is indeed often, 
and especially regarding private or family affairs, a just one, like the 
maxim that "the truth is not to be spoken at all times.'' It is true that 
only "children and fools" fail to notice that there is a power of self- 
restraint in the human mind, which warns it that there is a difference 
between the right of free thought and the right of free speech. Speech 
should be kindly in spirit, good in intent; so that anger must be sup- 
pressed, or made that godly anger at evil only, which as a "charity for 
all" is a "malice towards none." 

Nothing requires more careful consideration than free speech. For, 
besides the questioning of its purpose as to whether it is intended to 
or can accomplish any good, it is to be remembered that, however free 
and true the thought may be, the form to be given it is not so easily to 
be made true and perfect, and indeed cannot ever. In fact, "the truth 
cannot be wholly spoken, at any time, or in any way;" and that 
should be the way to state the proverb and learn it bj^ heart. Besides, 
one must always take the responsibility for speaking something which 
may be as much misreported as it is misspoken, and Virgil has de- 
scribed the way in which Rumor plays cameleon at every corner. 

The Press, however, is assimilated to the category of children and 
fools, so far as it is by necessity a mechanical utterance. There is im- 
posed upon it, therefore, the responsibility to have rationality present 



196 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

to watch the machine. It is also responsible for whatever it invents, 
according to its moral intent. If this intent be merely S£lf-interest, it 
betrays its trust to the public. If it be immoral in itself, this also will 
be judged and punished; but only according to the public appetite for 
such service; so that here the audience makes the play and the Press acts 
up to the call. 

Another sphere of its trust, and where its freedom is most enlarged, 
is the criticism of those who are presented as candidates for ofRcial 
trust. It may be said that, in this country, the motive of the criticism 
itself is almost wholly overlooked; and the fact that the pro is as free 
as the con seems considered sufficient guarantee for learning the truth, 
though neither of them be true, nor perfect in their motives. This 
springs from the fact previously pointed out, that neither political 
party sufficiently inspects and cleanses its own candidates. Sometimes, 
one of these parties itself blackens them all it can before nominated, 
so that aftei-wards they are not likely to be whitewashed by the other. 
This other party has a thick-skinned way of defending anything after 
it is nominated, and hence it makes the grave mistake of deeming it 
little matters whom it nominates. In this m616e, the Press is a sort of 
irresponsible responsible; and looking wildly now to its trust to party, 
and now to its trust to country, it stands with divided heart, not silent 
however, but shouting with all its might. In this attitude, more comic 
then sublime, it makes "the gods" dissolve in laughter. The comic 
cures the tragic in this gladiator show of a canvass, and what the Press 
has said is taken with many grains of allowance, whether for its truth 
or for its motives. Every one feels that he has made more or less 
of that "fool of himself" which free speech is said to evince; and a 
general quits is called as the best return to the order of the day. 

Doubtless cases occur during a canvass where the Press does good 
service in unveiling the unfitness of men for public trusts. But it is 
clear that, in this respect, its service must be done before nominations 
or it will rarely be done after. And when done at any time it should 
be done with a calmness, sagacity and real justice which are seldom 
shown actually. For here the "public motive" alone should acquit; 
and so the law stands. But the mismanagement of parties by them- 
selves introduces heats and jealousies of a private nature into the criti- 
cism by their own press; and the "good motive" is very liable to be 
much distorted in its inner character and still more made ugly in its 
outer expression. Yet rarely will a press be cast in damages by a jury, 
in a case where fitness for official trust has been disputed, whether 
justly or unjustly, from pure motives or poor; — perhaps because a jury 
cannot judge of the motive very clearl}', knows not how much has been 
unsaid, and deems it best to give the benefit of the doubt to the public; 
;since in fact there ought to be no doubt of the fitness in question. The 



THE PRESS. 197 

law ana its execution in this respect tends to maKe even this childish 
foolishness of free speech confute, and bring to naught, that unwisdom 
which reigns in reckless or careless partyism respecting nominations to 
public trusts. If Wisdom is not allowed to act in any other way, it 
will set Folly to work for it. This is a roundabout and expensive 
route; but many seem to prefer it. 

As a selecter from current literature, the Press makes itself not so 
much a judge of that, as of the public taste. Such is its professed cri- 
terion in this country, — to print what the public want to read. 
This judgment is often a harsh one on the public. In making it, how- 
ever, each press selects its own public; so that it also judges itself. It 
declares what voice it hears telling it; "feed my sheep." When its 
criterion is self-interest, the native beauty and moral excellence of that 
great principle will be displayed in its selections, and naturally will 
also be advocated in its columns. Every public thus gained and main- 
tained can read its own character in what it pays to mirror it, and can 
judge for itself how much of a public it is, and how public such a char- 
acter ought to be. In general, the selections of the Press show the 
same judgment which has been previously suggested, that the public 
taste as a whole excels only in the lowest sphere of Art, and calls for 
the comic in its moral form as "good humor." 

In its inventive sphere also, therefore, the Press seeks for the 
"funny man," and of that highest type which can be most useful, — 
the keen moralist. Men of this kind have done some of the best ac- 
tive work of the Press. A general effort to be funny, however, has 
often made lapses into silliness, and thus shown that this grade of Art 
is the lowest, since the "wit" must be native and of a sort that cannot 
be elaborated without thinning-out. Its very nature is to be "iirst-off," 
and if not best then, it is not good at all. It is the fool's wisdom which 
is spokpn as soon as thought, and which he cannot hold, it is so good. 
Thus there is little or no Art about it. And hence the French are 
inapt for it and even wonder at it. They, like the Romans, are rather 
satirists than good -humorists. Their wit has a feline malice which 
must scratch, because it is a little ill humored from over-excitability. 
But it has a feline grace also; it must stop to make its claws and coVer 
them deftly with fur; and that's the fun of it for them. 

In its literary invention of a higher grade, the Press can scarcely 
Tae called as a whole an Academy for the fostering of fine taste. It is 
said to be improving in this respect, and doubtless is when it sets itself 
to serious writing. But when it deals in abuse, or even satire, it seems 
generall}^ to regard the most vulgar as the most forcible, or perhaps as 
the most likely to be relished by its readers. Even religious journals 
are given to slang, such as "sitting down" on an adversary, and other 
like expressions which reporters have evidently derived chiefly from a 



198 THE CIVIL POLITY OF TJtE UNITED STATES. 

criminal argot. This "hail fellow, well met!" to such a taste, cer- 
tainly betokens a broad good-humor as uniting even religion and 
crime. Yet such terms can scarcely aspire to a place in the dictionarj^ 
unless we deem the art of speech to require no polishing. In that case, 
the foolish free- speech will never have to pause. It will be let coin all 
the words as it runs, making a constant Babel of the language, and 
leaving in use no terms or phrases which show a morally careful and 
thoughtfully creative art. Note, for example, that the phrase above 
quoted represents violence as argument. 

The opposite of this fault is to run to a kid-glove emptiness of 
speech, as full of idiocj^ as the other is of "force." This is coined for 
"fashionable society;" and was illustrated in New York journals, sup- 
ported by the Tweed regime. When moral sense is confused, rational 
vigor is lost; the man makes of himself a mere tailor of fine phrases^ 
and sinks into the same silliness which overtakes the man who tries too 
hard to be funny. Thus buffoonery in all its phases invades an art 
which is not rational and moral. 

In the days of Washington, he was abused by the Press perhaps worse 
than any publi9 man now-a-days; yet generally in the old classic style 
of speech which has passed away, like every monopolj^ in Art, into 
that freedom of invention which has been called "Romantic Art.'' 
This gives ever}^ thoughtful man the right to a "style" of his own, but 
which nevertheless must be judged by the taste of others. In such a 
state of things, the moral taste must be accounted the highest; for it is 
judge of the intent, and through that seizes and recreates the thought 
itself which had done the work to be interpreted. This is just what 
gives freedom to all good styles, and says there is no monopoly for a 
"classic" which can only imitate Nature. The function of Art is ra- 
ther to excel Nature in her own sphere, and to pass beyond that into 
higher ones. When the "Romantic" is called, as it should be^ 
"Moral," it will not display so much folly in fine clothes, so much mere 
tailorism in Art, so much loss of sight of the moral in the merely in- 
tellectual invention as among the French, nor such a vague notion of 
what Art is as is betrayed by the English and ourselves. Beethoven 
uttered a true word from a great soul when he said: " the true secret 
of Art lies, after all, in the Moral." 

Thus the Press, to guide its trust of free speech, has this highest 
criterion of all, which, as inner and the voice of Reason itself, is also 
its only general censor, within or without, in respect to its expression 
of opinions. Here, it must be inventive; at least in its art; and a 
higher progress in that always evinces a better moral judge of it within 
or without. But, in general, the American Press may be said to be 
divided on the question, whether its function here is that of teacher or 
only that of weathercock. 



THE PRESS. 199 

The former, — tlie teaching, seems to be either modestly declined by 
that sort of immodesty which hoots at "reforming the universe,'' or is 
immodestly assumed by those who have a self interest they deem in- 
structive for others. The latter, the weathercock theory, shows in its 
modest champions a deep moral sense that " only the all know best " — 
all except the one who is to speak; so that he has no opinion till he al- 
ready finds it prevailing without his help. And the immodest on this 
side do not blush to make any wind that blows fill their exchequers 
nor to advocate any cause of a local or any other nature which serves 
their supposed private interest, whatever may be the public interest or 
however manifest. On the whole, it would seem that this "division" 
is so much interdivided that it is of very little consequence. In fact, 
the Press claims, in gross, to be one of the educators of the people. 
And so it is, in that it nurses and develops habits of action already ex- 
isting, or habits of thinking sometimes created by exclusive reading of 
some particular journals. But when any journal claims this high func- 
tion in any wholly moral way, and finds that " the people " don't want 
to be- educated except in the way they are already running, — then this 
function of educator is suddenly surrendered as found strangely unfit, 
or "unprofitable" at least, for the press in question. The education 
must be, on the whole, if not a mysterious, at all events, a two-sided 
affair, wherein it is difficult to say which is the educated, — the Press or 
the public. Here we have again illustrated the reality of revelation; 
always two-sided, the revelation must find in another the kind of act 
to which it speaks, — the free moral act. The Press, then, is demoral- 
ized just as much as the public is. Even in the matter of opinions ex- 
pressed by the Press, the relation to the public is the same as that of a 
theater. The expression is merely intellectual Art, of a moral grade 
chosen for "success;" and the highest moral Art must wait for its call, 
before it can even appear upon the stage; if the love for it be not in the 
people, it cannot show its form in the Press. Hence in the Press we 
have so many different ways of "acting," and of talking. 

This is a view of the subject which seems to banish any high mo- 
tives from the Press, and to render the highest moral conduct of it un- 
profitable. And, indeed, this is what limits it to a merely temporary 
work, such as it is; and also in that fact limits its capacity for evil as 
well as good. It shows, also, that one must not get a moral dyspepsy, 
or mental indigestion, by confining his reading within this sphere. Yet 
here, of all places, must that moral Art which is highest be taught to 
show its utmost cunning. The highest moral purpose is often here in 
charge of the Press; but it knows that it must depend upon a religious 
education of the people, must watch for it where it is, wait for it where 
it is not. For such as see it in this way, it is clear that the Art of a 
moral Press must be subtle, "wise as the serpent, harmless as the 



200 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

dove;" it must know how to tura evil into good. The very highest in- 
tellectual art is called for to make the Press efficient for moral reforms; 
no bunglers can do the work. 

But for those who see, in this tied relation of the Press to a public 
morality which is itself imperfect, only an excuse, and even a free 
charter, for making the vile more vile, it is clear that the reason fails 
for which the Press is peculiarly freed in its speech; and the general 
character of a journal in this respect should be taken into considera- 
tion by a jury. It is not freed to fatten monstrosity or feed frauds by 
"^ts advocacy, nor to aid the immoral in any way. Even the temporary 
character of such teachings does not legalize such conduct of a press. 
This constant poisoning of the springs of life is not included as a part 
of the trust; which is rather to be a constant sweetening and purify- 
ing of them. 

Now the fact that this constant poisoning also flows out from the 
Press, is overlooked by many managers and writers for it. Hence the 
former needlessly lower their estimate of the quality of truth and of 
art demanded by the public. And from the latter we often hear that 
dismal cry: " no man is responsible for reforming the world,'' a theory 
which is very apt to set him doing his part towards deforming it. And 
thus he contradicts his own theory of his responsibility; or else he 
counts himself a mere machine with no responsibility at all, and hence 
something to be guided by a Reason and watched by a Morality not 
his own. 

And where, for any Press, is authoritatively that inner Reason and 
that outer Morality not its' own? Evidently the former is in a con- 
science religiously enlightened, and the latter is in the actual morality 
of the American people. The guide is better than the watcher. Hence 
the Art is generally even worse than the worst intent; as is illustrated 
by those papers which undertake to depict the vile whether by graphic 
or written art. Only deep disgust results for anything nameable 
good taste, from either looking at or reading such art. 

The same two final authorities, inner and outer, show themselves as 
result of any general view of opinions by the Press. It is a mere on 
dit on every subject imaginable, religious, scientific, artistic, political 
or other. All opinions have their say. But when we listen to it as a 
whole, it is a mere jabber of debate. It is a "they say this" and "they 
say that," — and what don't they say? It gives at first the total impres- 
sion, formed at leisure, that the wise man formed in his haste. But, 
on maturer reflection, the listener comes to the conclusion that in the 
end he will have to form an opinion for himself, however painful a 
process this may be for himself, however derogatory to the authority 
of the Press as a teacher, and however impossible it may be deemed by 
a Science which considers all knowledge as coming from without. It 



THE PRESS. 201 

always comes to this, when you " take it ail in," no matter how big oi' 
how many this " without," the thinking in it must come from within, 
and see in all this outer "differentiation" only what it can itself 
think. So with the Press, when taken in its totality. It teaches in so 
many ways that it teaches in no way. Its total instruction is that, not 
"all," but each must "know the best," or there will be no best for 
the all. Only that "Best" can be resorted to bj^ any to finally guide 
his opinion, or to guide it at all to other than a merely temporary or com- 
mon judgment, such as may suffice for the government of a State, 
party, sect or science, — but not for the moral self-governaient of a Man. 

The Press, then, can only have tliis same criterion by which to 
judge or be judged. It can only deal with a present purpose or a pas- 
smg policy, which must be ever changing and therefore ought to be 
ever changed for the better only. But this route of " progress " ends 
only with the " best;" so that the "best " itself is the only ideal which 
can guide to these "betters " which are children of it, — growing better 
and not worse, because inspired by the "good." 

This law of a rational Optimism in respect to human acts or Art was 
seized and expressed by Mr. Seward as follows: "The absolute in any- 
thing is unattainable by Man; although, as a general law, we attain 
anything desirable only by striving for the absolute." Pessimism is 
perhaps more voiceful in the Press of this country than in that of any 
other; but it has its corrective in good humor. That dissolves the 
strained attempt at impossible service of either the evil or the good, 
and lets all down to that divine level of a felt good-fellowship, which 
knows it "cannot make a world in a minute," yet can live in no world 
which is not being made better. It knows it cannot replace that ab- 
solute good Divine which alone can think or do the perfect; yet it can 
live only in the light of that, and feel only in its good-fellowship of 
love that Man is Man. 

What disables the Press from being any total authority in the mat- 
ter of its opinions is, that in this respect it has no total organization of 
its Reason. Had it that, how many irrational creatures would slink 
out of it into their native darkness! Tlie Press is founded on Reason, 
but it is a mere scattered exercise of it which reduces its totality to a 
self-neutralization, — mere expression, words onl3^ In that aspect, it 
illustrates what a people would be without a rationally organized gov- 
ernment. In the sphere of opinions, this is impossible for the Press; 
because just its function is to let loose this difference of opinions, so 
that they can be compared, conflict, and bring themselves into utility 
without the no^opinion of the " all" being accepted as the "law," but 
only that "best" to which this "all" points as its origin and safe 
guide. This "all '' must be organized towards its " best " for a State. 
The Press cannot do this for its opinions, but it can for its mechanical - 
work, — its news-gathering. 



•202 THE CmL POLITY OF THE TJNITED STATES. 

And, as if good-humoredly conscious of its farcical plajang at 
teacher, as well as shrewdly aware of its really most essential character 
as a mere teller, — whether of news or opinions, — the American Press 
has put this news-telling foremost in its claims, and made it its ambi- 
tion as a newspaper to " beat the world/' Nor are these claims un. 
grounded. In "enterprise " at least, if not in good taste, or in strict 
regard for truth, it has led the way and taught that to all competitors, 
if it has not excelled them wholly. 

This organization for news as yet only tends to be total; it must be 
world-wide to be most profitable. And thus our enterprise finds that 
what is best for all costs least for each. At present, however, it has 
not realized this federation of the world, and clings still to the more 
expensive ways of competition and monopoly, which are less fruitful 
and more subject to abuse, — in this sphere, in the forms of "sensa- 
tional ' ' Art and falsehood in fact. There are some features of mon- 
opoly, therefore, in existing methods, which may be objectionable as 
against worthy competitors, yet seem inevitable to any imperfect sys- 
tem. They may also be made to serve the good, however, by shutting 
out the worst part of the Press from the category of best newspapers, 
and thus tending to give the largest circulation to such as are respect- 
able in character. 

It is sometimes said, '"the Press is not a profession." It is true we 
have Taot j^et heard of a "professor of journalism,'' though we have 
of hair-shearing, nail-paring, corn-curing, and other arts of "physical 
culture;" perhaps because these take a deeper view than do some 
journals of the power and duty of human nature to transform itself 
into at least "a thing of beauty." The word "professor," meant as 
"teacher." is also, as we have seen, of somewhat doubtful appli- 
cation to the Press, since many of them profess to reject it. But laAv- 
yers, doctors, clergymen are, or were, called "the learned professions;' 
as though thej' also, having a monopoly of "revelation," could not 
teach it. And none of these are usually called ' ' professors" ; the Art 
is locked up in the "guild," as an awful hypothetic mystery, — itself 
"revealed," but how, nobody knows. 

Let it not be thought Ave can touch too often to the quick these ab- 
surd views of Art and Science; because we need to realize that they 
are merely habitual, and can be remedied by a better thinking. We 
must be duly grateful to all our human ancestors and teachers ; but 
must not accept such habits of thinking even from a "mother-country;" 
for she also, with her deep moral sense, is struggling bravely to get 
out of their toils. The "times have changed and we With them." The 
Press has arisen as an immediate electric utterance, which allows no ar- 
bitrary "teaching," but crowds all that out, and says: "the light is every- 
where," as a Reason which speaks to itself or finds no "understanding." 



THE PKESS. 203 

The Press is a "'profession," in the true sense that it demands 
learning, and must know that it knows. And in this sense of the 
word, it calls for the verj^ highest Art; and no kind of knowledge can 
come amiss for it. Its managers generally rather underrate than over- 
rate the qualifications for it, or else misjudge them by a false standard 
of their own interest or of the public capacity and demand. Despite 
all their professions their practice leans towards '' cheap labor." There 
is always an oversuppl}' of this; so that it is easy for any trade or in- 
ventive calling to deteriorate its products b}' depreciating those who 
make them. In the Press especiallj", the highest ability is not invited 
either to or by its work, when this becomes degraded, either morally 
or artisticall)^. Vain to expect the highest creative activitj' in behalf 
of a bad cause, or from those who have no moral genius for insight 
and utterance of the good. The very law of Reason prevents this. 
Truth is a double-edged sword which cuts the hands of those " brilliant" 
Philistines, who are supposed to be so efficient with their pens on 
any side of any question. Not good but bad Art is best for a bad 
cause; (it "knows its own''); and to that, such a cause t.^kes at once, 
whether as cheap or gaud}'. Xo really fine Art can help it; because 
fine Art is Moral Art, and cannot exist without sounding the kej- note 
of the good. 

The work of the Press calls for the highest Art in every way, and 
for the most thorough training to it, just because the work admits of 
no delay; if done well, if must be done bj' one already an expert. It is 
called upon to criticise the best works in all departments of Literature, 
and can onlj" show its ignorance unless it have the highest judgment at 
jts service. This task, fonnerly performed only hy " quarterlies " and 
regarded as fit only for the best hands,, is more and more assumed by 
the daily press. And the quartei'lies themselves are running into 
monthlies, and tending to lend themselves to mere sensationalism and 
notorieties, as most profitable, or on the great principle that the num- 
ber of readers decides the merit of a writer. SucJi periodicals would 
unquestionably reject a Shakespeare or a Goethe in favor of an Oscar 
Wilde in Art; and in Science or Philosophy thej' would recognize 
nothing till it was recognized for them by others. They wed them- 
selves to the old till it is stale, shut out the new as though it were a 
crime. Thus they are destrojing all function of their own sphere for 
recognition and development of a choicer, more elaborate thought. 
The result is that their work is as hasty as any other, and there is no 
choice left except between books and the Press. 

But this demand for fine artistrj' in the Press exists most where it is 
least suppUed generally, and least paid by its managers, — in the report- 
ing of news. Although this is confessedly the " backbone " of the 
business, it is by no iheans a hidden one. Yet managers seem to re- 



204 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

gard a skeleton and death's-head look for it as the most profitable per- 
haps; at least they show little true appreciation of what skillful and 
trained art is needed for such a work. A good reporter is a real treas- 
ure. His business is indeed a profession which requires a native genius 
for it, and a good training of heart as well as head. Those who think 
they understand it best generally comprehend and perform it worst. A. 
bad manager knows neither how to select nor train men for it. He 
deems it a vulgar business to be performed by the most vulgar. Thus 
he makes of the most vital function of the newspaper an essentig,lly 
vulgar and corrupting one. 

Reporting, on the contrary, is a serious business. It purports to 
give the picture of life as it is every day, from near and far. It is 
holding the mirror up, not to Nature, but to Man himself. But it is to- 
be remembered that the newspaper, like merely superficial history, 
may choose to give us only the worst side of things, — the wars and 
murders, the conflicts and divorces. Indeed, as " news," it finds little 
or nothing to reflect into pictures of beauty and peace, from the fruit- 
ful haiwest-fields or the happy homes. The reporter, then, has to deal 
chiefly with the morbid, — the diseased side of humanity. He ought to 
realize that this is not all, nor even the half, thank heaven! Let him 
not play the part of mere sexton, or still worse of a Mephistophiles. 
Let not the journal itself, with eyes so much called to the worst things, 
exaggerate them by a constant pessimism bred by such exclusive brood- 
ing over the morbid. A bad newspaper is given to gloating over such 
things and making "sensations" of them. (The word itself shows 
that Man, merely by thinking falsehood, can make his "sensations" as 
horrible a hell as he pleases). A journal meaning to be decent, but in- 
clining to pessimism, is apt to "try" and to ''hang" in its columns 
every one accused of ill before he has had a legal hearing. Thus it im- 
itates and fosters that practice of lynching which has no patience to 
wait for the whole truth, or no confidence in the rational methods of 
the law, — which are of course themselves derationalized by such a mor- 
bid spirit. 

But the reporter's work is, in all its branches, sad or gay, a most dif- 
ficult one. It is a fine art to serve up some facts. A decent public 
knows how to appreciate it when it is well done. It takes a genius to 
do it well; and most of all for a sick public. It is a medical art; no 
quack will answer; he kills instead of curing. Managers may deem it 
cheaper to sugar than to gild the pill; but that is a mistake in their cal- 
culation. They may judge that the most ofEensive is the most de- 
fensive; but that is not so in medical practice. More than half 
the battle for the patient consists in keeping up his courage. He 
must have ever kept in mind that there is in Man a Divine creative 
art, both to fashion his body to beauty by good thoughts, and also to 



THE PKESS. 2(l5 

sustain it against disease by good courage, — more vital and powerful for 
him than the vis medicatrix Naturae. Resort must be had to the same 
nobler powers and immortal courage, as the onlj^ manly way to meet 
and defeat those poisonous vices whose ravages are reported to us. 

The reporter of them needs to know human nature to its very 
depths, — so as to see what cures as well as what kills. "It does not take 
a rogue to catch a rogue." It is easy enough for any man to be some 
kind of a rogue, but not all kinds, — rogue in general. The profes- 
sional one always has merely his particular ways; and, absorbed in 
these, he fails to notice what the freer, wiser man, who looks all ways, 
sees and tracks him by. Thus always a bad man is better understood 
b}'- a good one than by himself; for, as bad, he is self -blinded, — he is a 
poor thinker. 

So every bad thinker is a bungler in his Art. One who has to report 
either the tragic or comic sides of life, and all other phases of it, needs 
the highest freedom of thought, so that he can put himself at any 
point of view, and tell what is seen there better than those who stand 
only there and have "fixed views." In reporting all this, even a sim- 
ple statement of facts requires much penetration. But what oppor- 
tunity this offers for presenting them by the light of a higher principle 
which sees all, illuminates all. What chance for that good humor 
which can condense, in a word that expresses the lower fact while it 
relieves the higher feelings. What field for that subtle wit of the 
French, which, when there is need to scratch, knows how to do it arti- 
tistically, and to serve up the follies of men for us, in a way which cul- 
tivates good taste and a language fit for polite uses. 

The reporter is the moralist of the Press. Its practical morality is 
what he is, or is allowed to be. Thus again we find that, on this side 
of the Press where it claims to be most useful to others and most 
profitable to' itself, it judges itself while it judges the community, on 
the point of morality. It chooses, and cannot help but choose, to take 
a part in either reforming or deforming the morals of the people. And 
thus it performs its trust;— according to the choice it makes. Thus also 
it guages its Art. If it merely watches the worst and apes the "ways 
and manners" of that, it is no artist at all. For Man is not made to be 
mere imitator of Nature; that sort of "classic art" is fit for pagans, 
not for Christians. It may be regarded as the acme of Art by an Eng- 
land which can only see a "Natural Science," and which therefore 
suspects her great Turner "had a defect in the eye." But what we 
need is, not this holding the miri'or up to Nature, but the inner recog- 
nition of himself by the spirit of Man, and of that power he has to 
make a mirror of his thoughts in his own Art. There, Mill be found a 
different sort of Art which can and must exceed that of Nature, be- 
cause moral Art. Divinely free, responsible for evil as well as good, it 



206 THE PRESS. 

must prove itself capable of curing all its own faults b}' recurring ever 
to the standard of the "best,'' and thus "oTercome evil with good." 
But this is a "progress:" — a progress, however, which cannot be 
merely in the outer art. The inner reality which betters that, must al- 
ways be there within as an absolute reality, which knows it cannot be 
fully mirrored even in its own Art. This "progress," as Science, is a 
triumph over ]S"ature; as Civil Polity, a triumph over " self-interest." 
In the best Ai-t of the Press, it is both. The work done without is also 
a work done within. A press which manfully does its outer work, is 
possessed of an inner manliness which is rising ever to a higher rejoic- 
ing. The world moves'? — nay, the spirit moves; — moves in world and 
men and all. And in the organized Nation, too, it moves as the crea- 
tive spirit of Man, placing there without ever a better moralitj', nour- 
ishing ever within a "best" in the bosom of Religion. 



CHAPTER XI. 

MORALITY. 

I.— Spheres and Modes op Moral Suasion. 
II. — National and State Laws op Morality. 
III. — Moral Use op Evils. 

That "Best," in its Divine Reality, is a transformer of Nature, a 
creator of rational selves, and a destroyer of selfishness. In civil poli- 
ties, it appears, first, as a best Man without, — a law-giver; next, as a 
law-giver within, — an "interest" ; finally, this law of interest ceases to 
be mistaken as selfish, it "is among " many selves all rationally free at 
last because religious. And then the "authority" of the Man without 
and of the Man within come together again in the Divine Reality. It 
is a personal authority, and no longer a vague authority of an abstract 
truth, or of a subdivided, scattered, partial interest. Man is interested 
only in some known truth, hence finally only in persons; for truth has 
no reality except in them, it is the act of a good person. What alone 
can fully interest any or all, is what all can love, — a good person as in- 
ner authority for Truth, a society of such where the aim of all is this 
personal goodness. Towards this interesting result, the Truth itself is 
in all an active moral suasion, a mutual interest and authority. A 
favorite and frequent word for Mr. Webster was this word "interest- 
ing," as if he divined its double significance, its absorption of all that 
is abstract as Truth into a personal reality for Man. (See quotation, 
p. 161). 

I. Every man who looks largely over either history or the actual 
world, sees that in civil society men not only have but need direction 
and guidance from without, as to what they shall do and how. It 
seems, at first, that this direction is only an outer affair, comes only 
from without; and then the only question seems to be, what shall thus 
direct them, force? or Reason? But what they want is a common law, 
a conventional method for mutual action. And whatever they have as 
such is recognized as a law, whether it be deemed a law of force or of 
Reason., Hence this recognition and acceptance of the outer authority 
as a law, shows that the direction is also from within. For this knowing 
of a law is possible only as a rational act. And it is so whether the outer 
law be taken as only a law of force or only a law of Reason; — although 
in fact it must, for Man, be both, and a designed relation of the two. 



208 THE CIVIL POLITV OF THE UNllED STATES. 

Men are slow to see this, because they no not i-ecognize within them- 
selves the fundamental relation of these laws; that in every man is a 
power to use both, and also such a relation of them that, in using the 
law of Reason, he knows the law of force, and thus can become as free 
a ruler over that without as he becomes within. And his need for this 
outer teaching, by his own practice in creating States, is rather to show 
him the relation of these laws than the laws themselves, since he is so 
slow to become conscious of it within. His science of mind and of 
matter tells him of these laws, but not of their relation, so long as it 
does not realize what it is doing In thinking law, method. 

Not seeing, then, this relation of the two laws either within or with- 
out, at first, the man seems to himself to be directed only frorn without, 
whether by force or Reason, by Nature or by Civil Society; (for lie 
builds his societies on just such a relation as seems to him the fact as 
to his own knowing). But in that case he seems a mere thing. He 
may say he knows nothing either of what he does or of how he does it. 
Yet, however agnostic he may profess to be, he must practically reject 
this theory, or do nothing. But the more he professes to be agnostic, 
the more he reverts into an arbitrary individualism,, and claims right to 
be governed the least possible from without. He wants this inner to 
*' do it all," the less he sees " what it is,"' or how it can do anything. 

Hence come vague views of Morality by both extreme parties; the 
one finding it only externally but superstitiously; the other ignoring it 
altogether, since he finds it not within as a known law of Reason. For 
evidently Morality must be the knowledge of a law in order to be free 
obedience to it, even if oaly the law of force without. And if an exter- 
nal law is obeyed because reasonable, then the reason of it is also re- 
cognized and yielded to as good autliority. For Man, then, there is 
always this double positing of authority and of Morality, both without 
and within But he passes from the superstitious perception of the 
fact to the clear rational view of it. 

Thus the broader look referred to over life or history, gives the half- 
reflective man an impression more or less vague of a "moral suasion," 
which operates, he sees well enough, but not how; he sees "that it is," 
but not "what it is." Hence he is superstitious and talks about "a 
providence that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will." But is 
this providence without or within, or both? The selfish man tends to 
think it is within only, and that all without is its enemy. "Every man 
must shake for himself" is his motto, and his hewing is rough indeed. 
But Science comes to his aid, and "finding" the law of force, makes of 
that a servant of Man. 

Unless Science, however, also becomes aware that it is working by 
real knowledge, and that its higliest power is in a real act of knowing 
and following a rational law, it is as yet a blind science, not recognizing 



SPHERES AND MODES OF MORAL SUASION. 209 

that its own power is the power of Reason. Yet, at this stage, since 
there is at least a perception of necessity for best methods, legal 
methods in the use of force, there may grow up an abstract worship of 
this law in all its materialistic forms; property among the rest being ac- 
counted such. Then this property, really created by Man, but taken 
as mysterious in its origin, seems to be the sacred; — a pity to destroy 
it! — and material science seems to be the "providence of nations," 

Go a little further in consciousness of what is really going on here. 
— see that this knowledge of law requires something more than mere 
memory of facts and worship of ancestors, — and we get out of China. 
We 2?erceive that Education must deal with the law of Reason, teach 
us how to form theories, discover laws, invent, design, create. Thus 
far, however, there seems to be no call for moral suasion from without. 
Rather the rod alone seems needful, and the "moral" is watched 
within as rather Inclined to be immoral than otherwise. It is there 
then, in its first "imp" form, (capable of being "rogue in general,") 
and Education, in "Natural Science " only, very properly stands with- 
out, as corresponding to that power of design which, as yet, is only 
taught to see and want to handle the law of force. 

These two alone , however, are insufficient. A morality which only 
nourishes an imp must keep him always tied, or else he will ' ' act like 
Satan." Education, therefore, must be under a theory of intelligence 
which recognizes the relation of Reason itself to a moral law, and of 
the highest kind, — a truly religious law. This " higher law " is what 
alone can set things to rights as property, and set persons to tKeir 
rights of liberty as truly free, — free only to be true, trusty, reasonable. 

This enlarges greatly the scope of this external Morality, since 
that, as moral suasion, must be a religious education. The methods to 
be taught are not merely laws of force or modes of using it. The man 
is a thinking-being capable of designs of all sorts. He must be taught 
to use his capacities so that in doing the l)est for himself he is also do- 
ing the best for all. He is not to be restricted by any external rule 
which would only deprive others of what inventive genius he has, and 
thereby also deprive him of any real moral or even intellectual free- 
dom. Such a rule is based on the silly theorj'' of Education, which re- 
g'ards all ideas as coming from Avithout, and hence can expect no man 
to do any share in offering them. Nor is he to be left without all 
needful guidance and authority from without; for by that alone can 
he be related in harmony with others, and all rise together to the 
highest creative action. Reason always gives for this harmony the 
diapason in every moral heart, but external Morality always sets the 
keynote of every new tune, so that all can bear their parts in it. 

In other words, the methods of action , so far as general, are made 
known by a common rational law. This law can be uttered without 



210 THE CIVIL POLITi'' OF THE UNITED STATES. 

by Man only imperfectly, and rather merely to warn against the had. 
Yet he can and does make of his civil polity itself a rational means foi- 
helping all to a higher actual morality. He makes of a Nation a moral 
authority, a moral suasion for all. But this is made by all, and its mor- 
ality rises or sinks for all. So also with other forms of organized ex- 
ternal moral suasion or authority; they are made by a many. The 
needs of self or others suggest all the inventions either theoretic or 
practical. One suffers for others through sympathy, and needs to 
organize charity, or moral suasion, or laws as the case may require. 
But this sympathy with others leads to imitation also; and mere imita- 
tion, not being freely inventive, but slavish, is inclined to imitate the 
worst rather than the best; so that evil habits spread and infect a whole 
community, paralyzing its good inventions. 

Mainly in reformation of bad habits, then, does moral suasion do its 
best work. It does not make any habits; the man himself makes 
them. It only points out to him that fact, and refers him to a moral 
rational law he knows as authority. Thus for the Morality, as well as 
for the laws, of a civil polity, we return to the true individual point of 
view, and find it, in each case, to be one of religious relation and 
trust for the man himself. He is not treated as an agnostic. He knows 
that a rational power has made the laws and morality authoritative 
without. He knows that he has used a free moral power within him 
to make the habits which he presents as his actual character. And the 
question now is, whether, imperfect as that outer authority naust needs 
be, it is not after all, for him, a better one than he makes of even his 
Religion. 

We sometimes hear a man talk about his bodily habits as the very 
acme of a scientific health, and as indispensable for everybody as for 
him. This seems the more evident, since no one can change such habits 
at once without effort, and even pain; so that they are taken as laws. So 
also a man may mistake his own acquired habits of thinking as laws 
of Science in general, or of such a Universe as he thinks there is "on 
the whole ;' ' but since doctors disagree here also, the moral law does 
not seem to be " found," or monopolized by any of them, in that way. 
But every man, when it really comes to the pinch, frankly concedes 
that he knows somewhat of a moral law which he considers better 
than anything he exemplifies in his actual life and conduct. This is a 
pride of Man, not Satanic, a pride of knowing better than he does. 
This does not make him "fall," but helps him to rise from a fall like 
the " sons of the morning." Let even the worst thinker, or the worst 
actor, be accused of not knowing this law, and he will tell you to "go- 
to the devil;" as though he found a double authority for it, — in evil as 
well as in good, — and deemed the former a proper teacher of it when 
the latter is not recognized as sufiicient. 



SPHERES AND MODES OF MORAL SUASION. 211 

But communities also recognize it as better known within than shown 
without. Hence, on one liand, thej^ make their g-ood overflow in moral 
suasion; on the other hand, the maladministration of even a good law 
turns it to evil. But, for all the actors here, their actual morality is 
in their habits of acting; and these are formed by their habits of think- 
ing. A civil law, however, must be made by these latter habits, such 
as they can "agree to disagree " in a common thought of what will be 
a best common habit of acting. A religious view of what Man is, and 
of what it is his duty to think and do, may here lead all to create and 
recognize a common law and authority for acts, which is a better guide 
and authority for most than their own habits either of acting or think- 
ing. Even the manly pride referred to here refuses to create for itself 
a confession of immorality. It rises to a higher criterion for what is 
human law, than merely Natural law, or even human habits of acting; 
since to better these latter is the very object sought. A civil polity 
would indeed attain no character other than that of a despotism, did it 
not receive from all this recognition of it. as a rational authority for 
better acts than would occur without it. 

Yet no such human law can be perfect. Hence it cannot be made 
to truly represent a religious thought; nor even to enjoin b}" force a 
religious habit of thinking; for this is to reverse the relation of the 
laws of Reason and of force. Civil law is a law of unity and of 
brotherhood for a nation of men, but it is not quite the law of love. 
Through it echoes that as the law of laws, it cannot enact what is al- 
ready enacted, as a law of Reason only which can take no form of 
force. Human laws can be only made by human intelligence and be 
subject to all its imperfect habits of thinking. Where these are irre- 
ligious, and suppose self-interest to be the great creator of all that is 
good, then the "law of love" is held to be something good to talk 
about, perliaps, when no " business " is to be ruled by it; or as an "im- 
possible altruism" and hence impotent; and so it comes to be chiefly 
wielded as this mere "talk" against Religion, — that law itself. Hence 
it is not singular that Kossuth should say, when the sorrow of his 
stricken country was on his soul: "There is no Christian Nation on 
the face of the Earth." 

But Kossuth had no right to expect this in the form of outer acts;— 
no more than any man has a right to expect of his Christian neighbor 
to be as perfect in his acts as he is even in his thoughts. To say 
nothing of excuses for his not attaining to the highest law and the best 
method for his thoughts, it is simply impossible, even if he did, to ex- 
press them perfectly. Language and the Civic State are both forms 
created for this purpose by Man himself: and either of them is better 
than Nature. But neither of them is perfect nor suffices. Both are- 
necessarily arbitrary in their forms. Both must resort to the Man 



212 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Mmself as what "stands under them " as their creator, and hence in- 
terpreter. He alone can take the uttered word, or the uttered law, and, 
recognizint!,' the Reason which created it, how to its authority. Both 
of them, therefore, are forms of moral suasion for him; — forms 
which appeal to his own creative faculty, require him to thinli, to be a 
Man. 

But this is an arbitrary as well as a free way to reach the result of 
a mutual moral suasion. The form is arbitrary. The spirit is free as 
creating and transforming it, yet only in a conventional way, whether 
in respect to a common language or common laws. These must be 
.agreed upon, and then they are law. But the language requires edu- 
ation into the meaning of its words and the genius of its forms, or it 
does not afford to all its highest uses. So also there must be a careful 
education into the design, the creative spirit of the laws, pointing to a 
■common Reason as their basis and their life, or they will not afford a 
means for the highest mutual action. In all this process, Man is ere. 
ating for himself a larger, freer, nobler sphere of action, and of fra- 
ternity and love for all. But his is also the responsibility; and he must 
judge of his work. And as he can see other's faults easier than his 
own, because he is looking at "the way they act," so here in his own 
work he is looking at those laws, methods of acting, which he is so 
prone to overlook in himself. 

Such is the lesson Man receives from his own practice in creating 
laws and methods;— to study them, and not "things;" and to look 
within and without, but always to Reason alone as the highest law, 
and in its method to find the all-ruler. Now since, in his outer work, 
he must use such conventional and arbitrary means, he must neither 
expect unreasonably from them, nor attempt unreasonably by them. 
Nor must he, as individual, either foolishly claim that language or law 
must be made to conform to his views, tastes or interests alone; nor on 
the other hand, complain of not " seeing any sense " in such a langu- 
age, or such a law, when his own chosen habit of ignorance, or of vice, 
is what prevents him from seeing anything but a "sense" which is very 
Natural but not reasonable. 

Between these two fallacies of men,— the one failing to see the 
necessary imperfection of human language and human law, the other 
refusing to see any guide or authority for Man but his brutal senses,— 
the sphere of moral suasion is to be rightly found and kept. For the 
best man, no human law or language can express what for him is Re- 
ligious; nor does he attempt so vain an effort as to enact it, either in 
creeds for churches or laws for States. To all these he looks with due 
deference, and to them yields the authority necessary for a common 
action and a common welfare. But he sees that they are changing 
mortal creations, and does his part always towards making them bet- 



NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS OF MORALITY. 213 

ter: — here lie acts by moral suasion. On the other hand, the worst man 
looks to Language as perhaps for him a sealed book when written, but 
which as spoken he learns only to profane. And to human law he 
looks as a caged beast under a slave-master, and deems himself 
wronged by everybody, by God and Man, because he sees not the 
creative power of love in either God or Man. He is a subject which 
moral suasion can reach, but only hy the touch of a divine sympathy. 

Between these two, we all are both users and objects of moral sua- 
sion. A little reflection shows us that all cannot be done by human 
law, any more than by Language. The latter is at best but a cruci- 
fixion of the Thought, the former of the Justice, which creates it. 
Both must be created to act through forms of force liable to misinter- 
pretation, abuse and misuse. Every word unkindly spoken is a shaft 
of evil; no telling how far it flies. Every law of Man must work some 
injustice even in doing justice. It is nailed up to suffer, from its own 
over-zealous friends, as well as from those who hate it, — from those 
who raise it up as Justice, and from those whom it raises up, and who 
die if it dies and do not "rise again." Thus this human creation of 
law is 'a type of a Divine Reality which must use force, yet shuns not 
its suffering. And, like that Divine method, Man's also must needs 
bring to the rescue that Reason which, seeing the necessity, is willing 
to suffer for the good, yet also seeks to bind up the wounded and raise 
its fallen, by a moral suasion which says: "See! we all suffer alike by 
this law of force; let us rise together by a better law! ' 

II. It has already been observed that it is difficult to set any pre- 
cise limits to this sphere of moral suasion. Partly in the law itself, it 
is also partly out of it and cannot go in, yet tends to go in as a written 
law, when the heart of a people says it must, as a profession of faith it 
is ready for, and no longer doubts, since it is ready to suffer for it, as 
it must, if it needs to be written and "executed" in a form of force. 

There is always a sphere of moral suasion known as one for which 
this form of law is unfit. Yet there is also a moral sphere, recognized 
.as such, where offence against morality itself is taken cognizance of by 
the law and left to juries to judge of the fact. This is especially the 
■ case with our laws, where the English unwritten "common law" can 
keep resolving itself into a series of successively higher judgments of 
morality which may advance with the rising moral sense of the people. 
'This mode of making law might still be used. And it is eminently fit 
for this moral sphere when, as with the English, it collects a total judg- 
ment. In this country, as used by States, it is subject to merely local 
interpretations, which may be as much below a decent morality in one 
place, as they are, by a sort of self-poising for safety, thereb}^ made too 
extreme in another. The English, however, have themselves remitted 
some moral questions to a "local option," — probably because of the* 



214 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

similar demand by the corrupting influences of large cities for a pro- 
testant effort elsewhere. Thus the moral sense of a community seeks 
to right itself, and save itself from shipwreck from that activity of the 
vile, which seems by its own conduct to make it needful that Reason 
also shall "never slumber, never sleep." 

The tendeney, however, in this country, even in the States, is to 
make all law written law. This is good, if it denote a moral courage 
to make a clear and noble profession of faith; bad if it evince a vague 
notion that nothing is "law" unless it is written and enforced by a 
club. It may be worthy of reflection, therefore, whether, in respect to 
general guardianship and declaration of a recognized common moral- 
ity, the National government shall be looked to, and its judgments 
sought, either in the one method or the other. It is indeed now such a 
guardian, as general preserver of the peace when needful. But why 
not also a final court of appeal for construction of that ' ' common 
law," which must ultimately be a moral law, and ought to be construed 
by our morality and not by that of the feudal ages? The Nation is al- 
ready an interpreter of this "common law" within its own courts; and 
one of its statutes on this subject of Morality has been heretofore re- 
ferred to. This statute also denies carria.ge by the mails to circulars 
reputed to further frauds. Evidently injustice might easily be done in 
such a matter; yet inquiry into it might only benefit the fair means, if 
such they were. And such a method of seeking a trust, unless open to 
such inquiry, wears a suspicious look, as though rather a trust for 
gambling than for any useful purpose. 

It is further evident that in some respects the law itself, as well as 
the interpretation of its scope and proper means, must vary with cir- 
cumstances. This is the phase of its "police power," which cannot 
safely be too loosely or too tightly drawn, but must be left as a trust, 
and the officer be held to a proper discretion. He is thus to act by 
moral suasion so far as safe, and to resort to force only so far as ueces 
sary. Here is illustrated the very principle upon which moral suasion 
tends to act in this country, — merely in a local and fortuitous way, one 
extreme forcing another. But just as a police cannot be made rulers, 
judges and all, so neither can such a system of mutual antagonism, 
and oscillating extremes between virtue and vice, be a rational mode of 
developing a better law or a better moral suasion. 

It is recognized by all that police power and rights vary with cir- 
cumstances. On election days, it is not denied that liquor- selling must 
at least keep far enough from the polls to not let the gettingdrunk be 
seen From States, if not from cities, it is possible to get a law 
to keep liquor-saloons shut on Sundays. And local option enables 
some rural communities, where the moral sense is roused against drink- 
ing itself, (and where hence disobedience to it is more fatal), to abolish. 



NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS OF MORALITY. 215 

the selling altogether. It is this difference of habit of thought and act, 
in regard to use of stimulants, which makes in part the difference in 
the effects of them. For this reason, Germans cannot understand 
why Americans cannot take to their social and decent ways of beer 
drinking, without adding to them vicious features and unmanly ex 
cesses. This does not indicate a higher moral sense in the American 
than in the German, but perhaps rather a lower one, — a failure to 
see that self-control, self-government is what makes the Man, and 
that he must not let a habit either rule or degrade him, but must show 
himself the ruler as well as the maker of it. But prevalent habits of 
thought respecting personal habits, when violated by one who recog- 
nizes their justice, lead him by a sense of degradation to give up all 
self-control and act as if he deemed himself a beast. 

On account of tiiis different national habit, and the too great pre- 
valence of materialistic theories, Americans cannot or will not use even 
beer as do the Germans. Besides, our natives are less phlegmatic; and 
once excited, the stronger the drink the better. Still worse for the 
Irish; the "drinks" for them are generally the devil incarnate; Drinks 
are the losings-bank of the mechanic, the purgatory of the laborer, the 
bottomless pit for the young clerk; — for all a "sure thing" as a route to 
defalcation of some sort, through orgies of a worse kind to which they 
lead direct. For, as we have seen, the surrender of one's duty to his 
own inner Reason, by betraying the trust of personal libertj^, goes 
headlong to the betrayal of all trusts. It is no wonder that those who 
look only to this effect and not to the cau§e, are disposed to drop all 
moral suasion and resort to "prohibition" on the "liquor-question." 

Now the conditions and methods under which any mere bodily ap- 
petites or habits of men are to be fed by others, are evidently a matter 
for rational control in all ways, and for regulation by law. They are 
so regulated in all civilized countries. And it is clear that no irrational 
or criminal man can be safely allowed to perform such a trust. Nor es- 
pecially can poisons and stimulants in general be propejly entrusted 
for sale to such hands, but only to those who both know what they are, 
and feel responsible for refraining themselves from their misuse and 
for preventing it by others. These are the plainly rational principles 
upon which the selling of even the simplest foods are regulated by law. 
But about the liquor-traffic, the makers, executors, and even judges of 
the law, seem to get sadly fuddled in their view of principles. The 
vulgar habit of considering only the money, — the pocket-question, — 
enables the criminal class itself to organize the liquor-interest, to elect 
mayors, legislators, judges, — all with this dead man's penny on the 
eye, and deeming themselves protectors of personal liberty. 

When, however, a legislature has had the common sense to perceive 
that the character of a man entrusted with sale of liquors is the main 



216 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

question, since he sells something which attacks directly the personal 
liberty of the drinker, and through his that of all, they generally pro- 
vide some guarantees in that regard. When this is done, it is just as 
plain how to execute the law, as how not to do it. If a mayor be 
elected by those whom the law itself excludes from the business, he 
may make himself their slave and shut his eyes to what all others see. 
But when he does so it'is vain for him to play champion of "rights;" 
for in his judgment of rights he sinks to the moral level of these 
whom he serves. It is true, these guarantees for the character of liquor- 
sellers are too much neglected in the lawmaking itself They need 
improvement, and the execution of them should be ensured by a quick 
process of impeachment for the least neglect. 

But when we look at the matter in this rational way, as an affair of 
trust for all concerned in the business, where all are public officials, — 
it is equally clear that, on the other side of the "bar" also, is an indi 
vidual who has in trust from a higher source his personal liberty. 
Mainly, he is a subject for moral suasion. But if a man cannot or will 
not be a ruler over his own appetites, he subjects himself to be re- 
strained of his liberty. On this principle, the irrational man is sent to 
a drunkard's or other asylum for cure. Laws against drunkenness are 
rational; they are against what endangers the lives of all, the drunk- 
ards included. Hence every corporation is bound to protect the public 
against agents who abuse or neglect their trust from drunkenness. 
They are also justified, as policemen are, in ejecting drunkards or 
other indecent or violent men, from cars, or public meetings, or any 
other resorts of rational beings. This is a right of public decency 
which extends even to liquor-saloons, and, both before and behind the 
bar, may be made a real protection of personal liberty. It is not a 
mere law of politeness but of police. 

That "nuisance" which is made of himself by the drunkard, or 
other sensualist who brawls in his filthy self -degradation, need not be 
nicely measured, as in the old English law, to find whether it is an 
offence against property, real or personal, — a "purpresture'' against a. 
lamp-post, or some other grave offence against "things." We can 
come to the point at once, and recognize a moral sense in Others which 
is offended by this betrayal of a common trust to be decent and manly. 
If a man object that this moral sense is unknown to him, he must 
needs borrow one from others, or else from the law itself. It he say it 
is nothing tangible, let him begin to realize that it is the intangible in 
us which alone can suffer, and suffers most when it sees its own noblest 
freedom self-enslaved to any brutal views of its liberty. 

This deepest moral sense of a debasement which kills the very man- 
hood, is what makes women suffer most from the practice of drunken- 
ness and all other vices. And it is for them, especially, that protection; 



NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS OF MOKALITY. 217 

is afforded by the law from the very sight of it; — not that the eye is 
hurl, but the spirit offended. The Religion of Man is protected in the 
woman. But just because woman is thus protected by men themselves, 
where the law itself does not, (as it does not enough and cannot 
wholly), against the lewd or drunken man, women in general forget 
this fact, and the responsibility of the drunkard himself, and turn all 
their indignation against the one Avho sells to him. And not realizing 
how arbitrary, and more or less incapable of perfect justice, must be 
every human law, women have been chiefly the champions of prohibi 
tion." "Stamp it out, this fire which consumes us!" they cry; as 
though it were really an external fire. But the fire is within, and of a 
sort which cannot be stamped- upon at all. It must die before that 
moral suasion of which woman herself is the high priest, and whose 
altar she only deserts too often, when she essays to enter the ruder 
ways and undertake the harsher tasks of men . 

Not often enough, or sternly enough, does she banish the self-de- 
grading man from her saloon, nor even from her guardianship, or from 
the life-trust of her "heart and hand." Nor indeed ought she to be, 
even in her own sphere, an extremist; for her office, too, is to reform, 
transform, make better. Often, by the total sacrifice of her earthly 
weal, she may haply efEei"t this. But in her own realm she is con- 
ceded queen. The finer good taste of women makes the gentle man. 
The piety of the mother protects the child -and arms him for his work 
as a good soldier; — ttlling him, by a higher sanction than that of the 
Spartan, when she hands him his shield of a religious honor; "Return 
with this, or upon it!" 

Woman deserts this sphere even when she advocates a ' ' total ab- 
stinence," and adjures the man to that as a moral act. Is that to 
recognize him as a man to be trusted? Such a pledge is fit only for 
those who cannot trust themselves. But such are sick men, not well 
ones; they need healing by medical art. Ask the well man to pledge 
himself to be a real man who never loses his self-control, and never 
stoops to be a slave to any habit, --and he is asked only to do that to 
which he is already pledged by a public trust. Such things may well 
be asked by women of children, who need such appeals to a pride 
which has not yet recognized its Divine Reason, though it feels that 
stirring within, and responds to it under the voice of a true mother 
without. 

All extreme measures, either as law or moral suasion, have their 
necessary reaction, simply because they do not recognize a moral act as 
what alone it can be, — a free act, a self-government. Habits are 
largely controlled by good-taste, of which woman is chief arbiter. She 
reforms the habits of polite society, and refines the manners of men 
in her presence. Yet in matters of etiquette and fashion, she seems 



2] 8 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

slave herself to a sort of vague collective outer authority. But that 
outer harmony is only a rational way of evincing the inner freedom of 
all to invent. "Woman is free in her own sphere, in her own ways. 
Since these are not made or regulated in anj^ way by laws, she wonders 
why men cannot change their habits as freelj^ as she changes her 
fashions. Tastes change when fashions do, in respect to the merely 
beautiful. This presei'ves for woman, in the sphere of Beauty, its own 
freedom and power to be ever creative. In this way, the good-taste of 
the individual, which always knows how to excel in every beauty, sim- 
ple or complex, absorbs into -itself all outer authorities as merely made 
by it and for it. 

But Reason also works in the same way in all its other spheres, and 
holds the individual responsible at last, as free and because free. When 
women's tastes pass beyond the merely formal sphere of Beauty and 
grapple with questions of pure Reason, they can philosophize at once 
with that penetration to the good, — the moral, free, all-creating spirit, 
and with that holding to this as what ought to be in all if it is not so, — 
which man is slower to attain to. He is apt to worship his particular 
creation of "systems," when she sees they can onlj' have their day like 
her fashions. Yet she may not see that they must have their day, and a 
longer one than her fashions. In respect to Education, this fact de- 
notes an equal capacity in women for the highest thinking, but a 
proneness to put it all at once under the form of Religion. That is her 
true sphere. Her comfort, her strength, her home is in the religious. 
She cannot depart from it so unwittingly as man. Her Education can- 
not wisely overlook this difference, nor fail to secure from it the best 
results. By a longer route than hers, man travels towards the City of 
God, and is prone to deem it distant. How fortunate if he have ever 
beside him a voice which says: " Lo! it is with thee always, — even in 
thine heart! '' 

Enough has already been said in various ways, (and must have been 
ill-said if not convincing), to show that there is a vital right and duty 
of the public to protect itself, above all things, against the merely 
sensual greeds, whether in theory or practice. "With respect to any 
business which purports to feed even only the needs of the body, such 
a right is self-evident. For one which purports to feed only an artifi- 
cial appetite, the right is absolute and vital. Since such appetites are 
created by Man himself, he alone is responsible for them; they are 
precisely what he is to regulate. Any trust for supplying them is con 
Aided by a community which must be supposed to know what it is 
about, and to have as clear and full a right to regulate the sale of such 
articles, as it has to make them or to regulate their manufacture. 

In respect to their making; and how, there may be a question to be 
decided only by a general judgment. But in respect to their sale. 



NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS OF MORALITY. 219 

(whellicr as "drinks" or iu bulk, or ut, all), the matter may var}', as 
we have noted, with cii'cumstances,— days, occasions, localities, &C' 
This variability itself shows that it must be regulated bjr law ; that it 
can be thus regulated iu any way a people may choose; for such a busi- 
ness has no standing at all before any police necessity. Hence it may 
perhaps be best left at least to States. And if they do not regulate it 
in cities, so that it shall not be allowed there to fall into the hands of 
criminals themselves, or others with as little sense of moral trust, then 
"local option" may be necessary. But since this latter would be 
"rural" only, and cannot be general, it shows how illogical and self - 
contradictory are all such sporadic methods of treating a matter of life 
and death to a whole community. 

But all regulation, local or other, ought to recognize and treat with 
equal severity the abuse of personal liberty by the one who indulges 
these appetites, as well as by the one who supplies them. For these 
are all alike criminals, often against the law itself, and always against 
that trust of all without which there can be no personal liberty for any 
That ignorance and vice which refuses to recognize that the very luxu- 
ries they lust for, especially, would not be here for them at all, but for 
a rational creativeness and self government, is what bloats itself into a 
blear-eyed "defender of personal liberty." And politicians are not 
ashamed to be followed by such a manifest destroyer of self and all, — 
of the city, of the State, of the man himself. 

When any appetite of men is thus arrayed in its own grave-clothesj 
and in that garb takes a political character, it seals its own prohibition, 
by a law of self-defense as manifest as that which makes man shoot the 
savage beast on sight. If a political party wants to ruin itself effectu- 
ally, let it court such followers. If liquor-selling wants to be prohib- 
ited, let it thus organize as a declared enemy to all true liberty, and 
with a deatli's head as its standard of what personal liberty is. In this 
way, it will put itself upon a par with those lazar-houses which 
are patronized, indeed, only by Natural lusts made unnatural; 
but where a similar worship of Nature makes Humanity blush and 
hide its head, asking in bitter doubt whether indeed this is its 
"origin '' Nay, worse; they have no such excuse of "Nature." 
They claim that the inventive power of man himself can be regu- 
lated when it creates, but not when it destroys; that his personal 
liberty is such that it is not right to repress the evil of it, but only 
the good. 

But it is unjust to the business of drink-selling to put it on a par 
with the infamous, or the absurd even, unless it is so put by itself. The 
total blindness of self-interest is just as apparent here as everywhere 
else. It never knows where to find any good reason for its own exist- 
ence, till it is obliged to find it in the Reason which creates and sus- 



220 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

tains, and has right to regulate all. It compels this, as Religion, t^ 
abolish it, unless it recognizes in the State a moral creator of it and all 
its rights, in a regulated harmony with the interests of all. 

The true interest of this selling of artificial stimulants is rather to 
ask to be regulated, and to be kept in judicious hands, whether by 
high-license or any other best means for this purpose. A community 
has full right to limit the number of such " saloons;" and that is the 
essential purpose of high-license. The object is to prevent the too 
easy gratification of a dangerous habit. Hence when such a habit is 
spreading, and showing its fangs, it might be well to intermit for a 
time all such feeding of it. Let no one flatter himself that he has any 
right to it, or to feed it, when it is bad. 

But the money question has plainly nothing at all to do with this. No- 
revenues can be acquired from bad habits. The object of high license 
is to limit the habit itself, and make it better; but from the better habit 
alone will come the revenue. The main question is that of character, 
— of a character which, by its own virtue, at once abolishes all those 
" holes " which a bad mayor cannot see in a city, but can see in a law. 
The character required for the business, and the legal method by which 
it is known to be conducted, are the sort of protection saloon-keepers 
need. 

If they know their own interest, this is what they will ask for and 
insist upon having. And they can get it cheap; without raising funds- 
for carrying elections, and bribing legislators; without heart burnings 
over the failure of men to keep such a trust! The liquor interest has- 
spent more money for its own damage, than would pay all its licenses 
if asked for in a proper shape. "What this business, like every other, 
wants most, is a good character. The seller wants to have as much- 
self-respect, and as much respect for his business, as have other men. 
Many of them now have this and deserve it, as men; and if not for 
their business, it is because that is degraded by other men, both 
sellers and drinkers. The seller wants to be protected against "the 
man who laughs" hideously at all morality, whether he be drinker or 
seller; both are ruining his business. Now the rational method of 
limiting the number injures no man, and need not discriminate 
against the poor man, if the matter of character is properly regulated. 
Let the revenue be sought for in a better character for the business and 
better habits for the community. Then the way to do it will be as- 
plain as if a dark hole were suddenly illumined by Man's own electric- 
light, knd all the rats found fleeing in dismay. 

"Whatever Man himself makes, he must himself limit, both as to 
making and use. That is the true principle, — the very necessity of the 
case. His rational right and duty are absolute in respect to his own 
creations. Now his inner abuse, of that divine trust of Reason which. 



NATIONAL AND STATE LAWS OF MORALITY. 221 

is his real freedom, is what causes all his crimes; and to prevent this, 
is the object of all law which operates by restraint of his outer liberty. 
But such restraint cannot make him any freer within, better in his 
thoughts, in ordinary cases where he has had full possession of his 
wits. 

But this liquor-selling and drinking, when let be an abuse of one 
of his own inventions, is the source of his worst loss of personal 
liberty, — loss of the power to think freely. This can be legally regu- 
lated, therefore, by outer restraints which operate in fact as a restora- 
tion to him of his personal liberty. 

That is the difference. And yet we hear stupid claims to a general 
right of everybody to use this invention without any regulation, when 
the regulation itself is simply a restoration of personal liberty. No 
wonder criminals themselves take the lead in this logic; but is it not a 
little singular that executors and judges of the law should be blind to 
its absurdity? Scavengers are a useful tribe; they preserve and save. 
But no one is ardent to follow that business; and a divine Vishnu alone 
smiles upon its humble followers. Is a business which merely feeds 
artificial appetites, and tends to destructive habits, a better one ? Is 
it so useful that every man has a "right" to follow it? And has the 
criminal class especially a right to do so? (See what a Siva this logic 
is; it sweeps all to destruction.) 

The last question has special import in relation to the sale of strong 
liquors. Their actual use as drinks is chiefly by the most ignorant and 
vicious, if not indeed mainly by criminals or those on the road to be- 
come such. This makes a grave difference in regard to their sale and 
its regulation. As a mere question of cost, no revenue derivable from 
them could save them from downright abolition as a bill of expense 
with no profit in it. There is a tendency therefore to apply to these a 
higher license as a limitation. But a higher character for the seller is 
a better security for such a trust. And without that, inexorably ap- 
plied, all others are simply absurd. To permit a man of no character 
but a bad one to exercise such a public trust, is to call the community 
itself a fool or a knave. What a difference it will make when the 
principle is laid down that, not the bad, but only the good characters 
have any right whatever to this business! What a difference in the 
business itself! What a difference in management of parties and elec- 
tions! — ay, and there's the rub! for those whose eye-single is stone- 
blind! 

These strong drinks require for their use also a higher intelligence 
and more than usual self-control. Thomas H. Benton, in a lecture 
many years ago in Cincinnati, recommended his own example of ab- 
stinence from these. He said that by refraining from them in his 
youth, he escaped all need for them in his manhood, and hence found 



222 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

them of some useful efficacy in his old age And the " old man elo- 
quent" was right. They can be made a "milk for old age," but rarely 
other than a corrupting humor for the young. The sale of them to 
minors, and to drunkards also, ought to be prohibited. 

III. The public interest in all these artificial stimulants must be 
sought for in some other form than a false notion of personal prop- 
erty or personal liberty. Devised by Man himself, they can be re- 
garded as useful only as self-disciplines. They furnish for their cre- 
ator an opportunity to show a proud and full control over his own 
creature. They prove that he, has been empowered to invent a de- 
stroyer of his own liberty, — to create outright such an "evil" as that. 
And what does this signify? That he is made to be a self ruler? or a 
self -destroyer? 

At first sight, it would seem that he ought not to make such an 
evil at all. And hence it is that the attempt to prohibit the selling goes 
also to the drinking and to the manufacture itself. Thus it says that 
Man is not yet morally fit to use the creative power Divinely given 
him. But there is a higher judge of the expediency of this inner trust 
confided to him than either himself or all men. This very thing of 
which he can make an ulcer, betokens a confidence in him by his own 
creator, which he must needs find some better reason for than that it is 
designed for his destruction. 

Can that which is allowed to create, destroy itself? No; it can only 
destroy the body by another body. And that is nothing new; for 
Man need not create for that purpose. But here he invents something 
which Shakespeare describes as " steaUng away his brains." Liter- 
ally, it does that. But it also steals away the freedom of his thought; 
and makes him wonder whether that is but • ' the stuff that dreams are 
made of,"— fantastic insanity let loose like a fool when it does not 
ra.ge as a devil. Now here, at least, he is brought into the sphere of 
the intangible, and he knows that he himself has done it. He sees 
that he can be deluded by "things," which seem to stand there before 
him, but do not thus exist. He can make of the world a heaven or a 
hell for himself; and the two run together in his own thoughts. This 
is a lesson which even the sufferings of a drunken imagination ought 
to make Man take to heart. It is one both practical and theoretical, 
in a way that would make him start with surprise, could he see it in all 
it teaches. 

Now in respect to all the bodily needs and habits, it is really neces- 
sary for every one to judge for himself. He can, if he will, limit his 
own needs, and make his own habits of a sensuous sort, by a higher 
law than any that can be given him from without in any way. And 
only thus can his trust of personal liberty be properly performed in 
the best interest of all. But when he seeks, merely as an individual, 



MOKAL USP: of EVILS. 223 

to judge by his own of the needs or habits of others in this respect, it 
is well to observe a proverb of the wise man: "Be not wise over- 
mucli: why shouldst tliou die before tliy time?" While a man is a 
child; he must think and act as a child; and only when he becomes a 
man can he put away childish things. He puts away bodily things only 
when he dies. To do so previously, is to be overwise and to die be- 
fore his time. But bodily comforts and habits are always childish 
things, hence matters to be instructed in and wisely regulated. But 
for the Man himself, let them, as childish, be recognized always as 
plaj-^things to be put aside whenever manly duty enjoins it; or, as 
'■'healthy,'" to be made according to a rational rule. Let them be cre- 
ated as habits, but mastered, made polite, made to shme, if possible, 
so far as artificial, with some creative light. If mere solaces for the 
nerves, let them be used as medicinal; and then no man seeks to air 
them in public, like a boy, as manly accomplishments. 

Bodily habits are not spiritual, and cannot be made so. They may 
be and are moralized by the common thought; they are made to be 
decent and even ornamental. Yielding to a new fashion is the simplest 
way to be simply attired; — better than the Quaker's way of having 
only one fixed fashion and thus no freedom. All protests against 
'■finery" are protests against the creative freedom given to Man, and 
impeachments of its Divine giver. And to undertake to make a civil 
law about such matters of mere taste or decent habits, is also a need- 
less arraignment of the Divine judgment of what is best for Man. It 
loses sight of the fact that what is really in common for men as moral 
beings, is only their intelligent thought, and not their bodies. , It runs, 
though by another route, yet to precisely the same goal, as does that 
communism which is founded upon physical wants alone. 

This impossible morality is supposed to be based on a common 
moral sense which does not and cannot exist as a mere affair of bodies 
and the same for all; for there is just where, as free and creative, it 
goes into difference; and where, even as judgment, each can judge 
only by his own, and knows that all the others are not like but differ- 
ent in their needs. The communist finds the body, at least, to be one 
piece of property which cannot be held in common, nor be guaged as 
to its need or mode of sustenance on an exact par with all. 

So also those extreme moralists who would judge all by their own 
whimsies or habits, whether of abstinence or indulgence, are like a 
doctor who has but one diet for health, and but one prescription for all 
ailments. They are even like that physician who is bid to "first heal 
thyself!" For they mistake their own mere habit of body or of thought 
for the moral law itself; they affirm it to be what is alone right for all, 
— a _habit all ought to come into and stand forever rigid as a grena- 
dier. But there is no such law in the book. The true law in respect 



224 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

to such things is a law of charity, compassion for the necessities of a 
bodily life, for the stress of temptation and the force of evil habits. 
Much must be allowed for these things if there is to be any real 
Morality, which, so far as external, must be recognized as a common 
judgment, and hence can be reached only through this sympathy 
which common needs excite, and not by any means through the aver- 
sion which different habits and tastes excite. 

"When a man wants to create something bodily, the civic State can 
judge of his right to it, and how to regulate its use. But when he 
presents himself also merely as a body, a created something, he de- 
clares that all his acts are mechanical and involuntary for him and 
thus he makes of himself a "thing" requiring to be wholly reguLtted 
and run as a machine bj^ others. In proportion as he takes that view 
of himself, he is evidently a subject for police regulation. 

But no rational man practically considers or presents himself as 
merely a created thing. He knows himself also as creative. He 
makes and transforms his own habits. He also creates or transforms 
nearly all that he uses to nourish or medicate the body. Nothing good 
he cannot make bad, nothing bad but he can make good. This de- 
pends upon how much he vulgarizes or refines what he does. And so 
with communities; they either refine or degrade the habits of Man by 
their actual moralities, and thus they bring about the rise or fall of 
empires. 

In using "evils," poisons, Man rises to his true grandeur by show- 
ing that he knows how to use them. If he is himself creator of them 
so also is the Divine itself. And thus both show that nothing, not even 
■evil, is beyond their power to control and to transform into good. To 
reach this highest declaration of power, the creation of what most 
seems to deny the goodness of a creator is necessary. To make it re- 
turn to the service of the good, and thus show the all-potence of the 
goodness also, requires the true use of it,— the triumph over it by tem- 
perance, so far as it can be made a "joy;" the proud "get thee be- 
hind me Satan !" for it, when it tempts the man to forget the very Rea- 
son which created it,— and which, like little Dot, "knows all its ways 
and its manners." 

If a man fails in this proud creative treatment of " drinks " which 
stagger his liberty, then he falls victim to his own creature. Then, as 
in his use of other powers for good and evil which are created for him, 
if he measure not the pleasure by its use, he is slain by the pain which 
comes from misuse. If he rejects all Reason, he rejects' all virtue, and 
becomes the hideous prey of vice. There, is a sphere of human action 
from which all eyes are averted , unless glued to it by a fatal fascination 
of habit, or drawn to it by a horrible necessity. There all talk is 
stilled of regulating that which can no longer regulate itself. For that 



MORAL USE OF EVILS. 225 

sphere also has its public which supplies its victims, and by its own 
vicious acts both creates and destroys them. When this work is fin- 
ished, its very patrons flee from it in horror. The curtain comes down 
upon the tragedy of vice. And from its dens. Force itself starts aghast 
to see its own work done by Vitality; human law departs powerless; 
moral suasion is absent, afraid to soil its own robes; and only Religion, 
with its divine pity, dare venture there to soothe the dying and bury 
the dead. 



CHAPTER XII. 

RELIGION; ITS RELATION TO THE NATION AND TO 
INDIVIDUALS. 

I. — Prevalent Theories op Religion. 

II. — The Nation Protecting and Protected by Religion. 

III. — Religious Education op the Individual, by the State 
AND Church, by Science, Art and Philosophy. 

rV". — Agnosticism and Modern Society. 

Civil Polity, in all its phases, proves, and practically acts upon the 
theory, that Man has been entrusted with prodigious powers. The 
examination of public morality shows that civil society itself, by its^ 
laws and its moral suasion, only helps to develop these powers and 
their moral relation, to the extreme of the powers, and thus to the clear 
manifestation of the relation itself. It appears that man's inventions 
for evil can create a hell, even of literal fires, from which Nature itself 
defends all other animals. And on the other hand, man defends for 
woman the right to declare and protect a heaven on earth, which, arti- 
ficed by a higher power than Nature, animals cannot know, — thougli 
they seek to bask in its more than sunshine, its atmosphere of affec- 
tion. Victim and slave of the former, guardian and saint of the latter, 
is woman. The more she is protected the more she protects. And 
man, let him figure it how he may, can derive no revenue from any 
evil invention, nor from licensing any abuse of that mutual trust which 
human society implies. On the contrary, his very power to invent 
for evil shows him where his real treasures are to be accumulated, in 
that hidden but best known form, frorn which, as a religious heaven, 
they ever issue bj^ a divinely given creative power. And they are most 
beautiful in their Art, most subtle in their Science, most fruitful in 
their uses, when that origin of them is recognized and its law obej-ed. 

I. It is not singular, then, that Auguste Comte should have ' ' posi- 
tively" discovered that, — if there is any religion at all, it must be a 
"religion of Humanity.'' It cannot be derived from the animal 
instincts, for they know nothing of it. Far keener was Comte than 
that greatest English thinker of his kind, Herbert Spencer. For the 
latter, beginning by declaring that what he is knowing with is itself an 
"unknowable," must of course find all else essentially unknowable. 
And since he examines only a merely outer and formal "differentia- 



PREVALENT THEORIES c>F RELIGION. 227 

tion '' which can be only that of the power of force, he leaves it am- 
biguous at least whether that is not what he knows with, as well as 
what he knows of by its law, — its method of use. And if the method 
of mental action is the same, then there is no freedom of thought, no 
moral law. In that case, there is no morality. Indeed, if the thought 
is not free, there is no use in thinking at all. 

Mr. Spencer's maxim is, that "only knowledge within our reach can 
be of any service to us." But he ignores the very nearest, as out of 
reach because it cannot be seen, but only felt. What " serves" us to 
know with, is not far enough off, too intimate, too small to be known. 
But the mechanical universe also he deems " out of reach", because it 
is too big to be known. Yet how does he know it is so big? By a law 
of its very nature, in knowing which we know its necessity to be big; 
and by which also we know it is not of the nature of thought. It is no* 
strange that Mr. Spencer, with his criterion of "reach," overlooks the 
fact that we do not know by a mechanical measuring, but by thinking; 
and that the only knowing which really " serves" us is a knowing of 
laws. 

It may be said that what Mr. Spencer deems beyond our reach is, — 
to know all the laws of the Universe. But how does he know there are 
many, except by knowing a law which resolves itself into many laws, 
— many modes of action? And in scattering his attention over the 
many, he forgets that there must be one. Laws imply some consistent 
design, and hence one law creative of all the other laws. Mr. Spencer's 
agnosticism really affirms that all we know is size, mere quantity, 
nothingness. How comes he, then, to be figuring shapes on that black- 
board? Kant sees, at least, that in doing this, he is " understanding" 
the shapes of things by redesigning them. But Mr. Spencer ignores 
even this ideal reality. As to "what it is," he deems it just as un- 
knowable and "out of reach " as the " thing in itself " which he thinks 
of. He ignores that what we know is activity and the method of it; 
and that these alone can constitute any reality. These are what we 
wish to know and do know. Now if we know and feel the nature and 
mode of activity which makes, which forms either ideas or things, pray 
what is beyond the reach of such a knowing? What is beyond the 
reach of the law which makes it? All the truth about it must be known 
in the law of truth which designs it; — if we do not know by this, 
"what it is," neither do we know "that it is." 

Now, at the beginning of Chapter VI, attention was called to the 
relations of things under a law of force, and those of persons under a 
law of Reason. In the former case, alternate dissolution and recompo- 
sition constitutes the whole process; so that the very method of this 
activity of mere force consists in shock, shock, shock. This law of 
force has, of itself, no " differentiation." It is always Ihe same, shock. 



228 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

shock, shock, because it has a side of dissolution, or it could not act as 
force. Mr. Spencer really imputes a designing to it, — the very design- 
ing which he himself makes in idea, in order to understand and de- 
scribe "things." But no designing of these can prevent their being 
unmade by this law of force, when they are made by means of that. 
Their very existence must be a constant dissolution. 

Instead, then, of their being any active "differentiation" by the 
law of force, its activity is one of dissolution to the uttermost. In- 
stead of a seeking for difference, it is a resolution into utter sameness. 
And just this indifference of it to any particular form is what enables 
our or any other designing power to construct formal differences in it. 
This is done by seizing upon its own side of dissolution, where all its 
forms return to their ultimate sameness to be remade. This death- 
side of it is just what enables designing power to turn it into vital 
uses. But vital forms also must be mortal, because made by means of 
a law which is essentially dissolving, not differentiating, — a tending 
to abstract sameness, not a seeking even of formal difference, much 
less of ideal difference, — difference of designing power. Such a 
power, then, is not in it, but only uses it. Why should it care to be in 
such a bodily, size-form, and thus declare itself mortal? Yet we 
moan over the "shortness of life;" and that, too, is supposed to be a 
proof of Man's ^capacity, and that his designing power has no 
"reach." But what a designing power should wish, if it know "what 
it is," would be rather to become such a free artist of "body," that 
this body would be no longer a limitation, nor a burden, but a mere ex- 
pression; — in other words, to seize upon this law of force in its utmost 
mortality, so that it can be used to express immortality. For at best it 
can be made into only mere outer show of life; and to render this 
show instant and constant, it must be used in its ultimate form. Thus 
a designing power shows itself to be that life which uses death itself 
for such outer expression, because it is itself a life which dies not, — 
the immortal act and reality of Thought, 

This cannot, of course, be fully developed here, but only suggested 
sufficiently to bring us out of that sphere of mere things in which Mr. 
Spencer dwells, into that other and far different relation of persons ex- 
pressed in the civic State. Here there must be a recognition that there 
is no longer a mere abstract law of force, as a death giving ruler of all. 
Men are not to be treated as things, which must find their unity and 
methods of action by shock, shock, shock. They are persons, who 
know "what it is" in them which enables them to design and act 
under other methods of action. It is a real actuality of Reason in 
them, of which the operation is felt and known, and hence its law is 
known. This law is known as a moral law, because it is known as a 
creative law, and the only law for any active designing. It is also a 



PKEVALENT THEOKIES OF KKLIGION. 229 

Teligious law; for it tells men they can and ought to love each other, 
ought to attain to the rule of that Divine "first principle " which has 
■'malice towards none, charity for all." 

This "first principle " makes a State; but it also makes the whole 
world. A " principle " is nothing at all, unless it is something active, 
and hence knowable in and by the method of its acts. Whoever calls 
the designing principle in Man an "unknowable," therefore, denies him- 
self the power to explain anything. Hence Mr. Spencer cannot bring 
within his theory even the laws of force, and account for that "perman- 
ence" of dissolution in it which is just what design uses to make the vital 
form. But in the sphere of Thought itself, whenever he reaches a 
moral fact, a creative reality, a law of thought itself, he fails to recog- 
nize it as such; it is an "unknowable," though the most knowable and 
the most precious of all things for Humanity. It is an affair of Re- 
ligion, which is also an unknowable mystery, a "revelation" perhaps; 
:but how can anything be revealed when it remains after all unknow- 
able, unrevealable? All this, no doubt is an unintended result; Mr. 
Spencer is as noble morally as he is great intellectually. But "it is 
the first step that costs." He begins indeed, not in the old way, of 
perceiving only "facts," but by afiirming that he knows a "law," 
But he says this is a law of the unknowable. A curious law to know 
is that! No wonder the " knowing ' ' itself is confoundel by it, or over 
flows it, as in Mr. Spencer's case, as a knowing of many laws, but an 
ignoring of any one all creative law. 

Comte is more sagacious. He recognizes these many laws, as laws 
of Science itself, and tries to organize them into a related whole. He 
is "knowing," With his French wit, (or vanity if you please), he 
■does not doubt that. He does not stultify himself to begin with, by 
conceding that in fact he does not know at all. On the contrary, he is 
" positive " that he does know, and proves it by much active and valu- 
able thought. But he modestly disclaims knowing any otherwise than 
"positively.'' This must mean, on the whole, that he intends to recog- 
nize at least the free action of his own mind, like Descartes, and be on 
guard against all gay "deceivers" from without. Yet, unlike Des- 
cartes, he denies any logical necessity for finding a total. Divine 
relation for this power to think. And there is his weakness; for there- 
by, he leaves unaccounted for the most essential fact he needs; — 
namely, that community in thought for Humanity, which makes him 
so "positive" that what he knows, others also know, or can know. 
Without this, his or any other man's thinking and organizing of 
thoughts, would evidently be of no possible use at all, in building-up 
a common Religion, Science, Art, Civil Polity or anything else. Here 
again we have what calls itself "practical thought," trying to get rid 
x»f any reason for its being useful! 



230 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Yet Comte, since he seeks to organize many known laws into one 
higher law, instead of trying to develop one abstract law of the " un- 
knowable" into many merely formal laws, gives far more fruitful sug- 
gestions for Science and Art than Spencer. Far better does he pene- 
trate the "fact," since he both analyzes and recreates the form of it. 
He thinks it, and seeks to relate it to other facts, by a law of thought 
which relates the thought of it to other thoughts. His whole object is- 
to show that a systematic whole springs from a law of truth itself. By 
this known law of thought, he proposes to organize Science anew and 
better. 

But the zeal of a human heart, once thus excited .to create some- 
thing better for his fellow men, carries him, in spite of himself, beyond 
this "positive" egoistic, into the many-egoed altruistic which it implies. 
For, as Reason makes all ideas flow into and out of any true idea, so 
also it makes all its persons unite in one good person. Comte 
does not see this clearly. But, under the wand of a woman who 
tells him: "Remember. Comte, remember, that I have suffered 
without deserving it!" — his vision is unsealed to a fact which Man 
cannot create, — to a religious sentiment more subtle than all outer 
facts; — and he calls woman to be its priestess, in a "new religion of 
Humanity." 

Thus a "positive" and great thinker declares that Man must invent 
even his own religion, if there is none. Just so, Voltaire averred that 
"if God did not exist it would be necessary to create him," — as Man's 
only self-defense. How strange that men should so long be blind, or 
half-blind, to what is essential to any true relation for "selves," for 
thinking-beings. Have not men already created enough "religions" 
and enough "gods?" Is it not clear enough that, in religions as in 
civil polities, the ancients'have in vain tried all methods of governing 
"selves' by an outer one or an inner few, or by either an outer many 
or inner many; and that the only true relation is that of the Infinite 
"One," for whom the "many selves" are both outer and inner; and 
who, to them also, is both these, — outer in his revealed, inner in his re- 
vealing? 

Not so strange, perhaps, that women like Harriet Martineau and 
George Eliot, with a mother's intensity, but not a mother's revelation 
of the One, should listen to this song of a "religion of Humanity." 
It is, indeed, but a mannish religion, a "religion of progress." But is. 
not Humanity itself both without and within us? And is not woman 
the center of all its sufferings, and lifted from cross to crown only by 
its " progress?" For women taught in a theory which can see only a 
progress, — a progress without end or beginning, and never with an 
Eternal Reason in it which creates it and ever resolves it into a Now, 
— such a "religion of Humanity," which at least seeks to organize 



PKEVALENT THEOKIES OF KELIGION. 231 

and better this progress, may well seem at first to be an ■'improve- 
ment." Albeit it denies all "proof" of Religion, at least it claims to 
know some proofs of true manhood. 

To such keen-eyed women, it may well seem preferable to a science 
of the unknowable as a basis or inspiration to practical action. Its 
methods, also, aiming at complete organization, and appealing to a 
concentrative, well-known "sentiment" in all, may seem at least better 
than those methods of an "orthodoxy" which, adopting the ''unknowa- 
ble" theory in respect to its science, — its "revelation," also adopts an 
Art "differentiated" merely as form, and thus making the mere form 
sacred and essential, and ignoring the spirit as unessential, no bond of 
union, but onlj^ a cause of difference, stands fixed as a mutual battle 
instead of a mutual aid, and limits its work for the world by the very 
chains it puts upon itself. In England, woman's moral intensity strug- 
gles against this imprisonment of the spirit in mere forms; and finally, 
as in George Eliot's case, sees that the Christian Religion itself is 
belied thereby. In this country, an eloquent good-humor springs into 
the arena to help dissolve this spell of a paralyzing dogmatism, but 
only by imitating it in its dissolving of humanity into mere individual- 
ism. The individualism of a generous nature attacks the individualism 
of a habitual exclusiveness; but only attains the vague, where that at- 
tains the "positive,'' and substitutes only the formless for the merely- 
formal, — thus showing they both belong to the same uncreative 
"famil3^" This mere individualism, in all its phases, must needs be 
merely egoistic, and sees not where or how to find the true One of 
thinking-selves. And good-humor is merely dissolving, not creative; 
its cure of suffering is but transient. 

But this same good-humor of the American cannot but smile at such 
a "worship" as Comte proposes. Our sense of the absurd is sufl[icient 
protection against that; but not equally so against the absurdity of an 
"ethics" which proposes to find religious "data," — the "given," as 
unknowable. For Comte is serious to the point of absurdity. He be- 
gan merely with an intent to organize the "positive sciences." Then 
he saw that, if this were done rightly, it would also organize civil 
polity in a rational way. Yet this would bring into play what seemed 
to him something vague, or of a negative character, — "sentiment." 
This was unlike his "positive" thought, he could not give it limits 
and precise form. Yet he would organize this also; for he saw it in 
himself and in others as a concentrative power for suffering and for 
happiness, — creative of both. But here his "first step" also cost. 
This "sentiment"' included all those who "are not" as well as tho.se 
who "are." The "many," for whom a religion would organize hap- 
piness, are in the past, the present, the future. Finding here no "posi- 
tive" One, either to worship or be worshipped, he makes of his 



232 THE CIVIL I'OLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

"religion" a vague worship of the many by the many. No rational' 
unity, nor Reason for this unity, is found for this many; — not even in 
a present many. No possible unity of a positive sort for it either in 
past or future. Where then shall a worshipper find anything "posi- 
tive" to worship? His many are coming and going as he worships. 
And some are bad, some are good. He must divide even these. He 
must go on dividing till he comes down to One that is perfect, and. 
really, Divinely good. As this is not himself, or he would not be in- 
voking it, where shall he find it? Is he playing the fool after all, and. 
adoring something he knows not of; — though he started with positivelj'' 
declaring that he would not even waste a moment's attention on such 
"unattainable objects?" Such is the reduetio ad dbsurdum of this 
philosophy of the "j)ositive." It comes back to its starting-point, and. 
kneels there as a worshipper of what it rejected at starting. 

Voltaire said Religion was necessary to soothe suffering in the in- 
dividual; he was egoistic merely. Comte said it is needed to organ- 
ize happiness for the many, though he could find no "positive reason" 
for it in any one; — he was altruistic merely. But Reason itself is the 
only power that can organize. And even in a civil polity, we have 
seen that Man's Reason is at work organizing happiness, not merely 
for one, but for all, now and forever. 

Hence, as general intelligence advances, it becomes more and more 
difficult to impose an external authority, either for State or Church, 
by force or fear or "pious fraud." That fear which "is the beginning 
of Wisdom" is not the fear of force in either State or Church. The 
necessity . grows more and more urgent to make manifest that the 
authority of each is essentially in Reason; and that the operation of 
each is such as to secure the highest happiness, both from within and 
without. In Reason and its laws alone is there any ground for real: 
happiness; and neither State nor Church can excuse itself from pre- 
senting this ground for the life and conduct it enjoins. Neither Kan- 
tian nor other agnosticism, pious or impious, can prevent this demand 
by humanity. The piety which sees in the "inconsistency of virtue 
with happiness in this life" the "certainty" of a future life as "com- 
pensation," only postpones the real difficulty to that life also, carries 
into that the same contingent relation of force, and fails to recognize 
that the very function of Reason, even in a civil polity, is to so organ- 
ize and properly relate this law of force to the law of Reason, that the 
force itself may be made a means of happiness, not by its suppression, 
but by its obedience to that which created it and which it ought alone 
to serve. 

A merely materialististic habit of thinking, which cannot but be 
irreligious even when it would not, renders the function of Religion. 
"unknowable," and hence irrational, "superstitious": — makes of the- 



t. PREVAI.ENT THEORIES OF RELIGION. 233 

"hopes of happiness" it offers hereafter a "pious fraud," but justi- 
tiable as a means of patient endurance of all sorts of "orderly" op- 
pression here. This theory fails to see that Religion is itself the very 
Reason that creates the State to help organize its happiness:— first, in- 
deed, only-as an outer order essential to all the rest, but then further 
as an ordering of its thoughts, a dominance of its moral designing 
power over all its acts of force. This very progress of Reason, in its 
building of States, ought to reveal to us its nature, as that of a power 
supreme which, by right divine, means to subordinate all to its own 
law, but only in a rational manner, without destroying any of its 
powers, and without forcing any of its many wills. 

Mr. Spencer's averment that were men perfectly rational no State 
would be needed, shows how that habit of thinking in merely mechani- 
cal terms, which must reduce all to mere "force" as "first principle" 
and sole principle, prevents from finding the real relation and rising 
to a higher method of thinking. So long as Man is bodily and mortal, 
his exterior needs will require for him organized action with his fel- 
low men, as the best and only rational way of equalizing for all the 
contingencies of Nature, of providing for all the highest possible use 
of its laws, and of securing for all a common possession of the thought 
of all by its communication. Will Language perish. Art die out, Sci- 
ence be speechless, because Man becomes more freely creative? Such 
views evince a blindness to the fact tliat Reason is creative at all; and 
to all which that "first principle" involves. 

M^'. Spencer's supposition and his inference from it really imply 
that, in such a case, the body as it now is, no longer exists for Man, 
and yet the mind remains; and that only thus, without a body, or 
with only a "spiritual body," can he show himself freely rational in 
outer acts as in inner thoughts. And thus, as usual, he touches the 
greatest of all "facts" without recognizing their nature; avers them 
as true, yet declares them unknowable; describes "what they are," 
and yet says we only know " that they are." For it is plainly the 
fact that Man is limited by the bodily organs he has; there is a light he 
cannot see, a sound he cannot hear, a heat he cannot feel. Extend 
these organs as he may by external means, he only makes himself a 
bigger man, not a better one, — excpt so far as he must necessarily, in 
that process of mere extension, show himself a wiser man respecting 
the law of force, and a more freely designing man in his inventions for 
using it. But let him learn all of this law of force, and be perfectly 
freed in the relation of his Reason to it, and then indeed his "organs" 
will no longer suffice for him as now they are, — merely particular and 
limiting. He can, on the one hand, "find" such "organs" already 
made for all, in the most general way, as a "law" known by all, used 
by all for external communication. On the other hand, as particular. 



234 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

he can make and unmake bis own "body"; — all this "law of force" 
becomes for him nothino- but a mere garment of light and shade by 
which to express his thoughts, — and what then would he care for other 
Art than this? — he has "neither hanger nor thirst any more," but for 
the Truth. 

But such a result in this direction implies that he has already the 
power which can accomplish it, only he is now too limited in his knowl- 
edge and control of the law of force; — and wisely made so, since he 
does not recognize a Reason in him which created this " Evil " to be a 
servant only of the Good. Hence he has to organize and increase his 
knowledge of this law, iu unity with his fellows, in order to attain to 
its best uses; and this is his business in the fellowship of mechaiiical 
science, — attaining a control over force as though it were to become 
useless as a body, useful only as a law fully under the power of a 
Reason which knows its law. But this " fact " is not something " un- 
knowable;" nor even is it something to be learned only by a progress 
which never ends. It can and should be recognized to begin with. It 
is an actual relation of a known triple activity of Man himself, as one 
who reasons, designs, and uses force. Only his looking at everything 
else but that, prevents his finding it. It is clearly not a made fact, 
but a maker of facts. And no fact is known otherwise than by its 
law. 

Now when one thinks of a law he does not think of a " thing," but 
of a method of making the thing; — when he " sees that," then he "un- 
derstands it." He has thought it out for himself. .Hence in all this 
Scientific "progress," the man is using a Reason which he knows for 
itself, by its own laws. He knows it as acting for itself and as having 
its best method of thinking, or knowing only, in its own highest 
law; — a moral law which bids it recognize its own freedom, its own su- 
premacy over force, and its own responsibility for using that. Hence 
all that seeking for its laws in the laws of force, all the using of them 
to find out what it is, is manifestly absurd. And nothing is more dan- 
gerous, — to the man himself, and through him to his civil polity and 
all else. 

All the metaphors of mechanical action which are given as "proofs" 
that the mind is a "matter " or a "force," even by those who profess 
not to know "what it is " whether as "force " or as "mind;" — in short 
all those "measuring" and weighing methods of "finding'' what the 
mind is as a "thing," destroy all possibility of morality for it; and 
must be disused iu the sphere of mental and moral philosophies. And 
it is evident they must be blind as bats in the sphere of Religion. He 
who cannot realize that all his seeing and hearing must, even now, 
when rational, be the knowing only of methods and laws of action, 
both in the mind and elsewhere; and that hence, Man is born into the 



PKEVALENT THEORIES OF RELIGION. 235 

very inmost relation of all powers, and entrusted with that trinity of 
powers which is creative in its function; can surely see clearly no 
Divine origin or end for anything, — no religious relation for man, "no 
use of Religion but for women and fools." 

Now Religion is recommended on all hands as what is to relieve 
suffering. Mainlj^ in that way is it regarded, especially by those who 
see only an endless progress; for that implies no perfect happiness, but 
rather only misery from mere anticipation of that sort. And Voltaire, 
who justly wanted the old persecuting religions destroyed because they 
caused suffering, wanted Religion preserved, even if it only gave 
"hopes." Comte forgets that everything created must have a positive 
character, and invents a new religion which is to have only this nega- 
tive nature, — to lessen the suffering incidental to the rest of the ma- 
chinery. 

Equally vague and negative are those apostles of a "religion of 
goodness," who tell us that " good is the only god." By reversing the 
Christian utterance; " only God is good," it leaves us nowhere to look 
for the "good," for it concedes that to be mere adjective and no "god" 
at all, hence not to be worshipped. But since this "good ' ' is just what 
-can suffer most, this "religion" is also a defensive one. There being 
no one God to defend all, we have only a " no god" to be defended. 
Hence, even more than any pagan religion, does this one defend its 
helpless "god," because this "god," being the mere abstraction, "good- 
ness," is quite apt to become every man for himself, his own god. This 
sort of " religion " which finds no One at all, is logically nothing but 
a religious communism, tending to more suffering rather than less. It 
finds no "good reason" and hence no comfort for suffering in any 
form, — ^least of all in that form of Death which tears two loving hearts 
asunder. 

But as Reason alone can create, so it alone can be the "comforter" 
for any human spirit. Only slowly, however, does man realize the 
difiiculties of a rational expression of Religion. At first, in his ignor- 
ance, it seems to him easy for the Divine to be human, or even bestial, 
or only an image; for otherwise it seems tohimontyan "abstraction." 
But when he comes to look on it from the other side, — the demand for 
the human to be Divine, — this practical part is what seems absurdly 
impossible, — unless he has "many gods," and so a mere abstraction 
again as basis. But now he is in the ideal realm, and like the Greeks, 
he talks about "hopes" and "fears," as forms for a "god," as powers 
within and poAvers without. Even the Christian Religion has been 
tossed and torn upon these extremes, of a merely sensuous, and a 
merely abstract, thinking, whereby the Living One is ever crucified. 

Thus, (to take for example one of the noblest and best of its sec- 
tarian workers), the Methodists, trusting at first to ignorant preachers, 



236 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

who believed most easily what seemed most striking and paralj^zed all 
thought by fear, have, with the education of their clergy, come to< 
realize the difficulties of expressing religious thought in the highest and 
most rational forms. "With less of that external faith in others, which 
man is apt to mistake for the whole, when it is only the educative 
side of Faith, they have tended to the view that it is quite as much a 
duty to make a heaven here as to avoid a hell hereafter. If there is 
anything that must be presently and always creative of happiness, it is 
Religion; that cannot be made into a mere threat, nor even into a mere 
preventer or consoler of suffering; it must be a living source of a real 
happiness for one and all. 

II. Now it is useless to exaggerate the authority of that which does 
not give rational happiness ; needless to exaggerate the authority of 
that which does. Just as a civil polity itself must accord with the de- 
mand for this as a product of its own rational character and conduct, 
so also may, and consistently must it, adopt this criterion by which to 
judge of what it shall recognize as Religion. 

Neither a superstition of fear, nor a materialistic worship of mere 
force, comes within this criterion. No theory which debases Man to 
the level of the brute can be a religion. No theory which subjects him 
to the dominion of mere lusts of his body, or to greeds of his own or of 
others for external things can be a religion. Any theory which does 
not work out practically into a rational life that exemplifies what would 
be a rational conduct for all and a happiness for all, cannot claim recog. 
nition as Religion from a rational Nation. 

Mr. Webster seems to have deemed the advance of rationality so 
great in this Nation, that only the Christian Religion can be regarded 
as coming up to this high standard for recognition. But of course this- 
regards Christianity, not as a sect, nor as having any "origin," "de- 
scent," or even "revelation," except such as is from the spirit and to 
the spirit, in the common Reason of all men. That is the Religion- 
which this Nation recognizes as sacred, because, not "a religion" but 
'Religion itself in its free, moral catholicity. In this sense, it recognizes 
the Christian Religion, not as a religion but as Religion itself. For 
when any sect proposes to limit Christianity to itself, it only shows its 
own imperfect comprehension of the spirit of Christianity. 

In fact, the Christian Religion alone has announced the sublime 
function of Reason, in declaring that " The Truth shall make you free.'' 
And it has also recognized all the spheres of Truth, as having each its 
own special authority and freedom for the thought; and all the ration- 
ally organized spheres of civil society, as having their particular au- 
thorities for that practical action which in them must have a common 
purpose. It concedes " to Csesar what is due to Caesar, and to God 
what is due to God." This Religion has shown that Reason is essentially 



THE NATIONAL RELATION TO RELIGION. 237 

free in it, by the very diversity of its sects; for it must and does take 
all ways to say all it lias to say ; but its spirit of charity passes beyond 
these differences of form or habits into communion of the whole. Thus 
it adapts itself to human nature; and knowing Man to be as yet only a 
God-child, it has patience with his stumblings, sympathy for his suffer- 
ings, an exemplar for his conduct, a voice exceeding mother's gentle- 
ness or father's wisdom for his instruction. 

Thus divinely gifted and "appointed" for its work, the Christian 
Religion must needs be truly free, because it evinces an intensely real 
moral character. And this it exhibits as no abstraction, but as a Di- 
vine Reality, for both the individual and for the community. Especi- 
ally does it show this by recognizing the religious relation between the 
Divine One and its Many, as being also a moral relation upon which to 
organize every many into one community. It recognizes the necessity 
for all rational action of an external character to be organized for the 
expression and gratification of a common purpose. 

No merely abstract thinking recognizes fliis necessity, — this creative 
desire of a really free Reason, to embody its thoughts in outer acts so 
formed that they also will appear informed, and shaped after the 
method of a rational act, such as is known within, — the act of a moral, 
designing nature which would express itself. This "expression, " since 
it must be freely read by a recreative act in all, "reveals" the mora 
unity of all, not in that which is created, but in that which creates, — 
and this, as a Divine Reality, is a Religious unity. But this great 
" fact" escapes the abstract thinker, — the ' ' free-thinker; " as he is fond 
of calling himself. For he does not regard Reason itself as aught but 
an " abstraction ; " — mere adjective, not substantive, it is neither fact 
nor factor, made nor maker; it is "no reality" at all. He does not 
realize that in his own "self," and always, it is in its absolute nature 
essentially personal, — an ever-uttering; and hence a demand for other 
persons and communion of persons, in the outer expression and inner 
joy of a common thought. 

This abstract sort of "freedom of thought" then, since it logically 
shuts itself up speechless and actless, may be fully recognized and pro- 
tected in all its rights for the individual without recognizing it as a re- 
ligion. A religion cannot exist without claiming some community with 
others as a religion for conduct as well as for thought. It cannot be a 
mere " philosophy," whether of matter, mind, morals, or even of Reli- 
gion itself. It must propose to live and act in a society organized to 
exemplify its methods of moral conduct, upon some principle it calls 
religious. If it present itself, then, in this practical guise, as an or. 
ganized religion to a Nation, the criterion for judging it, as above 
stated, is whether it is based on a principle, and proposes a morality 
which can really help the Nation in its own work of organizing happi- 



238 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ness for all. But if it be merely an abstract theory of morality or reli- 
gion, then by the common conduct it enjoins or approves is it to be 
judged as a theory; whether it is really a religion, or whether its 
"society" is only a debating society not yet come to conclusions. 

We fall upon this question of "religious freedom," therefore, at 
first under that form of "free speech" already so fully discussed in 
another phase. Before, it appeared as Wisdom running to folly, as a 
Jeujollet; now, it seems to be Religion running to heresy, — or after it. 
When a man, however, gets to chasing "heresy" as the diabolic, and 
deems he can "fight it with fire," it is quite indifferent whether he does 
this in the name of religion or of irreligion. In either case, he finds 
this will o' the wisp he calls heresy, spreading like a prairie-fire, tiU 
he stops, bewildered with the sudden discovery that he himself is the 
real heretic. He has been fighting free thought instead of free speech. 
For, in respect to both, he has been so stupid as to mistake his own 
habitual view of truth, or form of expressing it, for the only one, — as 
though Reason which creates all can be fixed and tied up in one thing 
it has itself created, and there stand gagged f orevermore. 

When such a crazy notion deems itself religious, it seems to show 
that Religion can be the worst of all, — the destroyer instead of the 
creator; or the maker of a hell and not of a heaven. Like the drunk- 
ard, it does not know how to use what itself creates. Hence it creates 
an "evil" and calls it "good." Yet also when this notion deems itself 
irreligious, it is the same in principle and in purpose. Even when it 
calls itself a "religion of Humanity," it cuts ofE Humanity from any 
Divine origin or character, and hence refers it, for its only final law, to 
a merely human thinking. And this latter, as egoistic and individual, 
can find no final decision but that of ".each man for himself;" and so 
there is nothing in common but heresy itself, — a common rejection of 
anything as Reason, One and Divine for all. Such a religion has no 
outlet practically, (since it must act outwardly), but into a communistic 
irreligion, — an attempt to make of the law of force, the only law for 
"good." It also calls this evil "good," because it only tipples with 
the creative law of Reason. 

But when this real heresy, — this denial of any Divine Reality, One 
in all, revelatory in all, and bringing together all by that law of love 
which a common Reason organizes into Nations, families, moralities of 
life and charities of the heart,— when this ill-born and ill-bred heresy 
takes on unabashed the name of irreligion and swaggers of its "free- 
dom," then we have that acting by the law of a " descent from the 
brute," which even overpasses the law of the brute himself. And 
against the "communism" which logically flows from this, humanity 
itself starts back horrified and exclaims: "Come in any other form than 
that!" It is a drunkard who has made his own hell and dwells in it. 
Is not this "irreligion" also "a mistake?' 



THE NATIONAL RELATION TO RELIGION. 239 

Above have been sketched all the prevalent forms in which the mere 
thinking of Religion may be found in this country. They are not so 
developed here as elsewhere perhaps, either in thought or action; yet 
they are present already in all forms, and are coming constantly from 
foreign lands, and chieHy perhaps in the most dangerous of these 
forms. By the founders of the Nation, Religion was evidently re- 
garded as a sacred reality, to be fostered and protected in its innermost 
sanctuary, — the spirit of every actual man. But by them, danger to it 
had been felt most in the form of a persecution calling itself religious. 
Hence, in the National Constitution they placed a provision, which has 
been imitated in the State Constitutions, protecting every one from 
persecution on account of his religious opinions or form of religious 
worship. Clearly this brings into question, '"what is a religious 
opinion,'' "only when it seeks to display itself in practice; and, as to 
either profession or practice of irreligion, there is no guarantee of pro- 
tection by law or use of law. No professed irreligion therefore re- 
ceives any recognition by the Nation. If it comes here, it comes unin- 
vited. If it is bred or taught here, it is not under law that it is nour- 
ished or shielded. It can be only a rank and poisonous growth, at war 
with that very freedom of religious thought upon which the Nation 
was founded. 

This must be manifest to a little rational reflection. The "freedom 
of opinion " is no doubt guaranteed by the Nation and by every State. 
But it was guaranteed first by God; — whoever denies that, denies it. 
Against such deniers of it alone, need civil law protect it. No opinion 
really can be forced; hence no one must be allowed to attempt it. The 
thinking-power is free; and only stupidity itself can undertake the im- 
possible task of making it otherwise. But what does a mechanical 
theory of Man say of this "freedom of thought?" It says it is forced. 
"W hat do theorists who derive Man from the physical Nature say of 
"freedom of opinion?" They say it does not exist; that all "motives" 
of Man are mechanical and that he is not at all a free moral being. 
Such theorists are indeed always the most rampant champions of "free- 
dom of thought." They even claim a monopoly of free-thinking, — 
which must indeed be peculiarly their own, since they deny it to all, — 
themselves among the rest. They demand "freedom of thought" 
while they declare there is none, and "freedom of opinion" while they 
say all opinions are enslaved. 

Obviously there is a grain of truth in what these men say, since 
they prove it, by showing that a man is capable of saying the most ab- 
surd things when he thus mounts a hobby and rides backwards. To 
hear a man shouting for " free thought" when he is preaching slave- 
thought, or rather no thought at all, but only force as the only moral 
law, — this rather excites the ilsibility of honest people when they see 



240 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

the point clearly. And so, no doubt, the good-humor of the Ameri- 
can ijeople induces them to listen, with much confidence in their own 
good sense, to a great manj'' displays of charlatanism. They may be 
a little confused when this standing on one's head calls itself "scien- 
tific," and puts on spectacles to be more impressive, or comes here 
from "mother-countries" under the name of "great discoveries." 
But our "ancestors" in particular, came here to be sure of having 
freedom of opinion; and the remarkably free manner in which it is ex- 
pressed by their children shows that the same old spirit is still alive 
and active. 

And indeed what those who deny it really want, is freedom of 
speech. But for Avhat purpose, — if they really have no freedom of 
thought? Do they want to prove that fact? But Avhat they really do 
prove is, — that they do not want to have any real freedom of thought; 
any free, true, known use of this power to think, either by themselves 
or others. For they discard and hoot at all effort to find any method 
or law for thought itself which shall insure its freedom and its truth. 
But as to "free speech," — that also must be merelv mechanical accord- 
ing to their own theory. If we get in that only the utterance of a 
machine, it is mere buzz and whirr. If there is a man who runs it, 
and he makes of himself only "an improved ape," we may laugh; but 
if he plaj^s the gorilla, we must object. In any case, free speech must 
have its limits. Even by human laAV, it is necessary to prevent base 
and corrupting speech which goes to the demoralization of a com- 
munity, or to the rejection of all laws or restraints of Reason. 

But our Constitutions protect freedom of opinion in general, 
because even to deny its reality is to allege it; and to try to prevent it 
by force is absurd because impossible, — just as much so as the theory 
of "giving" it by force. Thus "persecution" of this sort is twin-born 
with the notion that the Man himself is "made by Force." But our 
Nation recognizes it as simply an inhuman and useless effort to de- 
stroy the Man himself. Hence the freedom of speech, also, when con- 
fined to mere expression of private opinion, is a logical corollary of 
Man's, active, creative thinking, and of the relation he has to his 
fellow-men. It is in fact thus regarded and treated in this country, 
just so far as it is a practical necessity for free and full discussion of all 
subjects. 

In this way, a rational free speech is recognized by us as a means 
for progress towards a communion of all in the best thinking. For 
this, as public thought, is thus moralized by a common conviction of 
truth which, as fully free, can be found only in what is recognized bj" 
all as a religious and final authotity for truth, — Reason itself. As no 
man pretends to alone possess this, he wishes to hear its voice as others 
hear it. And if anv mishear or misutter it, even that also serves. 



THE NATIONAL EELATION TO RELIGION. 241 

since it warns. Tliose who try to wield the sword of Reason in a false 
way, only cut their own heads off, as we see, and still go on talking, 
unaware of the loss. 

Such, then, is the law, written or unwritten, of this country: — 
"let all have a hearing," — ^if only decent. Even the insane man is not 
hindered, if harmless; he, too, is let preach his illusions. Besides, we 
have noted what a Babel of confused tongues this becomes iu the 
Press, even when written speech; so that it forces every man back to 
an inner religious freedom of thought as a basis, if he is to have any 
real thinking of truth for himself. Thus the speech shows itself to be 
mere form; the rational reality must be found elsewhere. And every 
man, even the irreligious, practically says this rational reality of 
thought, as an act within him, is a religious one; for he says it can- 
not be touched by force, and ought not to be subjected to such an in- 
.sane attempt, either in theory or practice, either by law or by act. 

But when this freedom of thought comes forth into some form of 
utterance created by it, then it seeks to act upon itself in others, 
through their act of interpreting this imperfect and external form. 
The imperfection of the method requires its careful use by the actor 
himself, and sometimes its limitation by others, even by law, if he do 
not observe a common morality respecting it. The limits of what is 
merely speech, have perhaps already been sufficiently suggested, if not 
fully stated. What remains is to notice that when religious freedom 
proposes to show itself beyond mere speech, then it becomes the prac- 
tice of a religion, either as a public worship or as an acting upon 
others through its actual practice of morality. This brings up the 
question: what is the worship, or other actual moral practice, which 
can be recognized by the law, as what is guaranteed protection as 
"Religion." 

Now it is clear that no brawling that scouts at all religion can pre- 
tend to be recognized and protected as one. Nor can a "religion of 
Humanity" be recognized as a worship, since it worships a nothing; 
nor as a religion, because it denies all religious bond. No philosophy 
of the unknowable can organize any religion, unless it be of that past, 
pagan, "ignorant worship of an Unknown God,'' which Paul recog- 
nized at Athens. But this Nation is not Athens. Surely, at this day, 
and here, in a Nation which makes sacred the freedom of thought, 
nothing can be called religion which does not at least recognize the 
Divine as a "God of Truth," and all men as obligated to a moral law 
of Reason well known to all. There can surely be no "witness" for Re- 
ligion, who cannot be trusted as a "witness" for men, from his deny- 
ing all such obligation. 

Hence the worship, or other practice proposed or claimed as legiti- 
mate, must be judged of really, logically, by this Nation, only by the 



242 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

standard before described, essentially that of Christianity. But in a. 
Civil Society, the criterion for this rational judgment practicallj^ de- 
generates with the actual morality of the people, and rises or falls with 
that, as a common view of what is really moral practice. We ma}^ 
claim, however, that in this Nation, the Christian laws of morality are 
regarded as the only standard for a religious life and practice. And 
here the forms of the creed and the worship are so free, that the inner 
religious life of Reason itself is what is final authority, and points to a 
God of Truth as alone final judge of the thoughts. 

The really religious man who takes this standard will, of all men, 
be the last to deny the freedom of thought. Nor Avill he be the least 
charitable in respect to its human utterances, or least aware of the dif- 
ficulties of a perfect practice of Religion. It is by reason, then, of this 
thoughtful and Divinely inspired catholicity of the Christian Religion 
that it is so charitable and receptive of all. It spreads its white wings 
over even the evil as well as the good, in sublime confidence of its Di- 
vine mission and power to "overcome the evil with the good." 
Wherever it is truly preached and Nationally recognized as free, there 
flocks even irreligion as to its best shelter against its own devices, — to 
its own best freedom to suck the juices of an eternal life, that it. too, 
may live and have its day; — nay, that it may be cured and escape its 
night. Such is the situation of this above all other nations with respect 
to Religion. As before intimated, it is based upon a Religion of the 
Universe itself, to which all the religions of Man come with their im- 
perfections to be healed; — or else to corrupt, unless this Religion be^ 
taught in its inmost truth and practiced in its utmost charity. 

With a vague rather than a clear sense of this, the Nation has prac- 
tically acted as if it feared nothing. It has given a welcome to 
all sincere thought, to all useful lives. It has trusted the power of 
Reason to dominate all when given a free career, and to bring all into 
harmony by its own "hidden ways," — most invisible of all in the 
sphere of Religion, when this is regarded only in its phase of an in- 
most and freest thinking. 

And so also has the practice of Religion by worship or other public 
acts been mainly left to the conscience which inspires it. Here, how- 
ever, the guardianship of a Christian morality becomes a duty of the 
laws. Even a Chinese worship, Buddhistic, or pagan, has been per- 
mitted in California, when wholly remaining a matter of supposed ben- 
efit for the worshippers, and only a theatrical show for the curiosity of 
others. But should the Mahommedan worship offer itself, merely as- 
a worship, it would doubtless be allowed its private protection. Should 
it, however, seek to bring here its morality, — that, in its fatalistic 
teachings, would put it on a par with the Chinese, and neither would 
be allowed to inculcate such a morality. In this aspect, both are on a. 



THE NATIONAL KELATION TO RELIGION. 243' 

par with views which derive Man from the brute; or, making of him a 
mere plaything of force, logically come to the conclusion of Schopen- 
hauer, — that "the will to live" is really "irrational,'' — so that the 
only way to live "rationally" is not to live at all. 

Thus theories which reject the religious view, that "Man does not 
live by bread alone," confirm its truth; but in an immoral way, by 
prompting to suicide as a plunge into nonentity. Death is not re- 
garded as that 'opening of the gates" for a spiritual life which the 
Truth has "made free." But human laws, that of New York for ex- 
ample, make of an attempt at suicide a crime . If the act is regarded 
as "against public policy, " equally so must be the teachings or views 
of life which lead to it; so that this is essentially a law for protection 
of Religion. It regards men as morally bound to reject such views 
and teachings. 

But again, if we ask : would the Mahommedan be allowed to 
practice "his polygamy here because his religion permits it, and his 
"revelation" tells of sensuous "houris" in Heaven itself, — then we 
should have a par with the views of a sensualist theory of Man. And 
any sensualist who deems this life the only one, would have small 
scruple about becoming a Mahommedan, if that gave him a "respect- 
able '' morality. In this aspect, a ' ■ religion ' would be quite inviting 
to him. But such a ranging of "wives" or "harems" under the 
name of Religion would at once shock the moral sense of the American 
people. The attempt to do so would perhaps wake them to full con- 
sciousness of the fact that they have been educated by the Christian 
Religion, and have a Christian conscience on the subject of morality. 

Yet here we have almost a perfect parallel with the practice of 
Mormonism. Do " votes " ward ofE the " shock? " It is said by some 
of the Mormons, that their "revelation" does not command, but only 
permits polygamy. But that is true also of the Koran. And both 
these "religions" carry this sensuality into a future life; the Mormons 
doing so in even a grosser and more debasing theory of both Man and 
God than had Mohammed. Whether partyism has stood in the way, 
or whether that merely technical style of interpreting laws and con- 
stitutions which seems specially eminent in destroying them, it seems that 
in Mormonism, we permit at least the local existence of both polygamy 
and haremism. Into one or other of these descriptions of it, its mor 
ality surely falls, and can be legally judged. Let it be imitated else- 
where in either form and called a " religious practice,'' — as it may, if 
that is what is deemed to protect it, — and then judges, legislators and 
party politicians would soon be enlightened in their interpretations. 
If taking two or more wives by a religious form of marriage be not 
bigamy, what can be? This may call for "amnesty" in some cases; 
but surely leaves no other loophole for escape, when the rite of mar- 



244 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

xiage was performed anywhere in this country, or in any other with 
similar laws; for it was known to be against the recognized morality, 
and to be even a crime specified in the laws. But suppose the rite and 
practice be concealed, or not provable as a marriage, yet if it be no- 
toriously the keeping of a harem, that suffices. Can a Nation concede 
that such a practice is tolerable everywhere, — as it may be, if any- 
where, when it claims to be a morality? Such a "better morality," as 
it calls itself, may be adopted elsewhere also; by such as may consider it 
"as good a religion as any other " and with " as much right to be pro- 
tected." 

On such a point, therefore, parties and policies show what sort of 
religion they practice, whatever may be their professions. But a Na- 
tion cannot safely tamper with half-way policies in regard to what, 
claiming to be a morality, is opposed to the monogamous law of the 
land, or what, claiming to be a religion, shocks the National conscience 
of what Religion is. 

III. There is no scope here to complete such a theme as Religion. 
"We have come to it as that inmost Reason which through Man creates 
a Nation. And a free Nation, more or less conscioiisly, protects it as 
this sacred^ form of a creative trust. It is recognized as the truly free, 
the Divinely good, since it forces none, but persuades all, into an ever 
higher unity of rational men, passing beyond the sphere of any Nation^ 
or of any church. And thus it hovers with a larger sweep over this 
free Nation, which protects it as the inmost life of all men, and over all 
^Nations as the means whereby in part it works and wins its way, as 
culture for Man, as unity of all in God. In this larger view of it, the 
laws of civil polity must needs leave it to the aids of Science, the in- 
terpretations of Philosophy, the organized efforts of churches. These 
all appeal to the individual, and by them is he educated in Religion. 
"We are therefore here carried back to that common humanity, — the 
many men to whom Reason has been entrusted, and where alone can 
it find and edifice its " Church Universal," its " City Eternal." 

Man gets weaned from all his nurses, — from Nature, family, State, 
Church. Sooner or later, in one way or another, this must occur to 
every individual. Their function is only to teach him to stand alone, 
on his own responsibility, a true self-government. And he must learn 
to do this or fail of his manhood. He must learn to walk alone "in 
the spirit " not less than with the body. His body decays at last; then, 
at least, if no sooner, he must take disgust for mere Natural laws 
and their joys. But meantime his education has fitted him for some 
curriculum of active life, in business or State, and he is satiate with the 
powers of that career, or disgusted with their irrationality. So also the 
church has nourished him Math its teachings and guided him by his 
faith in others. But he can scarcely ha\ e been thoughtful at all, if he 



INDIVIDUAL RELATION TO KELIGION. 245 

•does not tire of all this clamor of contending sects, and wearily sigh 
for rest in a larger spirit than any of these, or else rise above all these 
various views, and grasp Religion in its own Reason and its own peace. 
In the latter case, he is ' " born into that spirit ' ' itself which has weaned 
him for itself, and from all else, yet by all else, and through all 
else. 

However imperfect may seem the means of this education, then, 
they must not be regarded as unnecessary nor even as unfit, since their 
very imperfection adapts them to those who use them. Man even pre. 
fers to see the Divine wisdom in a father, the Divine goodness in a 
mother; and these, when they depart carry a ray of light for him into 
eternity. So also he loves his Nation as "the best of Nations ;" and 
in his church he would have hidden a holy shekinah, too bright for his 
eyes. "All these " he wishes and loves to say, "are better and wiser 
than I. '' But if man could not turn at last from all these teachers and 
say: "Not enough!" he would really have no need of them; for he 
would have no capacity to surpass them. What is educated in him 
would not be a power capable of ruling over all, of transforming all 
into more than ' ' image, " of rising into real vision of the invisible 
This is the proof of Man's birthright, and that its origin and title are 
not to be sought for in Nature. 

Theories of Education which treat Man as nothing at all mentally, 
unless it be a hard case to be stuffed or written on or " polished; "' or 
of Morality, which seek for laws of that in relations of force; or of 
statecraft which regard him as to be ruled only by force ; — all these and 
their congeners in Science, Art or Philosophy of any kind, are theories 
as vulgarizing as they are false. They pride themselves upon being 
"practical;" — just what they are not, except for creating evil and de- 
stroying good. Their M^hole tendency is to corrupt the inaividual and 
al'l he makes, — Arts, States, Churches. They claim to be new; but they 
are only new forms of old falsities. They are essentially the same 
theories which made the imperfect States of the past, the ruin of which 
they are now fond of imputing to "Religion." But they are them- 
selves this vague ' ' religion in general ' ' which both made and ruined 
them. They are those "religions" which are mere superstitions of 
Nature, and worships of force ; and are merely seeking to repeat the 
old story in a new form, — to go through the old convulsions more 
rapidly, intensely and terribly. Not warned by the fact that Athens 
and Rome had as high intellectual development as they, they would 
repeat the old error of moral blindness or perversity, in subordinating 
the mental to the physical, the higher law to the lower in ' ' practical 
affairs," and especially in "statesmanship." Thus they would have us 
run down to barbarism again only more quickly; for agnosticisms and 
atheisms are shorter routes than polytheisms. Existing barbarisms 



246 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

show US what such theory is practically; for there it is in its nakedness, 
— an agnosticism of any Divine Reason as ruler in Man. It is just as 
likely that these barbarisms have degenerated from man's highest birth- 
light, if it were ignored in this way, as that they have become "de- 
veloped" thus far from the "brute." And it is quite as easy for us to 
"descend " to that as from that. 

The true inference is, that Reason is a power in trust for Man, and 
must show itself a ruling power and know itself as such. It has a bat- 
tle to win, and must win or lose it. Hence we may "infer" that it 
may be overpowered, if it be misused or miseducated by himself or 
others; but also that he must not let it be overpowered. Ignoring it, 
is the quickest way to enslave it; but equally sure are all false theories 
concerning it, which find not its religious relation and character. All 
such error and blindness is to be avoided as clearly the cause of all 
forms of ruin to former nations; — but more now than ever. If this 
Reason be with us at its Lucifer hight, it must also have a Lticif er fall. 
If its "pride " be only a blind one; a pride in its power of force, ignor- 
ing that this too is a power of Reason, — then it will make of this evil 
Osgood, and topple drunkenly to its fall. Our physical Science is justly 
proud of its grand achievements; but if it see not that these have a re" 
ligious origin, are created by a Reason divinely entrusted to Man as a 
creative power, — then it may prove to be, not "the providence," but 
the Lucifer of Nations. 

Reason, as reflective, is but another name for what Religion is 
merely in its rest, — its rest from its labors, its serene contemplation. It 
is a home which Religion oft needs to seek merely for rest; — but also 
for counsel. It is the home of its power, — the might of God. But when 
the "counsel," and not merely the rest, is asked for by Religion, it can 
be received only by a highest method of thinking the true; and it can be 
reuttered for others only by a highest Art, a moral art of expression. 
Hence when this interpretation of Religion, (in aid of the moral Art of 
Civil Polity or of Church Polity, or otherwise), is undertaken by phil" 
osophies, these will be found to fail in proportion as they neglect or re- 
fuse to recognize realities, and begin to talk about "illusions." 

If a philosophy grasps not the "revealed" and hence "self- 
evident" truth of all, that even Reason Divine must and does operate,, 
not merely by one but by three modes of power, and that one of these 
seems an ' ' evil " one, then such a philosophy fails to find the real rela- 
tion for any practical acts whatever. This entire book has been tracing 
this relation as that of the three powers of Reason, to merely think, to 
morally design, and to exercise force in space and time for embodi- 
ment, expression or symbolization of Man's designs. Taken in general,, 
this last mode of action may be Divinely resolved into good; but taken 
in particular as it must be by Man, it is essentially an evil, since all 



INDIVIDUAL EELATION TO KELIGION. 247 

such expression is necessarily imperfect. It is ever incomplete, and 
never, like the idea or thought itself, at once complete, divine in its 
nature and absolutely the same for all. This latter, the power to think, 
must therefore always pass beyond the imperfection of any external 
expression. Even to know what that "means," it must recreate it in 
the purer form of idea, by seizing the design of its maker, and allow- 
ing for its imperfect execution, by noting that the law of the form in 
which it is executed is inadequate for perfection. In this way, the 
power to think declares itself supreme over all, and capable of even 
turning evil into good. This has been shown all through the process of 
making laws and civil polities by Man. It has been pointed out also 
as the very acme of his power, and proof of his responsibility, in the 
sphere of his own creation of evils and his avoidance of the "illusions" 
they excite. 

Now, to recognize this designing power in Man, to make it con- 
scious of itself, and render it good in its designs, is just as vital to the 
Church as to the 8tate. All true philosophy of Education must rest 
upon such a power in Man. Keligious education especially must do so. 
It must not ignore this designing power in Man; for in that alone can 
it find a religious reality, since in that alone is there any reality of 
revelation. All laws of evidence are grounded upon it, and found in 
its acts ; — to ignore this, is what falsifies and partializes all science. All 
knowedge of good and evil is in and by it alone; — to ignore this, is to 
get lost, as Mr. Seward describes the Hindoos, in metaphysical mazes 
without issue. 

Yet ignoring of all this, is just what has largely reduced all relig- 
ious teaching to mere imposition of external authority, or else to mere 
memorizing study of "facts" as basis for religious belief. In this way, 
it has put itself on the same footing as physical science, and of course 
finds itself in a "conflict between Religion and Science," because no 
physical theories, or mechanical relations of things, can at all explain 
the religious relations of persons. To trace this briefly, is the quickest 
way to show the individual's relation to Science, Art and Philosophy, 
in regard to his religious education. 

Of com-se, unless the man or teacher begins with a true philosophy 
of what it is that is to be educated, he begins or is led blindly But 
there is no art whatever which cannot be made, when truly taught, to 
render him aware that he must needs be a designing, inventive power, 
in order even to understand his work. Neither is there any science, 
(as noted in the case of mathematics), which cannot be taught so as to 
show him that the only " revelation," the only law of evidence, and 
hence the only actual evidence he has, is in his own known act of 
thinking. Whatever else may be fact or illusion for him, whatever 
else may or may not be "proven," this religious reality of an actual 



248 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

thinking, — a self -revealing of truth, is in him. How stupid, then, to 
fix his attention on everything else but that as "evidence." In fact, 
the ignoring of that, is essentially irreligious teaching; for it treats as 
unknowable the religious reality itself. 

Thus, for example, we have seen religious teachers gravely discus- 
sing the "scientific evidence'" presented in the "positive" form of a 
series of rock strata, to "demonstrate of itself" such or such duration, 
and history of the earth. It seems entirely forgotten that all the evi- 
dence at all really offered, or possible in such a matter, consists in a 
process of reasoning. This is the only proof; and, whether it satisfies. 
us much or little concerning the history of the earth, it demonstrates, 
when our attention is called to it as an operation of the mind itself, 
that the "evidence" is in us, not outside of us. Hence we may con- 
sole ourselves with the reflection that, if it is Truth, it will stay there; 
and that, in any case, this religious reality of Truth, in its own act as 
only evidence of all, is quite indilferent to the supposed history of the 
earth. Are we rather to tremble with dismay before a certain 
pile of rocks as a "positive evidence,'' against a designing power 
which we must needs use, in order to see anything more in them 
than a pile of rocks? If we do not recognize this designing power 
in us as our evidence of a supposed "history," certainly there 
can be none other. This "scientific evidence" must otherwise 
be wholly an illusion, imless it be a "fact" made in just this^ 
way. 

At this rate, a man can consider as illusion any fact, or any reality, 
whether that of his inner thought, or whether the solid one which 
perhaps he deems the only evidence. The fact of the sun going 
around the earth is now said to be an illusion. Yet it served long, 
and serves still as "a practical fact." It is a supposition sufficient for 
many purposes. For, when we come to realize what this "fact" is, we 
find it to be really only a thought of ours, — a judgment about an in- 
finite number of sense impressions and their relation, regarded from, 
a certain point of view. This judgment is relatively correct, a "com- 
mon sense' ' j udgment. But when we undertake to settle our credo upon 
that alone as a basis, we render ourselves incapable of understanding 
even the solar system. For that purpose, this designing power in us 
must take another point of view, and one impossible for us to take 
bodily. It must "walk by faith and not by sight," if it gets to that 
point of view of the universe. In doing this, Galileo was more re- 
ligious than the Pope; for he asserted the entire independence of the 
thought, its dominion not only over the senses, but also over old the- 
ories. And now physical Science itself rests knowingly, (unless it 
floats) upon this free capacity in Man to conceive from any point of 
view he pleases; and the "evidence" it offers is an ideal, not a sensible 



INDrVTDFAL RELATION TO EELIGION. '249 

one. Shall we, then, ignore the very means essential to such science,- 
the very act of our own upon which all its work depends, and in which 
aU its evidence consists? 

It would seem, therefore, that this essential fact of all, this design- 
ing maker of facts, ought to be taken as only sufficient ground for re- 
ligious truth. And to point it out as such, and as free, should be the 
main object sought in religious teaching. For falsity, even in physical 
science, depends, as we have seen, not so much upon a failure to see 
"facts" as to recognize their factor: not so much on incapacity to de- 
sign, as on refusal to recognize its work as free designing. It shuts 
itself up in a particular point of view and says, either that it will not, 
or cannot go any farther; either this is all. or the rest is unknowable. 
But Galileo stepped out of that stupidity, though the church forbade 
it: and every advance in Science must do it, for the Religious reality 
commands it, commands the knowing to be free and know itseM as 
free. 

Religious teaching itself, then, is also just this mulish halting of 
Science, when it boxes itself up in certain hypotheses. If it rest its 
revelation merely upon supposed or proven outer facts, it ignores the 
real evidence of them in the thinking itself, which is, in any case, the 
only religious reality for the individual. "WTiether his suppositions 
about facts are false or true, they must be insufficient: and his very 
freedom to think about them as thus insufficient and incomplete, is the 
vital truth of all for him. — the very one to call his attention to as the 
religious reality of his nature. If this is not done, he may become a 
merely stolid accepter of others' opinions. But he may also become a 
mere fanciful thinker, because no religious ground of Truth is shown 
him. Since he is referred to outer proofs, he gets lost in them from 
his very freedom to transform them. He may fall into an idle dream- 
ing of iU-regulated thought. If this is made into habits of thinking, it 
may breed illusions respecting outer realities. The real truth is, that 
Ulusions of all sorts are also facts in some form; and. per contra, all 
facts, solid as you please, or ideal as you please, are but illusions also, 
if they are taken, not as facta, — the made, but as the maker. Both 
facts and illusions are but forms of the law which makes them. They 
are seen falsely or truly, according as this law is misused or misread. 
They may be well known to be insufficient and incomplete, yet practi- 
cally be taken as all in all, or as all that is known. In this case, there 
arises a thinking and worship of the evil rather than of the good, a 
slavery rather than a freedom of the thought. 

In this way arise those vulgar and false philosophies which under- 
take to tell us the precise "facts." and give us a solid irreligion. They 
are merely like the drunkard who has made of evil his good. Since 
they conceive only of snakes as ancestors, they find only snaky and 



250 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

crawling realities; and vice -versa. All else is illusion for them. Look 
ing back to the "descent of Man," they see the serpent itself, of sens- 
uality, and greed of force-form, not as his tempter merely, but as his 
"ancestor," his fatal all. Such theories, then, may WdU be asked, how 
Man is ever to be rid of his hell, if he has instinct only for that. And 
all who cherish them may well inquire, when they see their tendency 
to make men drunker and drunker, till they think only as in a deli- 
rium tremens, whether, after all, there is not more wisdom in that 
"old fable" they sneer at, yet which distinctly symbolizes this very re- 
lation of Man to both a heaven and a hell, — to Reason, and to a force- 
form which may be abused. It is this relation of Man to both good and 
evil, which gives him the knowledge of both. He is an active power 
for both, and to subordinate the evil to the good. Hence, in^the "old 
fable," there is a third party that expels from, and guards, this firs- 
"Eden," with a flaming sword. It is that designing Reason in Man, 
which makes him discontent with mere sensuous Edens, and sends him 
forth into the rugged way, a creative power. It tells him to account 
wisdom more precious than rubies, and manly virtues will render him 
"heroic," "divine," and make men themselves say: "Of a truth, he is 
a god!" 

All history echoes with that voice of Reason with its excelsior/ for 
men. It has built families. States, churches; and has ever repudiated 
that baser cry of the tempter wliich leads away to the illusions of the 
drunken sense, and sneers at the all-creative reality and sanctity of 
Religion. An earthly father sends forth his child and says: "Go, act 
for thyself that thou mayst be a Man! " So says this Divine parentage 
in Man: — "Go forth, creative child, that thou mayst know thyself and 
the reality of thy Manhood by thyself creating! " Thus it is, that Man 
traces his real "descent, " by an ascent. For even as one who "falls 
asleep," and "knows that he shall rise again " from that mimic death, 
as if he had touched a god and renewed an immortal strength, he 
seems a Hercules who can live forever, and vanquish every Anteus 
who, born of Earth alone, must hold to that for all his vigor. 

Even the ancients imputed a religious relation and birth to. the 
highest "strength." Has Man become less "heroic," less "heaven- 
born" because he now sees this relation as one of " laws?'' No; but 
this relation, in its religious reality, is more difficult for him to "under- 
stand " and state. Even the highest philosophy, when it seeks for the 
best methods, springs from the deepest insight, and rises to the hight 
of the religious relation, must also falter in its utterance of what it 
would fain say. And what it says must be imperfect; so that it must 
depend*! upon an insight and love of .truth as great as its own for a per- 
fect comprehension of what it would fain say but cannot, Thus was 
it with the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Men saw less easily 



INDIVIDUAL KKLATION TO KELIGION. 251 

their thinking of the "good" than the Epicurean thinking of the 
"evil;" the latter was the "good fact;" the former the "illusion.'' 
So has it been with the best German philosophies; for "fixed habits" 
of thinking, they are " nonsense. " When these rise to the hight of 
the Christian thesis itself, like that, they are subject to failui'e of ex^ 
pression in the utterance, as well as to misconstruction by a lesser in- 
sight or a prejudiced reception. Not easy is it for any "to attain un- 
to it," — that freest thinking of Truth, which must grasp a total and 
Divinely ordered relation of all realities. Unless the essential neces- 
sity for a triune relation of powers is kept firmly in view, and clearly 
•expressed, the philosophy itself is one-sided, or if otherwise, is "not 
understood " by any who insist upon having only what they call 
"facts" considered, and all the rest called "illusions." Thus the 
highest philosophy of Germany, ^o-day, is • deemed chiefly useful in 
supporting a despotic unity and government mainly by force, because 
it is "understood" as calling force itself an "illusion" as such, 
and really "rational;" and it is convenient not to recognize that 
it also regards illusions of all kinds as deplorable but instrumental 
facts. 

The error here is part intentional, part lack of insight; — it is the 
error of our old friend "self-interest." The man can build him a 
glass-house with mirrors within, so that he can see himself repeated in- 
finitely in a shape he recognizes as apparently himself. Yet he knows 
that this "fact," which he himself makes to tickle his vanity, really 
sends back to him only illusions made bj- a law which mocks at him. 
But when he is wiser, he finds the real fact of his own presence every- 
where infinitely; and his taking all else for "not himself," and not his 
self-interest, and " not in his time," seems now the illusion. Man's 
mirror gives only a shadow even in facts. The Divine mirror gives 
only a reality even in illusions. The facets of the latter are infinite, 
and give all sides; for indeed it is not a mirror but a maker of mirrors, 
— a recognition of the laws of reflection. Hence the man who looks 
at it " only one way," only thinks in one way. Thus he can see in- 
deed an infinite self repetition in any form he pleases, but attains to no 
spiritual, complete self -forming, and therefore "sees" none. 

Hence there are also extreme and one-sided philosophies. One will 
say that all but the ideal is an illusion, since we know nothing except 
as we think it; — "unless we have an idea of it, it does not exist for 
us." How manifestly untrue this is, is clear from the fact that we are 
constantly affected by all in the Universe, spiritual or sensible, yet we 
never do nor even can "think it all." This shows the thought itself to be 
free and able even to rest despite all its " affections." But such an ar- 
bitrary theory that "all is ideal" renders all thought itself mechanical; 
so that this kind of " idealism" may just as well be called "material- 



252 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ism." Or, otherwise, it only destroj's both sides in trying to destroy the- 
other; for, if it be true, then there are no "many;" each is the 
"One," — and a "One" that can forget and drop out the rest. 

Such an unreasonable theory tends to breed its other extreme, — 
that we know only what actually hits us and hits us hard. In this 
view, we must be "bodies" only: and then the power to think at once 
drops out of them as "unknowable." The German Haeckle is zeal- 
ously seeking to tind for us the beginning for such a body for all ani- 
mals alike. But the power to think, not being at all "found" in any 
such forms, nor at all necessary for "collisions," must be the "illu- 
sion," — and the greatest illusion of all. It is but a "secretion of the 
brain," — of a brain which it must itself create. It can get "created" 
then, only by what itself creates; a singular "fact" which seems after 
all to leave it "uncreate," and let it wing-away triumphant in its im- 
mortal character. Man builds a house, whenever and such as he 
needs. But he does not say that he or his thought is a secretion of the 
house. So thought must always build an outer, perishable fabric of 
some sort, if it wishes anything it owns or uses to appear, or to "ex- 
ist" in that way. But itself is not "secreted" by an}^ such form, brain 
or other, any more than its "vision" is secreted by a microscope the 
man uses. Nor does it perish with the using. 

These absurdities, to which inevitably run all so-called philosophies 
which reject a religious ground for science, are warnings for Nations 
as well as for men. The sanctity of the Truth is the only ground of 
Civil Polity for free men. If Truth has no reality as an active design- 
ing power, there are no free men. It is the only ground, therefore, 
for the individual himself as Man. He takes an oath by this sanctity 
of the Truth, not as an abstraction, nor as a formal, limited truth, but 
as a living Truth, — Truth in its wholeness of actuality in him. He is 
this actual capacity to know and tell the Truth, or he would not recog 
nize his right to call himself a Man. He swears by this as a religious 
reality, for he feels it as a moral obligation, to violate which, denies his 
own spiritual nature as born of the Truth. 

And he knows this Truth in him as a designing power. He is no- 
mere Hercules, no "heaven-born" of a sort that can be made into a 
mere fixture like the stars. The power he has is no illusion. It seems 
to rest from its toils in his sleep.- but he rises again from that sublime 
self-surrender, as though he had touched a.God of Reason and not a 
god of clay. And its labors are more mighty than those of the hero; 
for it can transform that evil form of force into a servant of the good. 
It is in this fact that he can understand his own design. He knows 
this power of design in him as a moral law, and an impulse to all refor- 
mation, in himself, in Civil Polity, or in Church. Its monition to him 
is ever as if it were almighty "Be ye not overcome with evil, but over- 
cohie evil with good!" 



INDIVIDUAL RELATION TC^ EELTGION. 253 

For in that process, (as already intimated in chapter XI), is alone at- 
tained the acme of goodness as well as of power. By knowing in him 
such a designing power and intent, therefore, Man is able to devour the 
Sphinxes of his "destiny," instead of letting them devour him. Their 
"riddles" of death he can read as only an immortal promise. The 
"problem of evil," or, what is the same, "the mystery of suffering," 
is revealed to him by the very nature of his designing power and its 
relation to his other powers. He knows that in such relations as his, 
all Art is painstaking, all goodness an act of victory over evil, all lib- 
erty a moral liberty delivered down from "father to son," as a "free- 
dom's battle," to be ever won, just because it must be won by every 
man of everj^ generation. Thus he knows himself designed to be a 
soldier, and free to be a good or poor one. He has a cross to bear, but 
also a crown to win. He has a real burden to bear; yet to shirk it is 
only to take on a worse one. He can rest from it, not merely by lay- 
ing it off in his sleep, but by reflecting that he is not the whole of Rea- 
son and does not bear it all. For such is the Divine Reality itself of 
Reason; — this burden is also for it both cross and crown. The glory of 
Reason is not declared by either a philosophical ignoring of evil, nor 
by a practical surrender to it; but by recognizing its reality, and its 
moral use by one who can create it to be conquered and made servant 
of the good. Every child of Reason shares in this work, partakes of 
its burden, helps realize its glory. 

Suffering itself may thus be seen as rational, and even loving, in 
its purpose. A baptismal chrism of the new-born, it may also be the 
source of the highest glory, and the crown of all rejoicing. Thus every 
one is ready to say of his own share of suffering, when he sees how it 
fades and perishes in the past: "I can forget that, but I cannot forget 
the sufferings of those I have loved." And this is but the echo of what 
a Divine heart also says: "I can forget my own, but never the suffer- 
ings of my children!" 

But none of this "explaining of the mysteries of life," (as it is 
called), is possible, if Man does not obey the injunction: " know thy- 
self," by knowing himself as a designing power. Designs alone can 
"evolve" into such facts as truth and falsity, good and evil. Whoever 
ignores designing in Man has no law of evidence even for things; so 
that when it comes to such different realities as goodness, truth, etc., 
he is wholly lost. The reason for his finding no evidence of these, or 
of "what they are," is very plain, however, when he tells us that we 
must ignore wholly "what it is" that Man is to know as himself, or 
else we must regard it as only an atom. He tells us that all our higher 
interpretations are "purely imaginary." He is wholly blind to the ne- 
cessity for all our interpretations to be " imaginary," — an act of im- 
derstanding. He has never even asked himself that primary question: 



254 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

"What is evidence?" never asked even Jioio ho "sees." It is clear, 
therefore, that such "objects of life" as he will propose for us, as 
■'within reach," will quite ignore that foreseeing, designing power in 
3Iau, which makes him build a State, not merely for himself, but for 
his posterity. 

All such agnostic teaching, therefore, is peculiarly degrading to 
Man. It sums up all other falsities in science and philosophy, and de- 
clares him slave altogether, because slave in them. But religious 
teaching itself has been guilty of this. For all false teaching springs 
(Hit of false views of the religious reality of what is educated in Man. 
The result, of course, is two-fold; — in theory, and in practice. On the 
one side, flow out false philosophies and imperfect sciences, all due to 
imperfect religions; and on the other hand, these theories are put into 
practice. When a man has no recognition of Truth as other than an ab- 
straction, it is obvious that goodness, also, will be mere abstraction for 
him. If he ignore the act by which he knows the good, how shall he 
know that as act also, — as a personal reality? Only in a designing 
power can he find a good reality. If he ignore this, good or evil be- 
come for him mere phantom-dance over the surface of things. This 
w^as traced in chapter II., as it showed itself in the Roman world. Let 
us see what it is and does in modern times. 

IV. Agnosticism is simply the final evolution into Science, of a 
religious effort to treat "revelation" as something independent of the 
act of thought itself in Man. It is the last step of that old denial of 
Man's capacity to know save by being acted upon as if by force, so 
that he also must react by force and be an atom. It is the step where 
this "atom" is driven to its nullity as atom; knows itself at last to be 
knowing freely and not by force, and hence is asking freely about all 
■'revelation,'' even that of the law of force itself. It asks: " do I know 
this 'revelation' by my own act, by a felt act of Reason in and by 
me?— if not, I do not know it at all." Thus Agnosticism recognizes 
Reason, but only as Man's reasoning. This Reason also acts; must 
act or it cannot be acted upon. It is found as a self-government which 
refuses to be ruled except by what it recognizes as Reason. Hence it 
rejects anj'^ "revelation" which is not felt aud known as in the guise of 
Reason by the one who interprets it. But, at this point. Agnosticism, 
driven to free itself from a law of force, stands pausing and says: "I 
do not know what it is, this Reason. By that alone I know, yet I know 
not it. Hence I know not at all. For I must know absolutel}', or not 
at all." 

Such is the realit}' of the case with Agnosticism. It is that " de- 
spair" of Religion, Avhich first found hope in Science, but, not recog- 
nizing the reality of its creative Art in that, over both thoughts and 
things, has returned to its despair, just as the sun is rising. It is the 



AGNOSTICISM AND MOI>EKN SOCIETT. '200 

"second cominff of the Son of Man.' in the clouds of Man's reason- 
ings, yet in the glory of his own Reason, — the glory of a world trans- 
formed by Man's own Art, and radiant with the light of his own 
known Science, so that there is no longer night there. Hence it is Re- 
ligion itself, again new risen, freed from its grave-clothes, and say- 
ing truly: "I Kxow; yea. I know absolutely, or I know not at all. I 
know that the Redeemer lireth, if at all, in this absolute knowing, this 
very act of Reason which transforms ail. I know the Truth as Truth. 
or I know nothing." 

That is the utterance of a true Agnosticism, which Man hears as 
he pauses, and rests from the fever and toil of his own creating. He 
recognizes a rational act by which he thinks, designs and creates. He 
knows it to be an absolute power over force, and of absolute nature it- 
self, hence known in itself and by itself. But if he halt there, and see 
not its 'reach" into all truth, and that its very nature as a self-govern- 
ment makes of the entire universe of Thought a mutual, personal, 
spiritual self-government. — then he stands upon the dividing line be- 
tween Religion and irreligion. 

And this is the false Agnosticism, whether in science or religion, 
which affects modesty. But the modesty is a false one. Hence it is 
an immodesty, an immorality; for, in especially disclaiming religious 
knowledge, it disclaims all moral responsibility, as well as all ground 
for true Science. Thus it uproots both State and Church, and sends 
Man himself adrift again like an atom. It is not that Socratic and 
modest agnosticism which claimed to know more than others, in seeing 
that a mere smattering in details which ignores principles is folly. 
Just the contrary of that; for it glorifies this mere knowing of details, 
while ignoring the very acts of Reason by which they are known. So- 
crates averred that the only real knowing must be an absolute know- 
ing, — a knowing of that by which we know, and of its acts whereby 
all else is known. But this false agnosticism is the exact reverse of 
that Socratic seeking for the absolute Beauty. Truth, Good, as only 
ground of all. It avers that such a seeking is futile: and that the only 
knowing, if any, is of "things within reach." No wonder sucB a 
view corrupts all business; but what are we to do if it is echoed in the 
religious sphere itself, as this "modest" disclaimer of "reach," and this 
preaching of Mans incapacity?" 

Thus we are told by every half-way business-man, scientist, poli- 
tician or theologian, that "it is not necessary for us to form a the- 
ory of the Universe." But just that is necessary. It is just what 
every man does and must do, in his theory of himself. And his prac- 
tical conduct shows what his theory of the Universe is. So also is every 
civic State thus dependent upon its theory of the Universe, and prac 
tically is made by that. This is the fact, and this the necessity, that 



256 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

makes of Religion the central feature of all civil polities, as it is of Man 
himself. It is vain, therefore, to try to escape this necessity of the 
case. It is precisely what makes Man "what he is" as Man, — a thinker 
of the universe, and of nothing less. Every thought a man thinks 
must be a theory of something, and one which involves a theory of all 
the rest; otherwise there is nothing to base it upon. 

But, we " must not grasp at things beyond our reach." This must 
mean, when applied to the mind, that it is a material thing and liable 
to fall to pieces. Hence a man must avoid putting any great strain 
upon his mental '■ faculties;" — and he docs, when that is preached to 
him. He is also apt to avoid straining his moral "faculties." The 
business-man sees "the truth of this observation is in the application 
of it.'' Of course it is idiotic to grasp at what is out of reach; so he 
takes good care to grasp at all within reach. He plays a losing game, 
it is true; for the former is bigger as well as better. But for him, and 
for the poor politician in every sphere, this doctrine is " self-evident," 
because it preaches to him a material view of evidence. It cuts down 
the world for him to a world of the senses, till he becomes mere mouse 
in all his ways, — business, politics, religion, — all must be cheese for 
him, or it " don't pay." 

"Man's faculties are limited!" Even the theologian deems he is* 
dealing out to us a God's mercy when he tells us that. Poor creatunss ! 
We are like rats that must go by sense of smell, must walk by sight; — 
but then, "we do not need to know much." And, besides, it would 
really " strain our faculties " to do so; hence the Truth is mercifully 
hidden from our " eyes." Can we look upon the sun, even? etc., etc. 
In such talk as this, the "faculties" are treated as mechanical, subject 
to shock and dissolution. Preachers do not intend to thus confirm the 
very theories they mean to preach against. They arc trying to explain 
why they cannot explain anything, and to make us understand why we 
cannot understand anything. But the trouble is, in both cases, that 
there is only an effort to explain and understand machines. No truth, 
religious or other, is subject to machinery. If our understanding de- 
pends upon the size, either of what is understood, or of what is under- 
stood with, no doubt such explanations would be ample, — ample 
enough to make of Man's trying to know at all a complete absurdity. 
And hence Religion, first of all, must go by the board; for that is a 
theory of the Universe, — a theory which, if impossible for Man to 
form, needs no further proof that it is not necessary for him, either to 
form, or to follow in his practice. 

Such a view of Man, in whatever sphere it is preached or practiced, 
is simply a return, or stupid adherence to the old, old doctrine of Man's 
incapacities; — so excellent for making slaves, so bad for making free- 
men. This preaching down of all his real capacities as a Man, has 



AGNOSTICISM AND MODERN SOCIETY. 257 

never made him free in Science, in Civil Polity, or otherwise. When 
the clergy have joined in it, it has also made him mere slave in religion- 
When men themselves accept it practically, and pay most to nourish 
their incapacities, and least to what tells them of their real capacities 
tind hence duties, they have resorted to methods of force and rejected 
rational methods. They have regarded each other as Natural ene- 
mies, instead of rational friends; — as things to be ruled by a law of 
force, to be tossed and torn, and to perish by shock, shock, shock, in- 
stead of persons to be mutually self -governed by a law of Reason. All 
the abuses of business methods, all the conflicts of capital and labor, all 
the slavery which man brings upon himself, under the name of personal 
libertj' or property, by rejection of any moral law for them. — will, in 
the future as in the past, spring directly from such agnosticism of all 
but incapacity in Man. 

The future of this and of every Nation depends, therefore, upon 
which theory it adopts and acts upon,— that the Universe is " unknow- 
able," or known only as a clash of forces; or that it is knowable, and 
governed, by a law of Reason. This book has sought to show that what 
Man knows as the law of laws is a law of design. It is a moral law, 
which regulates all rationally by suitable methods for every sphere of 
of action. But it is also a religious law, since it involves trust on one 
side, in an Absolute Truthmaker, and on the other in Man as absolute 
Truth-person. If this involves a theory of the Universe, so much the 
better. In that case the very building of a good State is the revelation 
of a good God. If it does not pay to tell this truth, so much the worse 
for those who think so. Those who pay for flattering their incapacities, 
pay dear, and get worse than the "nothing" which they worship. For 
no man, for no Nation, will it pay not to know the Truth; for the 
Truth alone can make us free. 

On this point, the voice of our greatest statesmen has never been 
silent; and never has it sunk to this preaching of Man's incapacities. 
Quotations have been made, and might be multiplied indefinitely. 
Suffice these words frojn that majestic and eloquent understanding of 
Webster, in 1830:— "Advance, then, ye future generations! Wc v/el- 
come you to the immeasurable blessings of rational existence, the im- 
mortal hope of Christianity, and the light of everlasting truth!" 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 

"The ability of a lofty spirit trusts not so much to mere hope, 
* * * but rather to a judgme it grounded upon present realities. 

It is but just, also, that you all should sustain the dignity of the 
State, derived from that sovereignty in it on which you all pride 
yourselves ; and that either you shrink not from its labors, or else 
lay no claim to its honors." —Pericles. 

"Man can know the future only by the past," — is another sample of 
that crab-fashion thinking, by memorizing whose maxims we are sijp- 
posed to be equipped for all emergencies. Why should we know the- 
future "only" by the past, if we at all know the present? The pres- 
ent is what alone can be transformed into the future; and what is 
knowing in it, is what is transforming it. If the man or nation knows 
what the present is, and what is creating a future out of it for him or 
it, that would seem to be nearer at hand, and capable of telling at 
least as much as the past. If nothing is known in the present, how- 
ever, it would seem quite impossible to remedj^ that difficulty by recur- 
ring to the past. And in fact, looking into the past is rather a dark 
business at the best. If we look far enough, memory fails as badly as 
prophesy, and what is ''found" is just nothing at all. Just so, a look- 
ing into the future finds nothing but a dead blank, unless there is 
known in the present something methodically creative of it. The only 
purpose of looking into the past, is to find a method, a law of creative 
activity, and one which ever continues, not as a law of chance, but as 
a known law which can be relied upon. And this, as even the 
"heathen" Pericles saw, is a law of spirit, of judgment, of thought 
itself. But as this always creates out of the present, it is always in 
the present, and "knows itself" there. Whoever overlooks or ignores 
it in the present, finds it nowhere. He is generally looking for some 
thing else, — a mechanical law which deals with machines; not a law of 
thought which creates Man and by Man. 

Thus the mechanical theorist looks into the past to find the "origin 
of Man." If he could only find a beginning, he could make an end of 
him; and that would satisfy the "inquiring mind." He would find 
Man to be a creature of chance, or a machine of ' ' unusually developed 



THE FUTUKE OF THE NATION. 259' 

brain;'' but substantially a mere "protoplasm," which happens to 
come and happens to i^o, yet, on the whole, is less admirable than the 
simple water-brook which sings to him: 

" Men m.a,j come, and men may go, 
But I flow on forever!" 

Thus the Eternal taunts Man from without, when he recognizes it 
not within himself. But when our searcher for origin in a temporal 
past finds it in a solid shape, he concedes that he finds it just so also in 
the present. He dilates on the absolute certainty of his "proof," by 
showing us that the two are precisely " like." Magnify it much as you 
may, this "past," — it is just like the present. The ''ancestor" then is 
found after all in the present. Vanish the '"ages on ages" necessary 
for him to get here— in this shape. Vanish the "development," and 
the "differentiation" of a formal sort, so essential to "make a Man." 
And after so much ado about it the mystery is worse than ever! If it 
is this microscopic thing, just like an}^ other thing of its size to all ap- 
pearance, then even that tine machinery of the brain must be given up 
as explanation; for what is to be explained, in the first place, is the 
"ancestor" that can begin in the present and show that as his first 
handiwork. 

By such a sudden turn of its own machinery, is this purblind sen- 
sualism brought to the necessity of explaining a thinkiag present, which 
is capable of thinking of a past as though it had been there, and of a 
future as though it were immortal and could have no origin at all in 
mortal things. That is the problem of "descent" for Man. And the 
more he studies it by the best instead of the worst knowledge he has, 
the more rational he shows himself to be. Will he grope in the dark 
when the light shines? 

The looking into the future of men and nations is very logically re- 
garded, by such a thinking, to be as foolish as it deems the looking 
into the past to be wise. This latter is to tell what Man is in such a 
way that he is sure to have no future. The same thinking treats na- 
tions in a way that makes sure of their having afacilis descensus Averni 
for their brief future ' descent." The first duty of a Nation, then, in 
behalf of its present as well as its future, is to have done with this pal- 
try and fatal thinking. 

To recur to the past alone, as a guide for determining their future, 
is for nations also almost equally fatal. It is indeed the acme of super- 
stition, as the past itself shows. Besides, what does History tell us 
but the worst, when looked at superficially? What does it originate in 
but utter darkness? Is this worst to be our model and this darkness 
our light, — the origin of all and the end of all? That is the way to 
maintain despotisms and return to barbarisms. There is a wise reading- 
of History ; but only by those who think of Thought as Thought, and 



•260- THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

watch its creative process, as it springs from the mind of Man and 
learns by its failures, makes of its "sufferings, lessons." Such a crea- 
tive work, done for us by men in the past, is indeed to be honored and 
reverenced, so far as it has been wise and moral, looking to and build- 
ing for a better future for us, with a religious sense of that as also one 
of the "true objects of life." This work of our fathers, who wrought 
and suffered in a religious spirit, and in hope of a rational future and 
richer blessings of "liberty and prosperity " for their children, — this 
we take from the past and sajr: " God bless them!" We recognize such 
an " ancestry " as something spiritually, divinely good in them, which 
could so think down to us and be willing to suffer for our sakes. It is 
but logically consistent, then, that we should add; "God guide us! " 
And if, in this religious spirit of our fathers, we look at what we are in 
the present, and find our hearts full of an equal resolve to do the best 
and make a better future, — that will be the surest guarantee for a Na- 
tional career which shall not fail to make our fathers rejoice and our 
posterit}" bless us. 

Especially by a free people, must this responsibility of every pres- 
ent to create its own future be taken to heart, and no past be held up 
as prevention or excuse for not making it a better one. What are its 
means and methods for this? — (1). A free people discusses. Hence it 
divides into two parties for total judgment. By these it judges. By 
these it is judged b}'' others, its polic}'' foreseen. Its future depends 
up(m the character and conduct of these parties. They have general 
differences which only constitute the actual moral unity of the Nation. 
But each has these differences also in itself; so that its moral conduct 
is a factor of the total character. — (2) What is in the future, however, 
also determines the future; every future is a present which shapes 
itself. But this present, now and always, for any nation, and espe- 
cially for ours, is not merely in itself, but also in the spirit and conduct 
of other nations; none is isolated and acting alone. This is a second 
element, — the action of others upon us; and in this may be included 
the mechanical or other changes of the situation. — (3) Lastly may be 
considered the moral disposition which overrules all for better or 
worse, and is affected from within and without, at home and abroad, 
by the reasoning of men and the Reason of God. 

I. For a child, "lessons are sufferings," imposed for the sake of 
his future. For a Nation, "sufferings are lessons," imposed by a past 
and felt in the present. In the former case, what is recognized is the 
need of organized effort in behalf of what is rational; in the latter, 
what is taught is, that there has been a lack of it. In either case, 
there is no dependence for a Nation upon mere chance; nor even upon 
merely individual suggestions and efforts; there must be rational organ- 
ization, recognized as such. Hence there is to be no reliance upon a 



THE FUTUKE OF THE NATION, 261 

^'providence" deemed to be such as "helps only one who helps him- 
self,'' in that remarkably agile way in which self-interest runs to the 
trough. It is just because, in respect to outer things, Man can "make 
most of the chances" when he wields over them a law of Reason, that 
he finds it necessary to interest himself in such a broad and philau- 
throphic way that he perceives he can really have no self interest. And 
his "providence," also, turns out to be one which best provides for him 
when it provides for all. A Nation which has not quite understood or 
.acted upon this "higher law," will doubtless have some sufferings in 
the present, as lessons from the past to duly con over. 

In general, then, social organization, and recognition of its author- 
ity, is found necessary for all rational common action. Our colonists 
and miners discover this; mainly from pressure of circumstances as to 
the fact, and from habit as to methods. The people at large, also, are 
apt to be "too busy for politics" till the need comes; they let things 
run to a crisis. Hence party-rule is the general order of the day. It 
IS allowed to be this regulator of the situation; and it is even necessarily 
so, in a free nation which supposes all its methods perfected until they 
show need of mending. When such a nation knowingly makes them 
as rational methods, yet is "too busy" to attend to them as such, it 
will find them "run as machines;" and hence comes the "crisis." And 
one party, regarding them as already perfected by the past, will be 
more apt to treat them as mechanical; the other, less superstitious 
about the past, will be more inventive for the future. 

In this governing by parties, the unreflecting are slow to see the re- 
lation of parties, that which differences them, and their mutual need 
of each other. Intelligent leaders discover this; some, by mere force 
of circumstances, see their mutual need; others, by deeper reflection, 
see their unity in the Nation. This character and tendency of parties 
is, then, the most general feature of the case. On that depends, at 
first, the rescue of the Nation from a mere chance-going; this is pre- 
vented by the fact that one party looks mainly to the past, and makes 
it its "principle" to preserve that against all change. This also serves 
as a check upon that mere individualism which is the "principle" of 
the other partj^ and is apt to run into mere self-interest. Thus in its 
total action, the Nation is rationalized by the unity in difference of its 
two parties, — the one looking mainly to the past, the other mainly to 
the future, thus bringing them both into the present. 

These radical differences in the parties evidently depend upon dif- 
ferent tendencies in the human mind. They are not, therefore, to be 
judged in general by any mechanical standard; nor, as to the future, 
merely by what they may be in the present through unfavorable cir- 
cumstances. As the one looks mainly to the past, so also it looks 
more to external authority, — to leaders, and to party itself. As the 



262 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Other look? mainly in a free and inventive spirit towards the future, so 
also it looks more to the inner authority, — the individual power to 
reason; and is apt to discard leaders, and to revolt from party itself. 
But the former, looking more to the already organized, retains its 
power through that, and compels the other also to organize and have a 
better judgment than that of mere individual opinion. 

Again, the former looks less kindly on an external civic authority 
for Education, but needs it most. In respect to this, it would have a 
religious authority, but gives to that also an outer form. The other 
party regards Education as the mainstay of the Nation; but is apt to 
regard it as mainly "industrial," — an affair of a so-called "pure 
science " which "has nothing to do with Religion." Hence its mem- 
bers are apt to bow to scientific persons as makers of their habits of 
thinking, with a faith which is childlike indeed, — a faith gullible 
enough to be dangerous, could it be made a party affair. But it is a 
faith which, when properlj' organized, really "removes mountains'' 
externally, and thus makes the Man feel it as something creative in 
him. - Here we touch the ground for a common unity of all in a Divine 
Reason. Either party must, if rationally guided, the one by its Re- 
ligion, the other by its Science, find those outer and inner authorities 
(which, for each as a party, are both partial), merged in a common in- 
terest for all, of Avhich both State and Church are servitors, but which 
exceeds all particular spheres, and unites all men in a religious duty 
both to the Nation' and to God. Thus the two parties mutually com- 
plement each other in various ways. They only represent that seek- 
ing for authority which can never complete itself externally, in any 
form made or organized by men, without finding, as ground for that, 
the inner religious relation of Reason in every Man which exceeds all 
that, and in which alone he is truly free. 

It is vain to expect, then, that in a free nation there will not always 
be necessarily these two parties. There will always be a party of rela- 
tive ignorance as to individuals, which is also a party of relative wis- 
dom in this respect, — that it feels the need of extei*nal authority, and 
organization. Just because it is ignorant, it looks for leadership; and 
when wisely and patriotically led, it is of all things, a National party, 
and tends to be nothing else, despite ail its pretensions to preserve local 
differences. It is the very party to swamp all these, and rush to a 
despotism, were it not checked by the other. They have just the differ- 
ence of Sparta and Athens. Sparta, because ignorant, had her "aris- 
tocracy" ; Athens, because intelligent, her "democracy." And the 
former ruled when the latter wrangled. 

On the other hand, this other party, just because it prides itself upon 
its intelligence, is apt, like the old Whig party, which made itself 
smaU by degrees, and "respectably" less as a guardian of "my 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 263 

property, " to also dissever itself into a mere sputtering of "my 
opinion." Out of this merely individualistic attitude it is forced by 
the other party, and compelled to choose between having some organi- 
zed opinion and action as a party, or else declare its intelligence not 
yet up to the level, even of preserving that which was handed down to 
us as a work of rational design. 

Hence, so far as both parties are infected with a mechanical habit of 
thinking, they show how vain such a "science" is when applied to 
even party policies. The unreflective party sees in the political sphere 
only an abstract force, — not as aone law of attraction andrepulsion, but 
as two forces which are two parties; and theirs is the party of attraction, 
though professing the theory of repulsion, — ''local self-govern- 
ment." The other party sees it as a " correlation of individual moral 
forces,'' yet mechanically acting; so that unless they are all "alike," 
there can be nothing but repulsion; and the correlation becomes too 
chaotic to be attractive to any sane mind, or to be safe ruler for any 
sane Nation. 

Hence this party, if it thus place the whole responsibility in the in- 
dividual, whether as leader or follower, without recognizing that all 
such external moralities require organization and a common authority, 
succeeds only in representing the abstract repulsion, while professing 
to be its opposite, — the abstract attraction, — that supposed self-govern- 
ment which "governs least." It lets the centralization, which it would 
have in numberless individuals, be run by the other party into that 
very centralization in leaders which it most abhors, and which has al- 
ready nearly wrecked the Nation; when even leaders avowing them- 
selves to be sectional were followed blindly by this other party to the 
last ditch. 

All such symbols of material action contradict their own theories 
when applied to a moral sphere. And it is only this mechanical 
method of thinking, — this attempt to understand rational action by 
physical metaphors, which renders each party unaware of its own absur- 
dities. But it also makes of each unawares the complement of the other. 

In the true and nobler view of their functions, each of these parties 
is a National party, and a living moral factor of the weal or woe of the 
future. They work together, by the difference of moral tendency in 
them, the one to be a preserver of the past, the other an inventor for the 
future This latter, to be truly a "party of progress," needs the 
former to check its merely individual whimsies, and to compel it to an 
organized action, — a self government of the party itself, which shall 
recognize the need for noble leaders and not deny them that support 
which they need. It may be that, in the future as in the past, only 
this compulsion will serve to remind " intelligence" of its public duty, 
or drag it from its "business " to patch up some crisis. 



264 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

But it would seem that there have been lessons enough in the past^ 
and are sufferings enough in the present, to ensure a wiser course for 
the future. Whether for the party's or for the Nation's sake, it were 
but silly indeed not to have learned that " every man is expected to do 
his duty." No trust in any man, or any party, is safely reposed on any 
other terms. And with such a dutiful action, worthy of noble leaders 
and noble men, a party which has done so much in the past, cannot 
fail to find in the future its yet higher victories of peace, its concord of 
organized intelligence, marching evermore to the heart-beat of a Chris- 
tian Nation. 

Nor will the other party fail to join in this common progress; for it 
must be made in common. The faults of a past weigh heavily on it; 
but this should teach it how to conquer. Certain symbols which it has 
carried so long, and so faithfully, do not seem to be the in hoc vinces. 
They are relics of a past which cannot "rise again.'' A dead past is 
difficult to preserve and make presentable. The life of every party is 
in the present, if it only knows how to seize upon its own vital princi- 
ple, and show it to be one phase, systole or diastole, of the heart-beat 
of the Nation. But in this respect the party has been largely a victim 
of circumstances. Wedded to a dead past, it could not get rid of its 
symbols. The very coffin clung to it. It had to look for its support to 
those who had aimed its own and the Nation's death-blow. Its policies 
were prescribed for it by sectional feeling; and even now it is obliged 
to sustain a sectional resort to force, before which the National law of 
suffrage licks the dust. Thus it has been deprived of its National 
character, — the only one it has; and it looks in vain to find some mot- 
ley suit in which it can keep together a Falstaff following, and yet es- 
cape the gibes of American humor. 

What an unfortunate plight for a preserver of the past! This 
Vishnu party has had no choice but to call the other only a Siva, to 
pronounce all its good, evil, and to itself make of evil its only good. 
It has even discarded its own past good, as for example, in "hard 
money," and run to stimulants, as if under some rabid infection. 
Thus, after a fashion, even evil itself has been made to work the good, 
by hindering mere individual invention of law, and obliging the whole 
wisdom of the Nation to organize for the work of reform. 

This has been a very self-sacrificing part to play, however, for the 
hold-back party. It can scarcely be that, in the future, when the dead 
past is finally buried, and overgrown with the blossom and beauty of a 
new life, this party will not at last find a "working hypothesis." 
Surely some leader from "the sunny South" may arise, with some- 
thing of that old pride which disdained to court what arrays itself as a 
"foreign vote," or to amble meekly with a drunken crowd, or to look 
to Mormons as one of the ' 'rods of strength" in a party offering itself 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 265 

to rule a rational and moral Nation. Even now, perchance, there may 
be in this party some manly spirit, clear-headed enough to see the folly 
of trainino- under such absurdities as "a tariff for revenue only. " as 
though a Nation were to go blindfold, without discrimination, and dis- 
owning its own rational powers and duties. Or some it may contain 
who are at least taught by others' fate not to ride a fence, especially on 
financial and moral questions; — not to warn a party to say nothing 
definite, but only that it "has always been opposed to sumptuary 
laws/' — which is very much like telling the party it doesn't know 
enough to be told anything. 

If the party itself must needs be piebald, all the more it needs to 
not have a piebald policy. Its leaders, at least, must rise to the hight 
of the situation. They are more responsible than other leaders, for 
they have more power. Thus morally strengthened, their wits ought 
not to be the less feeble, but the more free and better inspired. Only 
so can they win. For the Nation, this is the party where it must look 
for the most from mere individualism. Here again the coat shows its 
other side. Each party can do most by what it values least. The in- 
dividualistic party can really do nothing well except by the most care- 
ful organization of its intelligence, and by a dutiful support of it on 
the part of all its members. Thus that supposed and self-bepraised 
"independence" finds itself the most dependent of all. In the other 
party, so devoted to party itself, the leader has opportunity for a noble 
individuality, if he rates it aright, and makes of it, not the person- 
ation of a section, but the utterance of a Nation's wants, and a fore- 
sight of her future. 

Every true statesman, indeed, knows how to recognize the party 
with which he can best act, and yet knows also how to use the other, 
knowing them both to be necessary to his highest purposes. No such 
statesman shuts himself up in a State, a section, or even a party. He 
is one who can speak for all, because he thinks of all. And after thus 
finding the inmost gist of the Nation's thought, he can utter it, in one 
of those words which thrill like a revelation, and become, first a 
watchword for a party, and then a watchfire for the Nation. Such 
words, from some of our wisest and best, are now a recognized law of 
the land. 

II. The question now arises, therefore, whether the circumstances 
are changed or changing. We are told, in the usual one-sided fashion, 
that "circumstances alter cases." But the cases also take the liberty 
to alter circumstances, (as Darwin has toiled and spun to prove); so 
that it is often a little difficult to tell which is the case and which the 
circumstances. 

In respect to parties, it would appear that, already, circumstances 
have allowed themselves to be altered somewhat. "The party" is not 



'266 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

in such a rigid case that it cannot stir if it will; but begins to stir first 
where its National life was supposed most dead,— in the South itself. 
It has been discovered that the negro can be led quite as well by good- 
humor as by ill-humor: — a surprising fact for those who have known 
him longest and thought they knew him best. Moreover, it would 
seem that a change of name may have had somewhat to do with this. 
A rose does smell sweeter under some names than others: what a dif- 
ference the "white" and the "red" rose made in England. The sus- 
picion may spread that possibly a party which is nothing good if not 
National, might well call itself such. Many advantages, too numerous 
to mention, seem incident to such a course. It must not go too much 
for the "solid" in a sectional way, if it wants to look National. That 
is the folly of a crafty man, not the wisdom of a statesman. It is a 
policy which loses more than might be gained by a true policy after 
losing all it gains. Besides, if it were made the party name, the 
"National" might be useful in the way of inspiring local virtue to a 
higher flight, by suggesting in all cases the question: "Would this be 
good for all?" And in any case, it would lift the leader to that height 
of the great argument; and enable him to at least preach, if not prac- 
tice, something that would bear the light of day and sound in the Na- 
tional councils like a voice of Reason. Lucky is the leader who must 
propose progress only as a whole, since his party is conservative only 
as a whole. Such a party can indeed be led either forward or back- 
ward, either to the glory or to the ruin of the republic. Yet while it is 
easy to lead this party to either, it is difficult to lead the other party to 
either. For what the latter conserves, as "authority," is that freedom 
of individual opinion, that ' 'personal liberty," of which the other party 
mistakenly supposes itself to be the special guardian. 

Circumstances have been altered also in other respects, by the un- 
ceasing activity of business enterprise, so that both parties must learn 
to judge of their policy by a National standard, or they will catch a 
tartar where they most thought they were only playing fox and goose. 
Let us consider this more generally. 

The more you crowd men together, as for example in a city, the 
more dependent they become upon others without, or else they must 
become themselves more all-creative and self-sustaining within. This 
is a lesson for that supposed " right of independence " for cities and 
States and individuals, which, whether it calls itself "freedom of com 
merce," or " State-rights," or "personal liberty,'' fancies it is support- 
ing somebody else, when it is really a burden and a danger to the rest 
of the community. When it calls itself "personal liberty," it is con- 
tinually bringing on moral crises; when it calls itself "free trade," it 
is periodically bringing on financial crises. In both cases, it calls this, 
"business!" 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 26T 

In the one case, it fancies it is feeding tlie people witli cheap goods, 
~when it is destroying their inventive power, and with it, the growth of 
commerce itself in the only permanent and steady form it can have. 
In the other, it foi'gets that it is nothing but a consumer of poison, in 
a way that fancies it is standing defender of a "cheap" personal 
liberty, while it is nothing but a sewer of moral pollution, destroying 
all rational invention, all freedom of thought itself, and impoverishing 
all. Such a reasoning tells a man who wants nothing but "' free gin," 
and is full of that but bare of everything else, to talk about " sump- 
tuary laws" when he votes against laws to regulate the sale of poisons! 
It is no wonder, then, that such statesmanship allies itself with that 
Bourbonism which makes of "State-rights " a mere machine, by which 
to rule, corrupt, and finally ruin a National party and the Nation it- 
self. 

In general, we have here again the merely mechanical thinking, 
which cannot even read its own " laws'' aright, nor judge of their fu- 
ture course . 

Looking for a material reason, is losing sight of real reason for 
anything rational. For example, we have been told "the country is 
too large to hold together." More truly, those who saw real reasons 
told us we have held together as a Nation just because the country was 
so large and unoccupied, leaving room for expansion, and for " agree- 
ing to disagree " while everj'body had his own way. And this has 
given us a tendency, and even a need, to look mainly at the material 
side of "progress," Yet there can be no such progress without in- 
Tention, — rational designing; so that it is not "things," but thinking 
which has "done it." Nowhere more than here has Science been 
practically applied, — actively thought-out and worked-out by all. 

This thinking-out of "things," — this active creating, has come to 
pervade the Nation, and is growing more clearly conscious of "what 
it is," and of what it is doing. And if now the " State-rights " issue 
is fully seen to be absurd, especially for a "National party," and as 
fatal to it as to the Nation, no really sectional difference is likely to 
arise again. "Revenue tariff" may prove one of those manias by 
ty which "the gods destroy." Logically, it is opposition to both tariff 
and revenue of any National sort; no party can stand on that ground. 
Hence it may prove one of those unconscious doses of "transition," 
by which an unreflective party purges itself of its sectionalism, and 
comes out a National party once more. For what part of the country 
ie not equally interested in all forms of human effort and enterprise? 
ffiie country itself will not fall to pieces on account of its size. Nor 
rill the government of it be more, but less, unwieldy in this respect 
man it was at the very first for the thirteen Atlantic States. Railroads 
and telegraphs have made more compact a whole continent than could 



268 THE CIVIL POLITY Ob' THE UNITED STATES. 

then be even a single State. But just because the whole Nation is; 
thus becoming more like a single " city." it needs the more this inner 
enterprise, this completer creativeness from within. 

The "too small," then, is the real pinch towards which we are 
moving, — according to this mechanical thinking. Hitherto the in 
dividual tendency has had unwonted freedom here, both as to theory 
and practice; — more than it knew what to do with it has run to 
waste. It was rather over stimulated in every way than curbed in any 
way. It could not only invent material means, but also moral means ; 
new methods in business and government. No old ones of habit or 
authority greatly prevented this; the novelty of the situation invited it, 
and the needs of the case even demanded it. The large sphere of legisla- 
tion left to the States, let enter this individualism upon a career of variety, 
in different States, in respect to such matters as marriage and divorce. 
If one could not have his notions carried out in one place he might in 
another. That authority of the old and tried, which is a first check up- 
on mere individual invention, was here overslaughed. And the party 
whose profession it is to stand by the past, and save its tried and true, 
has been a sinner quite as much as the other, though in different ways. 
Not inventive, it has been permissive of evil inventions and of misuse' 
of good ones. It has been equally a corrupter of business methods, 
and more so of city governments, — the more dense grows the popula- 
tion, the worse it rules. All this has gone to the very core of our Civil 
Polity, and National life. If this party flatter itself it has not at least 
favored an irreligious view of marriage, why does it now stand chief 
defender of Mormonism itself? If it deem itself a National party, will 
it offer its government of cities as types of how it would govern a Na- 
tion becoming itseii one great city? 

The future Education of the Nation will be more towards testing 
its capacity for recognizing the necessity for common opinion, or 
rather for a common judgment, rationally organized, taken and ex- 
pressed, as authority for the individual in respect to his acts. The 
necessity for this higher form of rational action, in practical affairs of 
government in all its spheres, will press more and more closely as 
population accumulates and societies become less movable. One- 
ground of our safety, in this as in other respects, is that we can, if we 
will, change and reform to any -extent. If we have more faults than 
other nations, yet we have also more freedom to amend without shock, 
or danger of worse. We cannot indeed put moral dispositions into 
the future with certainty, by any mechanical means such as will go 
down as "Natural descent," or "Natural selection," considered as- 
bodily tendencies. What "selects" for Man must be rational and 
moral. We can secure these moral dispositions in the future, then, by 
rational methods for Education, and for organization of public and 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 269 

private business. For these teacli and foster habits of tliinking and 
acting, which are the true guarantees for keeping safe every step of 
good progress attained, and also for gaining more. A good habit is 
not so "tenacious," so like a mere claw, as is an evil one, simply be- 
cause it is more free, more creative . That is how and why the "cases," — 
hard as they may seem, can be made to alter the circumstances. Moral 
cases have a way of doing that perpetually. But if they grow^ worse 
within, so will they without; and even the best of circumstances they 
will make means of a corrupted and suicidal life. 

Hence it is that accumulating population is a test of how much cre- 
ative virtue there really is in a people. It crowds them towards the 
One Man that they are within, as a moral whole. It shows whether 
this is a Man merely of fliesh or one of spirit:— one of that "cheap 
labor" sort that only knows or wants enough to eat and drink, or one 
of that godlike sort who gives more than he receives, since his bounty 
is ever overflowing. Humanity, merely as 'Humanity,'' has never 
yet been able to bear this test and show itself worthy of a religious 
worship. It has not indeed been quite condensed into the One Man 
anywhere. But where it comes nearest to this, there is indeed, at first 
sight, a more brilliant exterior, dazzling not only with a material 
splendor of Nature's jewels and Man's Art, but also with a corrusca- 
tion of human intelligence in its highest forms, flocking thither as if 
Humanity knew it needed most its "watchmen upon the towers," Its 
flaming swords of the spirit. 

Here, then, in this "great Babylon," — this "city" of Man's making, 
human invention is at its highest and best works, — but also at its low- 
est and worst. On the one hand, it has the most refined inventions of 
a sensuous Art, which require for their appreciation that same culti- 
vated taste needed for the literary invention of books, and which may 
show itself in books that cast far and wide a food which is itself pro- 
ductive, because spiritual only and a communion of all in a common 
Thought. But, on the other hand, when we pass beyond this brilliant 
exterior, and lift the veil of what ought to be, upon any material the- 
ory of Man, his "holy of holies," — his "lowest which is highest," — 
what a sight! We need not detail it. Humanity itself shades its eyes 
from this darkness, it is so black. It seems capable of destroying all 
light. It is but the sepulchre to which Humanity descends. Not here, 
then, is that One Man, unless it be upon his cross of crucifixion, and 
pointing to that intellectual and creative radiance as what alone can 
"rise again.'' And that indeed can rise, — rise forever triumphant in 
its transforming power over all these ghastly cerements, in which sens- 
uous theories and vicious ways would bury Man, and make an end of 
him where they find his oiigin. "Ce que c' est que nous sommes!" 
— "that's what we are!" sighs the positive philosopher as he turns 



270 



THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 



away from the sight of human death. But when h3 looks upon this 
social death, this inventing of worse than death, his reflection has 
light enough from others to at least suggest a "religion of Humanity." 

It has already been sufficiently illustrated, how this increasing con- 
centration of humanity everywhere necessitates an increase of cre- 
ative power, in all its forms, to subsist at all as self sustaining. Mal- 
thus, seeing this necessity only on the material side, has been comple- 
mented, by the materialists themselves, with the Schopenhauer insight 
that Man at least knows enough to give up "the will to live." This, 
added to the loss of generative power which results from vice and 
starvation, is supposed to be the great regulator of the situation, and a 
sufficiently higher form of the "great law of supply and demand" to 
suffice for a "religion of Humanity." 

But the American people have at heart another Religion which, if 
it be not already enough shocked by terrible facts to altogether avoid 
the false theories which foster them, will come by its own moral 
earnestness to have clearer views of what it is that creates, and what it 
is that destroys. And then it will be seen that, since Man is inventive 
and destructive alike, both of the evil and the good, he can make his 
practice conform in both respects to a rational law. This has its com- 
pensation in a local way, as above suggested, as a distribution of labor, 
whereby the good may intensify itself, in its highest creative power, 
just where evil also intensifies itself, mainly only as destructive for 
others and "consumptive'' of itself. Thus both pour out upon others, 
the one a vigor, the other a vice ; but the latter is mortal and the for- 
mer immortal. Hence, in general, this is no mechanical law, as Mal- 
thus represents, and need have no such mechanical or vicious handling 
as others have suggested, as avis medicatrix Naturm Such "doc- 
tors" know not the higher law of Man This is a rational law, which, 
if he recognize and use as such, will prove its Divine origin and effi- 
cacy. It will be made to so fructify and diversify the creative power 
of Man for good, that even the weed of evil shall be made medicative, 
and the ''rose of Sharon" shall bloom in every valley. For it points 
to that One Man Divine whom alone Humanity can worship. 

Manifest enough is the law and its prophet. Its method has had but 
one example that can be safely imitated as sure to make truly one, of 
however many. A thorough conviction that this law of laws is known, 
that it has shown its presence in Man, and proved its power upon men 
and through them upon Nations, — is essential to true progress. Who- 
ever glances over history, or over the actual world, may see the differ- 
ence which springs from a higher creative power in Man, in proportion 
as he recognizes in it no "biggest Jove," Jupiter Maximus, — nor even 
a "best of gods" — Jupiter Optimus, — but the gift in trust of that 
" One who alone is Good." 



THE FUTUKE OF THE NATION. 271 

This makes clear as day the true route of progress for the Civil 
Polity of a Nation, for the business methods of a community. Any 
other law is insufficient, and, as human law, must therefore bring to its 
aid, for constant advance to better methods, the softer means of moral 
suasion, and that invisible but most real and efficient means of all, — 
the power of a felt and known Religion in the hearts of all. 

With such a known programme and intent, a Nation need not greatly 
err for itself; its own burden can be made lighter instead of heavier. 
But it has also the burden of others to help bear. No escape from this 
Religious law. for Nations or for men; "Bear ye one another's bur- 
dens!" And to this highest of all functions does this Nation seem to 
be especially called Will its own burden be made lighter thereby? 
That is a question to which all mechanical thinking answers; "No.'' 
Only a religious thinking can see in this bearing of a cross by the Na- 
tion a winning of its divinest crown. 

It is true that the mechanical side may be represented as rather a 
gain than a loss, and very ingenious methods may be devised to make 
it so But the 'proofs'* offered seem somewhat squint eyed like the 
methods. Regarding morality as quite a secondary matter, and reli- 
gion as a " mistake," they naturally contrive to destroy just what they 
deem they are creating And thus getting nothing but burden, they 
then call upon us for rescue from some crisis, material or moral, sud- 
denly discovered to be impending, and like the drunkard, needing more 
drunkenness. 

Thus, for example, we can " squeeze out " the skilled labor of other 
nations by laws supposed to protect us against it as "too cheap." And 
then we can magnanimously pay this labor what it really deserves, and 
-let it prevent our own youth from learning a trade so as to compete 
with it. This, however, may be a mere incident to that undue sense of 
"rights" which a sudden first freedom excites, and can scarcely be 
visited upon the own children of these men. The main point is, what 
do we want this "skilled labor '' for, unless we have tastes which have 
already created it here ? If it be a vicious taste, we are pretty sure to 
have it. If it be a highly refined taste, we shall offer no market for it 
unless it has already inspired in us invention for it. We have no inter- 
est then in squeezing out the skilled labor of other nations, but rather 
in squeezing out our own inventive powers, by rising to the highest and 
best, tastes; that is the onl}^ way to make a market here or anjrwhere 
else for good inventions. This is the true argument for. and the true 
method to accomplish, a really profitable diversification of a Nation's 
industry. So that, as Beethoven says: "the Moral is the secret of the 
Art, after all." It demands its rights as pre-eminent, and the very core 
of the question. 

All the more so f oi us, because, let it be noted, that in foreign lands 



':272 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

the skilled labor is not the source of the invention, as it generally is 
here, but is a taught labor, taught by rule, and so taught as to be made 
to believe the past perfect, and itself incapable of improving it. This 
is especially true, perhaps, of English workmen; they cling to the old 
machines and old methods, with such tenacity that it never occurs to 
them to invent anything. They are in the habit of regarding every- 
thing as already made for them; and they never ask: ''What would 
ever have been made if all had been uninventive?" They are apt to 
sneer at "Yankee inventions." English inventions coming from a 
higher intelligence, or a long experience, are indeed distinguished by 
a '■ solidity " valuable for coarse and long uses. But this higher Eng- 
lish intelligence also sneers at the French good taste, and fails to find 
that the law of Beauty is itself a law for economic strength. It is clear 
then that in such skilled labor we shall get no invention, and from such 
inventors themselves no rational law of invention. And those who see 
a gain in that mechanical shape, are also ever preaching to us an "in- 
dustrial education" of the same sort; as though Education consisted in 
making a machine of a man, instead of bringing out his thinking and 
inventive power. But what we want is mechanics and labor of our 
own, properly taught by the past, and to respect it, yet full of the 
spirit of free men, who are not crushed out by a science deriving them 
from the ascidian, but know the law of Reason to be in them, as a trust 
to be actively used b}^ them for both God and their fellow-men. The 
''mistake" is in not seeing that what is free and creative in Man for 
good is essentially religious. 

Thus ever the mind of Man, when it breaks free from these mechani- 
cal teachings, rises to the hight of the great argument, and declares 
that it alone is to be protected and freed as an inborn Religion. Why 
then need we look at all those other " advantages " we may reap from 
sending our army or navy officers to command Egyptians or Turks, or 
from building iron-clads for the Chinese, or by manufacturing deadly 
weapons for humanity in general? The Chinese and Japanese are 
sending their better class here to be "instructed" by a Christian Na- 
tion. If we reject their "cheap labor," because of all it is the most 
mechanical and hence the most uninventive in its ways, shall we then 
teach them only the mechanical, and send them in that only a greater 
capacity to destroy each other? But that will also give them capacity 
to overrun us and the whole world with this besom of organized de- 
struction. 

Truly it would seem that we need a foreign policy somewhat 
above these mercenary views which run blindly to their own doom. 
View it how you may, Man is bound by a "higher law" If he ties 
himself to a lower one, he is carried by it to a hell which he has in 
vented for himself, and where his " sufferings are lessons." 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 273 

All Other Nations are, for ours, brethren. With them it does and 
must suffer. Some of them think thej^ can teach us. Others ask us to 
•teach them. But, if we are wise, we can learn from all. Perhaps our 
policy towards the Asian peoples calls for the most consummate wisdom, 
and the most religious intent. Bnt we cannot dwell upon it further 
than to point out this fact, — that it is not merely a question of trade 
nor of cheap labor, but may even become a vital question for us ac- 
cording as we deal with it. It is a pathetic sight to see the eldest of 
the family of Nations coming to the youngest and saying: "Teach 
me!" Is it significant that they sought especially the advice of our 
great General of armies? Then it is happy that in him they found a 
human heart, and a deep good sense which deems the victories of 
peace nobler than those of war. "Let us have peace." 

Towards European Nations we usually look as our greatest source 
of burden and of danger. In all these, there is that intensified con- 
flict of both good and evil above described. It is as though each were 
a '*city," only enlarged from those ancient cities where men came 
together merely to defend themselves against, or to more safely prey 
upon, those without. Those were walled with stone, these with bayo- 
nets. The mechanical law is herein its utmost might. And what a 
burden it is for the people! — A burden, whether ruler or servant. The 
more refined the use of that, the more it weighs upon the soul of a Na- 
tion, as a law for whose use it has a fearful moral responsibility. Mon- 
archs tremble in theirbeds at the rumble of their own cannon. Is it to 
be used against those within or those without? No man can tell which! 
Na}^, whenever used in either way, it is used in both ways. Only de- 
structive, it can create nothing. It is a burden under which strains 
and staggers the very spirit which has created it. 

By these ways of war we are manifestly losers. We share in the 
burden. The creative power is wasted, and lessened for any mutual 
exchange of good whatever. No sales of arms can compensate us for 
this loss. These nations must needs be able to invent and make their 
own. Rather do they, in this way, so much the more increase our loss, 
by demanding cur own creation of another burden for self-defence. 
We have no interest, then, to be furthered by European wars; nor by 
favoring a mode of self-defence which only needs to go a little further 
to be self-destruction; nor by our harboring dynamite conspirators 
who only illustrate what such an "armed peace" is at its climax, — 
crazed and suicidal. Our policy should be that true comity of nations 
which looks to the whole and not to a fraction. It is a policj' which 
practices and advises a rational way of getting a better future; and this 
is not by dealing out revenges for the past in the spirit of a savage. 
And when we see a sister Nation staggering under this burden of war- 
tools compelled by another, — whether this other be a France whose 



274: THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

Lafayette we never forget, or a Germany whose slower struggle for a 
true nationality we respect, — we may say, what indeed says itself in 
oneway; "Respect the burden!" but what, said in another way, has 
a deeper moral meaning, as when uttered at St. Helena; and may 
awaken a deeper moral sense, which can show itself in even a man of 
genius for war, when he comes to reflect upon the inevitable and sufli- 
cient burdens of peace. 

But the worst is not yet told. That addiction to mechanical thinking 
which breeds wars of self-interest, and creates the intensest means 
therefor, has also cultivated an immoral thinking, and unti'us views 
of the relations of governments and peoples. This has already been 
sufficiently illustrated. That communism and nihilism are undermin- 
ing Europe, and heaving like a ground-swell under its thrones and 
its peoples alike, is only too apparent. That such false views should 
come here, whether in person or labelled as "science," is inevitable, 
and is part of our burden. But we are also indebted to Europe for 
those higher views of History and of Man, which this intensification 
of all his powers makes shine as beacon-lights among the breakers. 
Thus these modern Nations which are "cities" furnish for us the 
clearer light of Reason, as well as pour out upon us the festering brood 
of their vices. Germany, indeed, seems to have forgot its cunning in 
the ways of Philosophy, and made of even its best thought only a com 
maud to bow beneath the rod of force, and to call the soul of a Nation 
an affair of "iron and blood." This breeds in her, at once, a pessimis- 
tic science and a despair of anything rational which says: " Beware of 
Religion! — that is the road to insanity." 

But do these other methods lead anywhere else? Are they not or- 
ganized insanity itself? When they arm Nations cap a-pie, as if to de- 
clare that their life is ever in danger from this very god force which is 
worshipped as "protector," — does not this smack a little of that same 
insanity which says: " the will to live is irrational? " Methods which 
can see safety only in the organization of destruction, and life only in 
the form of force, certainly are irrational. An 1 when such a thinking 
infects rulers, it will also infect peoples, and vice versa. 

Not singular is it that, with such blood-shot eyes, men and Nations 
go back to that ancient stand-point of "Nature," and try to rebegin a 
"progress," in that way which Thucydides describes as the progress of 
Grecian cities; but which then was spread over centuries, and is now 
sought to be condensed into an explosion of dynamite, — and all will be 
well! Three points may be noticed in this significant parallel. 

(1). Getting a livelihood by robbery and piracy " did not yet involve 
any disgrace," but rather "brought with it something of glory, and 
when skillful and brave was honored and sung by poets." For it was 
"with a view to their own gain and to the maintenance of the needy." 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 275 

In Other words, Man was living like an animal or a bird of prey, 
recognizing no creative power in himself, and hence no right of prop- 
erty; for there was no basis for any "possession" even, except a 
greater force; and the invention was only of tools for destruction. 

(3). It was "through desire of gain that the lower classes submitted 
to be slaves to their betters [i. e. the richer] ; and the more powerful, 
having a superabundance of money, brought the smaller cities into 
subjection."' This is the stage of property-rule. And the physical life 
being still alone regarded, slavery to the rich was better than slavery to 
Nature; and wealth buys both arms and men to subdue others. Com- 
munism proposes to pass over this second stage in a new wa3^, but 
with essentially the same worship; only aM are to be enslaved to the 
physical as the "man;" property is to be in common as the "god" and 
"money" is to be made by machine. 

(3). "When the Greeks were becoming more powerful and acquir- 
ing possession of money still more than before, tyrannies, generally 
speaking, were established in the cities, on account of the revenues be- 
coming greater; whereas there had, before, been hereditary govern- 
ments with definite privileges." Thus it appears that the larger the 
revenue to be raised, the more is discrimination called for, both as to- 
how it is to be raised and how spent; if arbitrary or thoughtless in the 
raising, so will it also be in the spending. For this is in all cases nec- 
essarily a despotic question. If the discrimination could be only as to 
how a revenue is to be spent, this would be a ver}^ simple question for 
one, but a terrible bone of contention if all are to be officious about it; 
then the only resort is to some despot who reduces them by force and 
says: "let them growl!" On the other hand, if there is to be any 
discrimination as to how a revenue is to raised, this also will be verj-^ 
difficult for the many to agree upon to a man, unless they can raise it 
by machine. But then the revenue itself will be of a sort which can feed 
only machines; so that here we have the scientific communist starving 
to death on his own inventions; — that is his "victory of peace." 

There seems to be no recourse, therefore, but to a rational organ- 
ization of Civil Polity, which recognizes the inventive power of all 
men for good as the source of property, and a ground for mutual trust 
instead of defiance. Then there must be discrimination, both as to 
the mode of raising and spending a revenue, which grows larger and 
larger for legal purposes, in proportion as it grows larger for personal 
and moral and religious purposes. For indeed it includes all these pur- 
poses in a common trust; but each is administered according to its own 
nature. 

Now what is clear to all of us, respecting foreign Nations, is that, 
in some way, they have been brought to the necessity of raising a 
larger revenue for purposes of force and to pay war debts, than is at 



276 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

all healthy for a Nation, even in a physical way. We have had our 
own taste of that medicine, and we know it is bitter. Yet we know 
also that even this evil may be turned to good. If a Nation does not 
resort to a blind worshipping of its own Siva, it can transform even 
that into a "Vishnu. What first strikes us as the way to do it is, not to 
look " too deep " to such an intangible affair as morality, and not to 
make any such " mistake " as Religion, but to look merely on the sur- 
face, and recognize that "really, Education has something to do with 
this! " By this method, we shall not inquire too closely " what it is" 
that Education is to educate; and so we shall no doubt "save ourselves 
a great deal of useless trouble," We shall simply back our cart and 
load-up, not noticing whether the horse, or the cart, gets loaded. 

But other Nations have had some serious lessons on this subject; 
and their highest intelligence has given us some serious thoughts to re- 
flect upon. We have them all before us; we have but to choose the 
better from the worse, and improve upon the better if we can. It is 
not quite a matter to be decided hastily or at haphazard. Foreign Na- 
tions have set us some examples we can not safely follow. They have 
spent, and are spending so much for wars and rumors of wars, that 
they can only stagger the more, like drunken men, when they seek to 
add this blessed burden of Education. Or else they saturate their Ed- 
ucation with the false theories of force, so as to stimulate this rule of 
force for a longer career. 

Besides, we have no " classes " to be educated into a sense of their 
general incapacity, and thus made obedient to a law of force in a way 
which makes them resort to it as the only law. We get from abroad, in- 
. deed, many who have been thus educated, or not at all; and others who 
have grown up wild, in that frenzy of a " freethinking '' which is but 
the slavethinking bred in the downtrodden. The virus of these false 
views spreads more and faster than we are aware, because it spreads 
among our own more ignorant and uneducated; and also because our 
own education is,in general, too hasty and superficial. It is clear then, that 
our methods and system of Education for the future must be carefully 
devised and organized, with an all-embracing view of what is true in 
Science, best in Art, and highest in Philosophy. And this cannot be 
done without our knowing "what it is" that is to be educated, as well 
as " that it.is." It must be viewed as a moral and free realitj^ a relig- 
ious trust for Man. 

This is the result when we look at the burden which comes to us to 
be shared from the East; — the same as when it comes from the West, 
Both Europe and Asia ask us to teach for them. By this, Europe, 
unable to teach and thus develop a market at home, wants to increase 
her commerce; but needs besides to be protected by it against her own 
moral diseases, and to get from our example a higher popular religion 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 2 77 

than that " of Humanity." Asia, also, asks to be taught by some one 
who will not debauch her with tlieories of mere physical life, any more 
than with opium or rum to feed these vile views of Manhood. Com- 
merce boasts that it "civilizes;" — but must it not find something highsr 
than animal sense to feed and corrupt, in order to be commerce at all? 
And so Africa "stretches out her hands" to Religion alone, as the only 
one that can reach her degradation, or recognize the "Son of Man" 
in a manger. 

III. — By all routes, therefore, a really thinking and earnest Nation, 
like ours, finds itself led. not to Rome ancient or modern, but to a Divine 
One and into His " City eternal." That is a City, not built by hands, 
which this Xation is helping to build, and whose invisible walls should 
be ever visible for it. This moral intensity of a Nation's life should be 
its chief treasure; for it is the spirit which sees beyond all veils. It is 
not merely a " palladium of its liberties"; it is an inner prophesy of a 
future too noble to be called "glorious." In such a view all vanities 
and prides of a trivial sort die out. And, at first, the trust itself seems 
a burden too great to be borne. So it is, — to be borne alone. But the 
Nation has no monopoly of it, nor have all the Nations together. And 
hence, for a mechanical thinking, it seems to dissipate altogether, 
either as running into an external abstraction, or else as within, a trust 
too great to be given, an absurd exaggeration. Yet there it shows it- 
self, within and without, for men and for Nations, as a religious trust 
not to be avoided, not to be shaken off. It speaks in their sufferings, 
it speaks in their 303^3. It speaks in a Reason where all times clus- 
ter in an Eternal Now for the thought. Thus it retreats within, to a 
Religion which speaks of a highest happiness in "overcoming evil 
with good," and lifting up the symbol of this Divinest power and trust, 
says: "//i Tioc signo vinces.'^ 

The radical, final, constant question therefore is: What is the moral 
case in which, the moral purpose with which a Nation is ever entering 
upon its future? — that is what transforms for it all circumstances. That, 
if truly religious, is what "makes all work together for good" ; for 
this result is no mechanical or fnrtuituous affair, nor any external 
"providence," but is wrought out in all its forms by rational organiza- 
tion of human thought and human effort. " Good " is neither known 
nor sought, but by thought. 

No one disputes that this Nation was organized by and for free 
men. And its moral purpose was declared to be and to defend a free 
Religion . But no man is free except in a religious relation with God 
and his fellow-men. And no religion is free except as a true thinking 
of this relation. This free, firm, moral purpose of the Nation, there- 
fore, is essentiall3',in its sphere where the exercise of force is necessary, 
to organize and educate both the thoughts and acts of men on precisely 



278 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

the same principle as tliat which Religion lays as the basis of all human 
character, and in behalf of which its own etforts and means are organi- 
zed in a sphere of persuasion. Hence, between these two, there is a 
common sphere of moral suasion, wherein are organized both the outer 
charities of men and the inner charities of God. 

No truly-thinking man can, in regarding this triune sphere of 
human effort, be other than a religious man. He sees that this organi- 
zation in every sphere is, partly, to get rid of individual whimsies, and 
help all to a better intelligence by external teaching and authority. 
Yet he sees also that this cannot give any infallible opinion; and that 
its main object therefore is according to its necessity, — which is, to- 
furnish a common ground for common action. Thus he is compelled 
to ever resort to that law of Reason which is innate in him. By that 
alone, does he "understand" that it is itself disciphned by the' 
teachings it has itself organized without, and why these must be im- 
perfect. By that alone, does he also find that inmost and outmost Re- 
ligious relation and triune method of Reason, which also explains whj 
he himself is imperfect in his mere self-seclusion, and inadequate for 
any true thinking except as a religious thinking. 

Hence this is not an affair of that mere personal enthusiasm''' 
which the author of " Ecce Homo" seems to regard indeed a little 
askance, but as on the whole a good thing to have — if in a good cause. 
But on the contrary, just there is it worst to have it; better far have 
doubts of all one's own thoughts and of all formal behefs contrived by 
one's self or others. This doubting of the formal can alone lead to a 
knowing of the spiritual. The religious thought is not an enthusiasm 
for forms, nor for formalists. Such enthusiasms are more likely to 
be excited, and to be more useful, in behalf of "my interest," "my 
party," 'my sect," "my religion." Above all, then, are they mis- 
placed in the Christian Religion. And that is most of all misjudged as a 
mere "enthusiasm." 

R^nan made this grave mistake because he, like Comte, did not see 
that Religion, and this one especially, is not an affair of mere senti- 
ment but of the deepest thinking. And Strauss merely lost himself in 
fog after fog, because he did not find any true method of constructive 
thinking, whether "positive" or ' negative." But the really thought- 
ful man is always a practical man; he sees the necessity for organiza- 
tion of both thinking and acting, whether in business or elsewhere. In 
business he is a Napoleon; in Science, a Bacon or Descartes; in Art, a 
Goethe, Michael Angelo or Dante; in Philosophy, an Aristotle or a 
Hegel; in Religion, a Man Divine. Hence it is that founders of States 
especially, are regarded as "gods'" ; they organize for the thoughts as 
well as for the acts of men. 

But Christianity is by no means anything "found," or "founded." 



THE FCTUKE OF THE NATION. 279 

Such mechanical terms applied to it lead, to a total misapprehension of 
its origin and character. It is what it says it is; — the "bringing of im- 
mortality to light." It is the declaration of what is the origin and 
realitj' of Man. It is a true doctrine of his 'evolution," and a pro- 
posed organization of a known divine capacity of his nature, into a 
fellowship of love. Does that require less thinking-power, either in 
theorj^ or practice, than to be a Romulus and found a Rome? Rather 
needs it the calmness and clear-eyed vision of a judge, before whom aU 
created forms are bid to bow in obedience, and even the evil itself told 
to do its part, but tempt not its creator. Does such a proposal of "'ob- 
jects of life " for us come from, or ask for some exclusive enthusiasm, 
such as that of a cluster of robbers on Aventine for their leader, or 
for their self-interest? On the contrarj-, the devotion it asks for is an 
aU-pervasive, all-uniting one. Prom all persons, (not "parts"), of 
this organic unity, comes the watchword: " I am come into the world 
to bear witness to the Truth. Whoever is of the Truth, will hear m}- 
voice." ShaUwe reply to this, like Pilate or the modern agnostic, 
"what is Truth?" Is it not a calm appeal to the actual Divine pei-son- 
ality of Truth in every Man? Does it ask of him aught but to exercise 
Ms gift of Reason, in its deepest insight and purest nature: in a 
way which he knows must make, and alone can create, for all, a State 
and a Church Universal? 

The anti-religionists are quite right in distrusting any enthusiasms 
which do not know what they are about. The products of such enthu- 
siasm calling itself religious, are not onlj- in bad taste as Art, but also 
as Science they "do not work well." The}- have "lost the spirit," 
have taken to the merely formal, and thus fall into that mechanical 
thinking which in this sphere is fatal. Such a result seems to the anti- 
religionists to prove their own thesis, since it brings down Religion 
itself to their own waj- of thinking. Hence they greet with enthu- 
siasm a philosophy which says that Man is " agnostic," and in Religion 
especially, does not know what he is about. And with any other phU- 
osoph}- than this, they are extremely disgusted, — especiallj' because 
they, who "know nothing." cannot "understand" it! 

But the same is true of this enthusiasm for an agnostic Science; — 
it, also, is absurd, as we see, in its Art, — its expression becomes ridicu- 
lous and self-defeating. And here, as in the Religious sphere, it is the 
over zealous who are tied-up in the form and lose the creative spirit. 
There are other and nobler men of real science, who both know their 
duty and do it. Thej- are inventors of new methods, organizers of a 
new c-eation. Por they know what is the kind of evidence for a law 
of force, and what is the kind of evidence for a moral law of Reason. 
Above all, then, deliver us from a "philosophy" which rests on the 
"unknowable " in any sphere. That also will express distrust of "en- 



280 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

thusiasm," but its own danger is rather from despair. It may well, in- 
deed, be calm as the grave; for thither it is leading all Truth to bury it,, 
and inscribe over it: " Jiic jacet nihil." 

Much slowness, at least, of understanding can be excused in men 
who have little practiced their knowing; but not in men who 'know 
that they know nothing." because they have "seen so much." The 
latter have exercised their wits enough to realize that this act of un- 
derstanding is quite independent of the things it understands. Now 
the English taste for fixed habits evidently unfits them to be fashion- 
makers. But it also fits them for making works of permanence of the 
mechanical sort, and even in statecraft; albeit, in the latter, it lends to 
the Chinese pattern. The family as the house-castle, is the result in 
England, instead of the one family-State, as in China. In France, on 
the other hand, the tendency of volatile taste, and inventive quickness,, 
is to make a communistic no-family, so far as the thinking is ' 'posi- 
tive," irreligious, and hence mechanical. These two tendencies are 
represented in the two parties of this country, so far as they fail to 
realize the necessity for each to be a moral self -ruler, organized and 
acting under a religious sense of dutj^ which brings out the whole 
manhood in each, and hence makes them recognize each other as 
friends and fellow-workers for a same purpose, and not as feudal oppo- 
nents. 

For, in general, the opposite tendencies to be united in a civil polity, 
are, first, the disposition to make everything as if to last forever; and, 
second, the readiness to modify, and change at any moment, with the 
decisive quickness of the tactician of battles, and the fine taste of 
woman's tact. Each of these requires the same thorough creative 
judgment, only the one works slow and the other fast. Neither can 
safely be deficient in reference of all to the right principle, — the crea- 
tive principle itself. For what lasts forever can be only that which is 
forever creating; so that the instant transforming is its work, just as 
much as the constant sustaining or preserving. The "principle" 
which performs all this is, therefore, the religious principle, — the crea 
tive rational activity in us, the well-known personal reality of Truth 
itself. Its "immortality is brought to light," in that it "lasts for- 
ever," whatever else change. 

The life of men and Nations therefore is not in things, but in this 
actual form and work of Truth itself. For by Truth alone do they 
know how to create anything whatever. And we have seen that they 
create according to their designing power as intelligence, but also ac- 
cording to this as morality. What they desire most, that they make 
their "god." And if this be mere food and drink, then they devour 
their god like savages. But a higher intelligence brings a higher crea- 
tive Art, even for food and drink; and, if also a better morality, it, not 



THE FUTURE OF THE NATION. 281' 

only knows that, evil is lurking there, but has also turned it to service 
of the ,good. Yet it also knows that, for every taste or sense, not less 
than in that for music, the spirit must be there to judge, or there is no 
manly joy, no communion with a spirit which can write in every sym- 
bol some truth or some beauty divine. And the power to read this 
writing must be a power which a man acquires, by himself creating 
such symbols, and knowing why he does it,— to commune with his fel- 
low men; and how he does it, — by knowing the means, the law he is 
using as different from the means, the law by which he is creating. 
And thus he recognizes his power over both to be a trust for this very 
purpose. 

In all its forms, this is a religious purpose. Ti.> commune with either 
fellow men or with the Divine itself, is to make of the Many a One 
and of the One a Many. This has been traced in the Civil Polity of 
a Nation, as a highest ration al communion of all in the property, the 
Science, the Art, the Philosophy of all. When truly religious in its 
spirit, it is a government of all, by all and for all. When we look at it 
in church-organizations as the special means of Religion, we find the 
same necessity for external organization and authority, but also the 
same insufficiency of that. 

The " freedom of religion '' revolted, and kept revolting from "one 
church," because it deemed itself enslaved as to its freedom of thought 
or of forms. And thus it took upon itself all kinds of thought and of 
forms. Yet when this freedom of thought came to act for itself, it 
found the necessity, unless it were to be speechless, to organize some 
common authority for its opinions, so far as these involved a need for 
common action. The result was, that, in rejecting the broadest basis 
for this, sectarianism found itself enslaved to criterions which sub- 
jected it to compai'atively very small external authorities for its opin- 
ions, and very many of them. And so the " freedom " consists chiefly 
in a very free choice between "folds;" and, as the fence goes down, 
all this "difference'' shades off into "nothing essential," though at 
first erected as such. 

This created a diversification of religious rites of worship and 
means of action, reverting, as merely outer, into their own inner, 
creative freedom, and in this way letting free the mind of Man to seek 
a better and deeper judgment of what Religion is. Such differences of 
form, when taken as essential, may have also had a value as ' compe- 
tition," and as that "zeal" which an imperfect thought cannot ex- 
pand into love. Yet in its form, this organization, like all other, is 
more or less a slavery to the external, when this is regarded as in 
fallible. And especially when a sect claims "this man" as its 'foun- 
der," it is quite like the old religions of ancient cities. Still more 
when it deems a particular rite to be salvatory, it smacks very much 



282 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

of the fetich; and goes back to uproot the very plea of Protestantism, — a 
free religion, and not one that is bought. But when this "difiEeren- 
tiation" goes so far as to find the need of a "church-North" and 
a " church- South," — it r' veals that habit of merely formal, mechanical 
thinking, which here reaches its reduotio a I absurdum. No wonder 
the atomists themselves see the ridiculous side of "solidify," when it 
claim3 to be 'hardshell" or "softshell" in Religion. And it does 
not seem that the points of compass have anything very seriously tQ 
say even in Mechanics; while.what a "church-north-north-east," or a 
"church-south-west- by-south" may be, is indeed 'a hard question." 

Such a "differentiation" in the religious sphere is, then, quite like 
that which takes place in the civil sphere in the shape of ' North and 
South," "State-rights," "local self-government," — based upon a "my 
interest" running down to nihilism. And since it depends upon sim- 
ilar causes, it would seem that it had reached a point where it can go 
no further; so that, in future, "Evangelicism" must be sought, in 
neither the largest or least as to size, but in the highest rational judg- 
ment of Religion. So far af this concerns external common action, it 
must of course submit to a common judgment. But this will be a very 
unwise one, unless it is sought for, not in mere abstract number, but 
in an organized, rational way, rismg to the highest, most catholic, 
all-embracing views of what is essential to Man as religious. When 
this is left to narrow minds and uncharitable souls, " ' the spirit is 
quenched," and the form is triumphant — and dead. 

In this respect, as in all others, "sufferings are lessons." Needs 
quench all enthusiams when they are not intelligent enough to find 
a way to escape. Not true is it, that "necessity is the mother of in- 
vention." Necessity invents nothing, and of itself breeds no inven- 
tion. All history shows that the inventor has come to the needy, 
either as a "wiser man" without, or as a creative spii-it within him. 
These two are one, before whose Art all needs shall disappear, or be 
transformed from cross into crown, from evil into good. It is his 
sympathy for, his suffering with and for others, by a Divine law, 
which brings "the Man from without." It is the same religious sym- 
pathy, best known of all things, which binds all men into a unity 
Divine, which they cannot forego without losing Family, State, 
Church and Manhood itself. 

"What is plainer, then, than the route of prosperity for a Nation, 
if it recognize this fact of facts, or rather, this maker of all facts? The 
future merely tells, by its gettings, what we love and are ; the past, by 
its f orgettmgs, what we loved not and were not. The best things may 
indeed be got by merely loving them: but so also may they be lost 
with the least forgetting. Man can more safel}'- say: "I would not," 
than "I will not, forget thee!" But he can say: "I will often think 



THE FUTL'KE OF THE NATION. 383 

of thee !" And thus he binds to his soul what he loves and is ever cre- 
ating- it. And since his thinking is creative for him, he must think of 
the Best, if he would never lose the secret of his power for good. It is 
only an ever-creative love for good that can never forget its cunning 
in Art, never lose sigbt of its true aim in Science, never forget its Re- 
ligious trust, since it is ever getting and ever keeping its inlinite and 
unwasting treasure. Such also is the law of a Nation's future. It 
creates its own future, and according to the law of what it loves best. 

The moral grade of a Nation's consciousness is shown in the rela- 
tive interest it takes, in persons, or in things. If things are what it 
loves most, then it lives in them; and in their perishing nature has 
only an ever-perishing life. In persons, only, can it have immortal 
life. Without persons, indeed, there is no life of any sort for a Na- 
tion; for they alone can have that interest in mortal things which some 
take for the basis of society. This concentration of all -interest into a 
mutual interest in persons, was noted, at the beginning of Chapter 
XI, as the basis of the morality of a people. In considering Religion, 
we also find this prime interest of all to consil^t in a recognized rela- 
tion of all to good persons. Such a relation can be either formed, or 
known, only by a law of Reason. To ignore this as a Personal Re- 
ality, and make of it a mere abstraction, gives us sectarianism in re- 
ligion, agnosticism in philosophy, feudalism everywhere. This result 
follows, because when persons are thus taken as having no reality as 
acts of Reason, as Truth-persons, they can have no reality except as 
things, bodies. Hence they are put in feudal relation. As religious, 
chey can have only clash of opinions; in Science, they can know only 
things; — in politics, they try to form a Nation as a relation of atomic 
persons. This makes of all business a mere shock of interests; parts 
capital from labor as a feud between past and future; and renders pol- 
itical life a blind contest for material objects only, wherein the two 
parties organize against each other as two forces, the one defending 
a property only in things, the other defending a libertj^ only in things. 

The future of this Nation depends upon its rescuing its conscience 
from these blind views of a meclianical habit of thinking. Otherwise, 
despotism or communism is its future; for such is the logical resolution 
of a thinking only of things. Whai we "think a great deal of," that 
we love: and if it be perishable, we perish with it. A Nation, like a 
man, puts itself under the law of what it thinks of most. If this be 
persons, immortal persons, they have a law of Reason, as a law of 
love. Seeing tliis as the only maker of a good Nation, our second 
Washington gave us, as watchword for our second future: "Charity 

FOR ALL, MALTCE TOWARDS NONE." 

Those words sprang, not from a mere good-humor, but from a good 
spirit clarified by its suffering with and for us. T,hey were the utter- 



284 THE CIVIL POLITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 

ance of one whose rational insight penetrated to the spiritual reality of 
this relation of Truth-persons in a Nation. Such words are not ad- 
dressed to feudal atoms; these have not the spirit nor the act they de- 
scribe. They do not address men as agnostic, but as knowing Truth, 
in its Divine reality, as Personal. They do not recognize merely an 
abstract truth, which can only be scattered by a mechanical thinking 
into a making of things in time and space, or else into an unreality; 
but a real Truth, which comes in person and to persons, and thus can 
constitute, for a Nation, a "government of the people, by the people 
and for the people." Any other government than that must indeed 
"perish from the Earth.'' Spencer has only shown inductively, what 
Kant deduced from the very nature and law of Reason itself, that any 
mechanical thinking or relating of its acts can only blind us to its per- 
sonal reality, actual in all men. But these words of Lincoln declare it 
to be, not an unknowable, but a known act and a felt responsibility to 
act with charity. That was essentially a Christian watchword, from a 
Christian spirit. With such a spirit and aim, the Nation can win, first 
over itself, and then over others, its victories of peace. Exitus acta 
probabit. 

O Nation, thou art no ship of state, mechanically wrought, and 
launched upon a physical sea. Thou art a Nation of living men, 
thinking men; knowing well the hopes of designing ancestors, and en- 
trusted with their fulfillment; knowing also the infinite aspirations of 
all Humanity, and entrusted with a creative power Divine, to work 
with and for all men, as children of the same immortal Spirit. Thou 
hast only to be a Nation of True Men, to have it said, not that "they 
wrought better than they knew," but, "by the best they knew, they 
wrought Divinely!" 



